unavailability requirement in Florida

2001In United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 , 106 S.Ct. 1121 , 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986), the Supreme Court stated: There are good reasons why the unavailability rule, developed in cases involving former testimony, is not applicable to co-conspirators' out-of-court statements....

2001In United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 , 106 S.Ct. 1121 , 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986), the Supreme Court stated: There are good reasons why the unavailability rule, developed in cases involving former testimony, is not applicable to co-conspirators' out-of-court statements....

1996We have previously recognized that [i]n Chambers , the Court held that "[U]nder the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial." 410 U.S. at 303 , 93 S.Ct. at 1050 .

1996We have previously recognized that [i]n Chambers , the Court held that "[U]nder the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial." 410 U.S. at 303 , 93 S.Ct. at 1050 .

2008Contreras, 910 So.2d at 907 .

2003All of these indicate that Roberts simply reaffirmed a longstanding rule, foreshadowed in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), established in Barber , and refined in a line of cases up through Roberts , that applies unavailability analysis to prior testimony.[n.] Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the government without a showing that the declarant is unavailable. [n.] In federal court the unavailability rule for former trial testimony was established long before Pointer v. Te

2003All of these indicate that Roberts simply reaffirmed a longstanding rule, foreshadowed in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), established in Barber , and refined in a line of cases up through Roberts , that applies unavailability analysis to prior testimony.[n.] Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the government without a showing that the declarant is unavailable. [n.] In federal court the unavailability rule for former trial testimony was established long before Pointer v. Te

2003All of these indicate that Roberts simply reaffirmed a longstanding rule, foreshadowed in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), established in Barber , and refined in a line of cases up through Roberts , that applies unavailability analysis to prior testimony.[n.] Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the government without a showing that the declarant is unavailable. [n.] In federal court the unavailability rule for former trial testimony was established long before Pointer v. Te

2003All of these indicate that Roberts simply reaffirmed a longstanding rule, foreshadowed in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), established in Barber , and refined in a line of cases up through Roberts , that applies unavailability analysis to prior testimony.[n.] Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the government without a showing that the declarant is unavailable. [n.] In federal court the unavailability rule for former trial testimony was established long before Pointer v. Te

2003Barber, supra, at 722 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 ; Mancusi, supra, at 211, 92 S.Ct. 2308 .

2003Barber, supra, at 722 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 ; Mancusi, supra, at 211, 92 S.Ct. 2308 .

2003Five years after the Pointer decision, and therefore before the Roberts decision, the Supreme Court in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165-66 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), discussed the quoted passage from Pointer and ascribed an unavailability requirement to it.

2003Five years after the Pointer decision, and therefore before the Roberts decision, the Supreme Court in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165-66 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), discussed the quoted passage from Pointer and ascribed an unavailability requirement to it.

1999Servs. v. M.B., 701 So.2d 1155 , 1158 n. 4 (Fla.1997). [10] This statute can also be contrasted to the residual hearsay exception found in the Federal Rules of Evidence, which requires that the hearsay evidence be more probative than any other available evidence.

1994Consequently, it certified the following question to the supreme court: DOES A FINDING OF INCOMPETENCY TO TESTIFY BECAUSE ONE IS UNABLE TO RECOGNIZE THE DUTY AND OBLIGATION TO TELL THE TRUTH SATISFY THE LEGISLATIVE ‘TESTIFY OR BE UNAVAILABLE’ REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 90.803(23)(a)(2)? 613 So.2d at 538 .

1982Unlike the unavailability requirement under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.330(a)(3), which may possibly be satisfied by the deponent's own statement of unavailability contained in the deposition, see Colonnades, Inc. v. Vance Baldwin, Inc., 318 So.2d 515 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); but see Haverley v. Clann, 196 So.2d 38 (Fla.2d DCA 1967): Weber v. Berry, 133 So.2d 327 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961); Driscoll v. Morris, 114 So.2d 314 (Fla.3d DCA 1959), the fact of agency or conspiracy must be established by proof independent of the statement sought to be introduced that an agency or conspiracy existed.

1982Unlike the unavailability requirement under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.330(a)(3), which may possibly be satisfied by the deponent's own statement of unavailability contained in the deposition, see Colonnades, Inc. v. Vance Baldwin, Inc., 318 So.2d 515 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); but see Haverley v. Clann, 196 So.2d 38 (Fla.2d DCA 1967): Weber v. Berry, 133 So.2d 327 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961); Driscoll v. Morris, 114 So.2d 314 (Fla.3d DCA 1959), the fact of agency or conspiracy must be established by proof independent of the statement sought to be introduced that an agency or conspiracy existed.

1982Unlike the unavailability requirement under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.330(a)(3), which may possibly be satisfied by the deponent's own statement of unavailability contained in the deposition, see Colonnades, Inc. v. Vance Baldwin, Inc., 318 So.2d 515 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); but see Haverley v. Clann, 196 So.2d 38 (Fla.2d DCA 1967): Weber v. Berry, 133 So.2d 327 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961); Driscoll v. Morris, 114 So.2d 314 (Fla.3d DCA 1959), the fact of agency or conspiracy must be established by proof independent of the statement sought to be introduced that an agency or conspiracy existed.