right to bring claim in Connecticut

11 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1998–2024 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

Case	Followed	Cited
Detar v. Coast Venture XXVX, Inc.green connappct · 2005 · cited in 3 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2011–2024 2 sentences 2024The plaintiff points to our decision in Detar v. Coast Venture XXVX, Inc., 91 Conn. App. 263, 266 , 880 A.2d 180 (2005), for the proposition that a failure to raise an issue in an initial appeal to this court constitutes a waiver of the right to bring the claim in a subsequent appeal. 2024The plaintiff points to our decision in Detar v. Coast Venture XXVX, Inc., 91 Conn. App. 263, 266 , 880 A.2d 180 (2005), for the proposition that a failure to raise an issue in an initial appeal to this court constitutes a waiver of the right to bring the claim in a subsequent appeal.	1	3
State v. Straubgreen conn · 2005 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 1 sentence 2015Failure to raise an issue in an initial appeal to this court constitutes a waiver of the right to bring the claim.’’ (Citation omitted.) Detar v. Coast Venture XXVX, Inc., 91 Conn. App. 263, 266 , 880 A.2d 180 (2005); see also Fernandes v. Rodriguez, 90 Conn. App. 601 , 612–14, 879 A.2d 897 (refusing to consider merits of claim pertaining to denial of motion to vacate where appellant previously unsuccessfully attempted to file late appeal of denial from same motion), cert. denied, 275 Conn. 927 , 883 A.2d 1243 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1027 , 126 S. Ct. 1585 , 164 L.	1	1
Fernandes v. Rodriguezgreen conn · 2005 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 1 sentence 2015Failure to raise an issue in an initial appeal to this court constitutes a waiver of the right to bring the claim.’’ (Citation omitted.) Detar v. Coast Venture XXVX, Inc., 91 Conn. App. 263, 266 , 880 A.2d 180 (2005); see also Fernandes v. Rodriguez, 90 Conn. App. 601 , 612–14, 879 A.2d 897 (refusing to consider merits of claim pertaining to denial of motion to vacate where appellant previously unsuccessfully attempted to file late appeal of denial from same motion), cert. denied, 275 Conn. 927 , 883 A.2d 1243 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1027 , 126 S. Ct. 1585 , 164 L.	1	1
Fernandes v. Rodriguezgreen connappct · 2005 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 2 sentences 2015Failure to raise an issue in an initial appeal to this court constitutes a waiver of the right to bring the claim.’’ (Citation omitted.) Detar v. Coast Venture XXVX, Inc., 91 Conn. App. 263, 266 , 880 A.2d 180 (2005); see also Fernandes v. Rodriguez, 90 Conn. App. 601 , 612–14, 879 A.2d 897 (refusing to consider merits of claim pertaining to denial of motion to vacate where appellant previously unsuccessfully attempted to file late appeal of denial from same motion), cert. denied, 275 Conn. 927 , 883 A.2d 1243 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1027 , 126 S. Ct. 1585 , 164 L. 2015Failure to raise an issue in an initial appeal to this court constitutes a waiver of the right to bring the claim.’’ (Citation omitted.) Detar v. Coast Venture XXVX, Inc., 91 Conn. App. 263, 266 , 880 A.2d 180 (2005); see also Fernandes v. Rodriguez, 90 Conn. App. 601 , 612–14, 879 A.2d 897 (refusing to consider merits of claim pertaining to denial of motion to vacate where appellant previously unsuccessfully attempted to file late appeal of denial from same motion), cert. denied, 275 Conn. 927 , 883 A.2d 1243 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1027 , 126 S. Ct. 1585 , 164 L.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (19)

Case	Cited	Years
Gagne v. Vaccaro green conn · 2004 2 sentences 2023This court has defined waiver as ‘‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004). 2021Failure to raise an issue in an initial appeal to this court constitutes a waiver of the right to bring the claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Disciplin- ary Counsel v. Evans, 159 Conn. App. 343 , 356, 123 A.3d 69 (2015). ‘‘Waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004). ‘‘It is axiomatic, how- ever, that this principle applies only when the issue that a party seeks to raise in a subsequent appea	2	2021–2023
Old Kent Mortgage Services, Inc. v. Ford green conn · 2004 2 sentences 2023This court has defined waiver as ‘‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004). 2021Failure to raise an issue in an initial appeal to this court constitutes a waiver of the right to bring the claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Disciplin- ary Counsel v. Evans, 159 Conn. App. 343 , 356, 123 A.3d 69 (2015). ‘‘Waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004). ‘‘It is axiomatic, how- ever, that this principle applies only when the issue that a party seeks to raise in a subsequent appea	2	2021–2023
