State retains immunity in Texas

2015Second, the State retains immunity from liability though the Legislature has granted consent to the suit. 12 Id. (citations omitted); Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999) (“[i]mmunity from liability and immunity from suit are two distinct principles”).

2011Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 404-05 (Tex. 1997) (superseded by statute on other grounds) (providing that the state retains immunity from suit unless it has been 11 expressly waived); see also Tex. Logos v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., 241 S.W.3d 105, 123 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) ("[A]bsent express statutory authority, the APA does not independently provide a right to a contested case hearing.").

2025“In the absence of a properly pled takings claim, the state retains immunity.” Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 476 (Tex. 2012).

2025“In the absence of a properly pled takings claim, the state retains immunity.” Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 476 (Tex. 2012).

2015Second, the State retains immunity from liability though the Legislature has granted consent to the suit. 12 Id. (citations omitted); Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999) (“[i]mmunity from liability and immunity from suit are two distinct principles”).

2004Conservation Com'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Tex.2002) ("If the legislature has not expressly waived immunity from suit, the State retains such immunity even if its liability is not disputed."); Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999)("The party suing [a] governmental entity must establish the state's consent, which may be alleged either by reference to a statute or to express legislative permission.").

2011See Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d at 326-27 (explaining that the State retains immunity for its decision relative to “where” signs should be located); Johnson v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 905 S.W.2d 394, 398 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no writ) (holding that the location of where to place a sign is a discretionary design decision).

2010Ap-pellees do not cite any authority supporting their contention that location of a sign as chosen by a governmental entity amounts to a wrongful “condition” of the sign pursuant to subsection 101.060(a)(2), and we decline to so broaden the meaning of “condition.” See Johnson, 905 S.W.2d at 398 (“If a motorist’s claim that a sign is difficult to see were sufficient to call into question ... design discretion, virtually any challenge to the placement of a traffic sign would suffice to preclude summary judgment on sovereign immunity grounds and subject the ... engineering design in this limited

2024“If the Legislature has not expressly waived immunity from suit, the State retains such immunity even if its liability is not disputed.” Id.

2021See Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex. 2004) (“In Texas, sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction for lawsuits in which the state or certain governmental units have been sued unless the state consents to suit.”); IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 853 (“If the Legislature has not expressly waived immunity from suit, the State retains such immunity even if its liability is not disputed.”).

2010We also reject appellees’ argument that TxDOT failed to maintain the signs in a condition sufficient to perform their intended function. “[Maintenance involves preservation of a highway as it was designed and constructed.” Siders v. State, 970 S.W.2d 189, 193 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, pet. denied) (emphasis added).

2010We also reject appellees’ argument that FBCTRA failed to maintain the signs in a condition sufficient to perform their intended function. “[Mjaintenance involves preservation of a highway as it was designed and constructed.” Siders v. State, 970 S.W.2d 189, 193 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, pet. denied) (emphasis added).

2004Tex. Civ. *173 Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.056 (Vernon 1997); Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Garza, 70 S.W.3d 802, 806 (Tex.2002).

2004Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Garza, 70 S.W.3d 802, 806 (Tex.2002); Tex. Civ.

2024Blanton, 200 S.W.3d at 272 ; see City of Houston v. Carlson, 451 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex. 2014) (“[I]n the absence of a properly [pleaded] takings claim, the state retains immunity.”).

2021“In the absence of a properly pled takings claim, the state retains immunity” and “a court must sustain a properly raised plea to the jurisdiction.” Id. at 830 .

2023See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373 . “‘To fall within this ultra vires exception, a suit must not complain of a government officer’s exercise of discretion, but rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.”” Schroeder v. Escalera Ranch Owners’ Ass’n, 646 S.W.3d 329 , 332 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372 ). 12 As applicable here, to fall within the ultra vires exception, Fenter’s suit must allege and ultimately prove that City Manager Williams failed to perform a purely ministerial act.

2023See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373 . “‘To fall within this ultra vires exception, a suit must not complain of a government officer’s exercise of discretion, but rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.”” Schroeder v. Escalera Ranch Owners’ Ass’n, 646 S.W.3d 329 , 332 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372 ). 12 As applicable here, to fall within the ultra vires exception, Fenter’s suit must allege and ultimately prove that City Manager Williams failed to perform a purely ministerial act.

2002See City of Dallas v. Donovan, 768 S.W.2d 905, 909 (TexApp.-Dallas 1989, no writ).

2002See City of Dallas v. Donovan, 768 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).

2011See Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d at 326-27 (explaining that the State retains immunity for its decision relative to “where” signs should be located); Johnson v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 905 S.W.2d 394, 398 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no writ) (holding that the location of where to place a sign is a discretionary design decision).

2010“Under subsection (a)(2), the State retains immunity as long as it corrects a sign’s defective [condition, absence, or malfunction] within a reasonable time after notice.” Id.

2019City of Bellaire, 400 S.W.3d at 924 ; see Durhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. 1980) (noting that, in adopting the TTCA and providing workers’ compensation coverage for state employees, the state retains its immunity and provides its employees an alternate remedy through workers compensation insurance).

2004Id. (citing Mo. Pac.

2025The State retains immunity “unless surrendered in express and 14 unequivocal terms by the statute’s clear and unambiguous waiver.” Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 512 (Tex. 2012).

2024Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004); Weatherford, 652 S.W.3d at 911–12.

2023When determining legislative intent, “[w]e must enforce the statute as written and refrain from rewriting text that lawmakers chose.” City of Del Rio v. Arredondo, No. 04-20-00409-CV, 2021 WL 3376948 , at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 4, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting County of Galveston v. Triple B Servs., LLP, 498 S.W.3d 176, 184 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)).

2021See Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex. 2004) (“In Texas, sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction for lawsuits in which the state or certain governmental units have been sued unless the state consents to suit.”); IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 853 (“If the Legislature has not expressly waived immunity from suit, the State retains such immunity even if its liability is not disputed.”).

2021“In a suit against a governmental unit, the plaintiff must affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction by alleging a valid waiver of immunity.” Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003); cf. also Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 476 (Tex. 2012) (“In the absence of a properly pled takings claim, the state retains immunity.”).

2015State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876 (Tex. 2009) (“[i]mmunity from suit is a jurisdictional question of whether the State has expressly consented to suit.…”); Tomball Reg’l Hosp., 283 S. W.3d at 842 .

2011Moreover, in City of Grapevine v. Sipes, the Texas Supreme Court considered whether a city’s failure to install a traffic signal, after deciding to do so, fell under the portion of section 101.060(a)(2) allowing claims to be brought under the TTCA when the absence of a traffic-control device is not remedied within a reasonable time after notice. 195 S.W.3d 689, 692-95 (Tex.2006).

2011Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 404-05 (Tex. 1997) (superseded by statute on other grounds) (providing that the state retains immunity from suit unless it has been 11 expressly waived); see also Tex. Logos v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., 241 S.W.3d 105, 123 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) ("[A]bsent express statutory authority, the APA does not independently provide a right to a contested case hearing.").