existence of mitigating factors (California) · Go Syfert
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existence of mitigating factors in California

11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2026 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Simpsongreen
calctapp · 1979 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984
2 sentences

1984(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 423(b)(2); see People v. Simpson (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 919 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 249 ]; People v. Regalado (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 531 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 614 ].) The court also viewed petitioner’s youth as a potential mitigating factor. 4 Where a trial court has failed to state reasons for imposition of a consecutive sentence, and particularly when the record reflects the existence of mitigating factors which could have caused the choice of concurrency, a number of courts have found it appropriate to order a remand for resentencing.

1984(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 423(b)(2); see People v. Simpson (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 919 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 249 ]; People v. Regalado (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 531 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 614 ].) The court also viewed petitioner’s youth as a potential mitigating factor. 4 Where a trial court has failed to state reasons for imposition of a consecutive sentence, and particularly when the record reflects the existence of mitigating factors which could have caused the choice of concurrency, a number of courts have found it appropriate to order a remand for resentencing.

22
People v. Boycegreen
cal · 2014 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026(People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 717, fn. 24 .) The California Legislature replaced the term “ ‘mentally retarded’ ” with the term “ ‘intellectual disability’ ” when it amended section 1376, which establishes procedures for the determination of intellectual disability in capital cases.

11
People v. Stronggreen
calctapp · 2001 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024(See Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 377-378; see also Strong, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 337-338.) Nor did Macias proffer any argument or evidence tending to show he was not the sort of “revolving door” defendant for whom the Three Strikes law was enacted.

11
People v. Welchgreen
cal · 1999 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012(People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 415 ; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 767 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203 , 976 P.2d 754 ].) Thus, it would be error to deny a motion for modification because the defendant failed to prove the existence of mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.

2012(People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 415 ; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 767 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203 , 976 P.2d 754 ].) Thus, it would be error to deny a motion for modification because the defendant failed to prove the existence of mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.

11
People v. Avilagreen
cal · 2009 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011Instruction “in the language of CALJIC No. 8.85 allowed consideration of ‘any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial.’ ” (Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 722.) There is no *58 reasonable likelihood the jury understood the instructions to mean that mitigating evidence had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt or that

2011Instruction “in the language of CALJIC No. 8.85 allowed consideration of ‘any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial.’ ” (Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 722.) There is no *58 reasonable likelihood the jury understood the instructions to mean that mitigating evidence had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt or that

11
People v. Lewisgreen
cal · 2009 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011Instruction “in the language of CALJIC No. 8.85 allowed consideration of ‘any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial.’ ” (Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 722.) There is no *58 reasonable likelihood the jury understood the instructions to mean that mitigating evidence had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt or that

2011Instruction “in the language of CALJIC No. 8.85 allowed consideration of ‘any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial.’ ” (Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 722.) There is no *58 reasonable likelihood the jury understood the instructions to mean that mitigating evidence had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt or that

11
People v. Kellygreen
cal · 2007 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011Instruction “in the language of CALJIC No. 8.85 allowed consideration of ‘any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial.’ ” (Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 722.) There is no *58 reasonable likelihood the jury understood the instructions to mean that mitigating evidence had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt or that

2011Instruction “in the language of CALJIC No. 8.85 allowed consideration of ‘any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial.’ ” (Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 722.) There is no *58 reasonable likelihood the jury understood the instructions to mean that mitigating evidence had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt or that

11
People v. Coddingtongreen
cal · 2000 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
1 sentence

2001The only requirement of unanimity was for the verdict itself.” (People v. Breaux, supra, at p. 315 ; see also People v. Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 641 [“CALJIC No. 8.84.2 . . . was not misleading” on this point].) We note the jury was specifically instructed that each juror must decide the question of penalty individually: “Both the People and the defendant are entitled to the individual opinion of each juror.” We conclude it is not reasonably likely the instructions misled the jury into believing it must find the existence of mitigating factors unanimously before such factors could b

11
People v. Crandellgreen
cal · 1988 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
1 sentence

1991(See People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 884.) We disagree.

11
In Re Smithgreen
cal · 1967 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1976–1976
2 sentences

1976(In re Smith (1967) 67 Cal.2d 460, 462 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 615 , 432 P.2d 231 ].) Rather than recommend disbarment, however, the disciplinary board acknowledges the existence of mitigating factors which warrant a reduction of petitioner’s discipline.

1976(In re Smith (1967) 67 Cal.2d 460, 462 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 615 , 432 P.2d 231 ].) Rather than recommend disbarment, however, the disciplinary board acknowledges the existence of mitigating factors which warrant a reduction of petitioner’s discipline.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (13)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Burke green
calctapp · 1980
2 sentences

1984(See, e.g., People v. Masten, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d 579, 593 ; People v. Peters (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 75 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 76 ]; People v. Lutes (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 830 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 300 ]; People v. Whitehouse (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 479 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 199 ]; People v. Burke (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 932 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 4 ]; People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 669 ]; People v. Walker, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 619 .) Where, as here, the court’s comments at the time of imposing consecutive sentences also indicate its arguable reliance on an impermissible factor as determinative

