11 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1925–1985 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Baumgartner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.green1 sentence1985Baumgartner , fn. 6, p. 405. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Cook
green
2 sentences1967Sorrell v. Allstate Insurance Company, (La.App. 3 Cir., 1965), 179 So.2d 499 ; Breaux v. Meyers, (La.App., 3 Cir. 1961), 132 So.2d 77 ; Jones v. Dozier, (La.App., 1 Cir., 1964), 160 So.2d 395 ; Maryland Casualty Company v. Allstate Insurance Company, (La.App., 2 Cir., 1957), 96 So.2d 340 ; and Jackson v. Cook, 189 La. 860 , 181 So. 195 .” The evidence in this case makes it clear that the doctrine is not applicable here. 1967Sorrell v. Allstate Insurance Company, (La.App. 3 Cir., 1965), 179 So.2d 499 ; Breaux v. Meyers, (La.App., 3 Cir. 1961), 132 So.2d 77 ; Jones v. Dozier, (La.App., 1 Cir., 1964), 160 So.2d 395 ; Maryland Casualty Company v. Allstate Insurance Company, (La.App., 2 Cir., 1957), 96 So.2d 340 ; and Jackson v. Cook, 189 La. 860 , 181 So. 195 .” The evidence in this case makes it clear that the doctrine is not applicable here. | 3 | 1966–1967 |
Jones v. Dozier
green
2 sentences1967Sorrell v. Allstate Insurance Company, (La.App. 3 Cir., 1965), 179 So.2d 499 ; Breaux v. Meyers, (La.App., 3 Cir. 1961), 132 So.2d 77 ; Jones v. Dozier, (La.App., 1 Cir., 1964), 160 So.2d 395 ; Maryland Casualty Company v. Allstate Insurance Company, (La.App., 2 Cir., 1957), 96 So.2d 340 ; and Jackson v. Cook, 189 La. 860 , 181 So. 195 .” The evidence in this case makes it clear that the doctrine is not applicable here. 1966Sorrell v. Allstate Insurance Company, (La.App., 3 Cir., 1965), 179 So.2d 499 ; Breaux v. Meyers, (La.App., 3 Cir., 1961), 132 So.2d 77 ; Jones v. Dozier, (La.App., 1 Cir., 1964), 160 So.2d 395 ; Maryland Casualty Company v. Allstate Insurance Company, (La.App., 2 Cir., 1957), 96 So.2d 340 ; and Jackson v. Cook, 189 La. 860 , 181 So. 195 . | 3 | 1966–1967 |
Breaux v. Meyers
neutral
2 sentences1967Sorrell v. Allstate Insurance Company, (La.App. 3 Cir., 1965), 179 So.2d 499 ; Breaux v. Meyers, (La.App., 3 Cir. 1961), 132 So.2d 77 ; Jones v. Dozier, (La.App., 1 Cir., 1964), 160 So.2d 395 ; Maryland Casualty Company v. Allstate Insurance Company, (La.App., 2 Cir., 1957), 96 So.2d 340 ; and Jackson v. Cook, 189 La. 860 , 181 So. 195 .” The evidence in this case makes it clear that the doctrine is not applicable here. 1966Sorrell v. Allstate Insurance Company, (La.App., 3 Cir., 1965), 179 So.2d 499 ; Breaux v. Meyers, (La.App., 3 Cir., 1961), 132 So.2d 77 ; Jones v. Dozier, (La.App., 1 Cir., 1964), 160 So.2d 395 ; Maryland Casualty Company v. Allstate Insurance Company, (La.App., 2 Cir., 1957), 96 So.2d 340 ; and Jackson v. Cook, 189 La. 860 , 181 So. 195 . | 3 | 1966–1967 |
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences1967Sorrell v. Allstate Insurance Company, (La.App. 3 Cir., 1965), 179 So.2d 499 ; Breaux v. Meyers, (La.App., 3 Cir. 1961), 132 So.2d 77 ; Jones v. Dozier, (La.App., 1 Cir., 1964), 160 So.2d 395 ; Maryland Casualty Company v. Allstate Insurance Company, (La.App., 2 Cir., 1957), 96 So.2d 340 ; and Jackson v. Cook, 189 La. 860 , 181 So. 195 .” The evidence in this case makes it clear that the doctrine is not applicable here. 1966Sorrell v. Allstate Insurance Company, (La.App., 3 Cir., 1965), 179 So.2d 499 ; Breaux v. Meyers, (La.App., 3 Cir., 1961), 132 So.2d 77 ; Jones v. Dozier, (La.App., 1 Cir., 1964), 160 So.2d 395 ; Maryland Casualty Company v. Allstate Insurance Company, (La.App., 2 Cir., 1957), 96 So.2d 340 ; and Jackson v. Cook, 189 La. 860 , 181 So. 195 . | 3 | 1966–1967 |
Tyer v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co.
neutral
2 sentences1932Co., 143 La. 178 , 78 So. 438 : “In order to enforce the humanitarian doctrine of ‘the last clear chance,’ it must appear that plaintiff has clearly shown that defendant, after seeing the danger, could by the exercise of ordinary care have avoided the injury, or if defendant did not see the danger, it must appear that plain *649 tiff has clearly shown, that defendant might-by the exercise of ordinary care have seen the danger in time to avoid the injury.” If defendant was going at thirty miles an hour and had applied his brakes, as claimed by him, he would have unquestionably stopped bis car i 1931Co., 143 La. 177 , 78 So. 438 , the Supreme Court held (Muotatioh from the syllabus): “In order to enforce the humanitarian doctrine of ‘the last clear chance,’ it must appear that plaintiff has clearly shown that defendant, after seeing the danger, could by the exercise of ordinary care have avoided the injury, or, if defendant did not see the danger, it must appear that plaintiff has cleany shown that defendant might by the exercise of ordinary care have seen the danger in time to avoid the injury.” Norwood v. Bahm, 14 La. | 3 | 1925–1932 |
Evans v. Thorpe
green
2 sentences1968The doctrine invoked was stated by this court in Evans v. Thorpe, La.App., 175 So.2d 418 (1965): * * * The last-clear-chance doctrine is a humanitarian doctrine of discovered peril based on the principle that no one having an opportunity to avoid injury to another, after becoming aware of such person’s perilous position, or by the exercise of due diligence could and should have become aware thereof, may negligently injure him though he is at fault. 1967With regard to this doctrine the Court in Evans v. Thorpe, La.App., 175 So.2d 418, 419 , said: "The last-clear-chance doctrine is a humanitarian doctrine of discovered peril based on the principle that no one having an opportunity to avoid injury to another, after becoming aware of such person's perilous position, or by the exercise of due diligence could and should have become aware thereof, may negligently injure him though he is at fault. | 2 | 1967–1968 |
Sorrell v. Allstate Insurance Company
green
2 sentences1967Sorrell v. Allstate Insurance Company, (La.App. 3 Cir., 1965), 179 So.2d 499 ; Breaux v. Meyers, (La.App., 3 Cir. 1961), 132 So.2d 77 ; Jones v. Dozier, (La.App., 1 Cir., 1964), 160 So.2d 395 ; Maryland Casualty Company v. Allstate Insurance Company, (La.App., 2 Cir., 1957), 96 So.2d 340 ; and Jackson v. Cook, 189 La. 860 , 181 So. 195 .” The evidence in this case makes it clear that the doctrine is not applicable here. 1966Sorrell v. Allstate Insurance Company, (La.App., 3 Cir., 1965), 179 So.2d 499 ; Breaux v. Meyers, (La.App., 3 Cir., 1961), 132 So.2d 77 ; Jones v. Dozier, (La.App., 1 Cir., 1964), 160 So.2d 395 ; Maryland Casualty Company v. Allstate Insurance Company, (La.App., 2 Cir., 1957), 96 So.2d 340 ; and Jackson v. Cook, 189 La. 860 , 181 So. 195 . | 2 | 1966–1967 |
Clark v. Clark
neutral
2 sentences1954Again, in Clark v. Clark, 207 La. 606 , 21 So.2d 758, 760 , we said: “ * * * that while a corespondent is not disqualified by law from testifying with reference to his intimacies with the erring spouse, the statements made by him must be corroborated and weighed with great caution before being accepted as true.” There is no strong corroborative testimony as to the guilt of the wife. 1954Again, in Clark v. Clark, 207 La. 606 , 21 So.2d 758, 760 , we said: “ * * * that while a corespondent is not disqualified by law from testifying with reference to his intimacies with the erring spouse, the statements made by him must be corroborated and weighed with great caution before being accepted as true.” There is no strong corroborative testimony as to the guilt of the wife. | 2 | 1954–1954 |
Estopinal v. Estopinal
green
2 sentences1954In Estopinal v. Estopinal, 223 La. 485 , 66 So.2d 311 , in giving consideration to the testimony pf a .co-respondent, we said: “The only direct proof of the adultery charged came from the lips of the co-respondent, one Frederick Turpin, whose, testimony is strongly assailed by counsel for defendant. * * * Such testimony is generally considered to be of a rather reprehensible nature and the general rule is that it should be weighed with great caution before being accepted as true.” This is not only a humanitarian doctrine where the chastity of a woman is at stake, but it is the most sensible ru 1954In Estopinal v. Estopinal, 223 La. 485 , 66 So.2d 311 , in giving consideration to the testimony pf a .co-respondent, we said: “The only direct proof of the adultery charged came from the lips of the co-respondent, one Frederick Turpin, whose, testimony is strongly assailed by counsel for defendant. * * * Such testimony is generally considered to be of a rather reprehensible nature and the general rule is that it should be weighed with great caution before being accepted as true.” This is not only a humanitarian doctrine where the chastity of a woman is at stake, but it is the most sensible ru | 2 | 1954–1954 |
Sales v. Guillory
neutral
1 sentence1967The latest expression of the law relative to the doctrine of last clear chance is set forth in the recent case of Sales v. Guillory, 188 So.2d 429 (La.App.1966), in which it is stated as follows: "Our jurisprudence is now established that in order to apply the humanitarian doctrine of last clear chance, plaintiff must prove clearly three elements exist: (1) plaintiff must be in a position of peril of which he is unaware, or from which he is unable to extricate himself; (2) plaintiff must show that defendant actually discovered, or should have discovered plaintiff’s peril; (3) at the time that | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Norwood v. Bahm
green
1 sentence1931Co., 143 La. 177 , 78 So. 438 , the Supreme Court held (Muotatioh from the syllabus): “In order to enforce the humanitarian doctrine of ‘the last clear chance,’ it must appear that plaintiff has clearly shown that defendant, after seeing the danger, could by the exercise of ordinary care have avoided the injury, or, if defendant did not see the danger, it must appear that plaintiff has cleany shown that defendant might by the exercise of ordinary care have seen the danger in time to avoid the injury.” Norwood v. Bahm, 14 La. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.