addition clause (California) · Go Syfert
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addition clause in California

19 California opinions name it 2 courts 1919–2025 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (16)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Davisgreen
cal · 1995 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2021
2 sentences

2021(See People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 632 [approving hybrid general verdict forms in contrast to special verdicts which are not approved in criminal trials]; People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 511 [special “findings” may accompany a general criminal verdict, even if not expressly authorized by statute, as long as they do not interfere with the jury’s deliberative process].) For example, the jury could be asked whether it found Smothers and each coconspirator specifically intended to enter into an agreement to murder Carter or something to that effect. 59 _________________________ Wi

2021(See People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 632 [approving hybrid general verdict forms in contrast to special verdicts which are not approved in criminal trials]; People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 511 [special “findings” may accompany a general criminal verdict, even if not expressly authorized by statute, as long as they do not interfere with the jury’s deliberative process].) For example, the jury could be asked whether it found Smothers and each coconspirator specifically intended to enter into an agreement to murder Carter or something to that effect. 59 _________________________ Wi

23
People v. Gurulegreen
cal · 2002 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021(See People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 632 [approving hybrid general verdict forms in contrast to special verdicts which are not approved in criminal trials]; People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 511 [special “findings” may accompany a general criminal verdict, even if not expressly authorized by statute, as long as they do not interfere with the jury’s deliberative process].) For example, the jury could be asked whether it found Smothers and each coconspirator specifically intended to enter into an agreement to murder Carter or something to that effect. 59 _________________________ Wi

2021(See People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 632 [approving hybrid general verdict forms in contrast to special verdicts which are not approved in criminal trials]; People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 511 [special “findings” may accompany a general criminal verdict, even if not expressly authorized by statute, as long as they do not interfere with the jury’s deliberative process].) For example, the jury could be asked whether it found Smothers and each coconspirator specifically intended to enter into an agreement to murder Carter or something to that effect. 59 _________________________ Wi

22
People v. Jogreen
calctapp · 2017 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025(Dellinger, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1221 ; see also People v. Jo (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1157, fn. 7 [jury instructions should not be cited as legal authority].) In any event, given the appellate record in this case, defendant has not established a miscarriage of justice.

11
People v. Mooregreen
calctapp · 2012 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015But “[a] court may not revoke probation unless the evidence supports ‘a conclusion [that] the probationer’s conduct constituted a willful violation of the terms and conditions of probation.’ ” (People v. Cervantes (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 291, 295 , citing People v. Galvan (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 978, 982 ; see also People v. Moore (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1179 , 1184- 1185 [probationer cannot violate a weapons condition without knowledge that he or she is possessing the prohibited item].) An unwitting violation of a probation condition, by its very nature, is not willful and cannot be the basis of

11
People v. Freemangreen
cal · 1994 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
2 sentences

1996The trial court “may,” but is not required to give a reasonable doubt instruction utilizing the language of section 1096. (§ 1096a; People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 503 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558 , 882 P.2d 249 , 31 A.L.R.5th 888 ].) 5 Light proposes the following addition to the instruction: “ ‘An abiding conviction based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest level of certainty recognized in the law.

1996The trial court “may,” but is not required to give a reasonable doubt instruction utilizing the language of section 1096. (§ 1096a; People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 503 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558 , 882 P.2d 249 , 31 A.L.R.5th 888 ].) 5 Light proposes the following addition to the instruction: “ ‘An abiding conviction based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest level of certainty recognized in the law.

11
People v. DeVaughngreen
cal · 1977 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
2 sentences

1995(People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 895-896 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 558 P.2d 872 ]; People v. Ribero, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 63; People v. Ward, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 575.) Claims of error in postplea proceedings to determine punishment are also cognizable.

1995(People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 895-896 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 558 P.2d 872 ]; People v. Ribero, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 63; People v. Ward, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 575.) Claims of error in postplea proceedings to determine punishment are also cognizable.

11
People v. Riberogreen
cal · 1971 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
1 sentence

1995(People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 895-896 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 558 P.2d 872 ]; People v. Ribero, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 63; People v. Ward, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 575.) Claims of error in postplea proceedings to determine punishment are also cognizable.