1984(See, e.g., People v. Masten, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d 579, 593 ; People v. Peters (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 75 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 76 ]; People v. Lutes (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 830 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 300 ]; People v. Whitehouse (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 479 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 199 ]; People v. Burke (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 932 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 4 ]; People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 669 ]; People v. Walker, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 619 .) Where, as here, the court’s comments at the time of imposing consecutive sentences also indicate its arguable reliance on an impermissible factor as determinative

21984–1984
People v. Regalado green
calctapp · 1980
2 sentences

1984(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 423(b)(2); see People v. Simpson (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 919 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 249 ]; People v. Regalado (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 531 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 614 ].) The court also viewed petitioner’s youth as a potential mitigating factor. 4 Where a trial court has failed to state reasons for imposition of a consecutive sentence, and particularly when the record reflects the existence of mitigating factors which could have caused the choice of concurrency, a number of courts have found it appropriate to order a remand for resentencing.

1984(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 423(b)(2); see People v. Simpson (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 919 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 249 ]; People v. Regalado (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 531 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 614 ].) The court also viewed petitioner’s youth as a potential mitigating factor. 4 Where a trial court has failed to state reasons for imposition of a consecutive sentence, and particularly when the record reflects the existence of mitigating factors which could have caused the choice of concurrency, a number of courts have found it appropriate to order a remand for resentencing.

21984–1984
People v. Walker green
calctapp · 1978
2 sentences

1984(See, e.g., People v. Masten, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d 579, 593 ; People v. Peters (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 75 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 76 ]; People v. Lutes (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 830 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 300 ]; People v. Whitehouse (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 479 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 199 ]; People v. Burke (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 932 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 4 ]; People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 669 ]; People v. Walker, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 619 .) Where, as here, the court’s comments at the time of imposing consecutive sentences also indicate its arguable reliance on an impermissible factor as determinative

1984(See, e.g., People v. Masten, supra, 137 Cal. App.3d 579, 593 ; People v. Peters (1982) 128 Cal. App.3d 75 [ 180 Cal. Rptr. 76 ]; People v. Lutes (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 830 [ 173 Cal. Rptr. 300 ]; People v. Whitehouse (1980) 112 Cal. App.3d 479 [ 169 Cal. Rptr. 199 ]; People v. Burke (1980) 102 Cal. App.3d 932 [ 163 Cal. Rptr. 4 ]; People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal. App.3d 189 [ 160 Cal. Rptr. 669 ]; People v. Walker, supra, 83 Cal. App.3d 619 .) (6d) Where, as here, the court's comments at the time of imposing consecutive sentences also indicate its arguable reliance on an impermissible factor

21984–1984
People v. Lutes green
calctapp · 1981
2 sentences

1984(See, e.g., People v. Masten, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d 579, 593 ; People v. Peters (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 75 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 76 ]; People v. Lutes (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 830 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 300 ]; People v. Whitehouse (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 479 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 199 ]; People v. Burke (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 932 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 4 ]; People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 669 ]; People v. Walker, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 619 .) Where, as here, the court’s comments at the time of imposing consecutive sentences also indicate its arguable reliance on an impermissible factor as determinative

1984(See, e.g., People v. Masten, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d 579, 593 ; People v. Peters (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 75 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 76 ]; People v. Lutes (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 830 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 300 ]; People v. Whitehouse (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 479 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 199 ]; People v. Burke (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 932 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 4 ]; People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 669 ]; People v. Walker, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 619 .) Where, as here, the court’s comments at the time of imposing consecutive sentences also indicate its arguable reliance on an impermissible factor as determinative

21984–1984
People v. Masten green
calctapp · 1982
2 sentences

1984(See, e.g., People v. Masten, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d 579, 593 ; People v. Peters (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 75 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 76 ]; People v. Lutes (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 830 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 300 ]; People v. Whitehouse (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 479 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 199 ]; People v. Burke (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 932 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 4 ]; People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 669 ]; People v. Walker, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 619 .) Where, as here, the court’s comments at the time of imposing consecutive sentences also indicate its arguable reliance on an impermissible factor as determinative

1984(See, e.g., People v. Masten, supra, 137 Cal. App.3d 579, 593 ; People v. Peters (1982) 128 Cal. App.3d 75 [ 180 Cal. Rptr. 76 ]; People v. Lutes (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 830 [ 173 Cal. Rptr. 300 ]; People v. Whitehouse (1980) 112 Cal. App.3d 479 [ 169 Cal. Rptr. 199 ]; People v. Burke (1980) 102 Cal. App.3d 932 [ 163 Cal. Rptr. 4 ]; People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal. App.3d 189 [ 160 Cal. Rptr. 669 ]; People v. Walker, supra, 83 Cal. App.3d 619 .) (6d) Where, as here, the court's comments at the time of imposing consecutive sentences also indicate its arguable reliance on an impermissible factor

21984–1984
People v. Anjell green
calctapp · 1979
2 sentences

1984(See, e.g., People v. Masten, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d 579, 593 ; People v. Peters (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 75 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 76 ]; People v. Lutes (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 830 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 300 ]; People v. Whitehouse (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 479 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 199 ]; People v. Burke (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 932 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 4 ]; People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 669 ]; People v. Walker, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 619 .) Where, as here, the court’s comments at the time of imposing consecutive sentences also indicate its arguable reliance on an impermissible factor as determinative

