convictions exception in Washington

12 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2016 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

Case	Followed	Cited
State v. Ostergreen wash · 2002 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 2 sentences 2003See State v. Oster, 147 Wn.2d 141, 145-46 , 52 P.3d 26 (2002) (Apprendi does not apply where the fact of the prior convictions for violation of no-contact orders was found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt). 1 Carmen’s jury considered the judgment and sentence for each of the prior convictions and found beyond a reasonable doubt that Carmen had twice previously been convicted for violating a no-contact order. 2003See State v. Oster, 147 Wash.2d 141, 145-46 , 52 P.3d 26 (2002) ( Apprendi does not apply where the fact of the prior convictions for violation of no-contact orders was found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt). [1] Carmen's jury considered the judgment and sentence for each of the prior convictions and found beyond a reasonable doubt that Carmen had twice previously been convicted for violating a no-contact order.	2	2
State v. Ostergreen wash · 2002 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 2 sentences 2003See State v. Oster, 147 Wn.2d 141, 145-46 , 52 P.3d 26 (2002) (Apprendi does not apply where the fact of the prior convictions for violation of no-contact orders was found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt). 1 Carmen’s jury considered the judgment and sentence for each of the prior convictions and found beyond a reasonable doubt that Carmen had twice previously been convicted for violating a no-contact order. 2003See State v. Oster, 147 Wash.2d 141, 145-46 , 52 P.3d 26 (2002) ( Apprendi does not apply where the fact of the prior convictions for violation of no-contact orders was found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt). [1] Carmen's jury considered the judgment and sentence for each of the prior convictions and found beyond a reasonable doubt that Carmen had twice previously been convicted for violating a no-contact order.	2	2

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (16)

