12 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1918–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Villafani v. Trejogreen2 sentences2020As the Court’s opinion in Hernandez acknowledged, prohibiting a defendant from asserting his “statutory right would dilute the deterrent value of the statute.” Id. at 320 (citing Villafani v. Trejo, 251 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Tex. 2008)) (“Allowing defendants to seek sanctions under the MLIIA for attorney’s fees and dismissal with prejudice deters claimants from filing meritless suits.”). 2009However, the Texas Supreme Court recently held in Villafani v. Trejo that the filing of a nonsuit does not extinguish a defendant’s motion for sanctions, or, in other words, its entitlement to the dismissal of the claim with prejudice, costs, and attorney’s fees. 251 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Tex.2008) (“Allowing defendants to seek sanctions ... for attorney’s fees and dismissal with prejudice deters claimants from filing meritless suits.”) (citing Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878 ); see Tex. Crv. | 3 | 3 |
American Transitional Care Centers of Texas, Inc. v. Palaciosgreen2 sentences2009However, the Texas Supreme Court recently held in Villafani v. Trejo that the filing of a nonsuit does not extinguish a defendant's motion for sanctions, or, in other words, its entitlement to the dismissal of the claim with prejudice, costs, and attorney's fees. 251 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Tex. 2008) ("Allowing defendants to seek sanctions . . . for attorney's fees and dismissal with prejudice deters claimants from filing meritless suits.") (citing Palacios , 46 S.W.3d at 878 ); see Tex Civ. 2009However, the Texas Supreme Court recently held in Villafani v. Trejo that the filing of a nonsuit does not extinguish a defendant’s motion for sanctions, or, in other words, its entitlement to the dismissal of the claim with prejudice, costs, and attorney’s fees. 251 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Tex.2008) (“Allowing defendants to seek sanctions ... for attorney’s fees and dismissal with prejudice deters claimants from filing meritless suits.”) (citing Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878 ); see Tex. Crv. | 1 | 5 |
Ex Parte Gutierrezgreen1 sentence2014See Ex parte Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d 883, 895-96 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) (Allowing defendants to belatedly seek DNA testing that, for strategic reasons, was not sought earlier would “allow defendants to ‘lie behind the log’ by failing to seek testing because of a reasonable fear that the results would be incriminating at trial but then seeking testing after conviction when there is no longer anything to lose.”). . | 1 | 1 |
City of Austin v. Rangelgreen1 sentence2014Id. at 793-94 (quoting Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228 ); see also City of Austin v. Rangel, 184 S.W.3d 377, 382 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, no pet.) (“The defendant cannot simply deny the existence of jurisdictional facts and force the plaintiff to raise a fact issue.”). | 1 | 1 |
Fox v. Hinderlitergreen1 sentence2009PRac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351(b); Scott & White Mem’l Hosp. v. Schexnider, 940 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex.1996) (noting that “[i]f a litigant could purge his violation of Rule 11 merely by taking a dismissal, he would lose all incentive to ‘stop, think and investigate more carefully before serving and filing papers’ ” and that “Rule 162 merely acknowledges that a nonsuit does not affect ... a pending sanctions motion; it does not purport to limit the trial court’s power to act”) 5 ; see also Fox v. Hinderliter, 222 S.W.3d 154, 158 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (recognizing that a motion to d | 1 | 1 |
Scott & White Memorial Hospital v. Schexnidergreen1 sentence2009PRac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351(b); Scott & White Mem’l Hosp. v. Schexnider, 940 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex.1996) (noting that “[i]f a litigant could purge his violation of Rule 11 merely by taking a dismissal, he would lose all incentive to ‘stop, think and investigate more carefully before serving and filing papers’ ” and that “Rule 162 merely acknowledges that a nonsuit does not affect ... a pending sanctions motion; it does not purport to limit the trial court’s power to act”) 5 ; see also Fox v. Hinderliter, 222 S.W.3d 154, 158 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (recognizing that a motion to d | 1 | 1 |
Curtis v. Curtisgreen1 sentence2009However, the Texas Supreme Court recently held in Villafani v. Trejo that the filing of a nonsuit does not extinguish a defendant’s motion for sanctions, or, in other words, its entitlement to the dismissal of the claim with prejudice, costs, and attorney’s fees. 251 11 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Tex. 2008) (“Allowing defendants to seek sanctions . . . for attorney’s fees and dismissal with prejudice deters claimants from filing meritless suits.”) (citing Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878 ); see TEX CIV. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hernandez v. Ebrom
