11 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1991–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Truelove & MacLean, Inc.green2 sentences1997Under the majority’s reading of the statute, there would be no purpose for the language in subsection (a) of § 4-160, which sets forth the “were it a private person, could be liable” standard, or, more importantly, for the third sentence in subsection (b), which provides that the “liability of the state in each such action shall be coextensive with and shall equal the . . . liability of private persons in like circumstances.” “There is a presumption of purpose behind every sentence, clause or phrase in a legislative enactment so that in construing it no part is treated as insignificant and unn 1997Under the majority’s reading of the statute, there would be no purpose for the language in subsection (a) of § 4-160, which sets forth the “were it a private person, could be liable” standard, or, more importantly, for the third sentence in subsection (b), which provides that the “liability of the state in each such action shall be coextensive with and shall equal the . . . liability of private persons in like circumstances.” “There is a presumption of purpose behind every sentence, clause or phrase in a legislative enactment so that in construing it no part is treated as insignificant and unn | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chotkowski v. State
green
2 sentences2025Second, this court previously has recognized that ‘‘[t]he sole purpose of § 4-160 . . . is to remove the bar of sovereign immunity when the claims commissioner determines that it would be ‘just and equitable’ to permit a claimant to seek redress against the state.’’ Chotkow- ski v. State, 240 Conn. 246, 270 , 690 A.2d 368 (1997). 2025Second, this court previously has recognized that ‘‘[t]he sole purpose of § 4-160 . . . is to remove the bar of sovereign immunity when the claims commissioner determines that it would be ‘just and equitable’ to permit a claimant to seek redress against the state.’’ Chotkow- ski v. State, 240 Conn. 246, 270 , 690 A.2d 368 (1997). | 4 | 2004–2025 |
Dolnack v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad
green
2 sentences2019This court first extrapolated from decisional law of other jurisdictions a set of "characteristics" that courts should consider in determining whether an entity is entitled to raise the bar of sovereign immunity. 9 Id., at 835-37 , 639 A.2d 530 . 2019This court first extrapolated from decisional law of other jurisdictions a set of "characteristics" that courts should consider in determining whether an entity is entitled to raise the bar of sovereign immunity. 9 Id., at 835-37 , 639 A.2d 530 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Lemoine v. McCann
green
1 sentence2004Although we will not entirely disregard our rules of practice, we do give great latitude to pro se litigants in order that justice may both be done and be seen to be done.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lemoine v. McCann, 40 Conn. App. 460, 468-69 , 673 A.2d 115 (Landau, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 237 Conn. 904 , 674 A.2d 1330 (1996). 6 General Statutes § 4-160 (a) provides: “When the Claims Commissioner deems it just and equitable, he may authorize suit against the state on any claim which, in his opinion, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, we | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Malbaurn v. Weiss
green
1 sentence2004Although we will not entirely disregard our rules of practice, we do give great latitude to pro se litigants in order that justice may both be done and be seen to be done.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lemoine v. McCann, 40 Conn. App. 460, 468-69 , 673 A.2d 115 (Landau, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 237 Conn. 904 , 674 A.2d 1330 (1996). 6 General Statutes § 4-160 (a) provides: “When the Claims Commissioner deems it just and equitable, he may authorize suit against the state on any claim which, in his opinion, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, we | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Lemoine v. McCann
green
2 sentences2004Although we will not entirely disregard our rules of practice, we do give great latitude to pro se litigants in order that justice may both be done and be seen to be done.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lemoine v. McCann, 40 Conn. App. 460, 468-69 , 673 A.2d 115 (Landau, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 237 Conn. 904 , 674 A.2d 1330 (1996). 6 General Statutes § 4-160 (a) provides: “When the Claims Commissioner deems it just and equitable, he may authorize suit against the state on any claim which, in his opinion, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, we 2004Although we will not entirely disregard our rules of practice, we do give great latitude to pro se litigants in order that justice may both be done and be seen to be done.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lemoine v. McCann, 40 Conn. App. 460, 468-69 , 673 A.2d 115 (Landau, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 237 Conn. 904 , 674 A.2d 1330 (1996). 6 General Statutes § 4-160 (a) provides: “When the Claims Commissioner deems it just and equitable, he may authorize suit against the state on any claim which, in his opinion, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, we | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Savage v. Aronson
