Clay v. State, 224 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. 1976). · Go Syfert
Clay v. State, 224 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. 1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
36 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (rule) Nicole Duree Guerra v. State (4×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
And in the absence of such a request, the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on this issue did not constitute error, much less plain error.24 Accordingly, Guerra’s contention lacks merit. 23 Id. (emphasis in original). 24 See Bynum v. State, 315 Ga. App. 392, 394-95 (1) (b) ( 726 SE2d 428 ) (2012) (holding that because jury instruction regarding defendant’s decision not to testify was not required absent a request for such instruction, trial court did not err in failing to provide it sua sponte, and thus defendant’s claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by no…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barnes v. the State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
But even prior to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Carter, the Georgia Supreme Court held in Clay v. State, 236 Ga. 398, 399 ( 224 SE2d 14 ) (1976), that when a defendant makes a timely request for a charge that his failure to testify in his own defense shall not create a presumption against him, “it is error for the trial judge to fail to give it,” and the Court found that such an error “requires a new trial.” See Murphy v. State, 270 Ga. 880, 880 ( 515 SE2d 148 ) (1999); Culbertson v. State, 193 Ga. App. 9, 11 (6) ( 386 SE2d 894 ) (1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Murphy v. State (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ga. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
“It necessarily follows, as a matter of logical reasoning, that when a proper charge on this subject is timely requested by the defendant, it is error for the trial judge to fail to give it.” Clay v. State, 236 Ga. 398, 399 ( 224 SE2d 14 ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Harwell v. Georgia Power Co.
Ga. · 1980 · confidence medium
The “Furthermore” paragraph in Sadtler (236 Ga. at 398), relied upon by the majority here, was surplusage in Sadtler.
discussed Cited "see" Bigby v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Clay v. State, 236 Ga. 398, 399 ( 224 SE2d 14 ) (1976).
discussed Cited "see" Clay v. State (2×)
Ga. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Clay v. State, 236 Ga. 398 ( 224 SE2d 14 ) (1976), where this court reversed the former conviction for failure to give a requested charge that no presumption should attach to defendant’s failure to testify. 1.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Clay
v.
the State
30749.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Mar 8, 1976.
224 S.E.2d 14
Henry C. Ross, for appellant., Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Donald J. Stein, Assistant District Attorney, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Isaac Byrd, for appellee.
Ingram.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published
Ingram, Justice.

This appeal, from an armed robbery conviction in Fulton Superior Court, presents only one issue for[*399] decision: Did the trial court err in failing to charge the jury, upon the written request of the defendant to do so, that the defendant’s failure to testify in his own favor shall not create a presumption against him? Two recent decisions of this court, noted below, lead us to conclude that it was error and that a new trial must be ordered in this case.

Submitted January 29, 1976 Decided March 8, 1976. Henry C. Ross, for appellant. Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Donald J. Stein, Assistant District Attorney, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Isaac Byrd, for appellee.

In fairness to the capable trial judge who presided at this trial, it should be observed that the defendant was tried on July 7, 1975, before this court had passed on the issue. At the time of the trial, Linder v. State, 132 Ga. App. 624, 625 (3) (208 SE2d 630) (1974) was being followed by the trial courts. Linder held that such a charge was error. On September 5, 1975, this court decided Woodard v. State, 234 Ga. 901, 903 (218 SE2d 629) (1975), which held that such a charge would be proper but that it was not "error to fail to so charge in the absence of a proper and timely request.” This was the first precursor of the decision we reach in this case. Woodard expressly disapproved of the holding in Linder v. State, supra.

After Woodard came Stapleton v. State, 235 Ga. 513 (220 SE2d 269) (1975). In that case, the trial judge gave, without request by the defendant, an instruction to the jury that is similar to the instruction requested but refused in the present case. We held that it was not error for the charge to be given and that such a charge "was, in fact, beneficial to the defendant.” Id., p. 520.

It necessarily follows, as a matter of logical reasoning, that when a proper charge on this subject is timely requested by the defendant, it is error for the trial judge to fail to give it. This error requires a new trial.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur.