public forum analysis in California

2012In step one the court defines the ‘forum’ by deciding whether the forum is the entire property to which access is sought or only a portion of that property.” (Clark v. Burleigh (1992) 4 Cal.4th 474, 484 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 455 , 841 P.2d 975 ] (Clark).) The City contends the trial court erred in defining the area at issue as only the outdoor areas rather than the entire Library campus. 11 We disagree.

2012In step one the court defines the ‘forum’ by deciding whether the forum is the entire property to which access is sought or only a portion of that property.” (Clark v. Burleigh (1992) 4 Cal.4th 474, 484 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 455 , 841 P.2d 975 ] (Clark).) The City contends the trial court erred in defining the area at issue as only the outdoor areas rather than the entire Library campus. 11 We disagree.

2003This is consistent with the court's statement that while a public forum analysis generally provides a workable analytical tool, the distinctions may blur at the edges, particularly "in cases falling between the paradigms of government property interests essentially mirroring analogous private interests and those clearly held in trust, either by tradition or recent convention, for the use of citizens at large." ( City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent (1984) 466 U.S. 789, 815, fn. 32 , 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2134, fn. 32 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772, 794, fn. 32 .) It also is consistent with the court's view that

2003This is consistent with the court's statement that while a public forum analysis generally provides a workable analytical tool, the distinctions may blur at the edges, particularly "in cases falling between the paradigms of government property interests essentially mirroring analogous private interests and those clearly held in trust, either by tradition or recent convention, for the use of citizens at large." ( City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent (1984) 466 U.S. 789, 815, fn. 32 , 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2134, fn. 32 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772, 794, fn. 32 .) It also is consistent with the court's view that

2025Selker, who conceded the point below, does not meaningfully contest the issue; he merely notes that Xcentric cites authority for the “uncontroversial proposition that websites can be ‘public forums . . . .’ ” The law is more clear: “Websites accessible to the public . . . are ‘public forums’ for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 41, fn. 4 ; see also Muddy Waters, LLC v. Superior Court (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 905 , 917 [“Internet postings on websites that ‘ “are open and free to anyone who wants to read the messages” ’ and ‘accessible free of charge

2021(ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1007 (ComputerXpress, Inc.).) Multiple Courts of Appeal and the California 10 Supreme Court have reached this same conclusion.

2013(See § 425.16, subd. (b)(1); see also Kleveland, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 548 .) In making this showing, Hauser may not 4 In light of our decision, we deem it unnecessary to decide whether Nelson's alleged defamatory statements come within any other category of subdivision (e) of section 425.16, including subdivision (e)(4) of section 425.16 which, unlike subdivision (e)(3), does not include a public forum requirement. 14 rely on the allegations in the complaint (see Nagel v. Twin Laboratories, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 39, 45 ) or evidence that would not be admissible at trial (see Hall

2013(See § 425.16, subd. (b)(1); see also Kleveland, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 548 .) In making this showing, Hauser may not 4 In light of our decision, we deem it unnecessary to decide whether Nelson's alleged defamatory statements come within any other category of subdivision (e) of section 425.16, including subdivision (e)(4) of section 425.16 which, unlike subdivision (e)(3), does not include a public forum requirement. 14 rely on the allegations in the complaint (see Nagel v. Twin Laboratories, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 39, 45 ) or evidence that would not be admissible at trial (see Hall

2013(See § 425.16, subd. (b)(1); see also Kleveland, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 548 .) In making this showing, Hauser may not 4 In light of our decision, we deem it unnecessary to decide whether Nelson's alleged defamatory statements come within any other category of subdivision (e) of section 425.16, including subdivision (e)(4) of section 425.16 which, unlike subdivision (e)(3), does not include a public forum requirement. 14 rely on the allegations in the complaint (see Nagel v. Twin Laboratories, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 39, 45 ) or evidence that would not be admissible at trial (see Hall

2013(See § 425.16, subd. (b)(1); see also Kleveland, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 548 .) In making this showing, Hauser may not 4 In light of our decision, we deem it unnecessary to decide whether Nelson's alleged defamatory statements come within any other category of subdivision (e) of section 425.16, including subdivision (e)(4) of section 425.16 which, unlike subdivision (e)(3), does not include a public forum requirement. 14 rely on the allegations in the complaint (see Nagel v. Twin Laboratories, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 39, 45 ) or evidence that would not be admissible at trial (see Hall

2009The court departed somewhat from the United States Supreme Court’s rendering of the public forum doctrine, and instead articulated a more protective version based on the liberty of speech clause of the California Constitution. ( 154 Cal.App.3d at p. 1169 .) The court rejected an all-or-nothing approach to the issue of whether government property is a public forum, viewing the public forum question as “a continuum, with public streets and parks at one end and government institutions like hospitals and prisons at the other.” (Id. at p. 1164.) Instead, adopting the analysis formulated by then Cou

2009The court departed somewhat from the United States Supreme Court’s rendering of the public forum doctrine, and instead articulated a more protective version based on the liberty of speech clause of the California Constitution. ( 154 Cal.App.3d at p. 1169 .) The court rejected an all-or-nothing approach to the issue of whether government property is a public forum, viewing the public forum question as “a continuum, with public streets and parks at one end and government institutions like hospitals and prisons at the other.” (Id. at p. 1164.) Instead, adopting the analysis formulated by then Cou

2003(See Public Utilities Com. v. United States (1958) 355 U.S. 534, 540 , 78 S.Ct. 446, 451 , 2 L.Ed.2d 470, 475 .) We cannot fully and properly resolve the controversy presented without first resolving this question.

