11 California opinions name it 3 courts 1974–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Property Listed in Exhibit Onegreen2 sentences2014If a claim is filed, the district attorney cannot pursue nonjudicial forfeiture but must initiate a judicial forfeiture proceeding. [Citations.]” (People v. Property Listed in Exhibit One (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7 , italics added; see also People v. Shanndoah (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1191 [“Absent a claim to the property being made, a forfeiture under the Health and Safety Code can be effected without judicial action in a purely administrative proceeding.”] People v. ($10,153.38) in United States Currency (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1520, 1523, fn. 2 [because claim was filed challenging the f 1992If a claim is filed, the district attorney cannot pursue nonjudicial forfeiture but must initiate a judicial forfeiture proceeding.” (People v. Property Listed in Exhibit One (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 672 ], citations omitted.) The administrative forfeiture subdivision provides in full: “The Attorney General or the district attorney of the county in which property is subject to forfeiture under Section 11470 may, pursuant to this subdivision, order forfeiture of personal property not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) in value. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Shanndoahgreen1 sentence2014If a claim is filed, the district attorney cannot pursue nonjudicial forfeiture but must initiate a judicial forfeiture proceeding. [Citations.]” (People v. Property Listed in Exhibit One (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7 , italics added; see also People v. Shanndoah (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1191 [“Absent a claim to the property being made, a forfeiture under the Health and Safety Code can be effected without judicial action in a purely administrative proceeding.”] People v. ($10,153.38) in United States Currency (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1520, 1523, fn. 2 [because claim was filed challenging the f | 1 | 1 |
People v. $10,153.38 IN UNITED STATES CURRENCYgreen1 sentence2014If a claim is filed, the district attorney cannot pursue nonjudicial forfeiture but must initiate a judicial forfeiture proceeding. [Citations.]” (People v. Property Listed in Exhibit One (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7 , italics added; see also People v. Shanndoah (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1191 [“Absent a claim to the property being made, a forfeiture under the Health and Safety Code can be effected without judicial action in a purely administrative proceeding.”] People v. ($10,153.38) in United States Currency (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1520, 1523, fn. 2 [because claim was filed challenging the f | 1 | 1 |
Hayssen v. Board of Zoning Adjustmentsgreen2 sentences1992(See § 65010, subd. (b).) The failure to provide notice and public hearings was not a mere minor technical defect (cf. Hayssen v. Board of Zoning Adjustments (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 400, 407-408 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 464 ]; Mack v. Ironside (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 127, 131 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 557 ]), but rather the process was fundamentally flawed by the complete omission of any public notice or hearings when adopting the zoning ordinance. 1992(See § 65010, subd. (b).) The failure to provide notice and public hearings was not a mere minor technical defect (cf. Hayssen v. Board of Zoning Adjustments (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 400, 407-408 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 464 ]; Mack v. Ironside (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 127, 131 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 557 ]), but rather the process was fundamentally flawed by the complete omission of any public notice or hearings when adopting the zoning ordinance. | 1 | 1 |
MacK v. Ironsidegreen2 sentences1992(See § 65010, subd. (b).) The failure to provide notice and public hearings was not a mere minor technical defect (cf. Hayssen v. Board of Zoning Adjustments (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 400, 407-408 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 464 ]; Mack v. Ironside (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 127, 131 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 557 ]), but rather the process was fundamentally flawed by the complete omission of any public notice or hearings when adopting the zoning ordinance. 1992(See § 65010, subd. (b).) The failure to provide notice and public hearings was not a mere minor technical defect (cf. Hayssen v. Board of Zoning Adjustments (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 400, 407-408 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 464 ]; Mack v. Ironside (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 127, 131 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 557 ]), but rather the process was fundamentally flawed by the complete omission of any public notice or hearings when adopting the zoning ordinance. | 1 | 1 |
