11 Arizona opinions name it 1 courts 1996–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Willitsgreen2 sentences2022See State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184 (1964). 2020Lopez contends the superior court committed reversible error by refusing to give an adverse-inference instruction pursuant to State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184 (1964). | 1 | 2 |
Read v. City of Scottsdalegreen2 sentences2026See Read, 107 Ariz. at 525 . ¶15 The City also argues the superior court committed reversible error because it never determined who owned SR 279, but the court impliedly found what Read teaches: the City secured ownership when it annexed the relevant stretch of road. 2026See id. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Atwoodgreen1 sentence2024See State. v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 278 (1996); State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 629 (1992); see also State v. Taylor, 127 Ariz. 527, 530 (1980) (“if a defendant wants an instruction limiting the effect of certain evidence he must request it, and the failure of the trial court to so instruct is not error in the absence of a request therefor”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Taylorgreen1 sentence2024See State. v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 278 (1996); State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 629 (1992); see also State v. Taylor, 127 Ariz. 527, 530 (1980) (“if a defendant wants an instruction limiting the effect of certain evidence he must request it, and the failure of the trial court to so instruct is not error in the absence of a request therefor”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hydegreen1 sentence2024See State. v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 278 (1996); State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 629 (1992); see also State v. Taylor, 127 Ariz. 527, 530 (1980) (“if a defendant wants an instruction limiting the effect of certain evidence he must request it, and the failure of the trial court to so instruct is not error in the absence of a request therefor”). | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Arizona Department of Revenuegreen1 sentence2021This court reviews de novo “whether the [superior] court correctly applied the law.” See Baker v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 209 Ariz. 561, 564, ¶ 10 (App. 2005) (citation omitted). ¶9 Shinohara argues the superior court committed reversible error by dismissing this matter as to all parties because she was never a party to the stipulations or the orders placing the claims against all the other defendants on the Dismissal Calendar. | 1 | 1 |
Stokes v. Stokesgreen1 sentence2021See Stokes v. Stokes, 143 Ariz. 590, 592 (App. 1984) (noting appellate court may consider issue not raised on appeal in civil case when “facts of a particular case so warrant and the question is one of substantive law presenting no dispute as to the facts”). ¶20 Before imposing firearms restrictions under the Brady Act, a court must make an explicit finding that a credible threat of physical harm is present. | 1 | 1 |
Charles I. Friedman, P.C. v. Microsoft Corp.green1 sentence2020Friedman, P.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 213 Ariz. 344, 350, ¶ 17 (App. 2006). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Moodygreen1 sentence2015See State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424 , 467 ¶ 197 (2004). ¶9 Conceding that “shield” is not defined by statute, Jacobs argues the superior court committed reversible error in not giving the definition provided in Stone. | 1 | 1 |
Marriage of Kohler v. Kohlergreen2 sentences2015See Kohler, 211 Ariz. at 108 n.1 ¶ 8, 118 P.3d at 623 n.1. 2015See Kohler, 211 Ariz. at 108 n.1 ¶ 8, 118 P.3d at 623 n.1. | 1 | 1 |
Bilagody v. Thorneycroftgreen2 sentences2014Bilagody v. Thorneycroft, 125 Ariz. 88, 92 , 607 P.2d 965, 969 (1979). 2014Bilagody v. Thorneycroft, 125 Ariz. 88, 92 , 607 P.2d 965, 969 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Donald Joe Moorhead, Dba Don Moorhead Harvesting Company v. United States of America, Clifton Gattis, Dba Packing Company v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1996It submits that absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, the language of a statute must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive, citing Moorhead v. U.S., 774 F.2d 936, 940 (9th Cir.1985), and that A.R.S. section 36-2908(E) clearly authorizes the AHCCCS director to develop his own definition of emergency medical services, which the director did by enacting A.A.C. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Stone
green
2 sentences2015Stone, however, interpreted a now-superseded kidnapping statute that arguably required a different mental state and criminalized different conduct than current law. 122 Ariz. at 308 .6 Even then, Stone purported to state what the court thought “shield” “implies” in the context of that superseded statute based on its “ordinary meaning.” Id. at 309 . 2015Stone, however, interpreted a now-superseded kidnapping statute that arguably required a different mental state and criminalized different conduct than current law. 122 Ariz. at 308 .6 Even then, Stone purported to state what the court thought “shield” “implies” in the context of that superseded statute based on its “ordinary meaning.” Id. at 309 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.