tchra claim in Texas

2021Dist. v.Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 784 (Tex. 2018) (the elements of the TCHRA violation are jurisdictional facts).

2021Dist. v.Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 784 (Tex. 2018) (the elements of the TCHRA violation are jurisdictional facts).

2026Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 632, 637 (Tex. 2012) (explaining that a plaintiff must state a claim under the TCHRA to invoke the corresponding waiver of immunity, and to do so, she must “plead the elements of her statutory cause of action—[i.e.,] the basic facts that make up the prima facie case—so that the court can determine whether she has sufficiently alleged a TCHRA violation”); Minor v. Diverse Facility Sols., Inc., No. 04-20-00526-CV, 2021 WL 5218000 , at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 10, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reciting elements in review of Rule 91a dismissal of race discrimina

2026Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 632, 637 (Tex. 2012) (explaining that a plaintiff must state a claim under the TCHRA to invoke the corresponding waiver of immunity, and to do so, she must “plead the elements of her statutory cause of action—[i.e.,] the basic facts that make up the prima facie case—so that the court can determine whether she has sufficiently alleged a TCHRA violation”); Minor v. Diverse Facility Sols., Inc., No. 04-20-00526-CV, 2021 WL 5218000 , at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 10, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reciting elements in review of Rule 91a dismissal of race discrimina

2016The court explained that the TCHRA claim would not come within section 101.106 “because the Tort Claims Act expressly provides that the remedies it authorizes are in addition to any other legal remedies, and the TCHRA provides a statutory remedy for unlawful discrimination.” Id.

2016The court explained that the TCHRA claim would not come within section 101.106 “because the Tort Claims Act expressly provides that the remedies it authorizes are in addition to any other legal remedies, and the TCHRA provides a statutory remedy for unlawful discrimination.” Id.

2025“Like a failure of proof at the prima facie stage, a failure to prove the elements of a TCHRA claim after a trial on the merits deprives the trial court of jurisdiction.” San Antonio Water Sys. v. Nicholas, 461 S.W.3d 131, 137 (Tex. 2015) (citing University of Hous. v. Barth, 403 S.W.3d 851, 853 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that plaintiff’s failure to satisfy objective component of good-faith test for reporting violation deprived trial court of jurisdiction)); see also In re United Servs.

2025“Like a failure of proof at the prima facie stage, a failure to prove the elements of a TCHRA claim after a trial on the merits deprives the trial court of jurisdiction.” San Antonio Water Sys. v. Nicholas, 461 S.W.3d 131, 137 (Tex. 2015) (citing University of Hous. v. Barth, 403 S.W.3d 851, 853 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that plaintiff’s failure to satisfy objective component of good-faith test for reporting violation deprived trial court of jurisdiction)); see also In re United Servs.

2009See Pope v. MCI Telecom, Corp., 937 F.2d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding state limitation period mandatory in TCHRA claim). 11 on what event, in fairness and logic, should have alerted the average lay person to act to protect his rights. 139 F.3d at 537 (quoting Glass v. Petro-Tex Chem.

2009See Pope v. MCI Telecom., Corp., 937 F.2d 258, 264 (5th Cir.1991) (holding state limitation period mandatory in TCHRA claim). 9 .

2021“While a plaintiff must plead the elements of her statutory cause of action—here the basic facts that make up the prima facie case—so that the court can determine whether she has sufficiently alleged a TCHRA violation, she will only be required to submit evidence if the defendant presents evidence negating one of those basic facts.” Id. (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228 ); Flores, 612 S.W.3d at 305 (TCHRA waives immunity from suit “only if the plaintiff alleges facts that would establish that the state agency violated the Act and, when challenged with contrary evidence, provides evidence that

2021“While a plaintiff must plead the elements of her statutory cause of action—here the basic facts that make up the prima facie case—so that the court can determine whether she has sufficiently alleged a TCHRA violation, she will only be required to submit evidence if the defendant presents evidence negating one of those basic facts.” Id. (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228 ); Flores, 612 S.W.3d at 305 (TCHRA waives immunity from suit “only if the plaintiff alleges facts that would establish that the state agency violated the Act and, when challenged with contrary evidence, provides evidence that

2025See Williams, 68 S.W.3d at 109–11 (concluding that [Section] 21.211 does not prohibit an employee from pursuing [his] TCHRA claim while her EEOC charge is pending); Ledesma, 68 S.W.3d at 771 (concluding that [Section] 21.211 does not conflict with the Fifth Circuit’s holding in a related case that the EEOC’s right to sue letter does not trigger the sixty-day window for filing suit under the TCHRA).

2023See Williams, 68 S.W.3d at 109–11 (concluding that § 21.211 does not prohibit an employee from pursuing her TCHRA claim while her EEOC charge is pending); Ledesma, 68 S.W.3d at 771 (concluding that § 21.211 does not conflict with the Fifth Circuit’s holding in a related case that the EEOC’s right to sue letter does not trigger the sixty-day window for filing suit under the TCHRA).

2009In the 1998 Worksharing Agreement, "the EEOC and the [TCHR] each designate the other as its agent for the purpose of receiving and drafting charges, including those that are not jurisdictional with the agency that initially receives the charges." Vielma v. Eureka Co. , 218 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 2000).

2009In the 1998 Worksharing Agreement, "the EEOC and the [TCHR] each designate the other as its agent for the purpose of receiving and drafting charges, including those that are not jurisdictional with the agency that initially receives the charges." Vielma v. Eureka Co. , 218 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 2000).

2009See Pope v. MCI Telecom, Corp., 937 F.2d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding state limitation period mandatory in TCHRA claim). 9: “The causal link required by the third prong of the prima facie case does not rise to the level of a ‘but for’ standard.” Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 345 (5th Cir. Tex. 2002) ( citing Raggs v. Miss.

2005See Pope v. MCI Telecom, Corp., 937 F.2d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding state\ limitation period mandatory in TCHRA claim). \ ' var WPFootnote9 = ' “The causal link required by the third prong of the prima facie case does not rise\ to the level of a ‘but for’ standard.” Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 345 (5th Cir. Tex. 2002)\ ( citing Raggs v. Miss.

2008See Lopez, 259 S.W.3d at 155 (“The election of remedies language simply means that a claimant can pursue a remedy for discrimination under federal law or under grievance-redress systems in existence at the local level, but pursuing either of these options precludes later initiating a [T] CHRA complaint.”); Turner v. Richardson ISD, 885 S.W.2d 553, 561 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied) (considering argument that appellants could have timely filed Whistleblower Act claims, pursued TCHRA administrative remedies until permission to sue was granted, and then amended suit to add TCHRA claim and re

2008See Lopez, 2008 WL 2702182, at *6 (“The election of remedies language simply means that a claimant can pursue a remedy for discrimination under federal law or under grievance-redress systems in existence at the local level, but pursuing either of these options precludes later initiating a [T]CHRA complaint.”); Turner v. Richardson ISD, 885 S.W.2d 553, 561 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied) (considering argument that appellants could have timely filed Whistleblower Act claims, pursued TCHRA administrative remedies until permission to sue was granted, and then amended suit to add TCHRA claim a

2008See Lopez, 259 S.W.3d at 155 (“The election of remedies language simply means that a claimant can pursue a remedy for discrimination under federal law or under grievance-redress systems in existence at the local level, but pursuing either of these options precludes later initiating a [T] CHRA complaint.”); Turner v. Richardson ISD, 885 S.W.2d 553, 561 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied) (considering argument that appellants could have timely filed Whistleblower Act claims, pursued TCHRA administrative remedies until permission to sue was granted, and then amended suit to add TCHRA claim and re

2008See Lopez, 2008 WL 2702182, at *6 (“The election of remedies language simply means that a claimant can pursue a remedy for discrimination under federal law or under grievance-redress systems in existence at the local level, but pursuing either of these options precludes later initiating a [T]CHRA complaint.”); Turner v. Richardson ISD, 885 S.W.2d 553, 561 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied) (considering argument that appellants could have timely filed Whistleblower Act claims, pursued TCHRA administrative remedies until permission to sue was granted, and then amended suit to add TCHRA claim a

2025See Prairie make up a prima facie case—so that the court can View A&M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500 , 512 determine whether she has sufficiently alleged a (Tex. 2012); College of Mainland v. Glover, 436 TCHRA violation, she will only be required to Univ. of Tex. At Austin v. Kearney, NO. 03-14-00500-CV (Tex. App. May 03, 2016) submit evidence if the defendant presents that Kearney communicated to University officials evidence negating one of those basic facts."3 on December 6, 2012, prior to Kearney's Garcia II, 372 S.W.3d at 637 .

2018In Chatha, which involved a TCHRA claim brought against a state university, the Texas Supreme Court construed the term “statutory prerequisites.” Chatha, 381 S.W.3d at 510 .

2025See Williams, 68 S.W.3d at 109–11 (concluding that [Section] 21.211 does not prohibit an employee from pursuing [his] TCHRA claim while her EEOC charge is pending); Ledesma, 68 S.W.3d at 771 (concluding that [Section] 21.211 does not conflict with the Fifth Circuit’s holding in a related case that the EEOC’s right to sue letter does not trigger the sixty-day window for filing suit under the TCHRA).

2023See Williams, 68 S.W.3d at 109–11 (concluding that § 21.211 does not prohibit an employee from pursuing her TCHRA claim while her EEOC charge is pending); Ledesma, 68 S.W.3d at 771 (concluding that § 21.211 does not conflict with the Fifth Circuit’s holding in a related case that the EEOC’s right to sue letter does not trigger the sixty-day window for filing suit under the TCHRA).

2025“Like a failure of proof at the prima facie stage, a failure to prove the elements of a TCHRA claim after a trial on the merits deprives the trial court of jurisdiction.” San Antonio Water Sys. v. Nicholas, 461 S.W.3d 131, 137 (Tex. 2015) (citing University of Hous. v. Barth, 403 S.W.3d 851, 853 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that plaintiff’s failure to satisfy objective component of good-faith test for reporting violation deprived trial court of jurisdiction)); see also In re United Servs.

2025“Like a failure of proof at the prima facie stage, a failure to prove the elements of a TCHRA claim after a trial on the merits deprives the trial court of jurisdiction.” San Antonio Water Sys. v. Nicholas, 461 S.W.3d 131, 137 (Tex. 2015) (citing University of Hous. v. Barth, 403 S.W.3d 851, 853 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that plaintiff’s failure to satisfy objective component of good-faith test for reporting violation deprived trial court of jurisdiction)); see also In re United Servs.

2011The court stated that the TCHRA claim “would not come within subsection (e)’s purview because the Tort Claims Act expressly provides that the remedies it authorizes are in addition to any other legal remedies, and the TCHRA provides a statutory remedy for unlawful discrimination.” Garcia, 253 S.W.3d at 659 ; see Kelemen, 260 S.W.3d at 523 (holding that plaintiffs claim under TCHRA and Whistleblower Act were not claims “under” the Tort Claims Act); Swain v. Hutson, No. 02-09-00038-CV, 2009 WL 3246750 , at *6 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that a federal section 1983

2011The court stated that the TCHRA claim “would not come within subsection (e)’s purview because the Tort Claims Act expressly provides that the remedies it authorizes are in addition to any other legal remedies, and the TCHRA provides a statutory remedy for unlawful discrimination.” Garcia, 253 S.W.3d at 659 ; see Kelemen, 260 S.W.3d at 523 (holding that plaintiffs claim under TCHRA and Whistleblower Act were not claims “under” the Tort Claims Act); Swain v. Hutson, No. 02-09-00038-CV, 2009 WL 3246750 , at *6 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that a federal section 1983

