11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1964–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Qutb v. Straussgreen2 sentences2010(See, e.g., Hutchins, supra, 188 F.3d at p. 545 [statute upheld applying intermediate scrutiny based in part on recognition that “the eight defenses to the curfew strengthen the relationship between the curfew and its goal of reducing juvenile crime and victimization by narrowing the scope of the curfew . . . [by] ensuring] that the ordinance does not sweep all of a minor’s activities into its ambit but instead focuses on those nocturnal activities most likely to result in crime or victimization” (fn. omitted)]; Quib, supra, 11 F.3d at p. 494 [“[b]y including the defenses to a violation of the 2010(See State v. J.P., supra, 907 So.2d at pp. 1117-1119 [failure to have statutory exceptions for juveniles engaged in “ ‘legal, wholesome activities who have the permission of their parents’ ” was overly broad]; Nunez, supra, 114 F.3d at pp. 948-951 [failure to exempt minors engaged in legitimate activities with or without parental permission or to exempt minors who seek to exercise 1st Amend, rights during curfew hours was overly broad].) However, other courts employing strict scrutiny have examined the exemptions/defenses under the ordinance and concluded that “[b]y including the defenses to | 3 | 3 |
Hutchins v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences2010(See, e.g., Hutchins, supra, 188 F.3d at p. 545 [statute upheld applying intermediate scrutiny based in part on recognition that “the eight defenses to the curfew strengthen the relationship between the curfew and its goal of reducing juvenile crime and victimization by narrowing the scope of the curfew . . . [by] ensuring] that the ordinance does not sweep all of a minor’s activities into its ambit but instead focuses on those nocturnal activities most likely to result in crime or victimization” (fn. omitted)]; Quib, supra, 11 F.3d at p. 494 [“[b]y including the defenses to a violation of the 2010(See, e.g., Hutchins, supra, 188 F.3d at p. 545 [statute upheld applying intermediate scrutiny based in part on recognition that "the eight defenses to the curfew strengthen the relationship between the curfew and its goal of reducing juvenile crime and victimization by narrowing the scope of the curfew . . . [by] ensur[ing] that the ordinance does not sweep all of a minor's activities into its ambit but instead focuses on those nocturnal activities most likely to result in crime or victimization" (fn. omitted)]; Qutb, supra, 11 F.3d at p. 494 ["[b]y including the defenses to a violation of th | 3 | 3 |
Eisen v. Tavangariangreen2 sentences2022Where the appellant has failed to meet his or her burden of proof at trial, “ ‘the question for the reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law’ ” because “ ‘the appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see Lent v. California Coastal Com. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 812 , 837-838 [applying this standard to the defense of laches]; Eisen v. Tavangarian (2019) 36 Cal.App.5 2022Where the appellant has failed to meet his or her burden of proof at trial, “‘the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law’” because “‘the appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.”’” (Ibid.; see Lent v. California Coastal Com. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 812 , 837-838 [applying this standard to the 10 defense of laches]; Eisen v. Tavangarian (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 6 | 2 | 2 |
People v. Russellgreen2 sentences2016In other words, if a perpetrator seeks to regain possession of property in which [he] [she] honestly believes [he] [she] has a good faith claim of ownership or title, then [he] [she] does not have the required criminal intent. [¶] . . . [¶] [A good faith belief by a defendant, tried as an accomplice, that [he] [she] was assisting [his] [her] co-principal retake the co-principal’s property negates the required criminal intent for [robbery] [theft by larceny] [burglary, where it is alleged the entry was to commit theft].]” 14 In People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1431 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3 2016In other words, if a perpetrator seeks to regain possession of property in which [he] [she] honestly believes [he] [she] has a good faith claim of ownership or title, then [he] [she] does not have the required criminal intent. [¶] . . . [¶] [A good faith belief by a defendant, tried as an accomplice, that [he] [she] was assisting [his] [her] co-principal retake the co-principal’s property negates the required criminal intent for [robbery] [theft by larceny] [burglary, where it is alleged the entry was to commit theft].]” 14 In People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1431 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3 | 1 | 1 |
McDanels v. General Insurance Co. of Americagreen2 sentences1987Co. (1934) 1 Cal.App.2d 454, 459 [ 36 P.2d 829 ].) 7 We need not consider herein the sufficiency and timeliness of ICW's reservation of rights, due to our conclusion that HBC failed to properly plead the essential elements of the defenses of waiver and estoppel. 8 We have also examined HBC’s proposed first amended cross-complaint. 1987Co. (1934) 1 Cal.App.2d 454, 459 [ 36 P.2d 829 ].) 7 We need not consider herein the sufficiency and timeliness of ICW's reservation of rights, due to our conclusion that HBC failed to properly plead the essential elements of the defenses of waiver and estoppel. 8 We have also examined HBC’s proposed first amended cross-complaint. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nunez v. City Of San Diego
green
2 sentences2010(See State v. J.P., supra, 907 So.2d at pp. 1117-1119 [failure to have statutory exceptions for juveniles engaged in “ ‘legal, wholesome activities who have the permission of their parents’ ” was overly broad]; Nunez, supra, 114 F.3d at pp. 948-951 [failure to exempt minors engaged in legitimate activities with or without parental permission or to exempt minors who seek to exercise 1st Amend, rights during curfew hours was overly broad].) However, other courts employing strict scrutiny have examined the exemptions/defenses under the ordinance and concluded that “[b]y including the defenses to 2010(See State v. J.P., supra, 907 So.2d at pp. 1117-1119 [failure to have statutory exceptions for juveniles engaged in "`legal, wholesome activities who have the permission of the parents'"was overly broad]; Nunez, supra, 114 F.3d at pp. 948-951 [failure to exempt minors engaged in legitimate activities with or without parental permission or to exempt minors who seek to exercise 1st Amend. rights during curfew hours was overly broad].) However, other courts employing strict scrutiny have examined the exemptions/defenses under the ordinance and concluded that "[b]y including the defenses to a vio | 3 | 2010–2010 |
Atkins v. City of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2022(Atkins v. City of Los Angeles (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 696, 734 .) 1. 06 Subcontract The trial court concluded Camrock’s cause of action for breach of the 06 subcontract accrued on October 14, 2014, when Security Paving received its final payment from Caltrans. 2022(Atkins v. City of Los Angeles (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 696, 734 .) And yet Elisabetta has met it here: The uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence compels a finding that, no later than 2013, Elisabetta repudiated Marco’s alleged oral agreement that he had an ownership interest in the property and that he was entitled to half the proceeds upon a sale. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Saille
green
1 sentence2016Russell reasoned that even though the defendant did not request mistake of fact or claim-of-right instructions, “the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on both of these defenses if it appeared defendant was relying on the defenses, or if there was substantial evidence supportive of the defenses and they were not inconsistent with defendant’s theory of the case.” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal, however, failed to apply the exception we recognized in People v. Saille. supra. 54 Cal.3d at page 1117 , and subsequently applied in Anderson, that the trial court’s sua sponte instructional dut | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Tufunga
green
1 sentence2014"The claim-of-right defense provides that a defendant's good faith belief, even if mistakenly held, that he has a right or claim to property he takes from another negates the felonious intent necessary for conviction of theft or robbery." (People v. 9 Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 938 .) "The mistake-of-fact defense operates to negate the requisite criminal intent or mens rea element of the crime, but applies only in limited circumstances, specifically when the defendant holds a mistaken belief in a fact or set of circumstances which, if existent or true, would render the defendant's otherwis | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Lawson
green
2 sentences2014"The claim-of-right defense provides that a defendant's good faith belief, even if mistakenly held, that he has a right or claim to property he takes from another negates the felonious intent necessary for conviction of theft or robbery." (People v. 9 Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 938 .) "The mistake-of-fact defense operates to negate the requisite criminal intent or mens rea element of the crime, but applies only in limited circumstances, specifically when the defendant holds a mistaken belief in a fact or set of circumstances which, if existent or true, would render the defendant's otherwis 2014In People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 992 , our Supreme Court held that "a trial court has no obligation to provide a sua sponte instruction on accident where . . . the defendant's theory of accident is an attempt to negate the intent element of the charged crime." "[A]s explained in Anderson, the trial court's sua sponte instructional duties do not apply to defenses that serve only to negate the mental state element of the charged offense when the jury is properly instructed on the mental state element, even when substantial evidence supports the defense and it is consistent with the d | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2014In People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 992 , our Supreme Court held that "a trial court has no obligation to provide a sua sponte instruction on accident where . . . the defendant's theory of accident is an attempt to negate the intent element of the charged crime." "[A]s explained in Anderson, the trial court's sua sponte instructional duties do not apply to defenses that serve only to negate the mental state element of the charged offense when the jury is properly instructed on the mental state element, even when substantial evidence supports the defense and it is consistent with the d 2014In People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 992 , our Supreme Court held that "a trial court has no obligation to provide a sua sponte instruction on accident where . . . the defendant's theory of accident is an attempt to negate the intent element of the charged crime." "[A]s explained in Anderson, the trial court's sua sponte instructional duties do not apply to defenses that serve only to negate the mental state element of the charged offense when the jury is properly instructed on the mental state element, even when substantial evidence supports the defense and it is consistent with the d | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Central Valley General Hospital v. Smith
green
1 sentence2013Proc., § 632.) The statement of decision will be deemed adequate "if it fairly discloses the determinations as to the ultimate facts and material issues in the case." (Central Valley General Hosp. v. Smith (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 501, 513 ; Golden Eagle Ins. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Chicago Title Insurance v. California Canadian Bank
green
2 sentences1995Co. v. California Canadian Bank (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 798 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 422 ], the issue of comparative fault was revisited, not in the concept of negligence, but the payor bank argued that it should be allowed to raise the defenses of waiver, estoppel, and unclean hands, among others. 1995Co. v. California Canadian Bank (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 798 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 422 ], the issue of comparative fault was revisited, not in the concept of negligence, but the payor bank argued that it should be allowed to raise the defenses of waiver, estoppel, and unclean hands, among others. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Gajanich v. Gregory
green
2 sentences1964(Wetzstein v. Thomasson (1939) 34 Cal.App.2d 554 [ 93 P.2d 1028 ]; Gajanich v. Gregory (1931) 116 Cal.App. 622 [ 3 P.2d 389 ].) Although the defenses of waiver and laches had been pleaded by defendant, they were not tried by reason of the disposition of the action on other grounds. 1964(Wetzstein v. Thomasson (1939) 34 Cal.App.2d 554 [ 93 P.2d 1028 ]; Gajanich v. Gregory (1931) 116 Cal.App. 622 [ 3 P.2d 389 ].) Although the defenses of waiver and laches had been pleaded by defendant, they were not tried by reason of the disposition of the action on other grounds. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Wetzstein v. Thomasson
green
1 sentence1964(Wetzstein v. Thomasson (1939) 34 Cal.App.2d 554 [ 93 P.2d 1028 ]; Gajanich v. Gregory (1931) 116 Cal.App. 622 [ 3 P.2d 389 ].) Although the defenses of waiver and laches had been pleaded by defendant, they were not tried by reason of the disposition of the action on other grounds. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.