jury charge constitutes plain error in Georgia

2024Indeed, under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”39 The failure to do so precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects 39 OCGA § 17-8-58 (a). 19 the substantial rights of the parties.”40 In such cases, the proper inquiry is whether “the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whet

2024Indeed, under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”39 The failure to do so precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects 39 OCGA § 17-8-58 (a). 19 the substantial rights of the parties.”40 In such cases, the proper inquiry is whether “the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whet

2026“Because an objection voiced at the charge conference does not preserve objections to the charge as subsequently given, the failure to object to the charge as given precludes appellate review unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties.” White v. State, 291 Ga. 7, 8 (2012) (cleaned up).

2026“Because an objection voiced at the charge conference does not preserve objections to the charge as subsequently given, the failure to object to the charge as given precludes appellate review unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties.” White v. State, 291 Ga. 7, 8 (2012) (cleaned up).

2024Indeed, under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”39 The failure to do so precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects 39 OCGA § 17-8-58 (a). 19 the substantial rights of the parties.”40 In such cases, the proper inquiry is whether “the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whet

2024Indeed, under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”39 The failure to do so precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects 39 OCGA § 17-8-58 (a). 19 the substantial rights of the parties.”40 In such cases, the proper inquiry is whether “the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whet

2024Indeed, under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion 10 of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”11 The failure to do so precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects the substantial rights of the parties.”12 In such cases, the proper inquiry is whether the instruction was “erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whether it likely affected

2024Indeed, under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”39 The failure to do so precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects 39 OCGA § 17-8-58 (a). 19 the substantial rights of the parties.”40 In such cases, the proper inquiry is whether “the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whet

2024Indeed, under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”39 The failure to do so precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects 39 OCGA § 17-8-58 (a). 19 the substantial rights of the parties.”40 In such cases, the proper inquiry is whether “the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whet

2024Indeed, under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”39 The failure to do so precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects 39 OCGA § 17-8-58 (a). 19 the substantial rights of the parties.”40 In such cases, the proper inquiry is whether “the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whet

2024Indeed, under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”39 The failure to do so precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects 39 OCGA § 17-8-58 (a). 19 the substantial rights of the parties.”40 In such cases, the proper inquiry is whether “the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whet

2024Indeed, under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”39 The failure to do so precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects 39 OCGA § 17-8-58 (a). 19 the substantial rights of the parties.”40 In such cases, the proper inquiry is whether “the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whet

2018See Henderson v. State , 333 Ga. App. 759 , 760 (1), 777 S.E.2d 48 (2015) (citing OCGA § 17-8-58 (b) and noting that the failure to object regarding a jury instruction at trial precludes appellate review unless "the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties").

2018See Henderson v. State , 333 Ga. App. 759 , 760 (1), 777 S.E.2d 48 (2015) (citing OCGA § 17-8-58 (b) and noting that the failure to object regarding a jury instruction at trial precludes appellate review unless "the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties").

2024Indeed, under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”39 The failure to do so precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects 39 OCGA § 17-8-58 (a). 19 the substantial rights of the parties.”40 In such cases, the proper inquiry is whether “the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whet

2024Indeed, under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”39 The failure to do so precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects 39 OCGA § 17-8-58 (a). 19 the substantial rights of the parties.”40 In such cases, the proper inquiry is whether “the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whet

2023Under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”34 The failure to so object precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects the substantial rights of the parties.”35 In such cases, as the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained, “the proper inquiry is whether the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obvio

2023Under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”34 The failure to so object precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects the substantial rights of the parties.”35 In such cases, as the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained, “the proper inquiry is whether the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obvio

2023Under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”34 The failure to so object precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects the substantial rights of the parties.”35 In such cases, as the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained, “the proper inquiry is whether the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obvio

2023Under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”34 The failure to so object precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects the substantial rights of the parties.”35 In such cases, as the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained, “the proper inquiry is whether the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obvio

2013See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b) (“Failure to object . . . shall preclude appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties[.]”); Allen v. State, 290 Ga. 743, 744-745 (3) ( 723 SE2d 684 ) (2012).

2013See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b) (“Failure to object . . . shall preclude appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties[.]”); Allen v. State, 290 Ga. 743, 744-745 (3) ( 723 SE2d 684 ) (2012).

2026To establish plain error, Rivers must show that the alleged instructional error “was not affirmatively waived, was obvious beyond reasonable dispute, likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” DeMuro v. State, 317 Ga. 155, 163 (2023) (citation omitted).

2026To establish plain error, Rivers must show that the alleged instructional error “was not affirmatively waived, was obvious beyond reasonable dispute, likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” DeMuro v. State, 317 Ga. 155, 163 (2023) (citation omitted).

