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430 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1900–1986 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Banks v. Morris Companygreen2 sentences1982This was recognized in Banks v. Morris & Co., 302 Mo. 254 , 257 S.W. 482 (1924) which eliminated the substantive difference between extricability and obliviousness in determining whether a case had been pled under the humanitarian doctrine. 1982This was recognized in Banks v. Morris & Co., 302 Mo. 254 , 257 S.W. 482 (1924) which eliminated the substantive difference between extricability and obliviousness in determining whether a case had been pled under the humanitarian doctrine. | 14 | 79 |
Anderson Ex Rel. Anderson v. Prughgreen2 sentences1966Appellant reminds that “[ujsually a humanitarian negligence case must fail when the plaintiff or his vehicle comes to an intersection last and runs into the side of the other vehicle,” Lotta v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 342 Mo. 743 , 117 S.W.2d 296, 302 [13]; that “[t]he first and basic fact of liability under the humanitarian doctrine is a position of imminent peril,” Lane v. Wilson, Mo.App., 390 S.W.2d 943, 947 [3], Anderson v. Prugh, 364 Mo. 557 , 264 S.W.2d 358, 364 [8]; that “ ‘[t]he peril truly must be imminent * * *; it may not be remote, uncertain or contingent. 1966Appellant reminds that “[ujsually a humanitarian negligence case must fail when the plaintiff or his vehicle comes to an intersection last and runs into the side of the other vehicle,” Lotta v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 342 Mo. 743 , 117 S.W.2d 296, 302 [13]; that “[t]he first and basic fact of liability under the humanitarian doctrine is a position of imminent peril,” Lane v. Wilson, Mo.App., 390 S.W.2d 943, 947 [3], Anderson v. Prugh, 364 Mo. 557 , 264 S.W.2d 358, 364 [8]; that “ ‘[t]he peril truly must be imminent * * *; it may not be remote, uncertain or contingent. | 6 | 9 |
Ornder v. Childersgreen2 sentences1973Ornder v. Childers, 327 S.W.2d 913, 916 [3] (Mo.1959). 1972In the cited case of Ornder v. Childers, Mo., 327 S.W.2d 913, 916 , the court did not say that as a matter of law the plaintiff made no humanitarian case. | 5 | 8 |
Yeaman v. Stormsgreen2 sentences1965A case may not be submitted under the humanitarian doctrine where it rests solely upon speculation, conjecture and surmise [Yeaman v. Storms, 358 Mo. 774, 779 , 217 S.W.2d 495, 499 ; Bauer v. Wood, 236 Mo.App. 266, 270 , 154 S.W.2d 356, 359 (6)], either with respect to the basic element of a plaintiff’s (or cross-claimant’s) position of imminent peril [Paydon v. Globus, supra, 262 S.W.2d at 603 ; Hendrick v. Kurn, supra, 352 Mo. at 851 , 179 S.W.2d at 719 (6) ; Hartlage v. Halloran, Mo.App., 331 S.W.2d 197, 200 ; Kasten v. St. 1965A case may not be submitted under the humanitarian doctrine where it rests solely upon speculation, conjecture and surmise [Yeaman v. Storms, 358 Mo. 774, 779 , 217 S.W.2d 495, 499 ; Bauer v. Wood, 236 Mo.App. 266, 270 , 154 S.W.2d 356, 359 (6)], either with respect to the basic element of a plaintiff’s (or cross-claimant’s) position of imminent peril [Paydon v. Globus, supra, 262 S.W.2d at 603 ; Hendrick v. Kurn, supra, 352 Mo. at 851 , 179 S.W.2d at 719 (6) ; Hartlage v. Halloran, Mo.App., 331 S.W.2d 197, 200 ; Kasten v. St. | 5 | 8 |
Delay Ex Rel. Delay v. Wardgreen2 sentences1968As stated in De Lay v. Ward, Mo., 262 S.W.2d 628 , 634: “* * * we have, at places where there is a duty to keep a lookout, extended the humanitarian rule to discoverable as well as discovered peril * * * under the discoverable peril theory a defendant is charged with seeing what he could have seen whether he looked or negligently failed to look.” Defendant testified that she was proceeding northward along Union at 20 miles per hour. 1965A case may not be submitted under the humanitarian doctrine where it rests solely upon speculation, conjecture and surmise [Yeaman v. Storms, 358 Mo. 774, 779 , 217 S.W.2d 495, 499 ; Bauer v. Wood, 236 Mo.App. 266, 270 , 154 S.W.2d 356, 359 (6)], either with respect to the basic element of a plaintiff’s (or cross-claimant’s) position of imminent peril [Paydon v. Globus, supra, 262 S.W.2d at 603 ; Hendrick v. Kurn, supra, 352 Mo. at 851 , 179 S.W.2d at 719 (6) ; Hartlage v. Halloran, Mo.App., 331 S.W.2d 197, 200 ; Kasten v. St. | 4 | 7 |
