facts support claim in California

2024By contrast, in those cases appropriate for judicial resolution, as where the facts support a claim for compensatory or punitive damages, the exhaustion requirement may nevertheless lead to settlement and serve to eliminate the unlawful practice or mitigate damages and, in any event, is not an impediment to civil suit, in that the [DFEH’s] practice evidently is to issue a right-to- sue letter [citation] at the employee’s request as a matter of course [citations].” ( Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 83-84, fn. omitted.) To effectuate these purposes, the administrative exhaustion requirement is sat

2021By contrast, in those cases appropriate for judicial resolution, as where the facts support a claim for compensatory or punitive damages, the exhaustion requirement may nevertheless lead to settlement and serve to eliminate the unlawful practice or mitigate damages and, in any event, is not an impediment to civil suit, in that the [DFEH’s] practice evidently is to issue a right-to-sue letter (§ 12965) at the employee’s request as a matter of course [citations].” ( Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 83–84.) b.

2025By contrast, in those cases appropriate for judicial resolution, as where the facts support a claim for compensatory or punitive damages, the exhaustion requirement may nevertheless lead to settlement and serve to eliminate the unlawful practice or mitigate damages and, in any event, is not an impediment to civil suit, in that the [DFEH’s] practice evidently is to issue a right-to-sue letter [citation] at the employee’s request as a matter of course [citations].” (Fn. omitted.) To effectuate these purposes, the administrative exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the FEHA claims in the judici

2024By contrast, in those cases appropriate for judicial resolution, as where the facts support a claim for compensatory or punitive damages, the exhaustion requirement may nevertheless lead to settlement and serve to eliminate the unlawful practice or mitigate damages and, in any event, is not an impediment to civil suit, in that the [DFEH’s] practice evidently is to issue a right-to- sue letter [citation] at the employee’s request as a matter of course [citations].” ( Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 83-84, fn. omitted.) To effectuate these purposes, the administrative exhaustion requirement is sat

2025By contrast, in those cases appropriate for judicial resolution, as where the facts support a claim for compensatory or punitive damages, the exhaustion requirement may nevertheless lead to settlement and serve to eliminate the unlawful practice or mitigate damages and, in any event, is not an impediment to civil suit, in that the [DFEH’s] practice evidently is to issue a right-to-sue letter [citation] at the employee’s request as a matter of course [citations].” (Fn. omitted.) To effectuate these purposes, the administrative exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the FEHA claims in the judici

2024By contrast, in those cases appropriate for judicial resolution, as where the facts support a claim for compensatory or punitive damages, the exhaustion requirement may nevertheless lead to settlement and serve to eliminate the unlawful practice or mitigate damages and, in any event, is not an impediment to civil suit, in that the [DFEH’s] practice evidently is to issue a right-to- sue letter [citation] at the employee’s request as a matter of course [citations].” ( Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 83-84, fn. omitted.) To effectuate these purposes, the administrative exhaustion requirement is sat

2025(See § 12960, subd. (c) [a DFEH complaint “shall set forth the particulars [of the unlawful practice]”; see also Hobson v. Raychem Corp. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 614, 630 , disapproved on another ground by Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1019, 1031 [the DFEH complaint must “identify[ ] with specificity the discrimination alleged and the facts supporting it, including the nature of the disability claimed” because the purpose of the charge is “to supply fair notice of the facts, sufficient to permit investigation”].) Here, Jaimes did not meet the statutory requirements fo

2025(See § 12960, subd. (c) [a DFEH complaint “shall set forth the particulars [of the unlawful practice]”; see also Hobson v. Raychem Corp. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 614, 630 , disapproved on another ground by Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1019, 1031 [the DFEH complaint must “identify[ ] with specificity the discrimination alleged and the facts supporting it, including the nature of the disability claimed” because the purpose of the charge is “to supply fair notice of the facts, sufficient to permit investigation”].) Here, Jaimes did not meet the statutory requirements fo

2022(Dickinson v. Cosby (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1155 (Dickinson).) We also bear in mind the clear and convincing standard of proof if the facts support this standard.

1990By contrast, in those cases appropriate for judicial resolution, as where the facts support a claim for compensatory or punitive damages, the exhaustion requirement may nevertheless lead to settlement and serve to eliminate the unlawful practice or mitigate damages and, in any event, is not an impediment to civil suit, in *84 that the Department's practice evidently is to issue a right-to-sue letter (§ 12965) at the employee's request as a matter of course ( Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1401-1402; see, e.g., Baker v. Children's Hospital Medical Cent

1990By contrast, in those cases appropriate for judicial resolution, as where the facts support a claim for compensatory or punitive damages, the exhaustion requirement may nevertheless lead to settlement and serve to eliminate the unlawful practice or mitigate damages and, in any event, is not an impediment to civil suit, in *84 that the Department's practice evidently is to issue a right-to-sue letter (§ 12965) at the employee's request as a matter of course ( Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1401-1402; see, e.g., Baker v. Children's Hospital Medical Cent

1990By contrast, in those cases appropriate for judicial resolution, as where the facts support a claim for compensatory or punitive damages, the exhaustion requirement may nevertheless lead to settlement and serve to eliminate the unlawful practice or mitigate damages and, in any event, is not an impediment to civil suit, in *84 that the Department's practice evidently is to issue a right-to-sue letter (§ 12965) at the employee's request as a matter of course ( Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1401-1402; see, e.g., Baker v. Children's Hospital Medical Cent

1990By contrast, in those cases appropriate for judicial resolution, as where the facts support a claim for compensatory or punitive damages, the exhaustion requirement may nevertheless lead to settlement and serve to eliminate the unlawful practice or mitigate damages and, in any event, is not an impediment to civil suit, in *84 that the Department's practice evidently is to issue a right-to-sue letter (§ 12965) at the employee's request as a matter of course ( Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1401-1402; see, e.g., Baker v. Children's Hospital Medical Cent

1952Benefit claims, accordingly, are not comparable to applications for business and professional licenses such as those considered in McDonough v. Goodcell, 13 Cal.2d 741, 746-749 [ 91 P.2d 1035 ], and Southern Cal. Jockey Club v. California Racing Board, 36 Cal.2d 167, 174-175 [ 223 P.2d 1 ], where we held that a denial of the licenses did not interfere with property rights.

1952Benefit claims, accordingly, are not comparable to applications for business and professional licenses such as those considered in McDonough v. Goodcell, 13 Cal.2d 741, 746-749 [ 91 P.2d 1035 ], and Southern Cal. Jockey Club v. California Racing Board, 36 Cal.2d 167, 174-175 [ 223 P.2d 1 ], where we held that a denial of the licenses did not interfere with property rights.

1952Benefit claims, accordingly, are not comparable to applications for business and professional licenses such as those considered in McDonough v. Goodcell, 13 Cal.2d 741, 746-749 [ 91 P.2d 1035 ], and Southern Cal. Jockey Club v. California Racing Board, 36 Cal.2d 167, 174-175 [ 223 P.2d 1 ], where we held that a denial of the licenses did not interfere with property rights.

1952Benefit claims, accordingly, are not comparable to applications for business and professional licenses such as those considered in McDonough v. Goodcell, 13 Cal.2d 741, 746-749 [ 91 P.2d 1035 ], and Southern Cal. Jockey Club v. California Racing Board, 36 Cal.2d 167, 174-175 [ 223 P.2d 1 ], where we held that a denial of the licenses did not interfere with property rights.