83 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2025 14 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Arnettgreen2 sentences2019Highland No. 11CA7, 2011-Ohio-6526, at ¶ 34 , quoting State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215 , 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000) (“in considering the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12, the trial court has ‘the discretion to determine the weight to assign a particular statutory factor’ ”). 2019Highland No. 11CA7, 2011-Ohio-6526, at ¶ 34 , quoting State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215 , 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000) (“in considering the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12, the trial court has ‘the discretion to determine the weight to assign a particular statutory factor’ ”). | 5 | 5 |
State v. Baileygreen2 sentences2019Highland No. 11CA7, 2011-Ohio-6526, at ¶ 34 , quoting State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215 , 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000) (“in considering the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12, the trial court has ‘the discretion to determine the weight to assign a particular statutory factor’ ”). 2019Highland No. 11CA7, 2011-Ohio-6526, ¶ 34 , quoting State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215 , 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000) (“in considering the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12, the trial court has ‘the discretion to determine the weight to assign a particular statutory factor”). | 5 | 5 |
State v. Nelsongreen2 sentences2025A court may impose the longest jail term authorized under section 2929.24 of the Revised Code only upon offenders who commit the worst forms of the offense or upon offenders whose conduct and response to prior sanctions for prior offenses demonstrate that the imposition of the longest jail term is necessary to deter the offender from committing a future criminal offense. {¶17} R.C. 2929.22 does not “mandate that the record reveal the trial court’s consideration of the statutory sentencing factors.” State v. Nuby, 2016-Ohio-8157 , ¶ 13- 14 (7th Dist.), quoting State v. Nelson, 2007-Ohio-3459, ¶ 2024Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0052 9 2929.22 does not mandate that the record reveal the trial court's consideration of the statutory sentencing factors.” State v. Nelson, 172 Ohio App.3d 419 , 2007-Ohio-3459 , 875 N.E.2d 137, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). | 4 | 6 |
State v. Carltongreen2 sentences2016Montgomery No. 26086, 2014-Ohio-3835, ¶ 18 (observing that “we have held on more than one occasion that a trial court’s consideration of the statutory sentencing factors may be presumed from a silent record”). {¶ 9} In making sentencing decisions, “a trial court may rely on ‘a broad range of information.’ ” State v. Bodkins, 2d Dist. 2015Montgomery No. 26086, 2014-Ohio-3835 (noting that “we have held on more than one occasion that a trial court's consideration of the statutory sentencing factors may be presumed from a silent record.”) Id. at ¶ 18, citing State v. Imber, 2d Dist. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Bowsergreen2 sentences2012As detailed in response to Parks’s Third Assignment of Error, the trial 8 court did properly consider the statutory sentencing factors and guidelines in Parks’s case. {¶ 21} Furthermore, at sentencing “[t]he evidence the court may consider is not confined to the evidence that strictly relates to the conviction offense because the court is no longer concerned * * * with the narrow issue of guilt.” State v. Bowser, 186 Ohio App.3d 162 , 2010-Ohio-951 , 926 N.E.2d 714, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). 2012As detailed in response to Parks’s Third Assignment of Error, the trial 8 court did properly consider the statutory sentencing factors and guidelines in Parks’s case. {¶ 21} Furthermore, at sentencing “[t]he evidence the court may consider is not confined to the evidence that strictly relates to the conviction offense because the court is no longer concerned * * * with the narrow issue of guilt.” State v. Bowser, 186 Ohio App.3d 162 , 2010-Ohio-951 , 926 N.E.2d 714, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 158 Ohio App.3d 597 , 2004-Ohio-5939 , at ¶ 26 . 2005See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 158 Ohio App.3d 597 , 2004-Ohio-5939 , at ¶ 26 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Holloman, 07ap-875 (6-3-2008)green2 sentences2022Franklin No. 07AP-875, 2008-Ohio-2650, at ¶ 19 (Decided prior to Jones, the court stated that “a defendant claiming inconsistent sentencing must show that the trial court failed to properly consider the statutory sentencing factors and guidelines found in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.”). {¶ 8} Appellant acknowledges Jones, but attempts to differentiate it by asserting that “there is no indication from the court’s record at sentencing, other than a passing statement, that the court even considered proportionality in fashioning Appellant’s seventeen-month ODRC sentence.” {¶ 9} “[N]either R.C. 2929.1 2018Franklin No. 07AP-875, 2008-Ohio-2650, ¶ 19 . | 1 | 5 |