Case	Cited	Years
Almendarez-Torres v. United States red scotus · 1998 2 sentences 2016Ed. 2d 314 (2013) (plurality opinion) (acknowledging the prior convictions exception expressed in Apprendi and Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 , 118 S. Ct. 1219 , 140 L. 2016Ed. 2d 314 (2013) (plurality opinion) (acknowledging the prior convictions exception expressed in Apprendi and Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 , 118 S. Ct. 1219 , 140 L.	2	2016–2016
State v. Parmelee green washctapp · 2001 2 sentences 2015App. 702 , 32 P.3d 1029 (2001), we addressed whether two of the convictions for violation of a NCO "should merge into the felony stalking conviction because the statute requires more than one underlying act— repetitive behavior—to constitute stalking." Parmelee, 108 Wn. 2015App. 702 , 32 P.3d 1029 (2001), we addressed whether two of the convictions for violation of an NCO “should merge into the felony stalking conviction because the statute requires more than one underlying act — repetitive behavior — to constitute stalking.” Parmelee, 108 Wn.	2	2015–2015
State v. Parmelee green washctapp · 2001 2 sentences 2015App. 702 , 32 P.3d 1029 (2001), we addressed whether two of the convictions for violation of a NCO "should merge into the felony stalking conviction because the statute requires more than one underlying act— repetitive behavior—to constitute stalking." Parmelee, 108 Wn. 2015App. 702 , 32 P.3d 1029 (2001), we addressed whether two of the convictions for violation of an NCO “should merge into the felony stalking conviction because the statute requires more than one underlying act — repetitive behavior — to constitute stalking.” Parmelee, 108 Wn.	2	2015–2015
State v. Miller green wash · 2005 2 sentences 2010Miller, 156 Wash.2d at 30 , 123 P.3d 827 . 2010Miller, 156 Wn.2d at 30 .	2	2010–2010
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania green scotus · 1971 2 sentences 2006McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 , 91 S. Ct. 1976 , 29 L. 2006McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 , 91 S. Ct. 1976 , 29 L.	2	2006–2006
State v. Weber green washctapp · 2005 2 sentences 2006Under the majority approach, these convictions do not need to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in order to enhance an adult offender's sentence. ¶ 11 In State v. Weber, 127 Wash.App. 879, 892-93 , 112 P.3d 1287 (2005), [2] Division I concluded that the due process protections afforded in juvenile proceedings ensure that the fact-finding process is reliable without the need for a jury. 2006Under the majority approach, these convictions do not need to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in order to enhance an adult offender’s sentence. ¶11 In State v. Weber, 127 Wn.	2	2006–2006
State v. Mounts neutral washctapp · 2005 2 sentences 2006State v. Mounts, 130 Wash.App. 219, 222 , 122 P.3d 745 (2005), petition for review filed (Wash. Sept. 6, 2006). 2006State v. Mounts, 130 Wn.	2	2006–2006
Apprendi v. New Jersey green scotus · 2000 2 sentences 2016This is so because the provision at issue concerns prior convictions, which are an exception to the general rule that any fact increasing a penalty must be decided by the jury. ¶14 In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S. Ct. 2348 , 147 L. 2016This is so because the provision at issue concerns prior convictions, which are an exception to the general rule that any fact increasing a penalty must be decided by the jury. ¶14 In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S. Ct. 2348 , 147 L.	1	2016–2016
State v. Carmen green washctapp · 2003 1 sentence 2010Carmen, 118 Wash.App. at 663-64 , 77 P.3d 368 . ¶ 27 In Miller, the Washington Supreme Court approved of the holding in Carmen, and held that the existence of the previous convictions for violation of a no-contact order is an element of FVNCO under RCW 26.50.110(5), but the question of whether a prior conviction meets the definition and qualifies as a predicate offense under the FVNCO statute, is a threshold question of law for the court.	1	2010–2010
State v. Miller green wash · 2005 1 sentence 2010Miller, 156 Wash.2d at 30 , 123 P.3d 827 .	1	2010–2010
State v. Carmen green washctapp · 2003 1 sentence 2010Carmen, 118 Wash.App. at 663-64 , 77 P.3d 368 . ¶ 27 In Miller, the Washington Supreme Court approved of the holding in Carmen, and held that the existence of the previous convictions for violation of a no-contact order is an element of FVNCO under RCW 26.50.110(5), but the question of whether a prior conviction meets the definition and qualifies as a predicate offense under the FVNCO statute, is a threshold question of law for the court.	1	2010–2010
State v. Mounts green washctapp · 2005 1 sentence 2006State v. Mounts, 130 Wash.App. 219, 222 , 122 P.3d 745 (2005), petition for review filed (Wash. Sept. 6, 2006).	1	2006–2006
State v. Weber green washctapp · 2005 2 sentences 2006Under the majority approach, these convictions do not need to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in order to enhance an adult offender's sentence. ¶ 11 In State v. Weber, 127 Wash.App. 879, 892-93 , 112 P.3d 1287 (2005), [2] Division I concluded that the due process protections afforded in juvenile proceedings ensure that the fact-finding process is reliable without the need for a jury. 2006Id. at 892, 112 P.3d 1287 . *1218 ¶ 12 Division II also held that juvenile adjudications fall within the prior convictions exception.	1	2006–2006
Pollard v. State green ark · 1988 2 sentences 1990However, later in Pollard v. State, 296 Ark. 299 , 756 S.W.2d 455 , 456 n.2 (1988), that court declined to address admissibility of prior larceny convictions under rule 609(a)(2) on the ground that it ultimately held that the trial court correctly admitted the convictions under rule 609(a)(1). 1990However, later in Pollard v. State, 296 Ark. 299 , 756 S.W.2d 455 , 456 n.2 (1988), that court declined to address admissibility of prior larceny convictions under rule 609(a)(2) on the ground that it ultimately held that the trial court correctly admitted the convictions under rule 609(a)(1).	1	1990–1990
State v. Cintron green utah · 1984 2 sentences 1990In State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 (Utah 1984), the Utah State Supreme Court held that, under identical language to that in rule 609 in then rule 21, theft involves dishonesty. 1990In State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 (Utah 1984), the Utah State Supreme Court held that, under identical language to that in rule 609 in then rule 21, theft involves dishonesty.	1	1990–1990
State v. Rhoads green wash · 1984 2 sentences 1986State v. Rhoads, 101 Wn.2d 529, 535 , 681 P.2d 841 (1984). 1986State v. Rhoads, 101 Wn.2d 529, 535 , 681 P.2d 841 (1984).	1	1986–1986

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 26.52.020 (6) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 10.99.020 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

GA 20 (1986–2024) WA 12 (1986–2016) CA 10 (1968–2026) IL 8 (1980–2025) FL 8 (1991–2025) TX 6 (2002–2021) MO 6 (1983–2011) IN 5 (1981–2016) LA 5 (2007–2018) NJ 4 (1996–2014) AZ 4 (2005–2016) MI 3 (1979–2015) VA 3 (2003–2018) AL 3 (1998–1999) MA 3 (1978–2017) AR 2 (2003–2022) MD 2 (1973–1986) NY 2 (1997–2014) OR 2 (1980–1980) NH 2 (1980–2013) PA 2 (1974–1980) MN 2 (2005–2016) ND 2 (2013–2013) MS 2 (1994–2010) CT 2 (1987–2013)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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