11 California opinions name it 1 courts 2016–2024 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Marr. of Valligreen2 sentences2020(Raney v. Cerkueira (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 311 , 320–321; Dieden v. Schmidt (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 645, 650 .) Family Code section 760 provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property.” This provision establishes a presumption affecting the burden of proof, which may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. 13 (In re Marriage of Benson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1096, 1103 ; In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1400 (Valli).) 2020(Raney v. Cerkueira (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 311 , 320–321; Dieden v. Schmidt (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 645, 650 .) Family Code section 760 provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property.” This provision establishes a presumption affecting the burden of proof, which may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. 13 (In re Marriage of Benson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1096, 1103 ; In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1400 (Valli).) | 2 | 2 |
In Re Estradagreen1 sentence2022Rather, this provision establishes a presumption of the lower term if the defendant’s youth was “a contributing factor” in his or her commission of the crime “unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice . . . .” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B).) 17 Section 1016.7 was added by Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 4). 39 We agree with defendants that Senate Bill No. 567 “ ‘applies retroactively in this case as an ameliorative change in the l | 1 | 1 |
In Re Valerie A.green1 sentence2016This provision establishes an exception to terminating parental rights when the termination would result in “substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, [1] whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, [2] whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and [3] whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of l | 1 | 1 |
In Re LYLgreen1 sentence2016This provision establishes an exception to terminating parental rights when the termination would result in “substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, [1] whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, [2] whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and [3] whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of l | 1 | 1 |
In Re Daisy D.green1 sentence2016This provision establishes an exception to terminating parental rights when the termination would result in “substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, [1] whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, [2] whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and [3] whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of l | 1 | 1 |
San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Tomas L.green1 sentence2016This provision establishes an exception to terminating parental rights when the termination would result in “substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, [1] whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, [2] whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and [3] whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of l | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Superior Court of Riverside Cnty.
green
2 sentences2023(People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 308 .) Under established law, we “assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that the Legislature intended an ‘amended statute to 31. apply to all defendants whose judgments are not yet final on the statute’s operative date.’ ” (People v. Lopez (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 337 , 341.) “For the purpose of determining the retroactive application of an amendment to a criminal statute, the finality of a judgment is extended until the time has passed for petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.” (Id. at pp. 341-342, citin 2023(People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 308 .) Under established law, we “assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that the Legislature intended an ‘amended statute to apply to all defendants whose judgments are not yet final on the statute’s operative date.’ ” (People v. Lopez (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 337 , 341.) “For the purpose of determining the retroactive application of an amendment to a criminal statute, the finality of a judgment is extended until the time has passed for petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.” (Id. at pp. 341-342, citing Pe | 6 | 2022–2023 |
People v. Vieira
green
2 sentences2023(People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 308 .) Under established law, we “assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that the Legislature intended an ‘amended statute to 31. apply to all defendants whose judgments are not yet final on the statute’s operative date.’ ” (People v. Lopez (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 337 , 341.) “For the purpose of determining the retroactive application of an amendment to a criminal statute, the finality of a judgment is extended until the time has passed for petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.” (Id. at pp. 341-342, citin 2023(People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 308 .) Under established law, we “assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that the Legislature intended an ‘amended statute to apply to all defendants whose judgments are not yet final on the statute’s operative date.’ ” (People v. Lopez (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 337 , 341.) “For the purpose of determining the retroactive application of an amendment to a criminal statute, the finality of a judgment is extended until the time has passed for petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.” (Id. at pp. 341-342, citing Pe | 6 | 2022–2023 |
In Re Marriage of Benson
green
2 sentences2020(Raney v. Cerkueira (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 311 , 320–321; Dieden v. Schmidt (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 645, 650 .) Family Code section 760 provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property.” This provision establishes a presumption affecting the burden of proof, which may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. 13 (In re Marriage of Benson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1096, 1103 ; In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1400 (Valli).) 2020(Raney v. Cerkueira (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 311 , 320–321; Dieden v. Schmidt (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 645, 650 .) Family Code section 760 provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property.” This provision establishes a presumption affecting the burden of proof, which may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. 13 (In re Marriage of Benson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1096, 1103 ; In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1400 (Valli).) | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Dieden v. Schmidt
green
2 sentences2020(Raney v. Cerkueira (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 311 , 320–321; Dieden v. Schmidt (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 645, 650 .) Family Code section 760 provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property.” This provision establishes a presumption affecting the burden of proof, which may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. 13 (In re Marriage of Benson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1096, 1103 ; In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1400 (Valli).) 2020(Raney v. Cerkueira (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 311 , 320–321; Dieden v. Schmidt (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 645, 650 .) Family Code section 760 provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property.” This provision establishes a presumption affecting the burden of proof, which may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. 13 (In re Marriage of Benson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1096, 1103 ; In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1400 (Valli).) | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Raney v. Cerkueira
green
2 sentences2020(Raney v. Cerkueira (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 311 , 320–321; Dieden v. Schmidt (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 645, 650 .) Family Code section 760 provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property.” This provision establishes a presumption affecting the burden of proof, which may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. 13 (In re Marriage of Benson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1096, 1103 ; In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1400 (Valli).) 2020(Raney v. Cerkueira (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 311 , 320–321; Dieden v. Schmidt (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 645, 650 .) Family Code section 760 provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property.” This provision establishes a presumption affecting the burden of proof, which may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. 13 (In re Marriage of Benson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1096, 1103 ; In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1400 (Valli).) | 2 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Sandoval
red
1 sentence2024(People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847 .) “In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two fundamental precepts. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.