2015Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 580 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that the definition of an “adverse employment action” under section 1983 is broader than under Title VII); Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 2000) (for purposes of a section 1983 claim, adverse employment actions may include discharges, demotions, refusals to hire, refusals to promote, discipline and reprimands, and transfers (if sufficiently punitive)); see also Davis v. City of Grapevine, 188 S.W.3d 748, 766 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied) (as to the employee’s TCHRA claim, the employee was able to prove an adverse

2015Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 580 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that the definition of an “adverse employment action” under section 1983 is broader than under Title VII); Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 2000) (for purposes of a section 1983 claim, adverse employment actions may include discharges, demotions, refusals to hire, refusals to promote, discipline and reprimands, and transfers (if sufficiently punitive)); see also Davis v. City of Grapevine, 188 S.W.3d 748, 766 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied) (as to the employee’s TCHRA claim, the employee was able to prove an adverse

2009Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 471 (5th Cir. 2002)). 10: The court cited the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that the causal link element in a prima facie case is met by evidence showing that the employment decision and the protected activity “were not wholly unrelated.” 238 F.3d at 684 , ( citing Simmons v. Camden County Bd. of Education, 757 F.2d 1187, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985)). 11: See Pineda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 360 F.3d 483, 488-89 (5th Cir. 2004), (distinguishing Quantum Chemical in retaliation case based on Texas statute and explaining why traditional “but for” causation standard app

2005Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 471 (5th Cir. 2002)). \ ' var WPFootnote10 = ' The court cited the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that the causal link element in a\ prima facie case is met by evidence showing that the employment decision and the\ protected activity “were not wholly unrelated.” 238 F.3d at 684, ( citing Simmons v. Camden\ County Bd. of Education, 757 F.2d 1187, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985)). \ ' var WPFootnote11 = ' See Pineda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 360 F.3d 483, 488-89 (5th Cir. 2004),\ (distinguishing Quantum Chemical in retaliation case based on Texas statute and\ explaining wh

2009Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 471 (5th Cir. 2002)). 10: The court cited the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that the causal link element in a prima facie case is met by evidence showing that the employment decision and the protected activity “were not wholly unrelated.” 238 F.3d at 684 , ( citing Simmons v. Camden County Bd. of Education, 757 F.2d 1187, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985)). 11: See Pineda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 360 F.3d 483, 488-89 (5th Cir. 2004), (distinguishing Quantum Chemical in retaliation case based on Texas statute and explaining why traditional “but for” causation standard app

2005Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 471 (5th Cir. 2002)). \ ' var WPFootnote10 = ' The court cited the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that the causal link element in a\ prima facie case is met by evidence showing that the employment decision and the\ protected activity “were not wholly unrelated.” 238 F.3d at 684, ( citing Simmons v. Camden\ County Bd. of Education, 757 F.2d 1187, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985)). \ ' var WPFootnote11 = ' See Pineda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 360 F.3d 483, 488-89 (5th Cir. 2004),\ (distinguishing Quantum Chemical in retaliation case based on Texas statute and\ explaining wh

2009Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 471 (5th Cir. 2002)). 10: The court cited the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that the causal link element in a prima facie case is met by evidence showing that the employment decision and the protected activity “were not wholly unrelated.” 238 F.3d at 684 , ( citing Simmons v. Camden County Bd. of Education, 757 F.2d 1187, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985)). 11: See Pineda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 360 F.3d 483, 488-89 (5th Cir. 2004), (distinguishing Quantum Chemical in retaliation case based on Texas statute and explaining why traditional “but for” causation standard app

2005Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 471 (5th Cir. 2002)). \ ' var WPFootnote10 = ' The court cited the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that the causal link element in a\ prima facie case is met by evidence showing that the employment decision and the\ protected activity “were not wholly unrelated.” 238 F.3d at 684, ( citing Simmons v. Camden\ County Bd. of Education, 757 F.2d 1187, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985)). \ ' var WPFootnote11 = ' See Pineda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 360 F.3d 483, 488-89 (5th Cir. 2004),\ (distinguishing Quantum Chemical in retaliation case based on Texas statute and\ explaining wh

2007Cf. Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 249-52 (Tex. 2001) (explaining that intervening events can ripen a suit that was unripe and subject to dismissal when filed); but see Bernard v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., No. 01-92-00134-CV, 1994 Tex. App. LEXIS 2541 , at **9-11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no pet. h.) (op. on reh’g, not designated for publication).9 Nor do we believe that the legislature intended claimants like Wallace to be jurisdictionally barred from asserting his TCHRA claim in court, for failure to exhaust administrative 9 In Bernard, an aggrieved employee filed his compla

2007Cf. Perry v. Del Rio , 66 S.W.3d 239, 249-52 (Tex. 2001) (explaining that intervening events can ripen a suit that was unripe and subject to dismissal when filed); but see Bernard v. Browning-Ferris Indus ., Inc ., No. 01-92-00134-CV, 1994 Tex. App. LEXIS 2541 , at **9-11 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no pet. h.) (op. on reh'g, not designated for publication). (9) Nor do we believe that the legislature intended claimants like Wallace to be jurisdictionally barred from asserting his TCHRA claim in court, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, merely because he did not wait the

2021Under this second method, which applies in this case, Texas courts follow the burden- shifting mechanism set forth by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell 6 See also Alamo Heights ISD v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. 2018) (“By intertwining the TCHRA’s immunity waiver with the merits of a statutory claim, the Legislature ensures public funds are not expended defending claims lacking sufficient evidence to allow reasonable jurors to find the governmental entity liable.”). 10 Douglas.7 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 802–05, 93 S. Ct. 1817 , 1824– 26 (1973); Glover, 4

2018Garcia II, 372 S.W.3d at 636 ; Coll. of the Mainland v. Glover, 436 S.W.3d 384, 391 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).

2020In Michael v. City of Dallas, we described the TCHRA analysis this way: If the defendant proffers a legitimate reason for the adverse employment decision, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show either (1) the reason stated by the employer was a pretext for discrimination, or (2) the defendant's reason, while true, was only one reason for its conduct and discrimination is another motivating factor (‘mixed motive’). 314 S.W.3d at 691 (citing Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004); McCoy v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 183 S.W.3d 548 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet

2020In Michael v. City of Dallas, we described the TCHRA analysis this way: If the defendant proffers a legitimate reason for the adverse employment decision, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show either (1) the reason stated by the employer was a pretext for discrimination, or (2) the defendant's reason, while true, was only one reason for its conduct and discrimination is another motivating factor (‘mixed motive’). 314 S.W.3d at 691 (citing Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004); McCoy v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 183 S.W.3d 548 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet

2012Id. at 476 . 2 .

2001Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 477 (Tex.2001) (TCHRA claim); Bauer v. Albemarle Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 966 (5th Cir.1999) (ADEA claim).

2024See Wu, 2011 WL 5406263 , at *3 (noting that, because election-of-remedies provision barred plaintiff’s TCHRA claim, “any amendment of his pleadings would be futile”); cf. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 623 (noting that, when an appellate court “upholds a plea to the jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds,” it generally “allow[s] the plaintiff the opportunity to replead if the defect can be cured”). 13

2024Tex. July 11, 2011) (mem. op. & order) (explaining that “sixty-day period is not considered jurisdictional under Texas law and thus does not prevent a district court from considering the TCHRA claim”); McCollum v. Texas Dep’t of Licensing & Regul., 321 S.W.3d 58, 64 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (holding that Section 21.254’s sixty-day period is not jurisdictional).

2024Tex. July 11, 2011) (mem. op. & order) (explaining that “sixty-day period is not considered jurisdictional under Texas law and thus does not prevent a district court from considering the TCHRA claim”); McCollum v. Texas Dep’t of Licensing & Regul., 321 S.W.3d 58, 64 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (holding that Section 21.254’s sixty-day period is not jurisdictional).