unavailability requirement in Illinois

2000White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 , 116 L.

2000White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 , 116 L.

2020As our supreme court explained in Pitsonbarger: “[T]he United States Supreme Court, whose lead we followed in adopting the cause- and-prejudice test, observed: ‘ “Without attempting an exhaustive catalog of such objective impediments to compliance with a procedural rule [of waiver], we note that a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel *** would constitute cause under this standard.” ’ ” Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 460 (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 283 n.24 (1999), quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)).

2020As our supreme court explained in Pitsonbarger: “[T]he United States Supreme Court, whose lead we followed in adopting the cause-and-prejudice test, observed: ‘ ”Without attempting an exhaustive catalog of such objective impediments to compliance with a procedural rule [of waiver], we note that a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel *** would constitute cause under this standard.” ’ ” Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 460 (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 283 n.24 (1999), quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)).

2020As our supreme court explained in Pitsonbarger: “[T]he United States Supreme Court, whose lead we followed in adopting the cause- and-prejudice test, observed: ‘ “Without attempting an exhaustive catalog of such objective impediments to compliance with a procedural rule [of waiver], we note that a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel *** would constitute cause under this standard.” ’ ” Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 460 (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 283 n.24 (1999), quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)).

2020As our supreme court explained in Pitsonbarger: “[T]he United States Supreme Court, whose lead we followed in adopting the cause-and-prejudice test, observed: ‘ ”Without attempting an exhaustive catalog of such objective impediments to compliance with a procedural rule [of waiver], we note that a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel *** would constitute cause under this standard.” ’ ” Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 460 (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 283 n.24 (1999), quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)).

2000We hold today that the Confrontation Clause does not embody such a rule.” Inadi, 475 U.S. at 399-400 , 89 L.

2000We hold today that the Confrontation Clause does not embody such a rule.” Inadi, 475 U.S. at 399-400 , 89 L.

1994App. 3d 415 , 617 N.E.2d 360 .) We follow the reasoning of the Rice case and hold that the unavailability requirement of Rule 804(b)(3) is not so rigid that it should be confined to physical unavailability.

1994(Rice, 247 Ill.

1987People v. Myers (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 281, 290 , 426 N.E.2d 535 ; see also People v. Hiller (1955), 7 Ill. 2d 465, 470 , 131 N.E.2d 25 .

1987People v. Myers (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 281, 290 , 426 N.E.2d 535 ; see also People v. Hiller (1955), 7 Ill. 2d 465, 470 , 131 N.E.2d 25 .

1980Even a three-day continuance of a complicated jury trial inherently imposes inconvenience on the parties, witnesses and court. • 1, 2 The supreme court has held the denial of a continuance because of unavailability of counsel to be proper when co-counsel was available to adequately try the case in People v. Miller (1958), 13 Ill.2d 84 , 148 N.E.2d 455 , and People v. Davis (1950), 406 Ill. 215 , 92 N.E.2d 649 .

1980Even a three-day continuance of a complicated jury trial inherently imposes inconvenience on the parties, witnesses and court. • 1, 2 The supreme court has held the denial of a continuance because of unavailability of counsel to be proper when co-counsel was available to adequately try the case in People v. Miller (1958), 13 Ill.2d 84 , 148 N.E.2d 455 , and People v. Davis (1950), 406 Ill. 215 , 92 N.E.2d 649 .

1980Even a three-day continuance of a complicated jury trial inherently imposes inconvenience on the parties, witnesses and court. • 1, 2 The supreme court has held the denial of a continuance because of unavailability of counsel to be proper when co-counsel was available to adequately try the case in People v. Miller (1958), 13 Ill.2d 84 , 148 N.E.2d 455 , and People v. Davis (1950), 406 Ill. 215 , 92 N.E.2d 649 .

1980Even a three-day continuance of a complicated jury trial inherently imposes inconvenience on the parties, witnesses and court. • 1, 2 The supreme court has held the denial of a continuance because of unavailability of counsel to be proper when co-counsel was available to adequately try the case in People v. Miller (1958), 13 Ill.2d 84 , 148 N.E.2d 455 , and People v. Davis (1950), 406 Ill. 215 , 92 N.E.2d 649 .

1975(People v. Coburn, 20 Ill.App.3d 60 , 313 N.E.2d 270 .) In the instant -case, Officer Salerno’s testimony that he “picked up Shaw’s head, which was laying in a pool of blood” may border on the fine line between a proper and an improper foundation when viewed in the abstract, but when viewed in light of the entire record it is harmless error at worst.

1975(People v. Coburn, 20 Ill.App.3d 60 , 313 N.E.2d 270 .) In the instant -case, Officer Salerno’s testimony that he “picked up Shaw’s head, which was laying in a pool of blood” may border on the fine line between a proper and an improper foundation when viewed in the abstract, but when viewed in light of the entire record it is harmless error at worst.

1975(California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 .) The State may show the death of a witness to satisfy the unavailability requirement.

1975(California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 .) The State may show the death of a witness to satisfy the unavailability requirement.

1972Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282 , 189 S.W.2d 284 ; see also Miller, Beyond the Law of Evidence, 40 S. Cal. L.

1972Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282 , 189 S.W.2d 284 ; see also Miller, Beyond the Law of Evidence, 40 S. Cal. L.