12 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Weekley Homes, L.P.green2 sentences2024Because “the equitable nature of the doctrine may render firm standards inappropriate,” the doctrine requires “trial courts to exercise some discretion based on the facts of each case.” Id. at 135 (citing Bridas, 345 F.3d at 360 ). 2013Bashaw & Co., 305 S.W.3d 44, 53 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, orig. proceeding); see also In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 134-35 (Tex.2005) (orig. proceeding) (recognizing, in suit where signatory sought to compel arbitration of non-signatory’s claims under direct benefits estop-pel, “the equitable nature of the doctrine may render firm standards inappropriate, requiring trial courts to exercise some discretion based on the facts of each case”). | 3 | 6 |
Hill v. G E Power Systems, Inc.green2 sentences2009Power Sys., Inc. , 282 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that, when deciding whether to apply equitable estoppel, "the district court is better equipped to make the call than this court, and we do not lightly override that discretion"); In re Weekley Homes , 180 S.W.3d at 134-35 (recognizing, in suit where signatory sought to compel arbitration of non-signatory's claims under direct benefits estoppel, that "the equitable nature of the doctrine may render firm standards inappropriate, requiring trial courts to exercise some discretion based on the facts of each case"). 2009Power Sys., Inc., 282 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir.2002) (recognizing that, when deciding whether to apply equitable estoppel, “the district court is better equipped to make the call than this court, and we do not lightly override that discretion”); In re Weekley *54 Homes, 180 S.W.3d at 134-35 (recognizing, in suit where signatory sought to compel arbitration of non-signatory’s claims under direct benefits estoppel, that “the equitable nature of the doctrine may render firm standards inappropriate, requiring trial courts to exercise some discretion based on the facts of each case”). | 2 | 2 |
Jensen v. Jensengreen2 sentences1999Jensen, 665 S.W.2d at 109 ; Magill, 816 S.W.2d at 535 . 1999Jensen, 665 S.W.2d at 109 ; Magill, 816 S.W.2d at 535 . | 1 | 3 |
Merrill Lynch v. Eddingsgreen1 sentence2015Indeed, the equitable nature of the doctrine may render firm standards inappropriate, requiring [**22] trial courts to exercise some discretion based on the facts of each case. 45 40 Perfect Union Lodge No. 10 v. Interfirst Bank of San Antonio, N.A., 748 S.W.2d 218, 220 , 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 277 (Tex. 1988) (holding trust beneficiaries hold equitable title to trust property); cf. Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 627 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding arbitration agreements were binding on receiver who succeeded to interests of entities that signed them); Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pier | 1 | 1 |
Hays and Company, as Trustee for Monge Oil Corporation v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.green1 sentence2015Indeed, the equitable nature of the doctrine may render firm standards inappropriate, requiring [**22] trial courts to exercise some discretion based on the facts of each case. 45 40 Perfect Union Lodge No. 10 v. Interfirst Bank of San Antonio, N.A., 748 S.W.2d 218, 220 , 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 277 (Tex. 1988) (holding trust beneficiaries hold equitable title to trust property); cf. Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 627 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding arbitration agreements were binding on receiver who succeeded to interests of entities that signed them); Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pier | 1 | 1 |
Javitch v. First Union Securities, Inc.green1 sentence2015Indeed, the equitable nature of the doctrine may render firm standards inappropriate, requiring [**22] trial courts to exercise some discretion based on the facts of each case. 45 40 Perfect Union Lodge No. 10 v. Interfirst Bank of San Antonio, N.A., 748 S.W.2d 218, 220 , 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 277 (Tex. 1988) (holding trust beneficiaries hold equitable title to trust property); cf. Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 627 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding arbitration agreements were binding on receiver who succeeded to interests of entities that signed them); Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pier | 1 | 1 |