| Batson v. Ormsbeegreen | 4 | 4 |
Buehler v. Festus Mercantile Co.green2 sentences1960Co., 343 Mo. 139 , 119 S.W.2d 961 , the application of the humanitarian rule to a case where the plaintiff was only approaching a position of imminent peril. 1960Co., 343 Mo. 139 , 119 S.W.2d 961 , the application of the humanitarian rule to a case where the plaintiff was only approaching a position of imminent peril. | 3 | 15 |
Vietmeier v. Vossgreen2 sentences1962With the ability to stop within approximately 40 feet at 15 m. p. h.; at approximately 50 feet at 20 m. p. h.; and allowing ¾ second, Vietmeier v. Voss, Mo.Sup., 246 S.W.2d 785 , for reaction time, the jury reasonably could have found that the bus driver had sufficient time and space, under the humanitarian doctrine, within which to have stopped short of the point of collision after plaintiff came into a position of imminent peril. 1957At best, “there would have been but a mere possibility of avoiding the collision, and this is not sufficient to make a submissible case under the humanitarian rule.” Paydon v. Globus, Mo., 262 S.W.2d 601, 604 ; see also Yeaman v. Storms, 358 Mo. 774 , 217 S.W.2d 495 ; Claridge v. Anzolohe, 359 Mo. 65 , 220 S.W.2d 33 ; Vietmeier v. Voss, Mo., 246 S.W.2d 785, 788 . | 3 | 10 |
| Schmidt Ex Rel. Schmidt v. Allengreen | 3 | 5 |
| Martin v. Effreingreen | 3 | 4 |
| Herr v. Ruprechtgreen | 3 | 3 |
State Ex Rel. Fleming v. Blandgreen2 sentences1951Fleming v. Bland, 322 Mo. 565 , 15 S. W. 2d 798 , we have held that antecedent negligence of a defendant cannot be taken into consideration in determining whether he was negligent under the humanitarian rule. 1951Fleming v. Bland, 322 Mo. 565 , 15 S. W. 2d 798 , we have held that antecedent negligence of a defendant cannot be taken into consideration in determining whether he was negligent under the humanitarian rule. | 2 | 16 |
Downing v. Dixongreen2 sentences1972It is only when immediate danger of being injured exists that the humanitarian rule seizes upon the then existing factual situation, in effect “blotting out primary or antecedent negligence,” Downing v. Dixon, Mo.App., 314 S.W.2d 927, 930 , and imposes a duty thereafter to exercise the required degree of care to avoid the threatened injury. 1967It is only when this position arises or exists that the humanitarian rule seizes upon the then existing situation, in effect "blotting out primary or antecedent negligence,” Downing v. Dixon, Mo.App., 314 S.W.2d 927, 930 , and imposes a duty thereafter to exercise the required degree of care to avoid the threatened injury. | 2 | 11 |
Paydon v. Globusgreen2 sentences1972Paydon v. Globus, Mo.Sup., 262 S.W.2d 601 ; Yarrington v. Lininger, Mo., 327 S.W.2d 104 ; Davis v. Quality Oil Company, supra. In addition, if it is shown by the evidence that decedent was in a position of immediate danger of being injured, in order to impose liability on appellants under the humanitarian rule, it is necessary that the evidence also show that Harold Crider, after receiving actual or constructive notice of the immediate danger, then “had the present ability, with the means at hand, to have averted the impending injury without injury to himself or others,” in this case by slacke 1957At best, “there would have been but a mere possibility of avoiding the collision, and this is not sufficient to make a submissible case under the humanitarian rule.” Paydon v. Globus, Mo., 262 S.W.2d 601, 604 ; see also Yeaman v. Storms, 358 Mo. 774 , 217 S.W.2d 495 ; Claridge v. Anzolohe, 359 Mo. 65 , 220 S.W.2d 33 ; Vietmeier v. Voss, Mo., 246 S.W.2d 785, 788 . | 2 | 10 |
