11 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1968–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chatmon v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025See Chatmon v. United States, 801 A.2d 92, 100 (D.C. 2002) (“The purpose of the requirement of timely exceptions to trial errors is to alert the trial court and give it an opportunity to correct the error.”). 2024Such cases reflect the core purpose of the plain-error rule: to encourage timely and specific objections in order “to alert the trial court and give it an opportunity to correct the error.” Chatmon v. United States, 801 A.2d 92, 100 (D.C. 2002); see also, e.g., Austin v. United States, 64 A.3d 413, 419 (D.C. 2013) (“To avoid plain error review, objections must be made with reasonable specificity; the trial court must be fairly apprised as to the question on which it is being asked to rule.”) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). | 4 | 4 |
United States v. Benjamin Indivigliogreen2 sentences1974Timely and specific objection is desirable to give the trial judge “an opportunity to correct the error and thus avoid the necessity of further proceedings, possibly including a new trial.” United States v. Indiviglio, 352 F.2d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1965). 1974Timely and specific objection is desirable to give the trial judge "an opportunity to correct the error and thus avoid the necessity of further proceedings, possibly including a new trial." United States v. Indiviglio, 352 F.2d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1965). | 2 | 3 |
Johnson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2002See (Linwood) Johnson v. United States, 387 A.2d 1084, 1089 (D.C.1978) (citing Pennsylvania R.R. 2002See ( Linwood) Johnson v. United States, 387 A.2d 1084, 1089 (D.C.1978) (citing Pennsylvania R.R. | 1 | 2 |
Austin v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2024Such cases reflect the core purpose of the plain-error rule: to encourage timely and specific objections in order “to alert the trial court and give it an opportunity to correct the error.” Chatmon v. United States, 801 A.2d 92, 100 (D.C. 2002); see also, e.g., Austin v. United States, 64 A.3d 413, 419 (D.C. 2013) (“To avoid plain error review, objections must be made with reasonable specificity; the trial court must be fairly apprised as to the question on which it is being asked to rule.”) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Abdus-Price v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023To the contrary, a defendant could demonstrably was aware of the potential error and broached it sua sponte” because the “purpose of requiring a timely objection to the error, which is to alert the trial court and give it an opportunity to correct the error, has been met” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lewis v. United States, 263 A.3d 1049 , 1060 (D.C. 2021) (where trial court identified relevance as an issue, relevance challenge on appeal deemed preserved); Chatmon v. United States, 801 A.2d 92, 100 (D.C. 2002) (explaining “the purpose of the requirement of timely exceptions to trial er | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023See Robinson v. United States, 76 A.3d 329 , 341 n.24 (D.C. 2013) (concluding that “the government forfeited its opportunity to defend its seizure and search of [the defendant] based on [a] new theory” not litigated in the trial court). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2021If all three of those conditions are met, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to grant relief from a forfeited error, “but only if . . . the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467 ). 9 Brown v. United States, 726 A.2d 149, 154 (D.C. 1999). 10 held that a claim is not forfeited where, despite defense counsel’s failure to object, the trial judge demonstrably was aware of the potential error and broached it sua sponte.10 When that is so, we have explained, the purpose of requiring a timely ob | 1 | 1 |
Dixon v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1997See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 565 A.2d 72, 80 (D.C.1989). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. United States
green
2 sentences2021If all three of those conditions are met, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to grant relief from a forfeited error, “but only if . . . the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467 ). 9 Brown v. United States, 726 A.2d 149, 154 (D.C. 1999). 10 held that a claim is not forfeited where, despite defense counsel’s failure to object, the trial judge demonstrably was aware of the potential error and broached it sua sponte.10 When that is so, we have explained, the purpose of requiring a timely ob 2021If all three of those conditions are met, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to grant relief from a forfeited error, “but only if . . . the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467 ). 9 Brown v. United States, 726 A.2d 149, 154 (D.C. 1999). 10 held that a claim is not forfeited where, despite defense counsel’s failure to object, the trial judge demonstrably was aware of the potential error and broached it sua sponte.10 When that is so, we have explained, the purpose of requiring a timely ob | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.