green
1 sentence2020As the Court’s opinion in Hernandez acknowledged, prohibiting a defendant from asserting his “statutory right would dilute the deterrent value of the statute.” Id. at 320 (citing Villafani v. Trejo, 251 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Tex. 2008)) (“Allowing defendants to seek sanctions under the MLIIA for attorney’s fees and dismissal with prejudice deters claimants from filing meritless suits.”). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Frank and Shelley Thornton v. Northeast Harris County MUD 1
green
1 sentence2019MUD 1, 447 S.W.3d 23 , 39–40 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (“Allowing defendants to challenge subject matter jurisdiction by way of no-evidence motion [when jurisdiction and the merits intertwine] would force plaintiffs to put on 8 their case simply to establish jurisdiction and would eliminate any burden on the defendant other than to identify the specific ground he believes to be lacking evidentiary support.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).8 Other courts of appeals have held that the government defendants at issue demonstrated their entitlement to no-ev | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Arizona v. Youngblood
green
2 sentences2014Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 , 109 S.Ct. 333 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). . 2014Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 , 109 S.Ct. 333 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda
green
1 sentence2014Id. at 793-94 (quoting Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228 ); see also City of Austin v. Rangel, 184 S.W.3d 377, 382 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, no pet.) (“The defendant cannot simply deny the existence of jurisdictional facts and force the plaintiff to raise a fact issue.”). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Green Tree Servicing, LLC F/K/A Conseco Finance Servicing Corp. v. Ralph D. Woods and Karen Woods
green
1 sentence2014Id. at 793-94 (quoting Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228 ); see also City of Austin v. Rangel, 184 S.W.3d 377, 382 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, no pet.) (“The defendant cannot simply deny the existence of jurisdictional facts and force the plaintiff to raise a fact issue.”). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Guerra v. State
green
1 sentence2003However, we will not apply the additional two-step approach from Guerra to determine what kind of witness was involved, 771 S.W.2d at 476 , as it is appropriate when analyzing harm resulting from the trial court's allowing a violation of rule 614, not when analyzing a trial court's decision to allow an exception to rule 614. 3. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Anderson v. Ashe
green
2 sentences1932In Anderson v. Ashe, 99 Tex. 447 , 90 S. W. 872, 874 , the Supreme Court held that an order of the commissioners’ court allowing a claim which was made after the rejection of the claim by the auditor, was void, and the doctrine there laid down, it appears to us, would apply with equal force to the case at bar. ■ The court used this language: “The Legislature under article 5, § 18, of the Constitution, having the power to regulate the jurisdiction of the commissioners’ court, had authority to make their jurisdiction depend upon the approval of the auditor, and, having done so, the courts are no 1932In Anderson v. Ashe, 99 Tex. 447 , 90 S. W. 872, 874 , the Supreme Court held that an order of the commissioners’ court allowing a claim which was made after the rejection of the claim by the auditor, was void, and the doctrine there laid down, it appears to us, would apply with equal force to the case at bar. ■ The court used this language: “The Legislature under article 5, § 18, of the Constitution, having the power to regulate the jurisdiction of the commissioners’ court, had authority to make their jurisdiction depend upon the approval of the auditor, and, having done so, the courts are no | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Robison v. Whaley Farm Corporation
green
1 sentence1932Robinson et al. v. Whaley Farm Corporation (Tex. Sup.) 37 S.W.(2d) 714 ; Crawford v. McDonald, 88 Tex. 626 , 33 S. W. 325 ; Haverbekken v. Hale, 109 Tex. 106 , 204 S. W. 1162 . | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Haverbekken v. Hale, County Judge
green
2 sentences1932Robinson et al. v. Whaley Farm Corporation (Tex. Sup.) 37 S.W.(2d) 714 ; Crawford v. McDonald, 88 Tex. 626 , 33 S. W. 325 ; Haverbekken v. Hale, 109 Tex. 106 , 204 S. W. 1162 . 1932Robinson et al. v. Whaley Farm Corporation (Tex. Sup.) 37 S.W.(2d) 714 ; Crawford v. McDonald, 88 Tex. 626 , 33 S. W. 325 ; Haverbekken v. Hale, 109 Tex. 106 , 204 S. W. 1162 . | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Crawford v. McDonald
green
1 sentence1932Robinson et al. v. Whaley Farm Corporation (Tex. Sup.) 37 S.W.(2d) 714 ; Crawford v. McDonald, 88 Tex. 626 , 33 S. W. 325 ; Haverbekken v. Hale, 109 Tex. 106 , 204 S. W. 1162 . | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Callaghan v. Salliway
green
1 sentence1918Callaghan v. Salliway, 5 Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.