85 California opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2026 33 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.green2 sentences2025Pretext “Because of the similarity between state and federal employment discrimination laws, California courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying our own statutes. [Citation.] In particular, California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination.” (Guz v. Bechtel Nat., Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (Guz).) The test, established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 , “places on the plaintiff the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 2024“California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination, including age discrimination, based on a theory of disparate treatment.” 17 (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (Guz); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 (McDonnell Douglas).) “This so-called McDonnell Douglas test reflects the principle that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is rare, and that such claims must usually be proved circumstantially. | 28 | 57 |
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greengreen2 sentences2026California courts have long used the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 44 [(McDonnell Douglas)] . . . .”16 (Arnold, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 424.) At the first stage of the McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff bears a burden, which is “ ‘ “not onerous,” ’ ” to establish a prima facie case. 2026The Jury Did Not Have To Find The Regents’ Proffered Reasons Were False or Pretextual The Regents’ threshold argument is that Harper did not meet his burden of proof under the three-stage burden-shifting test for evaluating discrimination claims established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 . | 7 | 61 |
Wills v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2023(See Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354 [discussing claims for age discrimination]; Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143 , 159–160 [disability discrimination].) While originally developed under federal discrimination law, California courts routinely refer to the McDonnell Douglas test, and federal cases interpreting it, for application to claims based on FEHA. ( Guz, supra, at p. 354 [“California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination”]; see Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 2014Introduction “Because this case comes before us after the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment, we take the facts from the record that was before the trial court when it ruled on that motion. [Citation.] ‘“We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers except that to which objections were made and sustained.”’ [Citation.] We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. [Citation.]” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, | 7 | 11 |
DeJung v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2026“In employment discrimination cases under FEHA, plaintiffs can prove their cases in either of two ways: by direct or by circumstantial evidence.” (DeJung v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 533, 549 (DeJung).) “When a plaintiff proffers circumstantial evidence, California courts apply the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of employment discrimination . . . based on a theory of disparate treatment.” ( DeJung, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th 533, 549 .) At the first stage, “[t]o state a prima facie case for discrimination in violation o 2026“In employment discrimination cases under FEHA, plaintiffs can prove their cases in either of two ways: by direct or by circumstantial evidence.” (DeJung v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 533, 549 (DeJung).) “When a plaintiff proffers circumstantial evidence, California courts apply the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of employment discrimination . . . based on a theory of disparate treatment.” ( DeJung, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th 533, 549 .) At the first stage, “[t]o state a prima facie case for discrimination in violation o | 4 | 4 |
Mixon v. Fair Employment & Housing Commissiongreen2 sentences2000(See, e.g., Mixon v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1306, 1316 , 237 Cal.Rptr. 884 ( Mixon ).) In particular, California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination, including age discrimination, based on a theory of disparate treatment. ( Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) 450 U.S. 248 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 ( Burdine ); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 ( McDonnell Douglas ); Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & 2000(See, e.g., Mixon v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1306, 1316 , 237 Cal.Rptr. 884 ( Mixon ).) In particular, California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination, including age discrimination, based on a theory of disparate treatment. ( Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) 450 U.S. 248 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 ( Burdine ); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 ( McDonnell Douglas ); Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & | 4 | 4 |
Harris v. City of Santa Monicagreen2 sentences2023(See Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354 [discussing claims for age discrimination]; Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143 , 159–160 [disability discrimination].) While originally developed under federal discrimination law, California courts routinely refer to the McDonnell Douglas test, and federal cases interpreting it, for application to claims based on FEHA. ( Guz, supra, at p. 354 [“California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination”]; see Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 2021Legal Standards for Proving Causation in Mixed-Motive Discrimination Cases “In FEHA employment discrimination cases that do not involve mixed motives, [California] [has] adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 [.]” 41 (Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 214 .) Under the McDonnell Douglas test, “a plaintiff has the initial burden to make a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that it is more likely than not that the employer has taken an adverse action based on a prohibited criterion. | 3 | 6 |
Sandell v. Taylor-Listug, Inc.green2 sentences2025Disability Discrimination To prove her claim for disability discrimination, Tuens was required to prove that she “(1) suffered from a disability, or was regarded as suffering from a disability; (2) could perform the essential duties of the job with or without reasonable accommodations, and (3) was subjected to an adverse employment action because of the disability or perceived disability.” (Sandell v. Taylor-Listug, Inc. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 297, 310 .) California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test for discrimination claims set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 4 2021FEHA makes it unlawful for an employer, unless based upon a “bona fide occupational qualification,” to discharge or otherwise discriminate against a person because of specified characteristics, including “physical disability.” (§ 12940, subd. (a).) The specified characteristics expressly “include[] a perception that the person has any of those characteristics or that the person is associated with a person who has, or is perceived to have, any of those characteristics.” (§ 12926, subd. (o).) “Accordingly, when FEHA forbids discrimination based on a disability, it also forbids discrimination bas | 3 | 4 |
Reid v. Google, Inc.green2 sentences2023(Id., subd. (g).) “Because of the similarity between state and federal employment discrimination laws, California courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying our own statutes.” (Guz v. Bechtel National Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (Guz).) In analyzing FEHA discrimination claims, including 12 national origin discrimination, “California courts have long used the three- stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 .” (Arnold v. Dignity Health (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 412 , 424; see Reid v. Google, In 2022Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (Guz).) In analyzing FEHA discrimination claims, including national origin discrimination, California courts have long used the three- stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 793 ; Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 520, fn. 2 ; Guz, at p. 354.) “This so-called McDonnell Douglas test reflects the principle that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is rare, and that such claims must usually be proved circumstantially. | 3 | 3 |
Morgan v. Regents of the University of Californiagreen2 sentences2016(Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 67 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 652 ].) Because direct evidence of intentional discrimination is rare and most discrimination claims must usually be proved circumstantially, in FEHA employment cases California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 [ 36 L.Ed.2d 668 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 ]. 2016(Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 67 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 652 ].) Because direct evidence of intentional discrimination is rare and most discrimination claims must usually be proved circumstantially, in FEHA employment cases California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 [ 36 L.Ed.2d 668 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 ]. | 2 | 3 |
Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2021(Guz, at pp. 354-355; Glynn v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 47 , 53 (Glynn); Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 95, 111 (Reeves).) This test “reflects the principle that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is rare, and that such claims must usually be proved circumstantially. 2021(Guz, at pp. 354-355; Glynn v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 47 , 53 (Glynn); Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 95, 111 (Reeves).) This test “reflects the principle that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is rare, and that such claims must usually be proved circumstantially. | 2 | 2 |
Trop v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc.green2 sentences2021The McDonnell Douglas Test & Summary Adjudication in Employment Discrimination Cases “Because state and federal employment discrimination laws are similar, California courts look to pertinent federal precedent in applying California statutes.” (Trop, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1144 , citing Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354 .) Generally, in cases alleging employment discrimination, California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 . 2021The McDonnell Douglas Test & Summary Adjudication in Employment Discrimination Cases “Because state and federal employment discrimination laws are similar, California courts look to pertinent federal precedent in applying California statutes.” (Trop, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1144 , citing Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354 .) Generally, in cases alleging employment discrimination, California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 . | 1 | 6 |