Laguna Beach Taxpayers' Ass'n v. City Council of Laguna Beachgreen2 sentences1974Code, § 65800 et seq.), and particularly those provisions prescribing the requisite notice and hearing to be afforded to affected property owners. ( Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134 [ 277 P. 308 ]; Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal.2d 826, 837 [ 323 P.2d 71 ]; Laguna Beach Taxpayers' Assn. v. City Council, 187 Cal. App.2d 412, 415 [ 9 Cal. Rptr. 775 ]; People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App.3d 869, 872-873 [ 106 Cal. Rptr. 666 ]; Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal. App.3d 48, 61-64 [ 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 ].) The preceding cases are based in part on the premise that 1974Code, § 65800 et seq.), and particularly those provisions prescribing the requisite notice and hearing to be afforded to affected property owners. ( Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134 [ 277 P. 308 ]; Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal.2d 826, 837 [ 323 P.2d 71 ]; Laguna Beach Taxpayers' Assn. v. City Council, 187 Cal. App.2d 412, 415 [ 9 Cal. Rptr. 775 ]; People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App.3d 869, 872-873 [ 106 Cal. Rptr. 666 ]; Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal. App.3d 48, 61-64 [ 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 ].) The preceding cases are based in part on the premise that | 1 | 1 |
People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisorsgreen2 sentences1974Code, § 65800 et seq.), and particularly those provisions prescribing the requisite notice and hearing to be afforded to affected property owners. ( Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134 [ 277 P. 308 ]; Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal.2d 826, 837 [ 323 P.2d 71 ]; Laguna Beach Taxpayers' Assn. v. City Council, 187 Cal. App.2d 412, 415 [ 9 Cal. Rptr. 775 ]; People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App.3d 869, 872-873 [ 106 Cal. Rptr. 666 ]; Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal. App.3d 48, 61-64 [ 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 ].) The preceding cases are based in part on the premise that 1974Code, § 65800 et seq.), and particularly those provisions prescribing the requisite notice and hearing to be afforded to affected property owners. ( Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134 [ 277 P. 308 ]; Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal.2d 826, 837 [ 323 P.2d 71 ]; Laguna Beach Taxpayers' Assn. v. City Council, 187 Cal. App.2d 412, 415 [ 9 Cal. Rptr. 775 ]; People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App.3d 869, 872-873 [ 106 Cal. Rptr. 666 ]; Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal. App.3d 48, 61-64 [ 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 ].) The preceding cases are based in part on the premise that | 1 | 1 |
Taschner v. City Councilgreen2 sentences1974Code, § 65800 et seq.), and particularly those provisions prescribing the requisite notice and hearing to be afforded to affected property owners. ( Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134 [ 277 P. 308 ]; Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal.2d 826, 837 [ 323 P.2d 71 ]; Laguna Beach Taxpayers' Assn. v. City Council, 187 Cal. App.2d 412, 415 [ 9 Cal. Rptr. 775 ]; People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App.3d 869, 872-873 [ 106 Cal. Rptr. 666 ]; Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal. App.3d 48, 61-64 [ 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 ].) The preceding cases are based in part on the premise that 1974Code, § 65800 et seq.), and particularly those provisions prescribing the requisite notice and hearing to be afforded to affected property owners. ( Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134 [ 277 P. 308 ]; Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal.2d 826, 837 [ 323 P.2d 71 ]; Laguna Beach Taxpayers' Assn. v. City Council, 187 Cal. App.2d 412, 415 [ 9 Cal. Rptr. 775 ]; People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App.3d 869, 872-873 [ 106 Cal. Rptr. 666 ]; Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal. App.3d 48, 61-64 [ 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 ].) The preceding cases are based in part on the premise that | 1 | 1 |
Johnston v. City of Claremontgreen2 sentences1974Code, § 65800 et seq.), and particularly those provisions prescribing the requisite notice and hearing to be afforded to affected property owners. ( Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134 [ 277 P. 308 ]; Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal.2d 826, 837 [ 323 P.2d 71 ]; Laguna Beach Taxpayers' Assn. v. City Council, 187 Cal. App.2d 412, 415 [ 9 Cal. Rptr. 775 ]; People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App.3d 869, 872-873 [ 106 Cal. Rptr. 666 ]; Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal. App.3d 48, 61-64 [ 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 ].) The preceding cases are based in part on the premise that 1974Code, § 65800 et seq.), and particularly those provisions prescribing the requisite notice and hearing to be afforded to affected property owners. ( Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134 [ 277 P. 308 ]; Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal.2d 826, 837 [ 323 P.2d 71 ]; Laguna Beach Taxpayers' Assn. v. City Council, 187 Cal. App.2d 412, 415 [ 9 Cal. Rptr. 775 ]; People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App.3d 869, 872-873 [ 106 Cal. Rptr. 666 ]; Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal. App.3d 48, 61-64 [ 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 ].) The preceding cases are based in part on the premise that | 1 | 1 |
La Rue v. Board of Trusteesgreen2 sentences1974(Beseman v. Remy (1958) supra, 160 Cal.App.2d 437 .) As Justice White wrote in La Rue v. Board of Trustees (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 287, 293 [ 104 P.2d 689 ], “the action of the school board in making yearly contracts with respondents, with the idea of employing them for one year only, is not determinative of their status . . . .” Furthermore, even if the district in fact intended to dismiss Balen in 1967, which appears unlikely on this record, the discharge did not comply with the requisite notice and hearing requirements for terminating the employment of a probationary instructor. (§ 13443.) The 1974(Beseman v. Remy (1958) supra, 160 Cal.App.2d 437 .) As Justice White wrote in La Rue v. Board of Trustees (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 287, 293 [ 104 P.2d 689 ], “the action of the school board in making yearly contracts with respondents, with the idea of employing them for one year only, is not determinative of their status . . . .” Furthermore, even if the district in fact intended to dismiss Balen in 1967, which appears unlikely on this record, the discharge did not comply with the requisite notice and hearing requirements for terminating the employment of a probationary instructor. (§ 13443.) The | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Barber v. State Personnel Board
green
2 sentences2019In Barber v. State Personnel Bd . (1976) 18 Cal.3d 395 , 402, 134 Cal.Rptr. 206 , 556 P.2d 306 , the court held that the appropriate remedy when a permanent civil service employee is denied a Skelly 10 hearing prior to termination "is to award back pay for the period of wrongful discipline." ( Id . at p. 402, 134 Cal.Rptr. 206 , 556 P.2d 306 .) The court explained, "The constitutional infirmity of the disciplinary procedures used in the present case was the imposition of discipline prior to affording the employee notice of the reasons for the punitive action and an opportunity to respond. [Cit 2019In Barber v. State Personnel Bd . (1976) 18 Cal.3d 395 , 402, 134 Cal.Rptr. 206 , 556 P.2d 306 , the court held that the appropriate remedy when a permanent civil service employee is denied a Skelly 10 hearing prior to termination "is to award back pay for the period of wrongful discipline." ( Id . at p. 402, 134 Cal.Rptr. 206 , 556 P.2d 306 .) The court explained, "The constitutional infirmity of the disciplinary procedures used in the present case was the imposition of discipline prior to affording the employee notice of the reasons for the punitive action and an opportunity to respond. [Cit | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Gilbert v. City of Sunnyvale
green
1 sentence2024(See Schwartz, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 429 .) Generally, due process entails two fundamental elements: “notice and an opportunity to respond.” (Gilbert v. City of Sunnyvale (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1279 .) However, as noted above, because due process is a flexible concept (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 334 ), the precise nature of the requisite notice and hearing depends on the particular circumstances of the case and a balancing of various factors. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Schwartz v. Labow
green
1 sentence2024(See Schwartz, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 429 .) Generally, due process entails two fundamental elements: “notice and an opportunity to respond.” (Gilbert v. City of Sunnyvale (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1279 .) However, as noted above, because due process is a flexible concept (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 334 ), the precise nature of the requisite notice and hearing depends on the particular circumstances of the case and a balancing of various factors. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In Re Earl L.
green
1 sentence2024(Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 150 ; In re Earl L. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1053 .) Here, on January 4, 2022, the probate court denied an application filed by Lydia Vose to remove Cadena as trustee, on grounds the application did not comport with the notice provisions of Probate Code section 17203. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
1 sentence2024(See Schwartz, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 429 .) Generally, due process entails two fundamental elements: “notice and an opportunity to respond.” (Gilbert v. City of Sunnyvale (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1279 .) However, as noted above, because due process is a flexible concept (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 334 ), the precise nature of the requisite notice and hearing depends on the particular circumstances of the case and a balancing of various factors. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. John L.
