opportunity to correct error in Arizona

7 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2008 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

Case	Followed	Cited
Farmers Insurance v. Tallsaltgreen arizctapp · 1997 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 2 sentences 2002Co. v. Tallsalt, 191 Ariz. 177, 180 , 953 P.2d 921, 924 (App.1997) (defendant waived argument that verdict was not responsive because of its silence regarding the counterclaim when verdict received), vacated in part on other grounds, 192 Ariz. 129 , 962 P.2d 203 (1998). ¶ 40 Requiring the party to object to defective verdicts at trial provides the court with an opportunity to correct the error with minimal effort and expense, and aids “ ‘the just and efficient operation of the ... courts.’ ” Gonzalez, 181 Ariz. at 36 , 887 P.2d at 566 (quoting Cundiff v. Washburn, 393 F.2d 505, 507 (7th Cir.19 2002Co. v. Tallsalt, 191 Ariz. 177, 180 , 953 P.2d 921, 924 (App.1997) (defendant waived argument that verdict was not responsive because of its silence regarding the counterclaim when verdict received), vacated in part on other grounds, 192 Ariz. 129 , 962 P.2d 203 (1998). ¶ 40 Requiring the party to object to defective verdicts at trial provides the court with an opportunity to correct the error with minimal effort and expense, and aids “ ‘the just and efficient operation of the ... courts.’ ” Gonzalez, 181 Ariz. at 36 , 887 P.2d at 566 (quoting Cundiff v. Washburn, 393 F.2d 505, 507 (7th Cir.19	1	1
Thomas D. Cundiff v. Virginia Lee Washburngreen ca7 · 1968 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 2 sentences 2002Co. v. Tallsalt, 191 Ariz. 177, 180 , 953 P.2d 921, 924 (App.1997) (defendant waived argument that verdict was not responsive because of its silence regarding the counterclaim when verdict received), vacated in part on other grounds, 192 Ariz. 129 , 962 P.2d 203 (1998). ¶ 40 Requiring the party to object to defective verdicts at trial provides the court with an opportunity to correct the error with minimal effort and expense, and aids “ ‘the just and efficient operation of the ... courts.’ ” Gonzalez, 181 Ariz. at 36 , 887 P.2d at 566 (quoting Cundiff v. Washburn, 393 F.2d 505, 507 (7th Cir.19 2002A contrary rule would create additional burdens for the courts and “ ‘encourage jury-shopping by litigants, permitting them to decide whether to take their chances on resubmitting the verdict and findings to the jury sitting or remain silent thereby allowing the entry of judgment and moving for a new trial before a new jury.’ ” Id. ¶ 41 Trustmark argues that the Gonzalez and Farmers cases are distinguishable as the parties in those cases failed to object to the inconsistent verdicts as part of an apparent “wait and see” strategy, because an objection in those cases might have led to a less ben	1	1
Gabriel Ex Rel. Gabriel v. Murphygreen arizctapp · 1966 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1968–1968 2 sentences 1968“We therefore hold that when the appellant makes a motion for new trial (and gives the trial court the opportunity to consider alleged error), the appellant may. in effect, abandon his right for extension of time gained as a result of hav-ing the order in relation to his motion for new trial reduced to written form, and timely appeal from the judgment alone, and in doing so appellant may raise on appeal from said judgment, errors urged in the motion for new trial.” Gabriel v. Murphy, 4 Ariz.App. 440, 442, 443 , 421 P.2d 336, 339 (1967). 1968“We therefore hold that when the appellant makes a motion for new trial (and gives the trial court the opportunity to consider alleged error), the appellant may. in effect, abandon his right for extension of time gained as a result of hav-ing the order in relation to his motion for new trial reduced to written form, and timely appeal from the judgment alone, and in doing so appellant may raise on appeal from said judgment, errors urged in the motion for new trial.” Gabriel v. Murphy, 4 Ariz.App. 440, 442, 443 , 421 P.2d 336, 339 (1967).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

Case	Cited	Years
Eisele v. Kowal green arizctapp · 1970 2 sentences 2008The court ordered removal based on the fact that the billboards are currently in violation of the current sign code and are not protected by nonconforming status. ¶ 93 Finally, Clear Channel argues that there is a “mandate” in Arizona that “abhors forfeiture” and cites Mason v. Hasso, 90 Ariz. 126 , 367 P.2d 1 (1961), and Eisele v. Kowal, 11 Ariz.App. 468 , 465 P.2d 605 (1970), in support of this assertion. 2008The court ordered removal based on the fact that the billboards are currently in violation of the current sign code and are not protected by nonconforming status. ¶ 93 Finally, Clear Channel argues that there is a “mandate” in Arizona that “abhors forfeiture” and cites Mason v. Hasso, 90 Ariz. 126 , 367 P.2d 1 (1961), and Eisele v. Kowal, 11 Ariz.App. 468 , 465 P.2d 605 (1970), in support of this assertion.	1	2008–2008
Mason v. Hasso green ariz · 1961 2 sentences 2008The court ordered removal based on the fact that the billboards are currently in violation of the current sign code and are not protected by nonconforming status. ¶ 93 Finally, Clear Channel argues that there is a “mandate” in Arizona that “abhors forfeiture” and cites Mason v. Hasso, 90 Ariz. 126 , 367 P.2d 1 (1961), and Eisele v. Kowal, 11 Ariz.App. 468 , 465 P.2d 605 (1970), in support of this assertion. 2008The court ordered removal based on the fact that the billboards are currently in violation of the current sign code and are not protected by nonconforming status. ¶ 93 Finally, Clear Channel argues that there is a “mandate” in Arizona that “abhors forfeiture” and cites Mason v. Hasso, 90 Ariz. 126 , 367 P.2d 1 (1961), and Eisele v. Kowal, 11 Ariz.App. 468 , 465 P.2d 605 (1970), in support of this assertion.	1	2008–2008
Gonzalez v. Gonzalez green arizctapp · 1994 2 sentences 2002Co. v. Tallsalt, 191 Ariz. 177, 180 , 953 P.2d 921, 924 (App.1997) (defendant waived argument that verdict was not responsive because of its silence regarding the counterclaim when verdict received), vacated in part on other grounds, 192 Ariz. 129 , 962 P.2d 203 (1998). ¶ 40 Requiring the party to object to defective verdicts at trial provides the court with an opportunity to correct the error with minimal effort and expense, and aids “ ‘the just and efficient operation of the ... courts.’ ” Gonzalez, 181 Ariz. at 36 , 887 P.2d at 566 (quoting Cundiff v. Washburn, 393 F.2d 505, 507 (7th Cir.19 2002Co. v. Tallsalt, 191 Ariz. 177, 180 , 953 P.2d 921, 924 (App.1997) (defendant waived argument that verdict was not responsive because of its silence regarding the counterclaim when verdict received), vacated in part on other grounds, 192 Ariz. 129 , 962 P.2d 203 (1998). ¶ 40 Requiring the party to object to defective verdicts at trial provides the court with an opportunity to correct the error with minimal effort and expense, and aids “ ‘the just and efficient operation of the ... courts.’ ” Gonzalez, 181 Ariz. at 36 , 887 P.2d at 566 (quoting Cundiff v. Washburn, 393 F.2d 505, 507 (7th Cir.19	1	2002–2002
Farmers Insurance v. Tallsalt green ariz · 1998 2 sentences 2002Co. v. Tallsalt, 191 Ariz. 177, 180 , 953 P.2d 921, 924 (App.1997) (defendant waived argument that verdict was not responsive because of its silence regarding the counterclaim when verdict received), vacated in part on other grounds, 192 Ariz. 129 , 962 P.2d 203 (1998). ¶ 40 Requiring the party to object to defective verdicts at trial provides the court with an opportunity to correct the error with minimal effort and expense, and aids “ ‘the just and efficient operation of the ... courts.’ ” Gonzalez, 181 Ariz. at 36 , 887 P.2d at 566 (quoting Cundiff v. Washburn, 393 F.2d 505, 507 (7th Cir.19 2002Co. v. Tallsalt, 191 Ariz. 177, 180 , 953 P.2d 921, 924 (App.1997) (defendant waived argument that verdict was not responsive because of its silence regarding the counterclaim when verdict received), vacated in part on other grounds, 192 Ariz. 129 , 962 P.2d 203 (1998). ¶ 40 Requiring the party to object to defective verdicts at trial provides the court with an opportunity to correct the error with minimal effort and expense, and aids “ ‘the just and efficient operation of the ... courts.’ ” Gonzalez, 181 Ariz. at 36 , 887 P.2d at 566 (quoting Cundiff v. Washburn, 393 F.2d 505, 507 (7th Cir.19	1	2002–2002
State v. Neville green sd · 1981 1 sentence 1987In a case concerning the admissibility of evidence of á defendant’s refusal to take a blood alcohol test as well as a field sobriety test, the court stated: This case presents an opportunity to correct the error we made in State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723 (S.D.1981) (Neville I); and in State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425 (S.D.1984) (Neville II).	1	1987–1987
State v. Neville green sd · 1984 2 sentences 1987That error was our holding that “Neville’s refusal to submit to a blood test is evidence of a testimonial nature and thus within the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination.” 346 N.W.2d at 429 . 1987In a case concerning the admissibility of evidence of á defendant’s refusal to take a blood alcohol test as well as a field sobriety test, the court stated: This case presents an opportunity to correct the error we made in State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723 (S.D.1981) (Neville I); and in State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425 (S.D.1984) (Neville II).	1	1987–1987
Brooker v. Canny green ariz · 1968 2 sentences 1972See Rule 51(a), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S.; Hiett v. Howard, 17 Ariz.App. 1 , 494 P.2d 1347 (1972) ; Brooker v. Canny, 103 Ariz. 529 , 446 P.2d 929 (1968). 1972See Rule 51(a), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S.; Hiett v. Howard, 17 Ariz.App. 1 , 494 P.2d 1347 (1972) ; Brooker v. Canny, 103 Ariz. 529 , 446 P.2d 929 (1968).	1	1972–1972
Hiett v. Howard green arizctapp · 1972 2 sentences 1972See Rule 51(a), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S.; Hiett v. Howard, 17 Ariz.App. 1 , 494 P.2d 1347 (1972) ; Brooker v. Canny, 103 Ariz. 529 , 446 P.2d 929 (1968). 1972See Rule 51(a), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S.; Hiett v. Howard, 17 Ariz.App. 1 , 494 P.2d 1347 (1972) ; Brooker v. Canny, 103 Ariz. 529 , 446 P.2d 929 (1968).	1	1972–1972
Defnet Land & Investment Co. v. State Ex Rel. Herman green ariz · 1968 2 sentences 1971Herman, 103 Ariz. 388 , 442 P.2d 835 (1968) : * * * * # “Ordinarily, we would not consider a claim of error where the trial court was not given the opportunity to correct the error prior to the appeal, but the method of evaluation by the appraisers for the State is so fundamentally unfair and unjust as to permit no other conclusion than that a retrial of the cause is required.” 103 Ariz. at 390 , 442 P.2d at 387 . 1971Herman, 103 Ariz. 388 , 442 P.2d 835 (1968) : * * * * # “Ordinarily, we would not consider a claim of error where the trial court was not given the opportunity to correct the error prior to the appeal, but the method of evaluation by the appraisers for the State is so fundamentally unfair and unjust as to permit no other conclusion than that a retrial of the cause is required.” 103 Ariz. at 390 , 442 P.2d at 387 .	1	1971–1971
State v. Pickard green ariz · 1969 2 sentences 1970In State v. Pickard, 105 Ariz. 219 , 462 P.2d 87 (1969), the court pointed out that before a defendant is entitled to a new trial it is necessary to show that there was, in fact, a conflict of interest, that by virtue of that conflict his own case was in some way prejudiced and that the question was raised before the trial court so that the court had an opportunity to correct the error. 1970In State v. Pickard, 105 Ariz. 219 , 462 P.2d 87 (1969), the court pointed out that before a defendant is entitled to a new trial it is necessary to show that there was, in fact, a conflict of interest, that by virtue of that conflict his own case was in some way prejudiced and that the question was raised before the trial court so that the court had an opportunity to correct the error.	1	1970–1970

Where else courts name it

TX 263 (1917–2026) IL 104 (1893–2026) WA 70 (1915–2026) PA 63 (1966–2026) MI 57 (1883–2026) MO 54 (1878–2024) NH 53 (1988–2023) CA 35 (1930–2023) UT 33 (2004–2019) FL 29 (1986–2025) AR 23 (1980–2026) IA 21 (1868–2020) OR 18 (1939–2026) OH 17 (1985–2020) LA 16 (1927–2010) IN 16 (1892–2012) OK 15 (1914–2019) WI 13 (1984–2025) TN 12 (1998–2026) NM 12 (1950–2025) MS 11 (1997–2009) DC 11 (1968–2025) MT 10 (1896–2016) NY 10 (1981–2018) MD 7 (2004–2019) MA 7 (1999–2025) AZ 7 (1968–2008) KY 6 (1885–1961) AL 6 (1981–2011) WV 6 (1969–2024) SD 4 (1985–2016) CO 4 (1897–2011) NV 4 (1996–2017) NJ 3 (1984–2014) VT 3 (1933–2003) NC 2 (1991–2003) ID 2 (1974–1981) MN 2 (2002–2011) GA 2 (1978–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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