addition clause in Florida

2025Section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes (2024), provides that “no claim for punitive damages shall be permitted unless there is a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered by the claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of such damages.” Because the addition of a claim for punitive damages can be a “game changer” to the litigation, TRG Desert Inn Venture, Ltd. v. Berezovsky, 194 So. 3d 516 , 520 n.5 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016), the process 4 for asserting a claim for such damages is rather unique, in that a party may not assert such a claim without leave of the court.

2014Fluker, 311 So.2d at 865 .

2013Noting that the addition of rule 3.800(b) permits a defendant to seek correction of a sentence imposing costs of which the defendant may have been unaware at the sentencing hearing, the supreme court concluded “that an unpreserved error in the assessment of costs cannot be considered a serious, patent sentencing error that should be corrected on appeal as fundamental in the absence of proper preservation in the trial court.” Id. at 109 .

2011Id. at 422-23 .

2004In Arthur v. Unicare Health Facilities, Inc., 602 So.2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), the court also reversed a summary judgment in favor of a nursing home with the majority permitting an action to proceed, as described in the dissent, for recovery by an estate under section 400.023, alternatively for injuries prior to death that did not cause death.

1997See Mills v. State, 620 So.2d 1006 (Fla.1993); Mohammed v. State, 662 So.2d 410, 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Mitchell v. State, 682 So.2d 604 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

1982Airport Sign Corporation v. Dade County, 400 So.2d 828 (Fla.3d DCA 1981); e.g., Welsh v. Metropolitan Dade County, 366 So.2d 518 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).

1982This court's opinion in Hubbard v. State, 411 So.2d 1312, 1314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), quoted favorably in Spurlock v. State, 420 So.2d 875 (Fla. 1982) [7 FLW 463], opinion filed October 7, 1982, pointed out that no "special word formula" is required to preserve for appellate review the trial court's refusal to give a requested jury instruction.

1982Airport Sign Corporation v. Dade County, 400 So.2d 828 (Fla.3d DCA 1981); e.g., Welsh v. Metropolitan Dade County, 366 So.2d 518 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).

1964In that case the Supreme Court of Texas said: “The addition of the ‘severability of {interests’ clause does not indicate that the drafters of the policy form by the addition of such clause intended that the word ‘insured’ means only the person claiming coverage.” [Emphasis in original opinion] "The court went on to say that to hold otherwise would require additional wording in -the exclusionary clause after the word insured, these words being “the insured who is asking for a defense” or “the insured .against whom claim is made.” In Standard Surety and Casualty Company v. Maryland Casualty Comp

1964In that case the Supreme Court of Texas said: “The addition of the ‘severability of {interests’ clause does not indicate that the drafters of the policy form by the addition of such clause intended that the word ‘insured’ means only the person claiming coverage.” [Emphasis in original opinion] "The court went on to say that to hold otherwise would require additional wording in -the exclusionary clause after the word insured, these words being “the insured who is asking for a defense” or “the insured .against whom claim is made.” In Standard Surety and Casualty Company v. Maryland Casualty Comp

1964In that case the Supreme Court of Texas said: “The addition of the ‘severability of {interests’ clause does not indicate that the drafters of the policy form by the addition of such clause intended that the word ‘insured’ means only the person claiming coverage.” [Emphasis in original opinion] "The court went on to say that to hold otherwise would require additional wording in -the exclusionary clause after the word insured, these words being “the insured who is asking for a defense” or “the insured .against whom claim is made.” In Standard Surety and Casualty Company v. Maryland Casualty Comp

1964In that case the Supreme Court of Texas said: “The addition of the ‘severability of {interests’ clause does not indicate that the drafters of the policy form by the addition of such clause intended that the word ‘insured’ means only the person claiming coverage.” [Emphasis in original opinion] "The court went on to say that to hold otherwise would require additional wording in -the exclusionary clause after the word insured, these words being “the insured who is asking for a defense” or “the insured .against whom claim is made.” In Standard Surety and Casualty Company v. Maryland Casualty Comp

1964In that case the Supreme Court of Texas said: “The addition of the ‘severability of {interests’ clause does not indicate that the drafters of the policy form by the addition of such clause intended that the word ‘insured’ means only the person claiming coverage.” [Emphasis in original opinion] "The court went on to say that to hold otherwise would require additional wording in -the exclusionary clause after the word insured, these words being “the insured who is asking for a defense” or “the insured .against whom claim is made.” In Standard Surety and Casualty Company v. Maryland Casualty Comp

1964In that case the Supreme Court of Texas said: “The addition of the ‘severability of {interests’ clause does not indicate that the drafters of the policy form by the addition of such clause intended that the word ‘insured’ means only the person claiming coverage.” [Emphasis in original opinion] "The court went on to say that to hold otherwise would require additional wording in -the exclusionary clause after the word insured, these words being “the insured who is asking for a defense” or “the insured .against whom claim is made.” In Standard Surety and Casualty Company v. Maryland Casualty Comp