State v. Perkinsgreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., State v. Perkins (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 672 , 684-685 . 2000State v. Perkins (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 672 , 684-685 , citing State v. Kroner (1988), 49 Ohio App.3d 133 ; State v. Henry (1987), 37 Ohio App.3d 3 ; State v. Yontz (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 342 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Hairstongreen2 sentences2019FROELICH, J., concurring: {¶ 53} Brady was facing a maximum sentence of 198 years, and it is clear from the transcript that the court carefully and seriously weighed the statutory sentencing factors, the statements of Brady’s relatives and friends, and the statement of the victim before reaching its decision. {¶ 54} Hairston, 118 Ohio St.3d 289 , 2008-Ohio-2338 , 888 N.E.2d 1073 , a non- homicide case in which the defendant received a 134-year sentence, holds that when “none of the individual sentences are grossly disproportionate to their respective offenses, an aggregate term resulting from 2012In light of the facts revealed at trial and in the sentencing proceedings, Long’s sentence of life without parole eligibility was not so grossly disproportionate to the offenses that it “shock[s] the sense of justice of the community.” State v. Weitbrecht, 86 Ohio St.3d 368, 371 , 715 N.E.2d 167 (1999), quoting McDougle at 70 ; see also State v. Hairston, 118 Ohio St.3d 289 , 2008-Ohio-2338 , 888 N.E.2d 1073 , ¶ 14. {¶57} Long next argues that the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence and in failing “to even consider” the purposes and principles of felony sentencing and the other | 1 | 2 |
State v. Edmonsongreen2 sentences2000See State v. Edmondson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 324 , 326 , 715 N.E.2d 131 , 134 (Had the General Assembly intended the R.C. 2929.14 (B) finding to include reasons, it would have explicitly expressed that intent* * *.) Because we conclude the trial court properly considered all of the relevant statutory sentencing factors, we overrule Krocker's first assignment of error. 2000See State v. Edmondson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 324 , 326 , 715 N.E.2d 131 , 134 (Had the General Assembly intended the R.C. 2929.14 (B) finding to include reasons, it would have explicitly expressed that intent* * *.) Because we conclude the trial court properly considered all of the relevant statutory sentencing factors, we overrule Krocker's first assignment of error. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2025See State v. Williams, 2016-Ohio-733, ¶ 23 (4th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
State v. McCaleb, Unpublished Decision (9-8-2006)green2 sentences2025In addition, the court must consider “any relevant oral and written statement made by the victim, the victim's representative, the victim's attorney, if applicable, the defendant, the defense attorney, and the prosecuting authority regarding sentencing for a misdemeanor.” R.C. 2929.22(D)(1). {¶ 20} “When determining a misdemeanor sentence, R.C. 2929.22 does not -8- mandate that the record reveal the trial court's consideration of the statutory sentencing factors.” State v. McCaleb, 2006-Ohio-4652, ¶ 41 (2d Dist.). 2025“Rather, appellate courts will presume that the trial court considered the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.22 when the sentence is within the statutory limits, absent an affirmative showing to the contrary.” Id., citing State v. Kelly, 2005-Ohio-3058 (2d Dist.). {¶ 21} The sentences imposed in Case Nos. 23-TRD-001-1855 and 23-CRB-001- 0518 were within the applicable statutory limits for a first-degree misdemeanor and a fourth-degree misdemeanor, respectively. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. McIntoshgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Adamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Henry
green
2 sentences2000State v. Perkins (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 672 , 684-685 , citing State v. Kroner (1988), 49 Ohio App.3d 133 ; State v. Henry (1987), 37 Ohio App.3d 3 ; State v. Yontz (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 342 . 1999State v. Perkins (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 672 , 684-685 , citing State v. Kroner (1988), 49 Ohio App.3d 133 ; State v. Henry (1987), 37 Ohio App.3d 3 ; State v. Yontz (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 342 . | 4 | 1993–2000 |
State v. Kroner
green
2 sentences2000State v. Perkins (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 672 , 684-685 , citing State v. Kroner (1988), 49 Ohio App.3d 133 ; State v. Henry (1987), 37 Ohio App.3d 3 ; State v. Yontz (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 342 . 1999State v. Perkins (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 672 , 684-685 , citing State v. Kroner (1988), 49 Ohio App.3d 133 ; State v. Henry (1987), 37 Ohio App.3d 3 ; State v. Yontz (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 342 . | 4 | 1993–2000 |
State v. Yontz
green
2 sentences2000State v. Perkins (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 672 , 684-685 , citing State v. Kroner (1988), 49 Ohio App.3d 133 ; State v. Henry (1987), 37 Ohio App.3d 3 ; State v. Yontz (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 342 . 1999State v. Perkins (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 672 , 684-685 , citing State v. Kroner (1988), 49 Ohio App.3d 133 ; State v. Henry (1987), 37 Ohio App.3d 3 ; State v. Yontz (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 342 . | 4 | 1993–2000 |
State v. Foster
green