2003(See Public Utilities Com. v. United States (1958) 355 U.S. 534, 540 , 78 S.Ct. 446, 451 , 2 L.Ed.2d 470, 475 .) We cannot fully and properly resolve the controversy presented without first resolving this question.

2003This is consistent with the court's statement that while a public forum analysis generally provides a workable analytical tool, the distinctions may blur at the edges, particularly "in cases falling between the paradigms of government property interests essentially mirroring analogous private interests and those clearly held in trust, either by tradition or recent convention, for the use of citizens at large." ( City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent (1984) 466 U.S. 789, 815, fn. 32 , 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2134, fn. 32 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772, 794, fn. 32 .) It also is consistent with the court's view that

2003This is consistent with the court's statement that while a public forum analysis generally provides a workable analytical tool, the distinctions may blur at the edges, particularly "in cases falling between the paradigms of government property interests essentially mirroring analogous private interests and those clearly held in trust, either by tradition or recent convention, for the use of citizens at large." ( City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent (1984) 466 U.S. 789, 815, fn. 32 , 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2134, fn. 32 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772, 794, fn. 32 .) It also is consistent with the court's view that

2003This is consistent with the court's statement that while a public forum analysis generally provides a workable analytical tool, the distinctions may blur at the edges, particularly "in cases falling between the paradigms of government property interests essentially mirroring analogous private interests and those clearly held in trust, either by tradition or recent convention, for the use of citizens at large." ( City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent (1984) 466 U.S. 789, 815, fn. 32 , 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2134, fn. 32 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772, 794, fn. 32 .) It also is consistent with the court's view that

2003This is consistent with the court's statement that while a public forum analysis generally provides a workable analytical tool, the distinctions may blur at the edges, particularly "in cases falling between the paradigms of government property interests essentially mirroring analogous private interests and those clearly held in trust, either by tradition or recent convention, for the use of citizens at large." ( City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent (1984) 466 U.S. 789, 815, fn. 32 , 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2134, fn. 32 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772, 794, fn. 32 .) It also is consistent with the court's view that

2000The solicitation of money is banned in the District of Columbia on the Mall and other parks under the control of the National Park Service. [Citation.] [¶] The Postal Service regulation, narrow in its purpose, design, and effect, does not discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint, is narrowly drawn to serve an important governmental interest, and permits respondents to engage in a broad range of activity to express their views, including the solicitation of financial support.” (Id., at pp. 738-739 [ 110 S.Ct. at p. 3126 ], italics added.) Three justices joined Justice Brennan in dissen

2000The solicitation of money is banned in the District of Columbia on the Mall and other parks under the control of the National Park Service. [Citation.] [¶] The Postal Service regulation, narrow in its purpose, design, and effect, does not discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint, is narrowly drawn to serve an important governmental interest, and permits respondents to engage in a broad range of activity to express their views, including the solicitation of financial support.” (Id., at pp. 738-739 [ 110 S.Ct. at p. 3126 ], italics added.) Three justices joined Justice Brennan in dissen

2000It is apparent that the justification for the solicitation ban is unrelated to the content of speech or the identity of the speaker.” ( Lee, supra, 505 U.S. 672, 705-706 [ 112 S.Ct. 2701, 2721-2722 ], italics omitted (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) The dissent in Lee, supra, 505 U.S. 672, 709 [ 112 S.Ct. 2701, 2723-2724 ] (dis. opn. of Souter, J., joined by Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.), did not contest the conclusion that the solicitation ban was content neutral, but instead merely assumed arguendo that it was (id., at p. 712 [ 112 S.Ct. at p. 2725 ]), and challenged the majority’s public forum anal

2000It is apparent that the justification for the solicitation ban is unrelated to the content of speech or the identity of the speaker.” ( Lee, supra, 505 U.S. 672, 705-706 [ 112 S.Ct. 2701, 2721-2722 ], italics omitted (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) The dissent in Lee, supra, 505 U.S. 672, 709 [ 112 S.Ct. 2701, 2723-2724 ] (dis. opn. of Souter, J., joined by Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.), did not contest the conclusion that the solicitation ban was content neutral, but instead merely assumed arguendo that it was (id., at p. 712 [ 112 S.Ct. at p. 2725 ]), and challenged the majority’s public forum anal

1992It is settled that in such a forum “the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.” (Perry, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 46 [ 74 L.Ed.2d at p. 805 ].) “Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity.” (Id. at p. 49 [74 L.Ed.2d at pp. 807-808].) Specifically, “a speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes