first instance error in California

2025Appellate courts are willing to intervene in the first instance because such error is ‘clear and correctable’ independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing. [Citation.]” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354 .) “[T]he sentence is ‘subject to judicial correction whenever the error [comes] to the attention of the trial court or a reviewing court,’ even if the correction increases the sentence originally imposed.” (People v. Roth (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 694, 703 .) Accordingly, the matter must be remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate its order staying the puni

2024Appellate courts are willing to intervene in the first instance because such error is ‘clear and correctable’ independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 .) On the other hand, it is well-established that “[a] defendant wishing to argue on appeal that there is no factual basis for a restitution order must object on that ground in the trial court to preserve the issue for appeal.” (People v. Mays (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1232, 1237 .) Here, defendant could have caused each of these types of damage while driving and possessing

2022This is because “[a]ppellate courts are willing to intervene in the first instance because such error is ‘clear and correctable’ independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing.” (Ibid., quoting People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 236 (Welch).) Appellant’s claim that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority because the “loss” incurred is not a compensable loss under section 1202.4 falls within the “unauthorized sentence” exception.

2008This is because “[a]ppellate courts are willing to intervene in the first instance because such error is ‘clear and correctable’ independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing.” (Ibid., quoting People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 236 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 520 , 851 P.2d 802 ] (Welch).) *1095 Defendant’s claim that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority under section 1202.4, subdivision (f), falls within the “unauthorized sentence” exception.

2023The general rule is that only “ ‘claims properly raised and preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal.’ ” (People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852 .) “A claim that a sentence is unauthorized, however, may be raised for the first time on appeal, and is subject to judicial correction whenever the error comes to the attention of the reviewing court.” (People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 6 .) “Appellate courts are willing to intervene in the first instance because such error is ‘clear and correctable’ independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing.”

2015The general rule is that only “ ‘claims properly raised and preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852 .) “A claim that a sentence is unauthorized, however, may be raised for the first time on appeal, and is subject to judicial correction whenever the error comes to the attention of the reviewing court. [Citations.]” (People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 6 .) “Appellate courts are willing to intervene in the first instance because such error is ‘clear and correctable’ independent of any factual issues presented by th

2014Appellate courts are willing to intervene in the first instance because such error is ‘clear and correctable’ independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing. [Citation.]” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 .) “Because this case involves the jurisdictional validity of the trial court’s decision to issue [a] . . . protective order during sentencing, we will consider [appellant’s] claim on the merits.” ( Ponce, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 381-382; People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 995-996 .) The protective order was made pursuant to Judicial Counci

2012Appellate courts are willing to intervene in the first instance because such error is ‘clear and correctable’ independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing. [Citation.]” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ].) “Because this case involves the jurisdictional validity of the trial court’s decision to issue [an indefinite] protective order during sentencing, we will consider [appellant’s] claim on the merits.” (People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 381-382 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 667 ] (Ponce) [since protective order was not stat

2023The general rule is that only “ ‘claims properly raised and preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal.’ ” (People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852 .) “A claim that a sentence is unauthorized, however, may be raised for the first time on appeal, and is subject to judicial correction whenever the error comes to the attention of the reviewing court.” (People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 6 .) “Appellate courts are willing to intervene in the first instance because such error is ‘clear and correctable’ independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing.”

2022(People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 854 .) “[A] sentence is generally ‘unauthorized’ where it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 .) In such circumstances, “[a]ppellate courts are willing to intervene in the first instance because such error is ‘clear and correctable’ independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing.” (Ibid.) Here, defendant suffered two prior strikes and is subject to the alternative sentencing scheme under the Three Strikes law, rendering his sentence a minimum ter

2025(Rent-A- Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 70, fn. 1 (Rent-A-Center).) When, unlike in this case, parties do not contest the existence of an arbitration agreement, challenges to the enforceability of arbitration agreements that have clear delegation clauses are to be decided by the arbitrator, not the court. ( Rent-A-Center, supra, 561 U.S. at pp. 71–73; see Tiri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 236 .) This remains true even if the arguments favoring the agreement’s enforceability are “wholly groundless.” (Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. (2019) 586 U.S. 63 , 68 10

2025(Rent-A- Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 70, fn. 1 (Rent-A-Center).) When, unlike in this case, parties do not contest the existence of an arbitration agreement, challenges to the enforceability of arbitration agreements that have clear delegation clauses are to be decided by the arbitrator, not the court. ( Rent-A-Center, supra, 561 U.S. at pp. 71–73; see Tiri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 236 .) This remains true even if the arguments favoring the agreement’s enforceability are “wholly groundless.” (Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. (2019) 586 U.S. 63, 68 [ar