Yanowitz v. L'OREAL USA, INC.green2 sentences2016The plaintiff initially has the burden to “show: (1) [plaintiff] engaged in a ‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action. [Citations.] Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer is required to offer a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. [Citation.] If the employer produces a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, the presumption of retaliation ‘ “ ‘drops out of the picture,’ ” ’ and the burde 2014Introduction “Because this case comes before us after the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment, we take the facts from the record that was before the trial court when it ruled on that motion. [Citation.] ‘“We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers except that to which objections were made and sustained.”’ [Citation.] We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. [Citation.]” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, | 1 | 5 |
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdinegreen2 sentences2000(See, e.g., Mixon v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1306, 1316 , 237 Cal.Rptr. 884 ( Mixon ).) In particular, California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination, including age discrimination, based on a theory of disparate treatment. ( Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) 450 U.S. 248 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 ( Burdine ); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 ( McDonnell Douglas ); Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & 2000(See, e.g., Mixon v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1306, 1316 , 237 Cal.Rptr. 884 ( Mixon ).) In particular, California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination, including age discrimination, based on a theory of disparate treatment. ( Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) 450 U.S. 248 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 ( Burdine ); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 ( McDonnell Douglas ); Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & | 1 | 3 |
Wallace v. County of Stanislausgreen2 sentences2025Regarding the third element of a prima facie case of disability discrimination, “an employer has treated an employee differently ‘because of’ a disability when the disability is a substantial motivating reason for the employer’s decision to subject the employee to an adverse employment action.” (Wallace, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 128 .) This may be established by evidence “that the motive for the employer’s conduct was related to the employee’s physical . . . condition.” (Id. at p. 123.) “[I]n cases where there was no direct evidence that the adverse employment action taken by the employer 2025Regarding the third element of a prima facie case of disability discrimination, “an employer has treated an employee differently ‘because of’ a disability when the disability is a substantial motivating reason for the employer’s decision to subject the employee to an adverse employment action.” (Wallace, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 128 .) This may be established by evidence “that the motive for the employer’s conduct was related to the employee’s physical . . . condition.” (Id. at p. 123.) “[I]n cases where there was no direct evidence that the adverse employment action taken by the employer | 1 | 2 |
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicksgreen2 sentences2023Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks (1993) 509 U.S. 502, 509 .) If the employer meets its burden at the second step, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff, who is provided with “the opportunity to attack the employer’s proffered reasons as pretexts for discrimination, or to offer any other evidence of discriminatory motive.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 356 .) “In an appropriate case, evidence of dishonest reasons, considered together with the elements of the prima facie case, may permit a finding of prohibited bias,” although it is ultimately the plaintiff’s burden to persuade the finder of 2016Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks (1993) 509 U.S. 502, 506 [ 125 L.Ed.2d 407 , 113 S.Ct. 2742 ]; Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) 450 U.S. 248, 252-253 [ 67 L.Ed.2d 207 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 ].) The three stages are (1) the plaintiff making a prima facie showing of employment discrimination, (2) the employer producing a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, and (3) the burden shifting back to the plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination by offering evidence of the employer’s discriminatory motive, which can include attacking the employer’s proffered reasons as prete | 1 | 2 |
Sada v. Robert F. Kennedy Medical Centergreen2 sentences2013A. Cause of Action for Wrongful Termination Based on Retaliation Because California law prohibiting employment discrimination and retaliation is similar to federal law, "California courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying our own statutes. [Citation.] In particular, California has adopted the three- stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of [both] discrimination [and retaliation] . . . ." (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (Guz); Coffey v. Dobbs Int'l Servs., Inc. (2d Cir.1999) 170 F.3d 323, 326 ; Sada 2005Thus, by successive steps of increasingly narrow focus, the test allows discrimination to be inferred from facts that create a reasonable likelihood of bias and are not satisfactorily explained." ( Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354 , italics added.) The United States Supreme Court has held, however, that "the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination." ( Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston (1985) 469 U.S. 111 , 121 [ 83 L.Ed.2d 523 , 105 S.Ct. 613 ]; see also Sada v. Robert F. Kennedy Medical Center (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 138 , 150-1 | 1 | 2 |
