statutory sentencing factors in California

2012(D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 308; People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 704 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 208 , 182 P.3d 543 ]; People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1041.) “Because capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants, California’s death penalty law does not deny capital defendants equal protection by providing certain procedural protections to noncapital defendants but not to capital defendants.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 690 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133 , 237 P.3d 474 ]; see Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 681 ; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1

2012(D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 308; People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 704 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 208 , 182 P.3d 543 ]; People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1041.) “Because capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants, California’s death penalty law does not deny capital defendants equal protection by providing certain procedural protections to noncapital defendants but not to capital defendants.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 690 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133 , 237 P.3d 474 ]; see Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 681 ; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1

2012(D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 308; People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 704 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 208 , 182 P.3d 543 ]; People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1041.) “Because capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants, California’s death penalty law does not deny capital defendants equal protection by providing certain procedural protections to noncapital defendants but not to capital defendants.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 690 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133 , 237 P.3d 474 ]; see Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 681 ; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1

2011(D'Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 308; People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 704 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 208 , 182 P.3d 543 ]; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1041 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ].) The use in the sentencing factors of the phrases “extreme mental or emotional disturbance” (§ 190.3, factor (d), italics added) and “extreme duress or . . . substantial domination of another” (id., factor (g), italics added) does not inhibit the consideration of mitigating evidence or make the factors impermissibly vague.

2012(D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 308; People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 704 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 208 , 182 P.3d 543 ]; People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1041.) “Because capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants, California’s death penalty law does not deny capital defendants equal protection by providing certain procedural protections to noncapital defendants but not to capital defendants.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 690 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133 , 237 P.3d 474 ]; see Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 681 ; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1

2011(D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 308; People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 704 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 208 , 182 P.3d *497 543]; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1041 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ].) The use in the sentencing factors of the phrases “extreme mental or emotional disturbance” (§ 190.3, factor (d), italics added) and “extreme duress or . . . substantial domination of another” (id.., factor (g), italics added) does not inhibit the consideration of mitigating evidence or make the factors impermissibly vague.

2012(Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1249; People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 861 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 264 , 200 P3d 879 ]; People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 532 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 181 P.3d 947 ].) *770 The trial court need not label the statutory sentencing factors as either aggravating or mitigating, nor instruct the jury that the absence of mitigating factors does not constitute aggravation.

2012(Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1249; People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 861 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 264 , 200 P3d 879 ]; People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 532 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 181 P.3d 947 ].) *770 The trial court need not label the statutory sentencing factors as either aggravating or mitigating, nor instruct the jury that the absence of mitigating factors does not constitute aggravation.

1996(E.g., People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 791 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ].) Here, the prosecutor sought only to place Garcia’s mitigating testimony in its proper perspective, and to remind the jurors that the sentence defendant sought would allow him to enjoy benefits and relationships, as with Garcia, which he had forever denied his victim.

1996(E.g., People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 791 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ].) Here, the prosecutor sought only to place Garcia’s mitigating testimony in its proper perspective, and to remind the jurors that the sentence defendant sought would allow him to enjoy benefits and relationships, as with Garcia, which he had forever denied his victim.

2012(Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1249; People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 861 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 264 , 200 P3d 879 ]; People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 532 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 181 P.3d 947 ].) *770 The trial court need not label the statutory sentencing factors as either aggravating or mitigating, nor instruct the jury that the absence of mitigating factors does not constitute aggravation.

2011(Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1249; Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 861; People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 532 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 181 P.3d 947 ].) The trial court need not label the statutory sentencing factors as either aggravating or mitigating, nor instruct the jury that the absence of mitigating factors does not constitute aggravation.

2012(Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1249; People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 861 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 264 , 200 P3d 879 ]; People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 532 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 181 P.3d 947 ].) *770 The trial court need not label the statutory sentencing factors as either aggravating or mitigating, nor instruct the jury that the absence of mitigating factors does not constitute aggravation.

2012(Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1249; People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 861 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 264 , 200 P3d 879 ]; People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 532 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 181 P.3d 947 ].) *770 The trial court need not label the statutory sentencing factors as either aggravating or mitigating, nor instruct the jury that the absence of mitigating factors does not constitute aggravation.

2011(People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 474 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677 , 139 P.3d 64 ]; People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 359 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509 , 118 P.3d 545 ]; People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 946 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547 , 891 P.2d 93 ].) The trial court need not label the statutory sentencing factors as either aggravating or mitigating, nor instruct the jury that the absence of mitigating factors does not constitute aggravation.

2011(People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 474 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677 , 139 P.3d 64 ]; People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 359 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509 , 118 P.3d 545 ]; People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 946 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547 , 891 P.2d 93 ].) The trial court need not label the statutory sentencing factors as either aggravating or mitigating, nor instruct the jury that the absence of mitigating factors does not constitute aggravation.