2023Under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”34 The failure to so object precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects the substantial rights of the parties.”35 In such cases, as the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained, “the proper inquiry is whether the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obvio

2023Under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”34 The failure to so object precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects the substantial rights of the parties.”35 In such cases, as the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained, “the proper inquiry is whether the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obvio

2022And decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only 4 See Walter v. State, 304 Ga. 760, 764 (3) ( 822 SE2d 266 ) (2018) (footnote omitted); see also OCGA § 17-8-58 (b) (“Failure to object . . . shall preclude appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties.

2021The trial court’s factual determinations with respect to counsel’s effectiveness will be upheld on appeal unless clearly erroneous.”5 With these guiding principles in mind, we turn now to Duffie’s claims of error. 3 Walter v. State, 304 Ga. 760, 764 (3) ( 822 SE2d 266 ) (2018) (footnote omitted); see OCGA § 17-8-58 (b) (“Failure to object in accordance with subsection (a) of this Code section shall preclude appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties.

2021To establish plain error, Holmes “must point to an error that was not affirmatively waived, the error must have been clear and not open to reasonable dispute, the error must have affected his substantial rights, and the error must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Denson v. State, 307 Ga. 545, 547-548 (2) (837 SE2d 261) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2021To establish plain error, Holmes “must point to an error that was not affirmatively waived, the error must have been clear and not open to reasonable dispute, the error must have affected his substantial rights, and the error must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Denson v. State, 307 Ga. 545, 547-548 (2) ( 837 SE2d 261 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2014See Cheddersingh v. State, 290 Ga. 680, 682-683 (2), n. 2 ( 724 SE2d 366 ) (2012) (stating that appellant had a duty to inform the trial court of the specific objection to the verdict form before the jury retired to deliberate; failure to object in accordance with OCGA § 17-8-58 (a) “shall preclude appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties”; further, treating preprinted verdict form as a portion of the jury instructions in determining whether there was error in jury instruc

2014See Cheddersingh v. State, 290 Ga. 680, 682-683 (2), n. 2 ( 724 SE2d 366 ) (2012) (stating that appellant had a duty to inform the trial court of the specific objection to the verdict form before the jury retired to deliberate; failure to object in accordance with OCGA § 17-8-58 (a) “shall preclude appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties”; further, treating preprinted verdict form as a portion of the jury instructions in determining whether there was error in jury instruc

2026And an appellant’s “failure to object … to the omission of an instruction[] precludes appellate review of the instruction unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

2025(Citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Jivens v. State, 317 Ga. 859, 861 (1) ( 896 SE2d 516 ) (2023).

2019"An error cannot be plain where there is no controlling authority on point." State v. Herrera-Bustamante , 304 Ga. 259 , 264, 818 S.E.2d 552 (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019"An error cannot be plain where there is no controlling authority on point." State v. Herrera-Bustamante , 304 Ga. 259 , 264, 818 S.E.2d 552 (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2013“Despite the lack of objection below, the omission of the jury instruction [on voluntary manslaughter] was raised on motion for new trial and enumerated as error and argued on appeal in this case.” Carruth v. State, 290 Ga. 342, 347-348 (6) ( 721 SE2d 80 ) (2012).

2012Because an objection voiced at the charge conference does not preserve objections to the charge as subsequently given (Carruth v. State, 290 Ga. 342 (6) (721 SE2d80) (2012)), the failure to object to the charge as given precludes appellate review “unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties.” OCGA § 17-8-58 (b).

2024Examining the relevant case authority, the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that “when a proper charge on a criminal defendant’s election not to testify is timely requested by the defendant, it is error for the trial judge to fail to give it.”17 And such an error “requires a new trial.”18 Similarly, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a state trial judge has “‘the constitutional obligation, upon proper request, to minimize the danger that the jury will give evidentiary weight to a defendant’s failure to testify’ by instructing the jury to draw no adverse inference from the de

2024Examining the relevant case authority, the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that “when a proper charge on a criminal defendant’s election not to testify is timely requested by the defendant, it is error for the trial judge to fail to give it.”17 And such an error “requires a new trial.”18 Similarly, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a state trial judge has “‘the constitutional obligation, upon proper request, to minimize the danger that the jury will give evidentiary weight to a defendant’s failure to testify’ by instructing the jury to draw no adverse inference from the de

2024Examining the relevant case authority, the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that “when a proper charge on a criminal defendant’s election not to testify is timely requested by the defendant, it is error for the trial judge to fail to give it.”17 And such an error “requires a new trial.”18 Similarly, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a state trial judge has “‘the constitutional obligation, upon proper request, to minimize the danger that the jury will give evidentiary weight to a defendant’s failure to testify’ by instructing the jury to draw no adverse inference from the de