2 sentences2024State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 36 , abrogated on other grounds by Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 , 172 L.Ed.2d 517 , 129 S.Ct. 711 (2009). 2024State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 36 , abrogated on other grounds by Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 , 172 L.Ed.2d 517 , 129 S.Ct. 711 (2009). | 3 | 2007–2024 |
State v. Weyand, 07-Co-40 (12-4-2008)
green
2 sentences2013No. 07-CO-40, 2008-Ohio-6360, ¶ 7 , citing State v. Keylor, 7th Dist. 2012No. 07-CO-40, 2008-Ohio-6360, ¶7 , citing State v. Keylor, 7th Dist. | 3 | 2010–2013 |
State v. Marcum (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2025Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court will only reverse a sentence “if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002 . “[A]n appellate court’s authority to modify or vacate a sentence is limited to situations in which it concludes that the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under certain specified statutes, not including R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State v. Jones, 2020- Ohio-6729, ¶ 38. 2019State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516 , 2016-Ohio-1002 , 59 N.E.3d 1231 , ¶1, 22-23. | 2 | 2019–2025 |
State v. Kelly, Unpublished Decision (6-17-2005)
green
2 sentences2025“Rather, appellate courts will presume that the trial court considered the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.22 when the sentence is within the statutory limits, absent an affirmative showing to the contrary.” Id., citing State v. Kelly, 2005-Ohio-3058 (2d Dist.). {¶ 21} The sentences imposed in Case Nos. 23-TRD-001-1855 and 23-CRB-001- 0518 were within the applicable statutory limits for a first-degree misdemeanor and a fourth-degree misdemeanor, respectively. 2008Rather, appellate courts will presume that the trial court considered the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.22 when the sentence is within the statutory limits, absent an affirmative showing to the contrary." State v. Nelson , 172 Ohio App.3d 419 , 2007-Ohio-3459 , 875 N.E.2d 137 , citing State v. Kelly , Greene App. No. 2004CA122, 2005-Ohio-3058 ; see, also, Uy. *Page 8 {¶ 21} Cleveland Codified Ordinance 3103.99(a) and (c) allow the court to sentence a corporation to a fine of up to $5,000 each day that a property is not in compliance. | 2 | 2008–2025 |
State v. Clunen
neutral
2 sentences2024Columbiana No. 12 CO 30 , 2013-Ohio-5525, ¶ 21 ; State v. Moore, 11th Dist. 2020Columbiana No. 12 CO 30 , 2013-Ohio-5525, ¶ 21 ; State v. Moore, 11th Dist. | 2 | 2020–2024 |
State v. Jones (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2022The 11-month prison term that was imposed was within the appropriate statutory range pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(A)(5). {¶57} In our review of the matter, we stress that under State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242 , 2020-Ohio-6729 , and R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), this court has no authority to modify or vacate a sentence where the trial court has considered the appropriate sentencing statutes, the sentence is within the authorized sentencing range, and the sentence is not otherwise contrary to law. 2022The 11-month prison term that was imposed was within the appropriate statutory range pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(A)(5). {¶57} In our review of the matter, we stress that under State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242 , 2020-Ohio-6729 , and R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), this court has no authority to modify or vacate a sentence where the trial court has considered the appropriate sentencing statutes, the sentence is within the authorized sentencing range, and the sentence is not otherwise contrary to law. | 2 | 2021–2022 |
State v. Geldrich
green
2 sentences2019Warren No. CA2015-11- 103, 2016-Ohio-3400, ¶ 16 . {¶ 41} In support of his argument, appellant cites State v. Laracuente, 8th Dist. 2018Warren No. CA2015-11- 103, 2016-Ohio-3400, ¶ 16 . {¶ 36} In support of his argument, appellant cites several cases where defendants convicted of sexual battery received shorter sentences than appellant. | 2 | 2018–2019 |
State v. Hodges
neutral
2 sentences2019Cuyahoga No. 101145, 2014-Ohio-4690, ¶ 11 , citing State v. Clunen, 7th Dist. 2017Thus, even where a defendant does not speak at sentencing, the court's statement that the defendant demonstrated a lack of remorse and an unwillingness to take responsibility, does not demonstrate that a court's sentencing decision is based upon the silence but shows only that the court was considering the statutory sentencing factors.” Id., citing State v. Clunen, 7th Dist. | 2 | 2017–2019 |
State v. Sideris, Unpublished Decision (3-3-2005)
green
2 sentences2017Athens No. 04CA37, 2005-Ohio-1055 . 2007The court in Barger , however, found that the trial court properly considered the relevant statutory sentencing factors, and that the findings and sentence were not contrary to law, the reviewing court itself noting the "amount of controlled substance involved was substantial[.]" Id., at ¶ 26. {¶ 14} In State v. Sideris , Athens App. No. 04CA37, 2005-Ohio-1055 , at ¶ 27, the court held that, although not an enumerated factor under R.C. 2929.12 (B), the trial court could properly consider the fact the defendant had a "large quantity of drugs in his possession" as part of its consideration of " | 2 | 2007–2017 |
State v. Hayes, 08ap-233 (3-12-2009)
green