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurstongreen2 sentences2008(Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354 .) When a plaintiff proffers circumstantial evidence, California courts apply the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of employment discrimination, including age discrimination, based on a theory of disparate treatment. 10 (Guz, at p. 354, citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 [ 36 L.Ed.2d 668 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 ] (McDonnell Douglas).) *550 However, California has also adopted the rule that “ ‘the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence 2008(Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354 .) When a plaintiff proffers circumstantial evidence, California courts apply the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of employment discrimination, including age discrimination, based on a theory of disparate treatment. 10 (Guz, at p. 354, citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 [ 36 L.Ed.2d 668 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 ] (McDonnell Douglas).) *550 However, California has also adopted the rule that “ ‘the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence | 1 | 2 |
Diego v. City of L. A.green1 sentence2026(Ibid.) At the second McDonnel Douglas stage, the employer bears a burden to produce “ ‘admissible evidence, sufficient to “raise[] a genuine issue of fact” and to “justify a judgment for the [employer],” that its action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.’ ” (Arnold, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 425, quoting Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 355-356.) “ ‘This likewise is not an onerous burden [citation], and is generally met by presenting admissible evidence showing the defendant’s reason for its employment decision [citation].’ ” (Arnold, at p. 425.) The defendant’s reasons, “if | 1 | 1 |
Ortiz v. Dameron Hosp. Ass'ngreen2 sentences2026“In employment discrimination cases under FEHA, plaintiffs can prove their cases in either of two ways: by direct or by circumstantial evidence.” (DeJung v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 533, 549 (DeJung).) “When a plaintiff proffers circumstantial evidence, California courts apply the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of employment discrimination . . . based on a theory of disparate treatment.” ( DeJung, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th 533, 549 .) At the first stage, “[t]o state a prima facie case for discrimination in violation o 2026“In employment discrimination cases under FEHA, plaintiffs can prove their cases in either of two ways: by direct or by circumstantial evidence.” (DeJung v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 533, 549 (DeJung).) “When a plaintiff proffers circumstantial evidence, California courts apply the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of employment discrimination . . . based on a theory of disparate treatment.” ( DeJung, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th 533, 549 .) At the first stage, “[t]o state a prima facie case for discrimination in violation o | 1 | 1 |
Scotch v. Art Institute of California-Orange County, Inc.green2 sentences2023Thus, by successive steps of increasingly narrow focus, the test allows discrimination to be inferred from facts that create a reasonable likelihood of bias and are not satisfactorily explained.’ ” (Zamora, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 31.) “Under the McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 41 [Citation.] To meet this burden, the plaintiff must, at a minimum, show the employer took actions from which, if unexplained, it can be inferred that it is more likely than not that such actions were based on a prohibited discrimin 2023Thus, by successive steps of increasingly narrow focus, the test allows discrimination to be inferred from facts that create a reasonable likelihood of bias and are not satisfactorily explained.’ ” (Zamora, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 31.) “Under the McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 41 [Citation.] To meet this burden, the plaintiff must, at a minimum, show the employer took actions from which, if unexplained, it can be inferred that it is more likely than not that such actions were based on a prohibited discrimin | 1 | 1 |
McGrory v. Applied Signal Technology, Inc.green1 sentence2020Principles of Law “California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination, including age discrimination, based on a theory of disparate treatment.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 354 .) “Generally, the plaintiff must provide evidence that (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circu | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Batson v. Kentuckygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Scottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lincoln Fountain Villas Homeowners Ass'n v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Serri v. Santa Clara Universitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gonzales v. MetPath, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| County of Alameda v. Fair Employment & Housing Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Ewing v. Gill Industries, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kelly v. Stamps. Com Inc.