1984(See, e.g., People v. Masten, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d 579, 593 ; People v. Peters (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 75 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 76 ]; People v. Lutes (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 830 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 300 ]; People v. Whitehouse (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 479 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 199 ]; People v. Burke (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 932 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 4 ]; People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 669 ]; People v. Walker, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 619 .) Where, as here, the court’s comments at the time of imposing consecutive sentences also indicate its arguable reliance on an impermissible factor as determinative

21984–1984
People v. Whitehouse green
calctapp · 1980
2 sentences

1984(See, e.g., People v. Masten, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d 579, 593 ; People v. Peters (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 75 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 76 ]; People v. Lutes (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 830 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 300 ]; People v. Whitehouse (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 479 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 199 ]; People v. Burke (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 932 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 4 ]; People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 669 ]; People v. Walker, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 619 .) Where, as here, the court’s comments at the time of imposing consecutive sentences also indicate its arguable reliance on an impermissible factor as determinative

1984(See, e.g., People v. Masten, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d 579, 593 ; People v. Peters (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 75 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 76 ]; People v. Lutes (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 830 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 300 ]; People v. Whitehouse (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 479 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 199 ]; People v. Burke (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 932 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 4 ]; People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 669 ]; People v. Walker, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 619 .) Where, as here, the court’s comments at the time of imposing consecutive sentences also indicate its arguable reliance on an impermissible factor as determinative

21984–1984
People v. Peters green
calctapp · 1982
2 sentences

1984(See, e.g., People v. Masten, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d 579, 593 ; People v. Peters (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 75 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 76 ]; People v. Lutes (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 830 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 300 ]; People v. Whitehouse (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 479 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 199 ]; People v. Burke (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 932 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 4 ]; People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 669 ]; People v. Walker, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 619 .) Where, as here, the court’s comments at the time of imposing consecutive sentences also indicate its arguable reliance on an impermissible factor as determinative

1984(See, e.g., People v. Masten, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d 579, 593 ; People v. Peters (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 75 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 76 ]; People v. Lutes (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 830 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 300 ]; People v. Whitehouse (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 479 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 199 ]; People v. Burke (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 932 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 4 ]; People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 669 ]; People v. Walker, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 619 .) Where, as here, the court’s comments at the time of imposing consecutive sentences also indicate its arguable reliance on an impermissible factor as determinative

21984–1984
Hall v. Florida green
scotus · 2014
1 sentence

2026Dr. Schug observed that Thomas appeared “vulnerable to being drawn, perhaps unwillingly, into future acts of violence and aggression—acts he may not necessarily have willfully chosen had he not been in close proximity to other individuals already marked by such behavior.” Dr. Schug observed that Thomas’s “problematic relationship with [Jones] . . . antisocial peers . . . and violent attitudes” could be seen as “motivators for the crimes.” While acknowledging the existence of mitigating factors for sentencing, Dr. Schug opined that Thomas posed a moderate level of risk for re-offense based on h

12026–2026
People v. Carmony green
cal · 2004
1 sentence

2024(See Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 377-378; see also Strong, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 337-338.) Nor did Macias proffer any argument or evidence tending to show he was not the sort of “revolving door” defendant for whom the Three Strikes law was enacted.

12024–2024
People v. Gemelli green
calctapp · 2008
1 sentence

2014Before it imposed sentence, the trial court noted the existence of mitigating factors, such as defendant’s alcoholism and bipolar disorder, but it found them less weighty than the aggravating factors discussed ante. “‘We do not reweigh or reinterpret the evidence’” (People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1545-1546 ), and defendant offers, and we discern, no reason why assigning this degree of importance to the factors defendant asserts in mitigation fell outside the bounds of the court’s discretion. 8 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

12014–2014
People v. Moore green
cal · 2011
1 sentence

2012(People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 415 ; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 767 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203 , 976 P.2d 754 ].) Thus, it would be error to deny a motion for modification because the defendant failed to prove the existence of mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.

12012–2012
In Re Kreamer green
cal · 1975
1 sentence

1984However, a review of these cases reveals the existence of mitigating factors not present here. *169 In In re Kreamer, supra, 14 Cal.3d 524 , this court ordered three years’ probation with no actual suspension for an attorney who had engaged in two separate transactions to distribute large quantities of marijuana.

11984–1984

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Penal Code § 187 (5) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 352 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 91 (1987–2026) NY 70 (1980–2026) NJ 18 (1983–2009) OH 16 (1987–2020) NC 16 (1979–2018) CA 11 (1976–2026) MD 8 (2001–2025) FL 8 (1978–2026) IN 6 (1986–2014) PA 6 (1990–2018) AZ 5 (1981–2011) MN 5 (2007–2017) CT 4 (1999–2009) CO 4 (1990–2001) AL 3 (2007–2022) ME 3 (2010–2011) LA 2 (2010–2024) IA 2 (2022–2025) WA 2 (2013–2013)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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