2011(People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 474 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677 , 139 P.3d 64 ]; People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 359 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509 , 118 P.3d 545 ]; People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 946 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547 , 891 P.2d 93 ].) The trial court need not label the statutory sentencing factors as either aggravating or mitigating, nor instruct the jury that the absence of mitigating factors does not constitute aggravation.

2011(People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 474 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677 , 139 P.3d 64 ]; People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 359 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509 , 118 P.3d 545 ]; People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 946 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547 , 891 P.2d 93 ].) The trial court need not label the statutory sentencing factors as either aggravating or mitigating, nor instruct the jury that the absence of mitigating factors does not constitute aggravation.

2011(People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 474 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677 , 139 P.3d 64 ]; People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 359 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509 , 118 P.3d 545 ]; People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 946 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547 , 891 P.2d 93 ].) The trial court need not label the statutory sentencing factors as either aggravating or mitigating, nor instruct the jury that the absence of mitigating factors does not constitute aggravation.

2011(People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 474 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677 , 139 P.3d 64 ]; People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 359 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509 , 118 P.3d 545 ]; People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 946 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547 , 891 P.2d 93 ].) The trial court need not label the statutory sentencing factors as either aggravating or mitigating, nor instruct the jury that the absence of mitigating factors does not constitute aggravation.

1997Because virtually defendant’s only hope of avoiding a death sentence was to try to show his mental illness was so severe the ultimate penalty was unjustified, I cannot confidently conclude “that any misunderstanding ‘had no impact on the court’s decision to deny the motion’ ” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 848 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 809 P.2d 865 ]).

1997Because virtually defendant’s only hope of avoiding a death sentence was to try to show his mental illness was so severe the ultimate penalty was unjustified, I cannot confidently conclude “that any misunderstanding ‘had no impact on the court’s decision to deny the motion’ ” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 848 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 809 P.2d 865 ]).

2007"A jury properly advised about the broad scope of its sentencing discretion is unlikely to conclude that the absence of [mitigating] factors ... is entitled to significant aggravating weight." ( People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 769 , 244 Cal. Rptr. 867 , 750 P.2d 741 .) The other jury instruction proposed by the defense and refused by the trial court read: "Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing the specific harm caused by the defendant's crime.

2007"A jury properly advised about the broad scope of its sentencing discretion is unlikely to conclude that the absence of [mitigating] factors ... is entitled to significant aggravating weight." ( People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 769 , 244 Cal. Rptr. 867 , 750 P.2d 741 .) The other jury instruction proposed by the defense and refused by the trial court read: "Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing the specific harm caused by the defendant's crime.

1988As we held in People v. Ghent, supra , "No good reason appears for depriving the prosecutor of the opportunity to argue that certain otherwise mitigating factors are not present in the case." ( 43 Cal.3d at p. 775 ; see also People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 789-790 [ 230 Cal. Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ].) Our review of the record fails to indicate that the prosecutor actually argued that the absence of a mitigating factor would itself constitute an aggravating factor relevant to the jury's penalty determination.

1988We rejected a similar point in People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 776-777 [ 239 Cal. Rptr. 82 , 739 P.2d 1250 ], and we reject this point here. *699 Section 190.3, the statutory source of CALJIC No. 8.84.1, states in relevant part: "In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account any of the [specified] factors if relevant. ..." (Italics added.) We read the provision (1) to direct the trier of fact to the criteria that the legislative body has determined to be significant in choosing between life and death and (2) to require the trier to consider those criteria, insofar

2012(D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 308; People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 704 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 208 , 182 P.3d 543 ]; People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1041.) “Because capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants, California’s death penalty law does not deny capital defendants equal protection by providing certain procedural protections to noncapital defendants but not to capital defendants.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 690 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133 , 237 P.3d 474 ]; see Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 681 ; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1

2012(D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 308; People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 704 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 208 , 182 P.3d 543 ]; People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1041.) “Because capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants, California’s death penalty law does not deny capital defendants equal protection by providing certain procedural protections to noncapital defendants but not to capital defendants.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 690 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133 , 237 P.3d 474 ]; see Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 681 ; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1

2012(D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 308; People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 704 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 208 , 182 P.3d 543 ]; People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1041.) “Because capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants, California’s death penalty law does not deny capital defendants equal protection by providing certain procedural protections to noncapital defendants but not to capital defendants.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 690 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133 , 237 P.3d 474 ]; see Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 681 ; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1

2012(D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 308; People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 704 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 208 , 182 P.3d 543 ]; People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1041.) “Because capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants, California’s death penalty law does not deny capital defendants equal protection by providing certain procedural protections to noncapital defendants but not to capital defendants.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 690 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133 , 237 P.3d 474 ]; see Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 681 ; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1