green
2 sentences2003If it appears to the court that the rights of nonparties will be prejudiced by its declaration, it shall order entry of judgment in such form as to affect only the parties to the action.” The plaintiffs also assert that their declaratory judgment action should be excepted from the bar of sovereign immunity because in Savage v. Aronson, 214 Conn. 256, 266 , 571 A.2d 696 (1990), this court stated that, “[w]e have excepted declaratory and injunctive relief from the sovereign immunity doctrine on the ground that a corut may fashion these remedies in such a manner as to minimize disruption of gover 2003If it appears to the court that the rights of nonparties will be prejudiced by its declaration, it shall order entry of judgment in such form as to affect only the parties to the action.” The plaintiffs also assert that their declaratory judgment action should be excepted from the bar of sovereign immunity because in Savage v. Aronson, 214 Conn. 256, 266 , 571 A.2d 696 (1990), this court stated that, “[w]e have excepted declaratory and injunctive relief from the sovereign immunity doctrine on the ground that a corut may fashion these remedies in such a manner as to minimize disruption of gover | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Zichichi v. Middlesex Memorial Hospital
green
2 sentences1997Under the majority’s reading of the statute, there would be no purpose for the language in subsection (a) of § 4-160, which sets forth the “were it a private person, could be liable” standard, or, more importantly, for the third sentence in subsection (b), which provides that the “liability of the state in each such action shall be coextensive with and shall equal the . . . liability of private persons in like circumstances.” “There is a presumption of purpose behind every sentence, clause or phrase in a legislative enactment so that in construing it no part is treated as insignificant and unn 1997Under the majority’s reading of the statute, there would be no purpose for the language in subsection (a) of § 4-160, which sets forth the “were it a private person, could be liable” standard, or, more importantly, for the third sentence in subsection (b), which provides that the “liability of the state in each such action shall be coextensive with and shall equal the . . . liability of private persons in like circumstances.” “There is a presumption of purpose behind every sentence, clause or phrase in a legislative enactment so that in construing it no part is treated as insignificant and unn | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Fetterman v. University of Connecticut
green
1 sentence1994Fetterman v. University of Connecticut , 192 Conn. 539 , 553 (1984); Duguay v. Hopkins , 191 Conn. 222 , 227 n. 4 (1983); and Weaver v. Ives , 152 Conn. 586 , 590-91 (1965). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Doe v. Heintz
green
2 sentences1994"In the absence of legislative authority, . . . [the court has] declined to permit any monetary award against a state and its officials." Doe v. Heintz , 204 Conn. 17 , 32 , 526 A.2d 1318 (1987). 1994"In the absence of legislative authority, . . . [the court has] declined to permit any monetary award against a state and its officials." Doe v. Heintz , 204 Conn. 17 , 32 , 526 A.2d 1318 (1987). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Duguay v. Hopkins
green
1 sentence1994Fetterman v. University of Connecticut , 192 Conn. 539 , 553 (1984); Duguay v. Hopkins , 191 Conn. 222 , 227 n. 4 (1983); and Weaver v. Ives , 152 Conn. 586 , 590-91 (1965). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Weaver v. Ives
green
1 sentence1994Fetterman v. University of Connecticut , 192 Conn. 539 , 553 (1984); Duguay v. Hopkins , 191 Conn. 222 , 227 n. 4 (1983); and Weaver v. Ives , 152 Conn. 586 , 590-91 (1965). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Lewis
green
1 sentence1992We granted certification, limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the plaintiff had adequately alleged facts amounting to a substantial claim of a violation of his constitutional right against taking of his property without just compensation, so as to avoid the bar of sovereign immunity?” Tamm v. Burns, 220 Conn. 914 , 597 A.2d 340 (1991). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Suffield Bank v. Berman
green
1 sentence1992We granted certification, limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the plaintiff had adequately alleged facts amounting to a substantial claim of a violation of his constitutional right against taking of his property without just compensation, so as to avoid the bar of sovereign immunity?” Tamm v. Burns, 220 Conn. 914 , 597 A.2d 340 (1991). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Tamm v. Burns
green
1 sentence1991The named defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 25 Conn. App. 468 , is granted, limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the plaintiff had adequately alleged facts amounting to a substantial claim of a violation of his constitutional right against taking of his property without just compensation, so as to avoid the bar of sovereign immunity?” | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.