Teague v. Plaza Express Co.green2 sentences1966If this were a case submitted only on the humanitarian doctrine, as in Teague v. Plaza Express Co., 354 Mo. 582 , 190 S.W.2d 254 , this contention would be correct, for the sudden emergency doctrine has no application to a humanitarian submission. 1966If this were a case submitted only on the humanitarian doctrine, as in Teague v. Plaza Express Co., 354 Mo. 582 , 190 S.W.2d 254 , this contention would be correct, for the sudden emergency doctrine has no application to a humanitarian submission. | 2 | 9 |
Blaser v. Colemangreen2 sentences1960In Blaser v. Coleman, 358 Mo. 157 , 213 S.W.2d 420 , plaintiff, a guest-passenger sued under the humanitarian doctrine and received a judgment for personal injuries sustained when he leaped from the bed of a runaway truck abandoned by defendant’s driver-employee. 1960In Blaser v. Coleman, 358 Mo. 157 , 213 S.W.2d 420 , plaintiff, a guest-passenger sued under the humanitarian doctrine and received a judgment for personal injuries sustained when he leaped from the bed of a runaway truck abandoned by defendant’s driver-employee. | 2 | 8 |
Spoeneman v. Uhrigreen2 sentences1958In Spoeneman v. Uhri, supra [ 332 Mo. 821 , 60 S.W.2d 11 ], it is stated: “Neither should he be convicted of negligence under the humanitarian doctrine if he could have avoided injuring the appellant only by inflicting injury upon himself or third parties, or even only by exposing *821 himself or them to unreasonable hazard. * * * We do not mean to say that, if a defendant’s prior carelessness precipitates such an emergency, he will always he excused from liability merely because he could not thereafter avert the casualty without undue hazard to himself or others. 1951Appellant's next assignment is that Instruction No. 4, submitting certain issues under the humanitarian doctrine, was erroneous in that it omitted as one of its elements that appellant "should not have been required to swerve the course of his car unless it could have been done with safety to others on the highway." The cases of Spoeneman v. Uhri, 332 Mo. 821 , 60 S.W.2d 9 , and Banks v. Morris & Co., 302 Mo. 254 , 257 S.W. 482 , are cited in support of this contention. | 2 | 6 |
| Yarrington v. Liningergreen | 2 | 5 |
| Reiling v. Russellgreen | 2 | 5 |
| Knorp v. Thompsongreen | 2 | 5 |
| Carney v. Stuartgreen | 2 | 4 |
| Poague v. Kurngreen | 2 | 4 |
| White v. Kansas City Public Service Co.green | 2 | 3 |
| Glenn v. Offuttgreen | 2 | 3 |
| Findley v. Ashergreen | 2 | 3 |
| Barnes v. Jonesgreen | 2 | 3 |
Mayfield v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co.green2 sentences1944"In other words, in spite of a failure to keep a lookout the humanitarian doctrine may come into operation, not because that is in itself humanitarian negligence, but because we have, at places where there is a duty to keep a lookout, extended the humanitarian rule to discoverable as well as discovered peril." ( 337 Mo. at page 91 .) [434] Addressing ourselves now to this latter phase of defendant's duty — while the jury would be justified under the evidence in finding the plaintiff to have been in helpless peril after he had warned the driver, defendant's engineer could not know that plaintif 1941Co., 337 Mo. 79 , 85 S.W.2d 116 , 123.] "The prior or antecedent negligence of neither plaintiff nor defendant enters into the humanitarian doctrine." [Gray v. Columbia Terminals [167] Co., supra, 331 Mo. 73 , 52 S.W.2d 809 , 813.] We think instructions 7 and 8 introduced an issue foreign to the case, and set up a standard for the jury to consider and measure the conduct of deceased, rather than directing attention to the proper issues in the case. | 1 | 9 |
Grubbs v. Kansas City Public Service Co.green2 sentences1954“Under the humanitarian rule ‘the cause of the injured party’s peril is immaterial (save, perhaps, when he voluntarily seeks injury * * *).’ Grubbs v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 329 Mo. 390 , 45 S.W.2d 71, 74 ; Freeman v. Berberich, 332 Mo. 831 , 60 S.W.2d 393 , and cases therein cited. 1954“Under the humanitarian rule ‘the cause of the injured party’s peril is immaterial (save, perhaps, when he voluntarily seeks injury * * *).’ Grubbs v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 329 Mo. 390 , 45 S.W.2d 71, 74 ; Freeman v. Berberich, 332 Mo. 831 , 60 S.W.2d 393 , and cases therein cited. | 1 | 7 |