Gagne v. Vaccaro green connappct · 2003 2 sentences 2021Failure to raise an issue in an initial appeal to this court constitutes a waiver of the right to bring the claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Disciplin- ary Counsel v. Evans, 159 Conn. App. 343 , 356, 123 A.3d 69 (2015). ‘‘Waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004). ‘‘It is axiomatic, how- ever, that this principle applies only when the issue that a party seeks to raise in a subsequent appea 2021Failure to raise an issue in an initial appeal to this court constitutes a waiver of the right to bring the claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Disciplin- ary Counsel v. Evans, 159 Conn. App. 343 , 356, 123 A.3d 69 (2015). ‘‘Waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004). ‘‘It is axiomatic, how- ever, that this principle applies only when the issue that a party seeks to raise in a subsequent appea	2	2021–2023
Hryniewicz v. Wilson green connappct · 1999 2 sentences 2020Hryniewicz v. Wilson, 51 Conn. App. 440, 446 , 722 A.2d 288 (1999). . . . ‘‘Furthermore, the [trial] court, on remand, [is] bound by the law of the case doctrine. 2020Hryniewicz v. Wilson, 51 Conn. App. 440, 446 , 722 A.2d 288 (1999). . . . ‘‘Furthermore, the [trial] court, on remand, [is] bound by the law of the case doctrine.	2	2005–2020
Kachalsky v. Cacace green scotus · 2013 1 sentence 2021Failure to raise an issue in an initial appeal to this court constitutes a waiver of the right to bring the claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Disciplin- ary Counsel v. Evans, 159 Conn. App. 343 , 356, 123 A.3d 69 (2015). ‘‘Waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004). ‘‘It is axiomatic, how- ever, that this principle applies only when the issue that a party seeks to raise in a subsequent appea	1	2021–2021
In re Lee green scotus · 2013 1 sentence 2021Failure to raise an issue in an initial appeal to this court constitutes a waiver of the right to bring the claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Disciplin- ary Counsel v. Evans, 159 Conn. App. 343 , 356, 123 A.3d 69 (2015). ‘‘Waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004). ‘‘It is axiomatic, how- ever, that this principle applies only when the issue that a party seeks to raise in a subsequent appea	1	2021–2021
GlaxoSmithKline v. Human Med. Plans, Inc. green scotus · 2013 1 sentence 2021Failure to raise an issue in an initial appeal to this court constitutes a waiver of the right to bring the claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Disciplin- ary Counsel v. Evans, 159 Conn. App. 343 , 356, 123 A.3d 69 (2015). ‘‘Waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 445 , 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 , 846 A.2d 881 (2004). ‘‘It is axiomatic, how- ever, that this principle applies only when the issue that a party seeks to raise in a subsequent appea	1	2021–2021
Calcano v. Calcano green conn · 2001 2 sentences 2015To the extent that the plaintiffs contend that the right to bring a claim against a Medicaid recipient pursuant to § 17b- 265 is the effective equivalent of a lien right and, there- fore, that this application of the statute is inconsistent with and preempted by the antilien provision set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (a) (1) (2012),13 we decline to address this contention because the plaintiffs raised it for the first time in their reply brief.14 See, e.g., Calcano v. Calcano, 257 Conn. 230, 244 , 777 A.2d 633 (2001) (claims cannot be raised for first time in reply brief). 2015To the extent that the plaintiffs contend that the right to bring a claim against a Medicaid recipient pursuant to § 17b- 265 is the effective equivalent of a lien right and, there- fore, that this application of the statute is inconsistent with and preempted by the antilien provision set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (a) (1) (2012),13 we decline to address this contention because the plaintiffs raised it for the first time in their reply brief.14 See, e.g., Calcano v. Calcano, 257 Conn. 230, 244 , 777 A.2d 633 (2001) (claims cannot be raised for first time in reply brief).	1	2015–2015