green
1 sentence2024(Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 150 ; In re Earl L. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1053 .) Here, on January 4, 2022, the probate court denied an application filed by Lydia Vose to remove Cadena as trustee, on grounds the application did not comport with the notice provisions of Probate Code section 17203. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Skelly v. State Personnel Board
green
1 sentence2019In Barber v. State Personnel Bd. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 395, 402 , the court held that the appropriate remedy when a permanent civil service employee is denied a Skelly10 hearing prior to termination “is to award back pay for the period of wrongful discipline.” (Id. at p. 402.) The court explained, “The constitutional infirmity of the disciplinary procedures used in the present case was the imposition of discipline prior to affording the employee notice of the reasons for the punitive action and an opportunity 10 In Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 206 , the court held that the | 1 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. United States Currency in the Amount of $2,857.00
green
2 sentences1991(See e.g., United States v. United States Currency etc. (7th Cir. 1985) 754 F.2d 208, 211-212 .) 2 With nonjudicial forfeiture, if the district attorney provides the requisite notice and no claim is filed, the district attorney prepares a written declaration of forfeiture of the subject property to the state and disposes of the property in accordance with section 11489. (§ 11488.4, subd. (j).) The purpose of nonjudicial forfeiture is to save the government the time and expense of a judicial proceeding in cases where the value of the property *7 seized is small. 1991(United States v. United States Currency etc., supra, 754 F.2d at p. 211 .) The nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding is terminated, however, if anyone duly submits a claim to the seized property in response to the notice of nonjudicial forfeiture. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
De Luca v. Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County
green
1 sentence1986Accordingly, we turn to the merits of the standing issue, noting first that in De Luca, supra, petitioner challenged administrative approval of an application for zoning variance on the ground that the requisite notice of hearing did not contain “adequate intimation of the true subject matter of the application . . . .” ( 134 Cal.App.2d 606, 608 .) Only petitioner and one other interested property owner were by law entitled to notice. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Beseman v. Remy
green
1 sentence1974(Beseman v. Remy (1958) supra, 160 Cal.App.2d 437 .) As Justice White wrote in La Rue v. Board of Trustees (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 287, 293 [ 104 P.2d 689 ], “the action of the school board in making yearly contracts with respondents, with the idea of employing them for one year only, is not determinative of their status . . . .” Furthermore, even if the district in fact intended to dismiss Balen in 1967, which appears unlikely on this record, the discharge did not comply with the requisite notice and hearing requirements for terminating the employment of a probationary instructor. (§ 13443.) The | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Hurst v. City of Burlingame
green
2 sentences1974Code, § 65800 et seq.), and particularly those provisions prescribing the requisite notice and hearing to be afforded to affected property owners. ( Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134 [ 277 P. 308 ]; Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal.2d 826, 837 [ 323 P.2d 71 ]; Laguna Beach Taxpayers' Assn. v. City Council, 187 Cal. App.2d 412, 415 [ 9 Cal. Rptr. 775 ]; People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App.3d 869, 872-873 [ 106 Cal. Rptr. 666 ]; Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal. App.3d 48, 61-64 [ 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 ].) The preceding cases are based in part on the premise that 1974Code, § 65800 et seq.), and particularly those provisions prescribing the requisite notice and hearing to be afforded to affected property owners. ( Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134 [ 277 P. 308 ]; Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal.2d 826, 837 [ 323 P.2d 71 ]; Laguna Beach Taxpayers' Assn. v. City Council, 187 Cal. App.2d 412, 415 [ 9 Cal. Rptr. 775 ]; People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App.3d 869, 872-873 [ 106 Cal. Rptr. 666 ]; Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal. App.3d 48, 61-64 [ 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 ].) The preceding cases are based in part on the premise that | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Miller v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence1974In view of the evident difficulties inherent in drafting comprehensive zoning plans, “we may take judicial notice of the fact that it will take much time to work out the details of such a plan and that obviously it would be destructive of the plan if, during the period of its incubation, parties seeking to evade the operation thereof should be permitted to enter upon a- course of construction which might progress so far as to defeat in whole or in part the ultimate execution of the plan.” (Miller v. Board of Public Works, supra, 195 Cal. 477, 496 .) It has been suggested that one to three year | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.