2012(D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 308; People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 704 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 208 , 182 P.3d 543 ]; People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1041.) “Because capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants, California’s death penalty law does not deny capital defendants equal protection by providing certain procedural protections to noncapital defendants but not to capital defendants.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 690 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133 , 237 P.3d 474 ]; see Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 681 ; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1

2010(People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 488 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 759 , 122 P.3d 968 ].) Apprendi and its progeny do not demand a different result. {People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 861.) “The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments are not violated by the use of the adjectives ‘extreme’ and ‘substantial’ in connection with section 190.3, factors (g) and (d).” (People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 861.) The trial court need not label the statutory sentencing factors as either aggravating or mitigating nor instruct the jury that the absence of mitigating factors does not con

2010(People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 488 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 759 , 122 P.3d 968 ].) Apprendi and its progeny do not demand a different result. {People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 861.) “The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments are not violated by the use of the adjectives ‘extreme’ and ‘substantial’ in connection with section 190.3, factors (g) and (d).” (People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 861.) The trial court need not label the statutory sentencing factors as either aggravating or mitigating nor instruct the jury that the absence of mitigating factors does not con

2007(People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 729.) i. There is no constitutional requirement of a presumption in favor of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

2006(See People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 379-380 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716 , 956 P.2d 1169 ]; People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 171.) At the penalty phase, the court did not repeat the instruction; the jury was instructed to consider the statutory sentencing factors—including the expansive section 190.3, factor (k)—and to disregard any conflicting guilt phase instructions, and the prosecutor’s argument did not seek to exploit the notion that the “ ‘regardless of the consequences’ ” instruction applied at the penalty phase.

2006(See People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 379-380 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716 , 956 P.2d 1169 ]; People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 171.) At the penalty phase, the court did not repeat the instruction; the jury was instructed to consider the statutory sentencing factors—including the expansive section 190.3, factor (k)—and to disregard any conflicting guilt phase instructions, and the prosecutor’s argument did not seek to exploit the notion that the “ ‘regardless of the consequences’ ” instruction applied at the penalty phase.

1997(See, e.g., People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1192 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 832 P.2d 146 ]; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 979 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 ].) Moreover, the United States Supreme Court recently rejected this precise contention in Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. 967 , concluding that defendant’s labeling argument “is foreclosed by our cases.” (Id. at p. 979 [114 S.Ct. at p. 2638].) “A capital sentencer,” the high court stated, “need not be instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the capital sentencing decision.” (Ibid.) c.

1997(See, e.g., People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1192 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 832 P.2d 146 ]; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 979 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 ].) Moreover, the United States Supreme Court recently rejected this precise contention in Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. 967 , concluding that defendant’s labeling argument “is foreclosed by our cases.” (Id. at p. 979 [114 S.Ct. at p. 2638].) “A capital sentencer,” the high court stated, “need not be instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the capital sentencing decision.” (Ibid.) c.

1997(See, e.g., People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1192 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 832 P.2d 146 ]; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 979 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 ].) Moreover, the United States Supreme Court recently rejected this precise contention in Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. 967 , concluding that defendant’s labeling argument “is foreclosed by our cases.” (Id. at p. 979 [114 S.Ct. at p. 2638].) “A capital sentencer,” the high court stated, “need not be instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the capital sentencing decision.” (Ibid.) c.

1997(See, e.g., People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1192 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 832 P.2d 146 ]; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 979 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 ].) Moreover, the United States Supreme Court recently rejected this precise contention in Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. 967 , concluding that defendant’s labeling argument “is foreclosed by our cases.” (Id. at p. 979 [114 S.Ct. at p. 2638].) “A capital sentencer,” the high court stated, “need not be instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the capital sentencing decision.” (Ibid.) c.

1997(See, e.g., People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1192 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 832 P.2d 146 ]; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 979 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 ].) Moreover, the United States Supreme Court recently rejected this precise contention in Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. 967 , concluding that defendant’s labeling argument “is foreclosed by our cases.” (Id. at p. 979 [114 S.Ct. at p. 2638].) “A capital sentencer,” the high court stated, “need not be instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the capital sentencing decision.” (Ibid.) c.

1990(See California v. Brown, supra, 479 U.S. at pp. 542-543 [93 L.Ed.2d at pp. 940-941]; conc. opn. of O'Connor, J., id., at pp. 544-545 [93 L.Ed.2d at pp. 941-942]; see also People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 544 .) [26] b.

1990(See California v. Brown, supra, 479 U.S. at pp. 542-543 [93 L.Ed.2d at pp. 940-941]; conc. opn. of O’Connor, J., id., at pp. 544-545 [93 L.Ed.2d at pp. 941-942]; see also People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 544 .) 26 b.

1989We rejected a similar point in People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104-105 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 744 P.2d 1127 ].

1989We rejected a similar point in People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104-105 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 744 P.2d 1127 ].