Willhauck v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.green2 sentences1941Co., 332 Mo. 1165 , 61 S.W.2d 336 , l.c. 339 (7, 8), this court said: "This cause was submitted only on the charge of negligence under the humanitarian rule. 1941Co., 332 Mo. 1165 , 61 S.W.2d 336 , l.c. 339 (7, 8), this court said: "This cause was submitted only on the charge of negligence under the humanitarian rule. | 1 | 6 |
| Branscum v. Glasergreen | 1 | 5 |
| Janssens v. Thompsongreen | 1 | 5 |
| Welch v. McNeelygreen | 1 | 5 |
| Claridge v. Anzolonegreen | 1 | 5 |
| Branson v. Abernathy Furniture Co.green | 1 | 5 |
| Lotta v. Kansas City Public Service Co.green | 1 | 4 |
| McClanahan Ex Rel. McClanahan v. St. Louis Public Service Co.green | 1 | 4 |
| Johnson v. Hurck Delivery Service, Inc.green | 1 | 4 |
| Fisher v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 3 |
| Schmittzehe v. City of Cape Girardeaugreen | 1 | 3 |
| Wilson v. Tolivergreen | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schulz v. Smercina
green
2 sentences1941(For the purpose of this discussion we will assume that there was a real "sole cause" issue in the case.) In Pence v. Kansas City Laundry Company, 59 S.W.2d 633 , l.c. 638, the Supreme Court considered a humanitarian instruction which possessed a "tail" similar to that under discussion here, and said: "Counsel for appellant also say that above Instruction 5 was erroneous in permitting the jury to find for plaintiff `under this particular instruction, even though you should believe from the evidence that Mrs. Pence failed to use ordinary care for her own safety and that both Dr. and Mrs. Pence 1941(For the purpose of this discussion we will assume that there was a real "sole cause" issue in the case.) In Pence v. Kansas City Laundry Company, 59 S.W.2d 633 , l.c. 638, the Supreme Court considered a humanitarian instruction which possessed a "tail" similar to that under discussion here, and said: "Counsel for appellant also say that above Instruction 5 was erroneous in permitting the jury to find for plaintiff `under this particular instruction, even though you should believe from the evidence that Mrs. Pence failed to use ordinary care for her own safety and that both Dr. and Mrs. Pence | 13 | 1928–1941 |
State Ex Rel. Vulgamott v. Trimble
neutral
2 sentences1945A. Yes, sir.” Our Supreme Court, in setting forth the constitutive elements of a cause of action under the humanitarian doctrine, has denominated the position of peril as the chief factor of liability. [Banks v. Morris & Co., 302 Mo. 254 , 257 S. W. 482 .] The peril of the injured party is the real foundation upon which the doctrine rests. [State ex rel. *774 Vulgamott v. Trimble, 300 Mo. 92 , 253 S. W. 1014 .] And that peril must be something more than a bare possibility of an injury occurring. [State ex rel. 1945A. Yes, sir.” Our Supreme Court, in setting forth the constitutive elements of a cause of action under the humanitarian doctrine, has denominated the position of peril as the chief factor of liability. [Banks v. Morris & Co., 302 Mo. 254 , 257 S. W. 482 .] The peril of the injured party is the real foundation upon which the doctrine rests. [State ex rel. *774 Vulgamott v. Trimble, 300 Mo. 92 , 253 S. W. 1014 .] And that peril must be something more than a bare possibility of an injury occurring. [State ex rel. | 12 | 1925–1945 |
Smithers v. Barker
green
2 sentences1956Defendant relies on the inapplicable case of Smithers v. Barker, 341 Mo. 1017, 1028 , 111 S.W.2d 47, 53 , wherein it was held that the particular language of the so-called “tail” on a humanitarian instruction there given would conflict with a proper sole cause instruction. 1956Defendant relies on the inapplicable case of Smithers v. Barker, 341 Mo. 1017, 1028 , 111 S.W.2d 47, 53 , wherein it was held that the particular language of the so-called “tail” on a humanitarian instruction there given would conflict with a proper sole cause instruction. | 10 | 1939–1962 |
Gray v. Columbia Terminals Co.
green
2 sentences1955In Gray v. Columbia Terminals Co., supra, [ 331 Mo. 73, 52 S.W.2d 813 ] the Supreme Court said, “when plaintiff submitted her case to the jury ‘under the humanitarian rule alone all the other specifications of negligence contained in her petition passed out of the case * * (Citing cases.)” We therefore hold that it was not error for the defendant to omit a requirement for a finding negativing the defendant’s contributory negligence from the defendant’s instruction authorizing a verdict on the counterclaim, because contributory negligence is not an issue under the pleadings. 1941In an action brought under the humanitarian doctrine instructions which inject the issue of contributory negligence, or set it *Page 804 up as a defense, are erroneous. [Silliman v. Munger Laundry Co., 329 Mo. 235 , 44 S.W.2d 159 , 162; Schulz v. Smercina, 318 Mo. 486 , 1 S.W.2d 113 , 114; Gray v. Columbia Terminals Co., 331 Mo. 73 , 52 S.W.2d 809 , 813; Willhauck v. Chicago, R.I. | 9 | 1934–1955 |
Phillips v. Henson
green
2 sentences1946Defendant’s liability under the humanitarian rule depends upon whether plaintiff’s injuries were caused by negligent acts of defendant after he saw or could have seen plaintiff in a position of peril. [Phillips v. Henson, 326 Mo. 282, 289 , 30 S. W. (2d) 1065 .] There is no evidence that defendant’s bus could have been stopped after plaintiff got immediately in front of it. 1946Defendant’s liability under the humanitarian rule depends upon whether plaintiff’s injuries were caused by negligent acts of defendant after he saw or could have seen plaintiff in a position of peril. [Phillips v. Henson, 326 Mo. 282, 289 , 30 S. W. (2d) 1065 .] There is no evidence that defendant’s bus could have been stopped after plaintiff got immediately in front of it. | 9 | 1932–1946 |
Borgstede v. Waldbauer
green
2 sentences1950Louis Butter Co., 339 Mo. 996 , 98 S. W. (2d) 742 ; Borgstede v. Waldbauer, 337 Mo. 1205 , 88 S. W. (2d) 373 .) Surely it is no more difficult to make such a hypothesization of these facts, under which the humanitarian rule could not apply, than it is to hypothesize the essential facts of most specific negligence cases. 1950Louis Butter Co., 339 Mo. 996 , 98 S. W. (2d) 742 ; Borgstede v. Waldbauer, 337 Mo. 1205 , 88 S. W. (2d) 373 .) Surely it is no more difficult to make such a hypothesization of these facts, under which the humanitarian rule could not apply, than it is to hypothesize the essential facts of most specific negligence cases. | 8 | 1936–1956 |
Doherty Ex Rel. Doherty v. St. Louis Butter Co.
green
2 sentences1950Louis Butter Co., 339 Mo. 996 , 98 S. W. (2d) 742 ; Borgstede v. Waldbauer, 337 Mo. 1205 , 88 S. W. (2d) 373 .) Surely it is no more difficult to make such a hypothesization of these facts, under which the humanitarian rule could not apply, than it is to hypothesize the essential facts of most specific negligence cases. 1950Louis Butter Co., 339 Mo. 996 , 98 S. W. (2d) 742 ; Borgstede v. Waldbauer, 337 Mo. 1205 , 88 S. W. (2d) 373 .) Surely it is no more difficult to make such a hypothesization of these facts, under which the humanitarian rule could not apply, than it is to hypothesize the essential facts of most specific negligence cases. | 7 | 1936–1954 |
Morgan v. Wabash Railroad
green
2 sentences1929But regardless of what occasions bis peril, the law out of its extreme regard for human life makes it the duty of another who sees him in peril to exercise ordinary care to prevent injury or death. [Murphy v. Railroad, 228 Mo. 56 ; Morgan v. Railroad, 159 Mo. 262 ; Hanlon v. Railroad, 104 Mo. 388 .] The constitutive facts of a cause of action under the humanitarian rule, stated in their simplest terms, without any of the refinements, limitations or exceptions which might arise on a particular state of facts, are contained in this formula: ‘(1) Plaintiff was in a position of peril; (2) defendan 1924But regardless of what occasions his peril, the law out of its extreme 'regard' for human life makes it the duty of another who sees him in peril to exercise ordinary care to prevent injury'or death. [Murphy v. Railroad, 228 Mo. 56 ; Morgan v. Railroad, 159 Mo. 262 ; Hanlon v. Railroad, 104 Mo. 388 .] The constitutive facts of a cause of action under the humanitarian rule, stated in their simplest terms, without any of the refinements, limitations or exceptions which might arise on a particular state of facts, are contained in this formula: “(1) Plaintiff was in a position of peril; (2) defend | 7 | 1903–1932 |
Grout v. Central Electric Railway Co.