11
People v. Wardgreen
cal · 1967 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
2 sentences

1995(People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 895-896 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 558 P.2d 872 ]; People v. Ribero, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 63; People v. Ward, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 575.) Claims of error in postplea proceedings to determine punishment are also cognizable.

1995“A guilty plea amounts to an admission of every element of the crime and is the equivalent of a conviction.” (People v. Ward, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 574.) For that reason, both before and after the enactment of section 1237.5 and the addition of rule 31(d), issues going to the defendant’s guilt or innocence were not and are not cognizable on appeal, while those going to the jurisdiction of the court or the legality of the proceedings were and are reviewable.

11
Santobello v. New Yorkgreen
scotus · 1971 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
2 sentences

1993(See Santobello v. New York (1971) 404 U.S. 257, 262 [ 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 433 , 92 S.Ct. 495 ].) The majority suggest that a “mere misadvisement” regarding the parole consequences of a plea would never be significant enough to be considered a violation of a plea agreement.

1993(See Santobello v. New York (1971) 404 U.S. 257, 262 [ 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 433 , 92 S.Ct. 495 ].) The majority suggest that a “mere misadvisement” regarding the parole consequences of a plea would never be significant enough to be considered a violation of a plea agreement.

11
Marin County Board of Realtors, Inc. v. Palssongreen
cal · 1976 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984
2 sentences

1984Plaintiffs sue under the authority of the state provision. *28 Nonetheless, as we stressed in Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 920, 925 [ 130 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 549 P.2d 833 ], "A long line of California cases has concluded that the Cartwright Act is patterned after the Sherman Act and both statutes have their roots in the common law.

1984Plaintiffs sue under the authority of the state provision. *28 Nonetheless, as we stressed in Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 920, 925 [ 130 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 549 P.2d 833 ], "A long line of California cases has concluded that the Cartwright Act is patterned after the Sherman Act and both statutes have their roots in the common law.

11
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinoisgreen
scotus · 1977 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984
2 sentences

1984However appealing this attempt to allocate the overcharge might seem in theory, it would add whole new dimensions of complexity to treble-damages suits and seriously undermine their effectiveness.” ( 431 U.S. at p. 737 [ 52 L.Ed.2d at p. 719 ].) In the year after Illinois Brick the Legislature amended the California antitrust law by the addition of a clause in section 16750, subdivision (a), of the Business and Professions Code to provide that antitrust actions “may be brought by any person who is injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden or declared unlawful in this

1984However appealing this attempt to allocate the overcharge might seem in theory, it would add whole new dimensions of complexity to treble-damages suits and seriously undermine their effectiveness.” ( 431 U.S. at p. 737 [ 52 L.Ed.2d at p. 719 ].) In the year after Illinois Brick the Legislature amended the California antitrust law by the addition of a clause in section 16750, subdivision (a), of the Business and Professions Code to provide that antitrust actions “may be brought by any person who is injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden or declared unlawful in this

11
City of Long Beach v. Paynegreen
cal · 1935 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983
2 sentences

1983On July 13 subdivision (d) was again amended to add the words `or Section 1238'; on July 21 it was amended to add `pursuant to the proceedings authorized by this section' and `or Section 1466'; and on July 26 it was amended to add `or other hearing.'" ( Belleci, supra, 24 Cal.3d 879, 885-886, fn. 4 .) Section 1538.5 has been amended twice since this court's opinion in Belknap , and once since Zimmerman , yet no change has been made in the language "shall not be admissible against the movant at any trial or other hearing...." Subdivision (e) continues its directive to return the property to the

1983On July 13 subdivision (d) was again amended to add the words `or Section 1238'; on July 21 it was amended to add `pursuant to the proceedings authorized by this section' and `or Section 1466'; and on July 26 it was amended to add `or other hearing.'" ( Belleci, supra, 24 Cal.3d 879, 885-886, fn. 4 .) Section 1538.5 has been amended twice since this court's opinion in Belknap , and once since Zimmerman , yet no change has been made in the language "shall not be admissible against the movant at any trial or other hearing...." Subdivision (e) continues its directive to return the property to the