2 sentences2017No. 08AP-233, 2009-Ohio-1100 , 2009 WL 638475 ] at ¶ 10 ; [ State v. Holloman , 10th Dist. 2009State v. Holloman , Franklin App. No. 07AP-875, 2008-Ohio-2650 , at ¶ 19 ." State v. Hayes , Franklin App. No. 08AP-233, 2009-Ohio-1100 , at ¶ 8-10 . {¶ 40} Although the trial court did not expressly state that it had considered the principles and purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12 , we must presume that the trial court properly considered the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 . | 2 | 2009–2017 |
State v. Beasley
green
2 sentences1996The Supreme Court, in concluding its analysis in Beasley , stated: “[T]he suspension of a correctly imposed sentence is different from the failure to impose a required sentence; however the end results are the same. * * * Just as the United States Supreme Court has prohibited circumvention of statutory sentencing requirements by indefinitely suspending a sentence, we feel that that court would prohibit circumvention of a statutory sentencing requirement by a trial court’s failure to originally impose a correct sentence.” (Emphasis added.) 14 Ohio St.3d at 76 , 14 OBR at 512-513, 471 N.E.2d at 1996The Supreme Court, in concluding its analysis in Beasley , stated: “[T]he suspension of a correctly imposed sentence is different from the failure to impose a required sentence; however the end results are the same. * * * Just as the United States Supreme Court has prohibited circumvention of statutory sentencing requirements by indefinitely suspending a sentence, we feel that that court would prohibit circumvention of a statutory sentencing requirement by a trial court’s failure to originally impose a correct sentence.” (Emphasis added.) 14 Ohio St.3d at 76 , 14 OBR at 512-513, 471 N.E.2d at | 2 | 1996–2013 |
State v. Johnson, 08-Ma-72 (11-25-2008)
neutral
2 sentences2009No. 09MA72, 2008-Ohio-6206 . {¶ 12} Under the first prong appellate courts must "examine the sentencing court's compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law." Kalish at ¶ 26 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion.) To satisfy this prong, the trial court must consider the statutory sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 , and impose a sentence that is within the statutory range for the relevant offenses. 2009No. 09MA72, 2008-Ohio-6206 . {¶ 44} Under the first prong, appellate courts must "examine the sentencing court's compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law." Kalish at ¶ 26 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion.) To satisfy this prong, the trial court must consider the statutory sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 , and impose a sentence that is within the statutory range for the relevant offenses. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Martin
green
2 sentences2005Martin, 136 Ohio App.3d at 359 . 2002See State v. King (Sept. 9, 1999), Marion App. No. 9-98-67, unreported; Martin, supra, 136 Ohio App.3d at 359 . | 2 | 2002–2005 |
State v. Nuby
green
1 sentence2025A court may impose the longest jail term authorized under section 2929.24 of the Revised Code only upon offenders who commit the worst forms of the offense or upon offenders whose conduct and response to prior sanctions for prior offenses demonstrate that the imposition of the longest jail term is necessary to deter the offender from committing a future criminal offense. {¶17} R.C. 2929.22 does not “mandate that the record reveal the trial court’s consideration of the statutory sentencing factors.” State v. Nuby, 2016-Ohio-8157 , ¶ 13- 14 (7th Dist.), quoting State v. Nelson, 2007-Ohio-3459, ¶ | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Oregon v. Ice
green
2 sentences2024State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 36 , abrogated on other grounds by Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 , 172 L.Ed.2d 517 , 129 S.Ct. 711 (2009). 2024State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 36 , abrogated on other grounds by Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 , 172 L.Ed.2d 517 , 129 S.Ct. 711 (2009). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Johnson green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Crawford neutral | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Savage green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Ware neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Havergne neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Murphy green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Maggette green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Cargill green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Brandon green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Crandall neutral | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Smith green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Lewis neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Lloyd, 2006-L-185 (6-15-2007) neutral | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Delmanzo, 2007-L-218 (11-3-2008) green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Bonnell (Slip Opinion) green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Imber neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Morefield neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Holin green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Ross neutral | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Mannarino green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Gibson, Unpublished Decision (6-17-2004) green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Weitbrecht green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.