2024Examining the relevant case authority, the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that “when a proper charge on a criminal defendant’s election not to testify is timely requested by the defendant, it is error for the trial judge to fail to give it.”17 And such an error “requires a new trial.”18 Similarly, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a state trial judge has “‘the constitutional obligation, upon proper request, to minimize the danger that the jury will give evidentiary weight to a defendant’s failure to testify’ by instructing the jury to draw no adverse inference from the de

2023Even assuming that the evidence of Davis’s complicity was sufficient to require the giving of an accomplice-corroboration instruction, see Doyle v. State, 307 Ga. 609, 612 (2) (a) (837 SE2d 833) (2020), Williams has failed to establish that the trial court’s failure to give the instruction affected his substantial rights.

2023Even assuming that the evidence of Davis’s complicity was sufficient to require the giving of an accomplice-corroboration instruction, see Doyle v. State, 307 Ga. 609, 612 (2) (a) (837 SE2d 833) (2020), Williams has failed to establish that the trial court’s failure to give the instruction affected his substantial rights.

2023In such cases, the proper inquiry is 4 (Citations omitted.) Rankin, 278 Ga. at 705 . 5 See Drogan v. State, 272 Ga. App. 645, 647 (1) (b) ( 613 SE2d 195 ) (2005). 6 See Brent v. State, 270 Ga. 160, 161 (1) ( 510 SE2d 14 ) (1998). 4 whether the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whether it likely affected the outcome of the proceedings.”7 (a) Ghant argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on demonstrative evidence or on how to evaluate and/or weigh demonstrative evidence.

2023In such cases, the proper inquiry is 4 (Citations omitted.) Rankin, 278 Ga. at 705 . 5 See Drogan v. State, 272 Ga. App. 645, 647 (1) (b) ( 613 SE2d 195 ) (2005). 6 See Brent v. State, 270 Ga. 160, 161 (1) ( 510 SE2d 14 ) (1998). 4 whether the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whether it likely affected the outcome of the proceedings.”7 (a) Ghant argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on demonstrative evidence or on how to evaluate and/or weigh demonstrative evidence.

2023Indeed, under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”3 The failure to do so precludes appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless “such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects the substantial rights of the parties.”4 In such cases, the proper inquiry is whether “the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whether it likely affected the o

2023Indeed, under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”3 The failure to do so precludes appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless “such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects the substantial rights of the parties.”4 In such cases, the proper inquiry is whether “the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whether it likely affected the o

2023In such cases, the proper inquiry is 4 (Citations omitted.) Rankin, 278 Ga. at 705 . 5 See Drogan v. State, 272 Ga. App. 645, 647 (1) (b) ( 613 SE2d 195 ) (2005). 6 See Brent v. State, 270 Ga. 160, 161 (1) ( 510 SE2d 14 ) (1998). 4 whether the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whether it likely affected the outcome of the proceedings.”7 (a) Ghant argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on demonstrative evidence or on how to evaluate and/or weigh demonstrative evidence.

2023In such cases, the proper inquiry is 4 (Citations omitted.) Rankin, 278 Ga. at 705 . 5 See Drogan v. State, 272 Ga. App. 645, 647 (1) (b) ( 613 SE2d 195 ) (2005). 6 See Brent v. State, 270 Ga. 160, 161 (1) ( 510 SE2d 14 ) (1998). 4 whether the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whether it likely affected the outcome of the proceedings.”7 (a) Ghant argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on demonstrative evidence or on how to evaluate and/or weigh demonstrative evidence.

2022Such plain error may be considered on appeal even if it was not brought to the court’s attention[.]”). 5 466 U. S. 668, 687 (III) ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984). 4 if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a course.6 (a) Wood contends that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to file a statutory speedy trial demand.7 “Whether to file a demand for speedy trial is usually a matter of trial tactics and strategy, as a delay in bringing the case to trial may work to a defendant’s advantage.”8 At the hearing on the motion for new trial,

2022Such plain error may be considered on appeal even if it was not brought to the court’s attention[.]”). 5 466 U. S. 668, 687 (III) ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984). 4 if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a course.6 (a) Wood contends that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to file a statutory speedy trial demand.7 “Whether to file a demand for speedy trial is usually a matter of trial tactics and strategy, as a delay in bringing the case to trial may work to a defendant’s advantage.”8 At the hearing on the motion for new trial,

2022And under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”26 The failure to so object precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects the substantial rights of the prejudiced his case given overwhelming evidence that shooting was not in self- defense, including testimony from multiple witnesses that victim was not

2022And under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”26 The failure to so object precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects the substantial rights of the prejudiced his case given overwhelming evidence that shooting was not in self- defense, including testimony from multiple witnesses that victim was not