11
In Re Jeanice D.green
cal · 1980 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983
2 sentences

1983On July 13 subdivision (d) was again amended to add the words `or Section 1238'; on July 21 it was amended to add `pursuant to the proceedings authorized by this section' and `or Section 1466'; and on July 26 it was amended to add `or other hearing.'" ( Belleci, supra, 24 Cal.3d 879, 885-886, fn. 4 .) Section 1538.5 has been amended twice since this court's opinion in Belknap , and once since Zimmerman , yet no change has been made in the language "shall not be admissible against the movant at any trial or other hearing...." Subdivision (e) continues its directive to return the property to the

1983On July 13 subdivision (d) was again amended to add the words `or Section 1238'; on July 21 it was amended to add `pursuant to the proceedings authorized by this section' and `or Section 1466'; and on July 26 it was amended to add `or other hearing.'" ( Belleci, supra, 24 Cal.3d 879, 885-886, fn. 4 .) Section 1538.5 has been amended twice since this court's opinion in Belknap , and once since Zimmerman , yet no change has been made in the language "shall not be admissible against the movant at any trial or other hearing...." Subdivision (e) continues its directive to return the property to the

11
People v. Bellecigreen
cal · 1979 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983
2 sentences

1983On July 13 subdivision (d) was again amended to add the words ‘or Section 1238’; on July 21 it was amended to add ‘pursuant to the proceedings authorized by this section’ and ‘or Section 1466’; and on July 26 it was amended to add ‘or other hearing.’” ( Belleci, supra, 24 Cal.3d 879, 885-886, fn. 4 .) Section 1538.5 has been amended twice since this court’s opinion in Belknap , and once since Zimmerman , yet no change has been made in the language “shall not be admissible against the movant at any trial or other hearing. ...” Subdivision (e) continues its directive to return the property to th

1983On July 13 subdivision (d) was again amended to add the words `or Section 1238'; on July 21 it was amended to add `pursuant to the proceedings authorized by this section' and `or Section 1466'; and on July 26 it was amended to add `or other hearing.'" ( Belleci, supra, 24 Cal.3d 879, 885-886, fn. 4 .) Section 1538.5 has been amended twice since this court's opinion in Belknap , and once since Zimmerman , yet no change has been made in the language "shall not be admissible against the movant at any trial or other hearing...." Subdivision (e) continues its directive to return the property to the

11
Mercer v. Perezgreen
cal · 1968 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1968–1968
2 sentences

1968In the late Supreme Court case, Mercer v. Perez, 68 Cal.2d 104, 112-113 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 436 P.2d 315 ], an important change in the statute relative to motions for a new trial is discussed; the opinion points out the addition of a requirement that the court must specify not only the ground or grounds upon which the new trial is granted, but also its reasons for doing so.

1968In the late Supreme Court case, Mercer v. Perez, 68 Cal.2d 104, 112-113 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 436 P.2d 315 ], an important change in the statute relative to motions for a new trial is discussed; the opinion points out the addition of a requirement that the court must specify not only the ground or grounds upon which the new trial is granted, but also its reasons for doing so.

11
People v. Millergreen
calctapp · 1932 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1934–1934
2 sentences

1934That decision is among those considered in People v. Miller, 126 Cal. App. 162, 168 [ 14 Pac. (2d) 342 ], where the subject is reviewed at length, and the conclusion is plainly indicated that an instruction which fufiy and correctly defines the consideration which should be given by the jury to evidence of good character, is not rendered erroneous by the addition of a clause such as that above quoted, given in the case at bar.