2025(Rent-A- Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 70, fn. 1 (Rent-A-Center).) When, unlike in this case, parties do not contest the existence of an arbitration agreement, challenges to the enforceability of arbitration agreements that have clear delegation clauses are to be decided by the arbitrator, not the court. ( Rent-A-Center, supra, 561 U.S. at pp. 71–73; see Tiri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 236 .) This remains true even if the arguments favoring the agreement’s enforceability are “wholly groundless.” (Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. (2019) 586 U.S. 63 , 68 10

2025(Rent-A- Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 70, fn. 1 (Rent-A-Center).) When, unlike in this case, parties do not contest the existence of an arbitration agreement, challenges to the enforceability of arbitration agreements that have clear delegation clauses are to be decided by the arbitrator, not the court. ( Rent-A-Center, supra, 561 U.S. at pp. 71–73; see Tiri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 236 .) This remains true even if the arguments favoring the agreement’s enforceability are “wholly groundless.” (Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. (2019) 586 U.S. 63, 68 [ar

2025(Rent-A- Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 70, fn. 1 (Rent-A-Center).) When, unlike in this case, parties do not contest the existence of an arbitration agreement, challenges to the enforceability of arbitration agreements that have clear delegation clauses are to be decided by the arbitrator, not the court. ( Rent-A-Center, supra, 561 U.S. at pp. 71–73; see Tiri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 236 .) This remains true even if the arguments favoring the agreement’s enforceability are “wholly groundless.” (Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. (2019) 586 U.S. 63 , 68 10

2025(Rent-A- Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 70, fn. 1 (Rent-A-Center).) When, unlike in this case, parties do not contest the existence of an arbitration agreement, challenges to the enforceability of arbitration agreements that have clear delegation clauses are to be decided by the arbitrator, not the court. ( Rent-A-Center, supra, 561 U.S. at pp. 71–73; see Tiri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 236 .) This remains true even if the arguments favoring the agreement’s enforceability are “wholly groundless.” (Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. (2019) 586 U.S. 63 , 68 10

2020As this analysis indicates, defendants “persist[ed] in [an] outright refusal to comply with [their] discovery obligations,” making this one of the “extreme cases” where terminating sanctions were appropriate in the first instance for violation of a court order because issue and evidentiary sanctions would have been ineffectual. ( Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at pp. 793, 795; Howell, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 191-192; Fred Howland, supra, 244 Cal.App.2d at p. 612 ; see also Collisson & Kaplan v. Hartunian (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1617-1622 [imposing terminating sanctions as a first penalty]

2020As this analysis indicates, defendants “persist[ed] in [an] outright refusal to comply with [their] discovery obligations,” making this one of the “extreme cases” where terminating sanctions were appropriate in the first instance for violation of a court order because issue and evidentiary sanctions would have been ineffectual. ( Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at pp. 793, 795; Howell, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 191-192; Fred Howland, supra, 244 Cal.App.2d at p. 612 ; see also Collisson & Kaplan v. Hartunian (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1617-1622 [imposing terminating sanctions as a first penalty]

2020(Doe v. Occidental College (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1018 (Occidental I) [issue must be raised in the first instance at the hearing or appellant forfeits it]; Doe v. Occidental College (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 208 , 225 (Occidental II) [“By failing to make the argument until his 14 appeal to this court, [the complaining student] forfeited it.”] [collecting forfeiture authorities].) The rationale for this rule is fairness and efficiency.

2020(Doe v. Occidental College (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1018 (Occidental I) [issue must be raised in the first instance at the hearing or appellant forfeits it]; Doe v. Occidental College (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 208 , 225 (Occidental II) [“By failing to make the argument until his 14 appeal to this court, [the complaining student] forfeited it.”] [collecting forfeiture authorities].) The rationale for this rule is fairness and efficiency.

2018"Factual issues may be subject to the waiver rule, but an objection may be raised for the first time on appeal where it concerns an 'unauthorized' sentence, i.e., one that 'could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.' " ( People v. Percelle (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 164 , 179, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 731 .) "Appellate courts are willing to intervene in the first instance because such error is 'clear and correctable' independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing." ( People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 , 354, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 .) T

2018"Factual issues may be subject to the waiver rule, but an objection may be raised for the first time on appeal where it concerns an 'unauthorized' sentence, i.e., one that 'could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.' " ( People v. Percelle (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 164 , 179, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 731 .) "Appellate courts are willing to intervene in the first instance because such error is 'clear and correctable' independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing." ( People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 , 354, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 .) T

2018"Factual issues may be subject to the waiver rule, but an objection may be raised for the first time on appeal where it concerns an 'unauthorized' sentence, i.e., one that 'could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.' " ( People v. Percelle (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 164 , 179, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 731 .) "Appellate courts are willing to intervene in the first instance because such error is 'clear and correctable' independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing." ( People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 , 354, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 .) T

2018"Factual issues may be subject to the waiver rule, but an objection may be raised for the first time on appeal where it concerns an 'unauthorized' sentence, i.e., one that 'could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.' " ( People v. Percelle (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 164 , 179, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 731 .) "Appellate courts are willing to intervene in the first instance because such error is 'clear and correctable' independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing." ( People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 , 354, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 .) T

2024(See Attard v. Board of Supervisors of Contra Costa County (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1066, 1083 [when a litigant suspects bias on the part of a member of an administrative hearing body, the issue must be raised in the first instance at the hearing].) Second, while Lacey undisputedly 36 served as Fremont’s counsel, plaintiffs’ record citations do not show that she, like the attorney in Nightlife, advised the entity that reviewed the decision for which she advocated.

2022“When a litigant suspects bias on the part of a member of an administrative hearing body, the issue must be raised in the first instance at the hearing. [Citations.]” (Attard v. Board of Supervisors of Contra Costa County (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1066, 1083 .) Here, in its submission for the BPW appeal, Sullivan outlined the emails it obtained from the City in response to its records requests, including several involving Lorenzen and James, and argued that the City showed “blatant favoritism” toward project opponents, resulting in unfair administrative proceedings and a violation of Sullivan’s du

2023(People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965 , 996–997; People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378 , 381–382.) 39.

2014Appellate courts are willing to intervene in the first instance because such error is ‘clear and correctable’ independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing. [Citation.]” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 .) “Because this case involves the jurisdictional validity of the trial court’s decision to issue [a] . . . protective order during sentencing, we will consider [appellant’s] claim on the merits.” ( Ponce, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 381-382; People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 995-996 .) The protective order was made pursuant to Judicial Counci

2018"Factual issues may be subject to the waiver rule, but an objection may be raised for the first time on appeal where it concerns an 'unauthorized' sentence, i.e., one that 'could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.' " ( People v. Percelle (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 164 , 179, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 731 .) "Appellate courts are willing to intervene in the first instance because such error is 'clear and correctable' independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing." ( People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 , 354, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 .) T

2018"Factual issues may be subject to the waiver rule, but an objection may be raised for the first time on appeal where it concerns an 'unauthorized' sentence, i.e., one that 'could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.' " ( People v. Percelle (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 164 , 179, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 731 .) "Appellate courts are willing to intervene in the first instance because such error is 'clear and correctable' independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing." ( People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 , 354, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 .) T

2015It does not follow, however, that nonwaivable error is involved whenever a prison sentence is challenged on appeal." (Ibid.) " 'An appellate court may "correct a sentence that is not authorized by law whenever the error comes to the attention of the court." ' " (In re Birdwell (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 926, 946 .) In imposing a 10-year term, the court cited Eighth Amendment concerns given 48 Scott's age of 17 years when the crimes were committed.16 The court had evidence that the life expectancy for an African-American male was 67 years, which it rounded to 70 years.

2014(In re Andrews (1976) 18 Cal.3d 208, 212 [doctrine of invited error does not apply to unauthorized sentences, which are void and may be challenged at any time]; In re Birdwell (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 926, 931 [noting 4 After the court announced the condition that defendant “not reside in a home with children under the age of 18 years,” a discussion was held off the record.

2003In general, due process requires only that the parent receive notice "`"reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the [continued] pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."'" ( In re Anna M. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 463, 468 , 62 Cal. Rptr.2d 831 .) Former section 366.23, subdivision (a), which applied at all times relevant *347 here, set forth detailed requirements for notifying parents whenever the court set a section 366.26 hearing. [5] Under former section 366.23, it was not necessary to give a parent a second

2003In general, due process requires only that the parent receive notice "`"reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the [continued] pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."'" ( In re Anna M. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 463, 468 , 62 Cal. Rptr.2d 831 .) Former section 366.23, subdivision (a), which applied at all times relevant *347 here, set forth detailed requirements for notifying parents whenever the court set a section 366.26 hearing. [5] Under former section 366.23, it was not necessary to give a parent a second

2003In general, due process requires only that the parent receive notice “ 1 “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the [continued] pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” ’ ” (In re Anna M. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 463, 468 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 831 ].) Former section 366.23, subdivision (a), which applied at all times relevant here, set forth detailed requirements for notifying parents whenever the court set a section 366.26 hearing. 5 Under former section 366.23, it was not necessary to give a parent a second not

2003In general, due process requires only that the parent receive notice “ 1 “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the [continued] pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” ’ ” (In re Anna M. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 463, 468 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 831 ].) Former section 366.23, subdivision (a), which applied at all times relevant here, set forth detailed requirements for notifying parents whenever the court set a section 366.26 hearing. 5 Under former section 366.23, it was not necessary to give a parent a second not