neutral
2 sentences1914A petition which sets out the acts about which the plaintiff is complaining with reasonable certainty and clearness, followed by a general averment that the acts complained of were negligently done, is sufficient. [Dieter v. Zbaren, 81 Mo. App. 612 ; Wyler v. Ratican, 150 Mo. App. l. c. 479, 131 S. W. 155 .] In any event, the defect, not being fatal, cannot be questioned after judgment. [White v. Railroad, 202 Mo. 539 , 101 S. W. 14 ; McQuade v. Railroad, 200 Mo. 150 , 98 S. W. 552 .] A further complaint is made as to the petition in that the facts alleged and charges of negligence averred rob 1914A petition which sets out the acts about which the plaintiff is complaining with reasonable certainty and clearness, followed by a general averment that the acts complained of were negligently done, is sufficient. [Dieter v. Zbaren, 81 Mo. App. 612 ; Wyler v. Ratican, 150 Mo. App. l. c. 479, 131 S. W. 155 .] In any event, the defect, not being fatal, cannot be questioned after judgment. [White v. Railroad, 202 Mo. 539 , 101 S. W. 14 ; McQuade v. Railroad, 200 Mo. 150 , 98 S. W. 552 .] A further complaint is made as to the petition in that the facts alleged and charges of negligence averred rob | 7 | 1909–1914 |
Millhouser v. Kansas City Public Service Co.
green
2 sentences1954When the humanitarian rule begins to operate, all prior and antecedent negligence of either party goes out of the case, and the sole question left is the ability of the defendant to prevent the injury under the then conditions.” Millhouser v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 331 Mo. 933 , 55 S.W.2d 673 , loc. cit. 675. 1954When the humanitarian rule begins to operate, all prior and antecedent negligence of either party goes out of the case, and the sole question left is the ability of the defendant to prevent the injury under the then conditions.” Millhouser v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 331 Mo. 933 , 55 S.W.2d 673 , loc. cit. 675. | 6 | 1933–1955 |
Freeman v. Berberich
green
2 sentences1954“Under the humanitarian rule ‘the cause of the injured party’s peril is immaterial (save, perhaps, when he voluntarily seeks injury * * *).’ Grubbs v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 329 Mo. 390 , 45 S.W.2d 71, 74 ; Freeman v. Berberich, 332 Mo. 831 , 60 S.W.2d 393 , and cases therein cited. 1954“Under the humanitarian rule ‘the cause of the injured party’s peril is immaterial (save, perhaps, when he voluntarily seeks injury * * *).’ Grubbs v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 329 Mo. 390 , 45 S.W.2d 71, 74 ; Freeman v. Berberich, 332 Mo. 831 , 60 S.W.2d 393 , and cases therein cited. | 6 | 1933–1954 |
Ridge v. Jones
green
2 sentences1952It was said in Ridge v. Jones, Div. No. 2, 335 Mo. 219 , 71 S.W. 2d 713 , that, in some of the cases cited supra, the courts in approving submissions upon negligence under the humanitarian rule proceed upon the theory that “plaintiff was in a situation such that, while not in imminent peril, absent the negligent act of defendant in question, he was in imminent peril if such act was committed.” If such were a sound theory, then it could be urged [707] that all persons whose injuries were occasioned by the wrongful act or conduct of another were theretofore in “imminent peril” within the meaning 1952It was said in Ridge v. Jones, Div. No. 2, 335 Mo. 219 , 71 S.W. 2d 713 , that, in some of the cases cited supra, the courts in approving submissions upon negligence under the humanitarian rule proceed upon the theory that “plaintiff was in a situation such that, while not in imminent peril, absent the negligent act of defendant in question, he was in imminent peril if such act was committed.” If such were a sound theory, then it could be urged [707] that all persons whose injuries were occasioned by the wrongful act or conduct of another were theretofore in “imminent peril” within the meaning | 6 | 1935–1952 |
McGowan v. Wells
green
2 sentences1937How narrow the danger zone is, when a person approaching the path of an oncoming vehicle is not oblivious, was shown by this court’s opinion in McGowan v. Wells, 324 Mo. 652 , 24 S. W. (2d) 633 , which states that if a plaintiff, approaching a street car track, “saw the street car all the time, knew it was continuing at undiminished speed, and yet with this knowledge walked directly into its path,” he “did not enter the danger zone until he took the last step or so before going into the course the car would take.” In other words, the humanitarian rule did not require action by the operator of 1937How narrow the danger zone is, when a person approaching the path of an oncoming vehicle is not oblivious, was shown by this court’s opinion in McGowan v. Wells, 324 Mo. 652 , 24 S. W. (2d) 633 , which states that if a plaintiff, approaching a street car track, “saw the street car all the time, knew it was continuing at undiminished speed, and yet with this knowledge walked directly into its path,” he “did not enter the danger zone until he took the last step or so before going into the course the car would take.” In other words, the humanitarian rule did not require action by the operator of | 6 | 1931–1946 |
Burke Ex Rel. Burke v. Pappas
green
2 sentences1941(For the purpose of this discussion we will assume that there was a real "sole cause" issue in the case.) In Pence v. Kansas City Laundry Company, 59 S.W.2d 633 , l.c. 638, the Supreme Court considered a humanitarian instruction which possessed a "tail" similar to that under discussion here, and said: "Counsel for appellant also say that above Instruction 5 was erroneous in permitting the jury to find for plaintiff `under this particular instruction, even though you should believe from the evidence that Mrs. Pence failed to use ordinary care for her own safety and that both Dr. and Mrs. Pence 1941(For the purpose of this discussion we will assume that there was a real "sole cause" issue in the case.) In Pence v. Kansas City Laundry Company, 59 S.W.2d 633 , l.c. 638, the Supreme Court considered a humanitarian instruction which possessed a "tail" similar to that under discussion here, and said: "Counsel for appellant also say that above Instruction 5 was erroneous in permitting the jury to find for plaintiff `under this particular instruction, even though you should believe from the evidence that Mrs. Pence failed to use ordinary care for her own safety and that both Dr. and Mrs. Pence | 6 | 1929–1941 |
| Murphy v. Wabash Railroad green | 6 | 1912–1932 |
| Krause v. Pitcairn neutral | 5 | 1950–1967 |
| Dutcher v. Wabash Railroad green | 5 | 1914–1964 |
| Dilallo v. Lynch green | 5 | 1941–1948 |
| Silliman v. Munger Laundry Co. green | 5 | 1932–1941 |
| Degonia v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. neutral | 5 | 1911–1931 |
| Goben v. Quincy, Omaha & Kansas City Ry. Co. neutral | 5 | 1923–1931 |
| Davis v. Quality Oil Company green | 4 | 1963–1972 |
| Kirkham v. Jenkins Music Co. green | 4 | 1938–1964 |
| Catanzaro v. McKay green | 4 | 1959–1960 |
| Shumate Ex Rel. Shumate v. Wells neutral | 4 | 1933–1952 |
| Martin v. Fehse green | 4 | 1933–1944 |
| Peppers v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. green | 4 | 1932–1941 |
| Iman v. Walter Freund Bread Co. green | 4 | 1933–1941 |
| Schroeder v. Wells neutral | 4 | 1928–1936 |
| Reith v. Tober green | 4 | 1929–1936 |
| Ellis v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co. green | 4 | 1912–1934 |
| Frankel v. Hudson neutral | 4 | 1921–1931 |
| White v. St. Louis & Meramec River Railroad green | 4 | 1912–1925 |
| Kellny v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. neutral | 4 | 1906–1912 |
| Shirley v. Norfleet green | 3 | 1962–1972 |
| Dillon v. Hogue green | 3 | 1967–1971 |
| Banks v. Koogler green | 3 | 1959–1966 |
| Wapelhorst v. Lindner green | 3 | 1956–1965 |
| Largo v. Bonadonna green | 3 | 1960–1963 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.