1934That decision is among those considered in People v. Miller, 126 Cal. App. 162, 168 [ 14 Pac. (2d) 342 ], where the subject is reviewed at length, and the conclusion is plainly indicated that an instruction which fufiy and correctly defines the consideration which should be given by the jury to evidence of good character, is not rendered erroneous by the addition of a clause such as that above quoted, given in the case at bar.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (12)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Dellinger green
cal · 1989
2 sentences

2025The instruction now provides in relevant part: “The natural and probable consequences of the (act/ [or] failure to act) were dangerous to human life in that the (act/ [or] failure to act) involved a high degree of probability that it would result in death. . . .” (CALCRIM No. 520 (Mar. 2024 rev.).) Even if this addition to the instruction better articulates the implied malice standard for the jury, it remains true that the trial court did not err in giving the jury a legally correct instruction on implied malice, approved by California Supreme Court in Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pages

2025(Dellinger, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1221 ; see also People v. Jo (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1157, fn. 7 [jury instructions should not be cited as legal authority].) In any event, given the appellate record in this case, defendant has not established a miscarriage of justice.

22025–2025
People v. Nieto Benitez green
cal · 1992
1 sentence

2025The instruction now provides in relevant part: “The natural and probable consequences of the (act/ [or] failure to act) were dangerous to human life in that the (act/ [or] failure to act) involved a high degree of probability that it would result in death. . . .” (CALCRIM No. 520 (Mar. 2024 rev.).) Even if this addition to the instruction better articulates the implied malice standard for the jury, it remains true that the trial court did not err in giving the jury a legally correct instruction on implied malice, approved by California Supreme Court in Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pages

12025–2025
People v. Knoller green
cal · 2007
1 sentence

2025The instruction now provides in relevant part: “The natural and probable consequences of the (act/ [or] failure to act) were dangerous to human life in that the (act/ [or] failure to act) involved a high degree of probability that it would result in death. . . .” (CALCRIM No. 520 (Mar. 2024 rev.).) Even if this addition to the instruction better articulates the implied malice standard for the jury, it remains true that the trial court did not err in giving the jury a legally correct instruction on implied malice, approved by California Supreme Court in Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pages

12025–2025
People v. Galvan green
calctapp · 2007
1 sentence

2015But “[a] court may not revoke probation unless the evidence supports ‘a conclusion [that] the probationer’s conduct constituted a willful violation of the terms and conditions of probation.’ ” (People v. Cervantes (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 291, 295 , citing People v. Galvan (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 978, 982 ; see also People v. Moore (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1179 , 1184- 1185 [probationer cannot violate a weapons condition without knowledge that he or she is possessing the prohibited item].) An unwitting violation of a probation condition, by its very nature, is not willful and cannot be the basis of

12015–2015
People v. Cervantes green
calctapp · 2009
1 sentence

2015But “[a] court may not revoke probation unless the evidence supports ‘a conclusion [that] the probationer’s conduct constituted a willful violation of the terms and conditions of probation.’ ” (People v. Cervantes (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 291, 295 , citing People v. Galvan (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 978, 982 ; see also People v. Moore (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1179 , 1184- 1185 [probationer cannot violate a weapons condition without knowledge that he or she is possessing the prohibited item].) An unwitting violation of a probation condition, by its very nature, is not willful and cannot be the basis of

12015–2015
People v. Terry green
cal · 1970
2 sentences

1992Reilly also relies on People v. Terry (1970) 2 Cal.3d 362 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 409 466 P.2d 961 ], but that case is similarly inapposite.

1992Reilly also relies on People v. Terry (1970) 2 Cal.3d 362 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 409 466 P.2d 961 ], but that case is similarly inapposite.

11992–1992
People v. Lassiter green
calctapp · 1988
2 sentences

1991In People v. Lassiter (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 352 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 320 ], the court construed this language.

1991In People v. Lassiter (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 352 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 320 ], the court construed this language.

11991–1991
Randone v. Appellate Department green
cal · 1971
2 sentences

1977Section 538.4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for a hearing prior to the issuance of a writ of attachment, and limits the issuance of such writs to cases in which “grounds for the issuance of an attachment exist,” and where “the plaintiff has established the probable validity of his claim and the absence of any reasonable probability that a successful defense can be asserted by the defendant. . . .” This provision was enacted in 1972 (Stats. 1972, ch. 550, § 12) in direct response to the due process mandate set forth in Randone v. Appellate Department, 5 Cal.3d 536 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 709 ,

1977Section 538.4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for a hearing prior to the issuance of a writ of attachment, and limits the issuance of such writs to cases in which “grounds for the issuance of an attachment exist,” and where “the plaintiff has established the probable validity of his claim and the absence of any reasonable probability that a successful defense can be asserted by the defendant. . . .” This provision was enacted in 1972 (Stats. 1972, ch. 550, § 12) in direct response to the due process mandate set forth in Randone v. Appellate Department, 5 Cal.3d 536 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 709 ,

11977–1977
Union League Club v. Johnson green
cal · 1941
2 sentences

1946However, in the case of Union League Club v. Johnson, 18 Cal.2d 275 [ 115 P.2d 425 ], cited with approval in Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 24 Cal.2d 40 [ 147 P.2d 577 ], our Supreme Court said, at pages 278-279: “As against these contentions, the respondent takes the position that because the legislature in 1939 expressly amended the statute to impose a tax upon social clubs, this court should construe the former law as not including them.

1946However, in the case of Union League Club v. Johnson, 18 Cal.2d 275 [ 115 P.2d 425 ], cited with approval in Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 24 Cal.2d 40 [ 147 P.2d 577 ], our Supreme Court said, at pages 278-279: “As against these contentions, the respondent takes the position that because the legislature in 1939 expressly amended the statute to impose a tax upon social clubs, this court should construe the former law as not including them.

11946–1946
Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson green
cal · 1944
2 sentences

1946However, in the case of Union League Club v. Johnson, 18 Cal.2d 275 [ 115 P.2d 425 ], cited with approval in Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 24 Cal.2d 40 [ 147 P.2d 577 ], our Supreme Court said, at pages 278-279: “As against these contentions, the respondent takes the position that because the legislature in 1939 expressly amended the statute to impose a tax upon social clubs, this court should construe the former law as not including them.

1946However, in the case of Union League Club v. Johnson, 18 Cal.2d 275 [ 115 P.2d 425 ], cited with approval in Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 24 Cal.2d 40 [ 147 P.2d 577 ], our Supreme Court said, at pages 278-279: “As against these contentions, the respondent takes the position that because the legislature in 1939 expressly amended the statute to impose a tax upon social clubs, this court should construe the former law as not including them.

11946–1946
People v. Bailey neutral
calctapp · 1924
1 sentence

1924The instructions given and refused upon the question of intent and guilty knowledge are unlike those of the Flanagan case and are substantially the same as in People v, Bailey, ante, p. 1 [ 225 Pac. 752 ], wherein the judgment was affirmed.

11924–1924
Flora v. Bimini Water Co. neutral
cal · 1911
2 sentences

1919(Flora v. Bimini Water Co., 161 Cal. 495 , [ 119 Pac. 661 ].) It is further claimed that the blanket findings of the truth of the allegations of the defendant’s separate defense in the cross-complaint were not supported by the evidence.

1919(Flora v. Bimini Water Co., 161 Cal. 495 , [ 119 Pac. 661 ].) It is further claimed that the blanket findings of the truth of the allegations of the defendant’s separate defense in the cross-complaint were not supported by the evidence.

11919–1919

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Penal Code § 187 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 19 (1919–2025) TX 16 (1927–2024) IL 14 (1915–2021) NY 14 (1884–2012) FL 11 (1964–2025) PA 10 (1895–2023) OH 10 (1876–2020) MO 10 (1895–2024) MA 9 (1941–2025) LA 7 (1975–2011) KS 5 (1940–2014) MD 5 (1931–1999) DC 5 (1973–1999) CT 5 (1959–2005) MT 4 (1906–2002) VT 4 (2006–2023) OR 4 (2003–2021) NM 3 (1978–2010) NJ 3 (1985–2020) DE 3 (1999–2017) AZ 3 (1980–2005) WI 3 (1972–2013) WA 2 (1996–2021) KY 2 (1930–2022) MS 2 (1911–1961) IN 2 (1971–1999) VA 2 (1891–1920) AR 2 (1919–1993) GA 2 (1945–2009) RI 2 (1993–2013) MI 2 (2019–2023) IA 2 (2024–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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