deferential substantial evidence standard in California

2021Standard of Review for a Motion to Suppress “‘An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.] [¶] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] “The [trial] court’s resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review.” [Citations.] [¶] The court’s resolution of the fi

2018In ruling on such a motion “ ‘the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] “The [trial] court’s resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review.” [Citations.] [¶] The court’s resolution of the first inquiry, which involves questions of fact, is reviewed under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. [Citations.] Its decision on the second, which is a pure question o

2021R.L. appealed the trial court’s order denying the motion to suppress and sustaining the petition. 7 DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review “‘In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to that court’s factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’” (Robey v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1223 ; accord, People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255 [on motion to

2021Standard of Review for a Motion to Suppress “‘An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.] [¶] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] “The [trial] court’s resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review.” [Citations.] [¶] The court’s resolution of the fi

2015(People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 279 .) We review the court's resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial evidence standard.

2014(People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 279 .) We review the court's resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial-evidence standard.

2020(Id. at p. 136.) The standard of review that generally applies to a trial court’s resolution of a suppression motion reflects the evidentiary nature of a section 1538.5 hearing. “ ‘ “In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.]” ’ ” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1140 , quoting People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182 (Alvarez).) “ ‘ “The [trial] court’s resolut

2020(Id. at p. 136.) The standard of review that generally applies to a trial court’s resolution of a suppression motion reflects the evidentiary nature of a section 1538.5 hearing. “ ‘ “In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.]” ’ ” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1140 , quoting People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182 (Alvarez).) “ ‘ “The [trial] court’s resolut

2026(People v. Ochoa [(1998)] 19 Cal.4th [353,] 401.) When reviewing a trial court’s determination that a defendant did not undergo custodial interrogation, an appellate court must ‘apply a deferential substantial evidence standard’ (id. at p. 402) to the trial court’s factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and it must independently decide whether, given those circumstances, ‘a reasonable person in [the] defendant’s position would have felt free to end the questioning and leave’ (ibid.).” (People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1400 .) Here, the interview b

2024(People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 833 .) “An interrogation is custodial when ‘a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of [their] freedom of action in any significant way.’ ” (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1400 (Leonard).) “Whether a person is in custody is an objective test; the pertinent inquiry is whether there was “ ‘ “ ‘a “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement” of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) This presents “a mixed question of law and fact,” requiring us to “ ‘apply a deferential substantial evidence standard

2020The trial court’s process of analyzing a motion to suppress, we have explained, calls for a three-step inquiry: The trial court “ ‘find[s] the historical facts, select[s] the rule of law, and appl[ies] it to the facts in order to determine whether the law as applied has been violated.’ ” (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 145 .) We review de novo a trial court’s resolution of the legal questions resolved in a suppression motion, and we review the trial court’s resolution of factual issues under the more deferential substantial evidence standard.

2020A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable, and the prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating a legal justification for the search.” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 120 (Simon).) “The trial court ‘ “find[s] the historical facts, select[s] the rule of law, and appl[ies] it to the facts in order to determine whether the law as applied has been violated.” ’ ” (Letner, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 145 .) We review de novo a trial court’s resolution of the legal questions resolved in a suppression motion, and we review the trial court’s resolution of factual issues under the more defer

2016Code, § 1538.5), the superior court is vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the 3 testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences in deciding whether a search is constitutionally unreasonable.” (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673 .) “We review the court’s resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial- evidence standard.” (People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1134 .) We then independently apply the requisite legal standard to the facts presented.

2016Code, § 1538.5), the superior court is vested 3. with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences in deciding whether a search is constitutionally unreasonable.” (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673 .) “We review the court’s resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial- evidence standard.” (People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1134 .) We then independently apply the requisite legal standard to the facts presented.

2024Although we ordinarily review such challenges under the deferential substantial evidence standard (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357 ), because the Court of Appeal’s ruling is based on the interpretation of section 136.1(b)(2), we review that legal determination de novo (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961 ). “ ‘When we interpret a statute, “[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.