AMERICAN DIAMOND EXCHANGE, INC. v. Alpert green conn · 2011 2 sentences 2015Ed. 2d 312 (2006). ‘‘It is axiomatic, however, that this principle applies only when the issue that a party seeks to raise in a subse- quent appeal was one that the party actually litigated prior to the initial appeal such that the issue could have been raised in the initial appeal.’’ (Emphasis in original.) American Diamond Exchange, Inc. v. Alpert, 302 Conn. 494, 508 , 28 A.3d 976 (2011). 2015Ed. 2d 312 (2006). ‘‘It is axiomatic, however, that this principle applies only when the issue that a party seeks to raise in a subse- quent appeal was one that the party actually litigated prior to the initial appeal such that the issue could have been raised in the initial appeal.’’ (Emphasis in original.) American Diamond Exchange, Inc. v. Alpert, 302 Conn. 494, 508 , 28 A.3d 976 (2011).	1	2015–2015
Neuhaus v. DeCholnoky neutral connappct · 2004 2 sentences 2014The plaintiff argues that while this court has ‘‘refused to find the statute unconstitutional in other cases, such as Golden [v. Johnson Memorial Hospital, Inc.,] supra, 66 Conn. App. 533–42, and Neuhaus [v. DeCholnoky, 83 Conn. App. 576 , 589–95, 850 A.2d 1106 (2004), rev’d in part on other grounds, 280 Conn. 190 , 905 A.2d 1135 (2006)] the facts of this case, and of any ‘foreign object’ case, warrant a reconsideration of these rulings.’’ We disagree. 2014The plaintiff argues that while this court has ‘‘refused to find the statute unconstitutional in other cases, such as Golden [v. Johnson Memorial Hospital, Inc.,] supra, 66 Conn. App. 533–42, and Neuhaus [v. DeCholnoky, 83 Conn. App. 576 , 589–95, 850 A.2d 1106 (2004), rev’d in part on other grounds, 280 Conn. 190 , 905 A.2d 1135 (2006)] the facts of this case, and of any ‘foreign object’ case, warrant a reconsideration of these rulings.’’ We disagree.	1	2014–2014
Neuhaus v. DeCholnoky green conn · 2006 2 sentences 2014The plaintiff argues that while this court has ‘‘refused to find the statute unconstitutional in other cases, such as Golden [v. Johnson Memorial Hospital, Inc.,] supra, 66 Conn. App. 533–42, and Neuhaus [v. DeCholnoky, 83 Conn. App. 576 , 589–95, 850 A.2d 1106 (2004), rev’d in part on other grounds, 280 Conn. 190 , 905 A.2d 1135 (2006)] the facts of this case, and of any ‘foreign object’ case, warrant a reconsideration of these rulings.’’ We disagree. 2014The plaintiff argues that while this court has ‘‘refused to find the statute unconstitutional in other cases, such as Golden [v. Johnson Memorial Hospital, Inc.,] supra, 66 Conn. App. 533–42, and Neuhaus [v. DeCholnoky, 83 Conn. App. 576 , 589–95, 850 A.2d 1106 (2004), rev’d in part on other grounds, 280 Conn. 190 , 905 A.2d 1135 (2006)] the facts of this case, and of any ‘foreign object’ case, warrant a reconsideration of these rulings.’’ We disagree.	1	2014–2014
State v. Leonard green conn · 1988 1 sentence 2000It is well established, for example, that a non-attorney officer of a corporation may not file such an appearance on the corporation's behalf Triton Associates v. Six New Corporation, et al, 14 Conn. App. 172 , 175-76 , 540 A.2d 95 , cert. denied, 208 Conn. 806 , 545 A.2d 1104 (1988).	1	2000–2000
Triton Associates v. Six New Corp. green conn · 1988 1 sentence 2000It is well established, for example, that a non-attorney officer of a corporation may not file such an appearance on the corporation's behalf Triton Associates v. Six New Corporation, et al, 14 Conn. App. 172 , 175-76 , 540 A.2d 95 , cert. denied, 208 Conn. 806 , 545 A.2d 1104 (1988).	1	2000–2000
Triton Associates v. Six New Corp. green connappct · 1988 2 sentences 2000It is well established, for example, that a non-attorney officer of a corporation may not file such an appearance on the corporation's behalf Triton Associates v. Six New Corporation, et al, 14 Conn. App. 172 , 175-76 , 540 A.2d 95 , cert. denied, 208 Conn. 806 , 545 A.2d 1104 (1988). 2000It is well established, for example, that a non-attorney officer of a corporation may not file such an appearance on the corporation's behalf Triton Associates v. Six New Corporation, et al, 14 Conn. App. 172 , 175-76 , 540 A.2d 95 , cert. denied, 208 Conn. 806 , 545 A.2d 1104 (1988).	1	2000–2000
Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Town of Lebanon green conn · 1993 2 sentences 1998Specifically, the plaintiffs, relying on dicta in Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Lebanon, 226 Conn. 314, 330-33 , 627 A.2d 909 (1993), contend that they are entitled to bring such an action because a damages remedy existed prior to the adoption of our constitution in 1818 for violations of rights that were viewed as fundamental at that time and which are substantially similar to those protected under article first, §§ 7 and 9. 8 We disagree. 9 Our resolution of the plaintiffs’ claim requires a brief review of our article first, § 10 jurisprudence, which derives from the seminal case of G 1998Specifically, the plaintiffs, relying on dicta in Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Lebanon, 226 Conn. 314, 330-33 , 627 A.2d 909 (1993), contend that they are entitled to bring such an action because a damages remedy existed prior to the adoption of our constitution in 1818 for violations of rights that were viewed as fundamental at that time and which are substantially similar to those protected under article first, §§ 7 and 9. 8 We disagree. 9 Our resolution of the plaintiffs’ claim requires a brief review of our article first, § 10 jurisprudence, which derives from the seminal case of G	1	1998–1998
Gentile v. Altermatt green conn · 1975 2 sentences 1998Specifically, the plaintiffs, relying on dicta in Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Lebanon, 226 Conn. 314, 330-33 , 627 A.2d 909 (1993), contend that they are entitled to bring such an action because a damages remedy existed prior to the adoption of our constitution in 1818 for violations of rights that were viewed as fundamental at that time and which are substantially similar to those protected under article first, §§ 7 and 9. 8 We disagree. 9 Our resolution of the plaintiffs’ claim requires a brief review of our article first, § 10 jurisprudence, which derives from the seminal case of G 1998Specifically, the plaintiffs, relying on dicta in Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Lebanon, 226 Conn. 314, 330-33 , 627 A.2d 909 (1993), contend that they are entitled to bring such an action because a damages remedy existed prior to the adoption of our constitution in 1818 for violations of rights that were viewed as fundamental at that time and which are substantially similar to those protected under article first, §§ 7 and 9. 8 We disagree. 9 Our resolution of the plaintiffs’ claim requires a brief review of our article first, § 10 jurisprudence, which derives from the seminal case of G	1	1998–1998
Thompson Van Lines, Inc. v. United States green scotus · 1976 1 sentence 1998Specifically, the plaintiffs, relying on dicta in Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Lebanon, 226 Conn. 314, 330-33 , 627 A.2d 909 (1993), contend that they are entitled to bring such an action because a damages remedy existed prior to the adoption of our constitution in 1818 for violations of rights that were viewed as fundamental at that time and which are substantially similar to those protected under article first, §§ 7 and 9. 8 We disagree. 9 Our resolution of the plaintiffs’ claim requires a brief review of our article first, § 10 jurisprudence, which derives from the seminal case of G	1	1998–1998
Cabot Corp. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia green scotus · 1976 1 sentence 1998Specifically, the plaintiffs, relying on dicta in Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Lebanon, 226 Conn. 314, 330-33 , 627 A.2d 909 (1993), contend that they are entitled to bring such an action because a damages remedy existed prior to the adoption of our constitution in 1818 for violations of rights that were viewed as fundamental at that time and which are substantially similar to those protected under article first, §§ 7 and 9. 8 We disagree. 9 Our resolution of the plaintiffs’ claim requires a brief review of our article first, § 10 jurisprudence, which derives from the seminal case of G	1	1998–1998
Gentile v. Altermatt green scotus · 1976 1 sentence 1998Specifically, the plaintiffs, relying on dicta in Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Lebanon, 226 Conn. 314, 330-33 , 627 A.2d 909 (1993), contend that they are entitled to bring such an action because a damages remedy existed prior to the adoption of our constitution in 1818 for violations of rights that were viewed as fundamental at that time and which are substantially similar to those protected under article first, §§ 7 and 9. 8 We disagree. 9 Our resolution of the plaintiffs’ claim requires a brief review of our article first, § 10 jurisprudence, which derives from the seminal case of G	1	1998–1998

Where else courts name it

CA 22 (1972–2024) CT 11 (1998–2024) IL 10 (2001–2023) OR 8 (2003–2025) NJ 5 (1958–2015) NV 3 (2016–2020) ND 3 (1898–2018) MD 3 (2008–2022) MI 3 (2015–2024) CO 3 (2016–2026) GA 3 (2013–2019) WV 3 (1997–2005) IA 2 (2007–2020) OH 2 (2007–2023) NE 2 (2025–2025) TN 2 (2001–2022) NM 2 (1994–1995) AZ 2 (1986–2011) FL 2 (1989–2025) AL 2 (2001–2003)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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