In Re James E. Bashaw & Co.green1 sentence2013Bashaw & Co., 305 S.W.3d 44, 53 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, orig. proceeding); see also In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 134-35 (Tex.2005) (orig. proceeding) (recognizing, in suit where signatory sought to compel arbitration of non-signatory’s claims under direct benefits estop-pel, “the equitable nature of the doctrine may render firm standards inappropriate, requiring trial courts to exercise some discretion based on the facts of each case”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Magill v. Magill
green
2 sentences1999Jensen, 665 S.W.2d at 109 ; Magill, 816 S.W.2d at 535 . 1999Jensen, 665 S.W.2d at 109 ; Magill, 816 S.W.2d at 535 . | 2 | 1998–1999 |
Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Government of Turkmenistan
green
2 sentences2024Because “the equitable nature of the doctrine may render firm standards inappropriate,” the doctrine requires “trial courts to exercise some discretion based on the facts of each case.” Id. at 135 (citing Bridas, 345 F.3d at 360 ). 2024Nevertheless, “when a nonparty consistently and knowingly insists that others treat it as a party [to the contract], it cannot later ‘turn[] its back on the portions of the contract, such as an arbitration clause, that it finds distasteful.’” Id. (quoting DuPont, 269 F.3d at 200 ) (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber and Resin Intermediates, S.A.S.
green
1 sentence2024Nevertheless, “when a nonparty consistently and knowingly insists that others treat it as a party [to the contract], it cannot later ‘turn[] its back on the portions of the contract, such as an arbitration clause, that it finds distasteful.’” Id. (quoting DuPont, 269 F.3d at 200 ) (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Penick v. Penick
green
1 sentence2022“The outright rejection of offsetting benefits is inconsistent with the equitable nature of a claim for reimbursement.” Penick, 783 S.W.2d at 197 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Sun Oil Co. (Delaware) v. Madeley
green
2 sentences2015Indeed, the equitable nature of the doctrine may render firm standards inappropriate, requiring [**22] trial courts to exercise some discretion based on the facts of each case. 45 40 Perfect Union Lodge No. 10 v. Interfirst Bank of San Antonio, N.A., 748 S.W.2d 218, 220 , 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 277 (Tex. 1988) (holding trust beneficiaries hold equitable title to trust property); cf. Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 627 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding arbitration agreements were binding on receiver who succeeded to interests of entities that signed them); Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pier 2015Indeed, the equitable nature of the doctrine may render firm standards inappropriate, requiring [**22] trial courts to exercise some discretion based on the facts of each case. 45 40 Perfect Union Lodge No. 10 v. Interfirst Bank of San Antonio, N.A., 748 S.W.2d 218, 220 , 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 277 (Tex. 1988) (holding trust beneficiaries hold equitable title to trust property); cf. Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 627 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding arbitration agreements were binding on receiver who succeeded to interests of entities that signed them); Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pier | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Perfect Union Lodge No. 10 v. Interfirst Bank of San Antonio, N.A.
green
1 sentence2015Indeed, the equitable nature of the doctrine may render firm standards inappropriate, requiring [**22] trial courts to exercise some discretion based on the facts of each case. 45 40 Perfect Union Lodge No. 10 v. Interfirst Bank of San Antonio, N.A., 748 S.W.2d 218, 220 , 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 277 (Tex. 1988) (holding trust beneficiaries hold equitable title to trust property); cf. Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 627 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding arbitration agreements were binding on receiver who succeeded to interests of entities that signed them); Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pier | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Anderson v. Gilliland
green
1 sentence1990In resolving this conflict we emphasized the equitable nature of the claim and selected what we considered the fairest measure, holding “that a claim for reimbursement for funds expended by an estate for improvements to another estate is to be measured by the enhancement in value to the benefited estate.” Anderson, 684 S.W.2d at 675 . *197 Noting that the correct measure for reimbursement under the present circumstances was unclear, the court of appeals held that the best rule was to reimburse the community for every dollar advanced on the principal of Robert’s prenuptial, purchase money debt. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.