choice-of-law analysis in New York

2013Where the choice of law analysis leads to the application of foreign law, a court may only refuse to apply that law if its application would violate public policy, “some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal,” and would be “truly obnoxious” (Cooney, 81 NY2d at 78, 79 [internal quotation marks omitted]; Hugh O’Kane Elec.

2013Where the choice of law analysis leads to the application of foreign law, a court may only refuse to apply that law if its application would violate public policy, “some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal,” and would be “truly obnoxious” (Cooney, 81 NY2d at 78, 79 [internal quotation marks omitted]; Hugh O’Kane Elec.

2015Corp. v MasTec N. Am., Inc., 7 NY3d 624, 629 [2006] [“Generally, courts will enforce a choice-of-law clause so long as the chosen law bears a reasonable relationship to the parties or the transaction,” unless the chosen law “violates some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)]).

2015Corp. v MasTec N. Am., Inc., 7 NY3d 624, 629 [2006] ["Generally, courts will enforce a choice-of-law clause so long as the chosen law bears a reasonable relationship to the parties or the transaction," unless the chosen law "violates some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal"] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2024Advisors, Inc. , 6 NY3d 242, 247 [2006]). " '[O]bjections to a choice of law clause are not a warrant for failure to enforce a choice of forum clause' " ( Erie Ins.

2013Advisors, Inc., 6 NY3d 242, 247 [2006]). “[Objections to a choice of law clause are not a warrant for failure to enforce a choice of forum clause” (id.).

2013Co.], 81 NY2d 219 , 223 [1993].) Where no conflict exists, “the law of the forum state where the action is being tried should apply.” (SNS Bank v Citibank, 7 AD3d 352, 354 [1st Dept 2004]; see Elson v Defren, 283 AD2d 109, 114 [1st Dept 2001] [“Where no conflict exists . . . there is no reason to engage in a choice of law analysis”].) A conflict exists if there are “relevant substantive differences that could have a significant impact on the outcome of the case.” (Finance One Pub.

2004Co.] , 81 N.Y.2d 219 ,223 [1993] ["The first step in any case presenting a potential choice of law issue is to determine whether there is an actual conflict between the laws of the jurisdictions involved"]; see also , Elson v. Defren , 283 A.D.2d 109, 114 [1st Dept. 2001] ["Where no conflict exists between the laws of the jurisdictions involved, there is no reason to engage in a choice of law analysis"]).

2024NO. 249 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/06/2024 Sherie's principal place of business, it would not change the fact that this factor also points in favor of Rhode Island. "[T]he Restatement factors 'are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue."' (Foster Wheeler Corp., 36 AD3d at 27 , quoting Restatement§ 188[2].) "Stated otherwise, the choice-of-law analysis is not a mindless scavenger hunt to see which state can be found to have more contacts, but rather ... an effort to detect and analyze what interest the competing states have in enforcing their respec

2011Foster Wheeler, 36 AD3d at 20-21 [New Jersey’s “mathematical method of effecting a pro rata allocation of an insured loss over the period of its occurrence . . . would make tens of millions of dollars more coverage available” to the insured than New York’s method]). *546 Furthermore, there is nothing in the provisions of section 7433 (a) setting forth what claims “may be allowed” which requires that substantive New York law must apply in computing their value.

2019Although courts will generally enforce a choice of law clause " so long as the chosen law bears a reasonable relationship to the parties or the transaction' " ( Friedman v Roman , 65 AD3d 1187, 1188 [2d Dept 2009], quoting Welsbach Elec.

2009The premarital agreement, which was signed by the parties in Massachusetts at a time when both parties resided there, contains a choice of law clause providing that “[t]he validity and construction of this Agreement shall be determined in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.” It is well settled that courts will enforce a choice of law clause “ ‘so long as the chosen law bears a reasonable relationship to the parties or the transaction’ ” (Friedman v Roman, 65 AD3d 1187, 1188 [2009], quoting Welsbach Elec.

2015Although plaintiffs contend that we should apply Missouri law pursuant to a choice of law clause in the CDA, they have not “pointed to any actual conflict between the laws of New York and [Missouri] with regard to the is sues raised here[.] [Accordingly], we need not engage in a choice of law analysis” (Wellsburg Truck & Auto Sales, Inc. v Peoples State Bank of Wyalusing, 80 AD3d 942, 943 [2011]).

2015Although plaintiffs contend that we should apply Missouri law pursuant to a choice of law clause in the CDA, they have not “pointed to any actual conflict between the laws of New York and [Missouri] with regard to the is sues raised here[.] [Accordingly], we need not engage in a choice of law analysis” (Wellsburg Truck & Auto Sales, Inc. v Peoples State Bank of Wyalusing, 80 AD3d 942, 943 [2011]).

2014The expert witness evidence that defendant proffered following that appeal in support of his claim that the note contained only a choice of law clause does not constitute “subsequent” or “new” evidence that was previously unavailable for the purpose of avoiding the law of the case doctrine (see Carmona v Mathisson, 92 AD3d 492, 492-493 [1st Dept 2012]; Clark Constr.

2014The expert witness evidence that defendant proffered following that appeal in support of his claim that the note contained only a choice of law clause does not constitute “subsequent” or “new” evidence that was previously unavailable for the purpose of avoiding the law of the case doctrine (see Carmona v Mathisson, 92 AD3d 492, 492-493 [1st Dept 2012]; Clark Constr.

2013Corp., 84 NY2d 519, 521 [1994]; Schultz v Boy Scouts of Am., 65 NY2d 189 , 196, 197 [1985]). .

2013Corp., 84 NY2d 519, 521 [1994]; Schultz v Boy Scouts of Am., 65 NY2d 189 , 196, 197 [1985]). .

2013Co., LLC v MasTec N. Am., Inc., 19 AD3d 126, 127 [1st Dept 2005]).

2013Co., LLC v MasTec N. Am., Inc., 19 AD3d 126, 127 [1st Dept 2005]).

2013Servs. v Jupiter Partners, 309 AD2d 288, 301 [1st Dept 2003]), and the fact that the defendant Morgan enti ties have their principal places of business in New York City is irrelevant (see e.g.

2013Servs. v Jupiter Partners, 309 AD2d 288, 301 [1st Dept 2003]), and the fact that the defendant Morgan enti ties have their principal places of business in New York City is irrelevant (see e.g.

2012The Federal Arbitration Act ( 9 USC § 1 et seq. [FAA]) applies to any arbitration provision in a contract that affects interstate commerce (see Matter of Diamond Waterproofing Sys., Inc. v 55 Liberty Owners Corp., 4 NY3d 247, 252 [2005]).

2005The timeliness of respondent’s claims is for determination by the arbitrators, not the court, given the parties’ decision to submit to arbitration all claims and disputes arising out of or relating to the agreement, and that the choice-of-law clause therein does not expressly provide that the agreement and its enforcement would be governed by New York law (Diamond Waterproofing Sys., supra at 252-253; Hamershlag, Kempner & Co. v Oestrich, 234 AD2d 172 [1996]).

2011In contrast, in the instant case, the causes of action arise from a single incident in New York — the collision of the bus into the parked tractor-trailer — and the liability of the defendants is interrelated (see King v Car Rentals, Inc., 29 AD3d 205, 213 [2d Dept 2006] [“(b)ecause the liability of all of the defendants here is thus interrelated, the application of the laws of different jurisdictions to the several defendants may lead to unanticipated complications as potentially inconsistent law is applied”]).

2011Although the Court of Appeals has applied different Neumeier principles to different defendants in performing a choice-of-law analysis (see Schultz, 65 NY2d at 194; see also Butler v Stagecoach Group, PLC, 72 AD3d 1581 [2010], lv granted 75 AD3d 1115 [2010]), this Court has recognized that circumstances exist in which “the application of the laws of different jurisdictions to the several defendants may lead to unanticipated complications as potentially inconsistent law is applied and, therefore, must be rejected” (King, 29 AD3d at 213 ).

2006A basic precept of contract interpretation is that agreements should be construed to effectuate the parties’ intent (see Greenfield v Philles Records, 98 NY2d 562, 569 [2002]; see R/S Assoc. v New York Job Dev.

2006A basic precept of contract interpretation is that agreements should be construed to effectuate the parties' intent ( see Greenfield v Philles Records, 98 NY2d 562, 569 [2002]; see R/S Assoc. v New York Job Dev.

1993Co. v Stecker, 3 NY2d 1, 5 [emphasizing place of contracting in automobile insurance dispute]; Cooney v Osgood Mach., 81 NY2d, at 74 [using place of the tort, "the traditional choice of law crucible,” to resolve impasse when State interests are irreconcilable]).

1993Co. v Stecker , 3 N.Y.2d 1, 5 [emphasizing place of contracting in automobile insurance dispute]; Cooney v Osgood Mach. , 81 NY2d, at 74 [using place of the tort, "the traditional choice of law crucible," to resolve impasse when State interests are irreconcilable]).

1998Prior to 1963, New York almost invariably applied the traditional choice of law rule that “the substantive rights and liabilities arising out of a tortious occurrence are determinable by the law of the place of the tort” (Babcock v Jackson, 12 NY2d 473, 477 ).

1985The Court of Appeals framed the issue carefully: “[s]hall the law of the place of the tort invariably govern the availability of relief for the tort or shall the applicable choice of law rule also reflect a consideration of other factors which are relevant to the purposes served by the enforcement or denial of the remedy?” ( 12 NY2d 473, 477 , supra; emphasis in original.) The court rejected the traditional lex loci delicti rule and held that in tort cases, as in contract cases, “[j]ustice, fairness and ‘the best practical result’ * * * may best be achieved by giving controlling effect to the

2013Co.], 81 NY2d 219 , 223 [1993].) Where no conflict exists, “the law of the forum state where the action is being tried should apply.” (SNS Bank v Citibank, 7 AD3d 352, 354 [1st Dept 2004]; see Elson v Defren, 283 AD2d 109, 114 [1st Dept 2001] [“Where no conflict exists . . . there is no reason to engage in a choice of law analysis”].) A conflict exists if there are “relevant substantive differences that could have a significant impact on the outcome of the case.” (Finance One Pub.

2004Co.] , 81 N.Y.2d 219 ,223 [1993] ["The first step in any case presenting a potential choice of law issue is to determine whether there is an actual conflict between the laws of the jurisdictions involved"]; see also , Elson v. Defren , 283 A.D.2d 109, 114 [1st Dept. 2001] ["Where no conflict exists between the laws of the jurisdictions involved, there is no reason to engage in a choice of law analysis"]).

1996Corp. v Kent, 183 AD2d 446 .) Ordinarily, if the parties’ arbitration agreement contains a choice of law clause providing that the law of a particular State will govern their arbitration, the parties’ choice will be given effect if to do so will not conflict with the FA A. (Volt Information Sciences v Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 US 468 [1989]; Matter of Salvano v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 85 NY2d 173 .) However, the Supreme Court has recently held that an arbitration proceeding governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, such as this one, preempts the Garrity rule, even when there

1995If the parties’ arbitration agreement contains a choice of law clause providing that the law of a particular State will govern their arbitration, the parties’ choice will be given effect if to do so will not conflict with the policies underlying the FAA; otherwise, the FAA applies (see, Volt Information Sciences v Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 US 468 ; Matter of Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v Luckie, 85 NY2d 193 [decided today]). 3 Volt makes clear, however, that only an explicit choice will displace the provisions of the FAA.

2017The Indian Harbor court also quoted IRB-Brasil Resseguros, S.A. v Inepar Invs., S.A. ( 83 AD3d 573, 574 [1st Dept 2011], affd 20 NY3d 310 [2012], cert denied 569 US 994 [2013]): “The enforcement of such clauses is favored since it protects] the justifiable expectation of the parties who choose New York law as the governing law in international financial transactions.” ( 83 AD3d at 574 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].) To be sure, the Indian Harbor court made clear that constitutional challenges in the contractual context require less judicial scrutiny: “Against this background,

2017The Indian Harbor court also quoted IRB-Brasil Resseguros, S.A. v Inepar Invs., S.A. ( 83 AD3d 573, 574 [1st Dept 2011], affd 20 NY3d 310 [2012], cert denied 569 US 994 [2013]): “The enforcement of such clauses is favored since it protects] the justifiable expectation of the parties who choose New York law as the governing law in international financial transactions.” ( 83 AD3d at 574 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].) To be sure, the Indian Harbor court made clear that constitutional challenges in the contractual context require less judicial scrutiny: “Against this background,

2004Because it is plaintiff who seeks the application of the law of Vermont, it is her burden to prove that State's law and the existence of a conflict with the law of New York ( see , Portanova v. Trump Taj Mahal Associates , 270 A.D.2d 757,759-760 [3d Dept. 2000], lv. denied 95 N.Y.2d 765 [2000]).

2001(See, Portanova v Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 270 AD2d 757, 759-760 , lv denied 95 NY2d 765 .) In this case, there is no conflict and thus no need for such analysis.