2022(See e.g., People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 342 [trial court’s findings of historical fact is reviewed under the deferential substantial evidence standard; if there is conflicting testimony or evidence, appellate court must accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences and its evaluations of credibility to the extent the record supports them]; Williams v. Saunders (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1158 , 20 1162.) As long as there is substantial evidence, the appellate court must affirm, even if the reviewing justices personally would have ruled differently if they had presi

2021Standard of Review for a Motion to Suppress “‘An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.] [¶] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] “The [trial] court’s resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review.” [Citations.] [¶] The court’s resolution of the fi

2021Standard of Review for a Motion to Suppress “‘An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.] [¶] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] “The [trial] court’s resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review.” [Citations.] [¶] The court’s resolution of the fi

2023Standard of Review Appellate review of a trial court’s order granting or denying a motion for preliminary injunction generally is “limited to whether the trial court’s decision was an abuse of discretion.” (Butt v. State of California, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 678 .) “The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711 ; accord, County of Kern v. T.C.E.F., Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 301, 316 .) The sufficiency of the evidence for the

2023Standard of Review Appellate review of a trial court’s order granting or denying a motion for preliminary injunction generally is “limited to whether the trial court’s decision was an abuse of discretion.” (Butt v. State of California, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 678 .) “The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711 ; see T.C.E.F., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 316 .) When the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s

2016(People v. Clark (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 490, 496 .) An appellate court reviews the trial court’s factual determinations under the deferential substantial evidence standard; the determination of whether the applicable law as applied to the facts discloses a violation of Fourth Amendment rights is subject to independent review. ‘“On appeal, we consider the correctness of the trial court’s ruling itself, not the correctness of the trial court’s reasons for reaching its decision.”’ (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 364-365 .) II.

2015We review the court’s resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial-evidence standard.” (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 145 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746 , 235 P.3d 62 ] (Letner and Tobin); see Harris, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 681 , quoting People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 364-365 [ 178 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 , 334 P.3d 573 ], which was, in turn, quoting Letner and Tobin.) However, “ ‘[t]he ruling on whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to independent review.’ ” (Letner and Tob

2015(Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at p. 74 ; People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 609 (Smith ).) We review the trial court’s resolution of disputed factual issues under the deferential substantial evidence standard (Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 902), and independently review whether the facts demonstrate prosecutorial good faith and due diligence (id. at pp. 902-903).” (People v. Herrera (2010) 49 Cal.4th 613, 622-623 ; accord, People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 674-675 .) Efforts to locate Ms. Quilling began immediately after the June 30, 2014 hearing.

2014(Ohio v. Roberts [(1980)] 448 U.S. [56,] 74[, overruled on other grounds in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 67 ]; People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 609 (Smith).) We review the trial court’s resolution of disputed factual issues under the deferential substantial evidence standard (Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 902), and independently review whether the facts demonstrate prosecutorial good faith and due diligence (id. at pp. 902-903).” (Herrera, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 623 .) Background Sarai testified at defendant’s preliminary hearing on September 20, 2012.

2013The agents also found a single socket wrench behind the driver's seat, which was the right size to open the compartment where the drugs were hidden. 4 DISCUSSION "In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical facts, select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts in order to determine whether the law as applied has been violated. [Citation.] We review the court's resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. [Citation.] The ruling on whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that

2013"In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical facts, select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts in order to determine whether the law as applied has been violated. [Citation.] We review the court's resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. [Citation.] The ruling on whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to independent review." (People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 891 , overruled on another ground by People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 637-643

2023(Thompson v. Keohane (1995) 516 U.S. 99 , 112–113, superseded by statute ( 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)); accord, People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1400 (Leonard).) The reviewing court applies “‘a deferential substantial evidence standard’ [citation] to the trial court’s factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and it must independently decide whether, given those circumstances, ‘a reasonable person in [the] defendant’s position would have felt free to end the questioning and leave’ [citation].” (Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1400 ; People v. Davidson (201

2014(Thompson v. Keohane, supra, at p. 112 .) 9 “Whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact. [Citation.] When reviewing a trial court’s determination that a defendant did not undergo custodial interrogation, an appellate court must ‘apply a deferential substantial evidence standard’ [citation] to the trial court’s factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and it must independently decide whether, given those circumstances, ‘a reasonable person in [the] defendant’s position would have felt free to end the questioning

2023We agree with the City and Gemdale. 14 “Substantial evidence is the proper standard where, as here, an agency determines that a project consistent with a prior program EIR presents no significant, unstudied adverse effect.” (Mission Bay Alliance v. Office of Community Investment & Infrastructure (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 160, 174 ; Santa Teresa Citizen Action Group v. City of San Jose (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 689, 702 [“When an agency has already prepared an EIR, its decision not to prepare [a subsequent EIR] for a later project is reviewed under the deferential substantial evidence standard”]; see G

2014(See Santa Teresa, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 704 .) “When an agency has already prepared an EIR, its decision not to prepare an SEIR for a later project is reviewed under the deferential substantial evidence standard. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 702.) “We independently review the administrative record. [Citation.] We resolve reasonable doubts in favor of the administrative decision. [Citation.] ‘We do not judge the wisdom of the agency’s action in approving the Project or pass upon the correctness of the EIR’s environmental conclusions. [Citations.] Our function is simply to determine whether t

2022We review a finding of bad faith under the deferential substantial evidence standard.” ( Powell, supra, at p. 234 .) We presume that the trial court correctly determined that appellant had acted without reasonable cause and in bad faith.

2022(See Powell v. Tagami (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 219, 234 (Powell) [considering a bad faith finding under section 17211, subd. (a).].) “Under the deferential substantial evidence standard of review, findings of fact are liberally construed to support the judgment or order and we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the findings. [Citation.] ‘A single witness’s testimony may constitute substantial evidence to support a finding. [Citation.] It is not our role as a reviewing court to reweigh the evidence or to assess

2024The ruling on whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to independent review.” (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 505 .) II.

2024We agree. 1 The trial court also discussed the legality of the patdown search, but as this case turns on the propriety of the stop, we will not discuss that finding. 4 A. Standard of Review “In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical facts, select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts to determine whether the law as applied has been violated. [Citation.] We review the court’s resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial evidence standard.” (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 505 .) “ ‘We exercise our independent judgment in deter

2024(People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401 .) “When reviewing a trial court’s determination that a defendant did not undergo custodial interrogation, an appellate court must ‘apply a deferential substantial evidence standard’ [citation] to the trial court’s factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and it must independently decide whether, given those circumstances, ‘a reasonable person in [the] defendant’s position would have felt free to end the questioning and leave’ [citation].” (People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1400 ; Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th

2022(Id. at p. 478.) Whether a person is in custody “depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.” (Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 323 [ 128 L.Ed.2d 293 ].) “The question whether [the] defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact.” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401 .) “[A]n appellate court must ‘apply a deferential substantial evidence standard’ [citation] to the trial court’s factual findings regarding the circumstan

2021Rather, we look at the interplay and combined effect of all the circumstances to determine whether on balance they created a 9 coercive atmosphere such that a reasonable person would have experienced a restraint tantamount to an arrest.” (People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1162 .) “‘Whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact. [Citation.] When reviewing a trial court’s determination that a defendant did not undergo custodial interrogation, an appellate court must “apply a deferential substantial evidence standard” [citation] to the tr

2015(Id. at pp. 1084-1089.) “ ‘Whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact. [Citation.] When reviewing a trial court’s determination that a defendant did not undergo custodial interrogation, an appellate court must “apply a deferential substantial evidence standard” [citation] to the trial court’s factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and it must independently decide whether, given those circumstances, “a reasonable person in [the] defendant’s position would have felt free to end the questioning and leave.” ’ ” (

2024Standard of Review “ ‘ “An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.] [¶] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.” ’ ” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1140 .) “On appeal, we independently review the second and third determinations, but we apply ‘ “ ‘the deferential substantial-evidence stand

2020(Id. at p. 136.) The standard of review that generally applies to a trial court’s resolution of a suppression motion reflects the evidentiary nature of a section 1538.5 hearing. “ ‘ “In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.]” ’ ” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1140 , quoting People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182 (Alvarez).) “ ‘ “The [trial] court’s resolut

2023(E.g., Linville, at p. 929.) A. Standard of Review “On appeal, we review factual determinations under the deferential substantial evidence test, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People. [Citation.] We review de novo the legal question of whether section 654 applies.” (Valli, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 794 .) “Generally, courts examine what the prosecution knew or should 16. have known before the date of the defendant’s conviction in the earlier prosecution.” (People v. Ochoa, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 38 .) B.

2016(People v. Britt, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 955 .) We review factual determinations under the deferential substantial evidence test, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.3 (Valli, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 794 .) We review de novo the legal question of whether Section 654 applies.

2026(A.H., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 523.) 10 never properly ripened to permanent jurisdiction,” and, in his view, Indiana retained exclusive permanent subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, such that the California court acted without jurisdiction in issuing the custody order Father now challenges. “[A]s with any statute, interpretation of the UCCJEA is a question of law we review de novo.” (Schneer v. Llaurado (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1287 .) Factual findings made in connection with assessing jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, however, are “reviewed under the deferential substantial evi

2025In addition, while some decisions have suggested that factual findings concerning UCCJEA subject matter jurisdiction are reviewed de novo ( Schneer, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1284-1285), the better reasoned and more widely established view is that “ ‘when the facts are contested, a trial court’s jurisdictional finding under the UCCJEA is reviewed under the deferential substantial evidence standard.’ ” (A.H. v. Superior Court (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 504 , 517, quoting Schneer, supra, at p. 1287 ; see also Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶

2017(Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 69 .) Our task “is to apply the deferential substantial evidence standard to determine whether any reasonable [public] official could have approved the challenged design. [Citation.] If the record contains the requisite substantial evidence, the immunity applies, even if the plaintiff has presented evidence 28. that the design was defective.” (Arreola v. County of Monterey (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 722, 757 .) “The fact of approval by competent professionals can, in and of itself, establish the reasonableness element.” (Higgins v. State of California (1997) 54 Ca

2016(Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 69.) Our task “is to apply the deferential substantial evidence standard to determine whether any reasonable [public] official could have approved the challenged design. [Citation.] If the record contains the requisite substantial evidence, the immunity applies, even if the plaintiff has presented evidence that the design was defective.” (Arreola v. County of Monterey (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 722, 757 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 38 ].) “The fact of approval by competent professionals can, in and of itself, establish the reasonableness element.” (Higgins v. State of Califo

2013Motion to Suppress A. Standard of Review “An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.] [¶] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] ‘The [trial] court’s resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review.’ [Citations.] [¶] The court’s resolution of the first

2013Motion to Suppress A. Standard of Review “An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.] [¶] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] ‘The [trial] court’s resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review.’ [Citations.] [¶] The court’s resolution of the first

2025“We review the trial court’s resolution of disputed factual issues under the deferential substantial evidence standard [citation], and independently review whether the facts demonstrate prosecutorial good faith and due diligence.” (Herrera, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 623 .) As we next explain, the facts here demonstrate prosecutorial good faith and due diligence.

2020It provides, in relevant part, “Notwithstanding any other law, no court may imprison or otherwise confine or place in custody the victim of a sexual assault . . . for contempt when the contempt consists of refusing to testify concerning that sexual assault . . . .” (Section 1219(b).) Our Supreme Court 6 has held this provision “reflects the Legislature’s view that sexual assault victims generally should not be jailed for refusing to testify against the assailant.” (Cogswell, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 478 .) “We review the trial court’s resolution of disputed factual issues under the deferential

2023We apply “a deferential substantial evidence standard of review.” (Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 871 .) When the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict is challenged, our review is limited to the evidence presented at the competency trial.

2023A defendant is mentally incompetent for purposes of this chapter if, as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.” There is a presumption of competence to stand trial, and the defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she lacks competence. (§ 1369, subd. (f).) 8 “We apply a deferential substantial evidence standard of review on appeal. ‘In reviewing a [factfinder’s] determination tha

2021(People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 979 .) “Thus, while we ultimately exercise our independent judgment to determine the constitutional propriety of a search or seizure, we do so within the context of historical facts determined by the trial court. ‘As the finder of fact . . . the superior court is vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences in deciding whether a search is constitutionally unreasonable.’ (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673 .) We review its factual findings ‘

2016Code, § 1538.5), the superior court is vested 3. with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences in deciding whether a search is constitutionally unreasonable.” (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673 .) “We review the court’s resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial- evidence standard.” (People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1134 .) We then independently apply the requisite legal standard to the facts presented.

2017Standard of Review When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court determines the facts, selects the rule of law, and applies the rule to the facts "in order to determine whether the law as applied has been violated." ( People v. Gonzales (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254 , 284, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 , 256 P.3d 543 .) "On appeal from a section 995 review of the denial of a defendant's motion to suppress, we review the determination of the magistrate at the preliminary hearing." ( People v. McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521 , 529, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 422 .) We review the magistrate's resolution of the fact

2017Standard of Review When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court determines the facts, selects the rule of law, and applies the rule to the facts "in order to determine whether the law as applied has been violated." ( People v. Gonzales (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254 , 284, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 , 256 P.3d 543 .) "On appeal from a section 995 review of the denial of a defendant's motion to suppress, we review the determination of the magistrate at the preliminary hearing." ( People v. McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521 , 529, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 422 .) We review the magistrate's resolution of the fact