miscarriage of justice exception in Delaware

2018Under that, and subsequent, versions of the rule there is no longer a miscarriage of justice exception.12 The June 1, 2015 version’s only exceptions to Rule 61(i)(4) are if the movant “pleads with particularity that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent” or “claim[s] that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme 8 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 9 Redden v. State, 150 A.3d 768, 778 (Del. 2016). 10 The Superior Court failed to mak

2014Apr. 17, 2003). 10 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990) (explaining that conclusory statements do not satisfy the interest of justice exception under Rule 61(i)(2) and (i)(4) or the miscarriage of justice exception under Rule 61(i)(5)).

2020Rule 61 Mot. 2 Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 985-86 (Del. 2014) (explaining the miscarriage of justice exception to the procedural bars set forth in Superior Court Criminal Rule of Procedure 61). '3 Td. at 983. '4 Td. at 993-94. 'S Td. at 994, has not demonstrated that reconsideration of the claims is warranted in the interest of justice.

2015R. 61(i)(5). 39 Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 985-86 (Del. 2014) (“[I]t is well established that a colorable Brady v. Maryland violation falls within the miscarriage of justice exception.”). 40 Id. at 983 . 41 Id. at 993-94 . 42 Id. at 994 . 13 cumulatively.

2025In Bronshtein, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the doctrine of procedural default18 did not bar federal habeas review of the merits of a capital defendant’s claims, even though he had failed to file his motion for postconviction relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act within one year after the end of direct review as required by the Act.19 The Third Circuit concluded that Bronshtein’s claims were not procedurally defaulted because the one-year time limit was not clearly established or regularly followed in capital cases at the time Bronshtein

2018Under that, and subsequent, versions of the rule there is no longer a miscarriage of justice exception.12 The June 1, 2015 version’s only exceptions to Rule 61(i)(4) are if the movant “pleads with particularity that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent” or “claim[s] that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme 8 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 9 Redden v. State, 150 A.3d 768, 778 (Del. 2016). 10 The Superior Court failed to mak

2016But under former Rule 61(i)(5), if Robinson can show “a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction,” he is relieved from the procedural default.14 This Court has held that viable Brady claims fall within the miscarriage of justice exception.15 After our review of Robinson’s Brady claims, we find that they are procedurally defaulted and his counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial. (10) In B

2015Nevertheless, Cabrera asserts that this Court should address his reverse-Batson claim on the merits as structural error on the grounds 125 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991); Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1 , 8–9 (1999). 126 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310 (internal citation omitted). 127 Cf. McCoy, 112 A.3d 239 (Del. 2015); Sells v. State, 109 A.3d 568 (Del. 2015). 38 that this type of error by Cabrera Trial Counsel satisfies the miscarriage of justice exception and requires grating a new trial.

2015That entails a duty on the part of the individual prosecutor “to learn of any 16 Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 552-53 (Del. 1998) (“That other witnesses might have been available, alone, is insufficient to prove ineffective assistance of counsel.”); State v. Jackson, 2014 WL 4407844 , at *7 (Del.

2014No. 9704012286 D.I. 136 at 1. 6 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 7 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 8 Younger, 580 A.2d at 555 . 9 Gattis v. State, 955 A.2d 1276, 1290 (Del. 2008). 3 statement10 without conducting an inquiry into whether Summers was read his Miranda rights or invoked his right to counsel.

2014No. 9704012286 D.I. 136 at 1. 6 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 7 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 8 Younger, 580 A.2d at 555 . 9 Gattis v. State, 955 A.2d 1276, 1290 (Del. 2008). 3 statement10 without conducting an inquiry into whether Summers was read his Miranda rights or invoked his right to counsel.