green
2 sentences2022(Kelly v. Stamps.com Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1088 , 1097–1098.) By presenting such evidence, the employer shifts the burden to the plaintiff to present evidence that the employer’s decision was motivated at least in part by prohibited discrimination.7 ( Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 353, 357.) The accommodation, as we have concluded that there is a factual dispute as to the essential functions of Schoensiegel’s position. 7 This burden-shifting test is derived from the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for use at trial in cases involving claims, 2020Principles of Law “California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination, including age discrimination, based on a theory of disparate treatment.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 354 .) “Generally, the plaintiff must provide evidence that (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circu | 5 | 2014–2022 |
Cucuzza v. City of Santa Clara
green
2 sentences2020Principles of Law “California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination, including age discrimination, based on a theory of disparate treatment.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 354 .) “Generally, the plaintiff must provide evidence that (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circu 2014And an inference is reasonable if, and only if, it implies the 6 unlawful motive is more likely than defendant’s proffered explanation. [Citation]” (Cucuzza v. City of Santa Clara (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038 .) Also “‘[s]peculation cannot be regarded as substantial responsive evidence.’ [Citation.] In order to raise an issue as to the employer’s credibility, the employee must set forth specific facts demonstrating ‘“such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder | 2 | 2014–2020 |
Lui v. City & County of San Francisco
green
2 sentences2014(See Lui v. City and County of San Francisco (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 962, 970 .) Given “the similarity between state and federal employment discrimination laws, California courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying our own statutes. [Citation.] In particular, California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test 23 established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination . . . .” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (Guz); Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 159 (Wills).) “This so-called McDonnell Douglas test re 2014(See Lui v. City and County of San Francisco (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 962, 970 .) Given “the similarity between state and federal employment discrimination laws, California courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying our own statutes. [Citation.] In particular, California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination . . . .” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (Guz); Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 159 (Wills).) “This so-called McDonnell Douglas test refle | 2 | 2014–2014 |
McCall v. PacifiCare of California, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023(McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415 .) “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 .) When a demurrer “is sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment; if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Blank v. Kirwan
green
1 sentence2023(McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415 .) “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 .) When a demurrer “is sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment; if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Heard v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.
green
1 sentence2023(Id. at p. 550.) “It is rare for a plaintiff to be able to produce direct evidence or ‘smoking gun’ evidence of discrimination,” because there is “‘seldom … “eyewitness” testimony as to the employer’s mental processes.’” (Heard v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1735, 1748 .) “Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus without inference or presumption. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co.
green
1 sentence2023(McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415 .) “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 .) When a demurrer “is sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment; if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Hersant v. Department of Social Services
green
2 sentences2023Thus, by successive steps of increasingly narrow focus, the test allows discrimination to be inferred from facts that create a reasonable likelihood of bias and are not satisfactorily explained.’ ” (Zamora, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 31.) “Under the McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 41 [Citation.] To meet this burden, the plaintiff must, at a minimum, show the employer took actions from which, if unexplained, it can be inferred that it is more likely than not that such actions were based on a prohibited discrimin 2023Thus, by successive steps of increasingly narrow focus, the test allows discrimination to be inferred from facts that create a reasonable likelihood of bias and are not satisfactorily explained.’ ” (Zamora, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 31.) “Under the McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 41 [Citation.] To meet this burden, the plaintiff must, at a minimum, show the employer took actions from which, if unexplained, it can be inferred that it is more likely than not that such actions were based on a prohibited discrimin | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Castro-Ramirez v. Dependable Highway Express, Inc.
green
1 sentence2021FEHA makes it unlawful for an employer, unless based upon a “bona fide occupational qualification,” to discharge or otherwise discriminate against a person because of specified characteristics, including “physical disability.” (§ 12940, subd. (a).) The specified characteristics expressly “include[] a perception that the person has any of those characteristics or that the person is associated with a person who has, or is perceived to have, any of those characteristics.” (§ 12926, subd. (o).) “Accordingly, when FEHA forbids discrimination based on a disability, it also forbids discrimination bas | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. O'Malley green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Wheeler green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Swanson v. Morongo Unif. School Dist. CA4/3 green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Loggins v. Kaiser Permanente International green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Gutierrez v. RWD Technologies, Inc. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Akers v. County of San Diego green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Aviel v. Ng green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Paula L. COFFEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOBBS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INC. and John Bryson, Defendants-Appellants green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Phillips v. ST. MARY REGIONAL MED. CENTER green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Slatkin v. University of Redlands green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.