6 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1977–1997 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dixon v. Stategreen1 sentence1997Id. at 888-89 (footnotes omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Marks v. Stategreen2 sentences1980Dixon asserts that the delay of nearly five months between the occurrence of the event in dispute on October 9, 1976, and the return of the indictment on March 4, 1977, prejudiced his defense and effectively denied him due process of law. 18 This court has previously recognized that in addition to the protection afforded by the applicable statute of limitations, the guarantees of due process of law under the Alaska Constitution also serve to protect a defendant against the hazards of pre-indictment delay. 19 Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66, 68 (Alaska 1972), established that two factors are releva 1980Dixon asserts that the delay of nearly five months between the occurrence of the event in dispute on October 9, 1976, and the return of the indictment on March 4, 1977, prejudiced his defense and effectively denied him due process of law. [18] This court has previously recognized that in addition to the protection afforded by the applicable statute of limitations, the guarantees of due process of law under the Alaska Constitution also serve to protect a defendant against the hazards of pre-indictment delay. [19] Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66, 68 (Alaska 1972), established that two factors are re | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Abm v. Mh
green
2 sentences1985Neither the Petition for Return nor its supporting memo stated the basis for the request to decline jurisdiction. [10] The supporting memo merely cites A.B.M. v. M.H., 651 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1982) which arose not under §§ 1913 or 1920 but under 25 U.S.C. § 1916 (a) (1983). [11] Thus, as the State notes, there was nothing in R.S.'s petition which demonstrated that there was any basis for declining jurisdiction under either § 1913 or § 1920. 1985Neither the Petition for Return nor its supporting memo stated the basis for the request to decline jurisdiction. 10 The supporting memo merely cites A.B.M. v. M.H., 651 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1982) which arose not under §§ 1913 or 1920 but under 25 U.S.C. § 1916 (a) (1983). 11 Thus, as the State notes, there was nothing in R.S.’s petition which demonstrated that there was any basis for declining jurisdiction under either § 1913 or § 1920. | 2 | 1985–1985 |
Forquer v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission
green
1 sentence1984Furthermore, in light of our decision in Forquer v. CFEC, 677 P.2d 1236 (Alaska, 1984), we hold that White is entitled to a hearing on remand. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Tarnef v. State
green
1 sentence1977In those states that have abolished the common law distinction between principals and accessories before the fact, the same rule prevails. 9 (footnotes omitted) We thus conclude that there is no merit in appellant’s assertion that the indictment was insufficient. 10 Scharver also contends that the superior court committed reversible error by virtue *303 of its admission of certain statements he gave to law enforcement personnel in violation of his constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and Tarnef v. State, 512 P.2d 923 (Alaska 1973 | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1977In those states that have abolished the common law distinction between principals and accessories before the fact, the same rule prevails. 9 (footnotes omitted) We thus conclude that there is no merit in appellant’s assertion that the indictment was insufficient. 10 Scharver also contends that the superior court committed reversible error by virtue *303 of its admission of certain statements he gave to law enforcement personnel in violation of his constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and Tarnef v. State, 512 P.2d 923 (Alaska 1973 1977In those states that have abolished the common law distinction between principals and accessories before the fact, the same rule prevails. 9 (footnotes omitted) We thus conclude that there is no merit in appellant’s assertion that the indictment was insufficient. 10 Scharver also contends that the superior court committed reversible error by virtue *303 of its admission of certain statements he gave to law enforcement personnel in violation of his constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and Tarnef v. State, 512 P.2d 923 (Alaska 1973 | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.