80 California opinions name it 3 courts 1977–2026 25 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Skelly v. State Personnel Boardgreen2 sentences2026As discussed, post, the 2019 Decision would later be set aside, and a new hearing 2 “A Skelly hearing is an opportunity for the employee to respond to the charges in the notice of adverse action.” (Benefield v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 469, 472, fn. 6 , citing Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 206 (Skelly) and other case law.) 3. and decision would follow. 2026As discussed, post, the 2019 Decision would later be set aside, and a new hearing 2 “A Skelly hearing is an opportunity for the employee to respond to the charges in the notice of adverse action.” (Benefield v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 469, 472, fn. 6 , citing Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 206 (Skelly) and other case law.) 3. and decision would follow. | 4 | 52 |
Barber v. State Personnel Boardgreen2 sentences2026The ALJ did not find this to be true. “ ‘The substantial evidence standard of review takes on a unique formulation where, as here, “the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and that party appeals.” ’ [Citation.] Under these circumstances, ‘ “ ‘ “the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a chara 2025Rejecting Riggs’s contention that reinstatement was the proper remedy for the Skelly violation, the court awarded her back pay and benefits from January 21, 2022 to May 18, 2022—when the Chief of Police signed the final order executing the Board’s recommendation that Riggs “be removed from her position as sergeant, with total loss of pay, effective 01/21/2022.” In Barber v. State Personnel Board (1976) 18 Cal.3d 395, 402 (Barber), our high court held the remedy for a Skelly violation “is to award back pay for the period of wrongful discipline.” (See also Economy v. Sutter East Bay Hospitals (2 | 3 | 11 |
Benefield v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATIONgreen2 sentences2026As discussed, post, the 2019 Decision would later be set aside, and a new hearing 2 “A Skelly hearing is an opportunity for the employee to respond to the charges in the notice of adverse action.” (Benefield v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 469, 472, fn. 6 , citing Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 206 (Skelly) and other case law.) 3. and decision would follow. 2026As discussed, post, the 2019 Decision would later be set aside, and a new hearing 2 “A Skelly hearing is an opportunity for the employee to respond to the charges in the notice of adverse action.” (Benefield v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 469, 472, fn. 6 , citing Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 206 (Skelly) and other case law.) 3. and decision would follow. | 3 | 3 |
Flippin v. Los Angeles City Board of Civil Service Commisionersgreen2 sentences2022(See Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 709 [Labor Code “Section 1102.5 provides whistleblower protections to employees who disclose wrongdoing to authorities”].) the proposed action, the reasons therefor, a copy of the charges and materials upon which the action is based, and the right to respond, either orally or in writing, to the authority initially imposing discipline.’ [Citation.] The Supreme Court’s directive gave rise to an administrative procedure known as a Skelly hearing, in which an employee has the opportunity to respond to the charges upon which the 2022(See Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 709 [Labor Code “Section 1102.5 provides whistleblower protections to employees who disclose wrongdoing to authorities”].) the proposed action, the reasons therefor, a copy of the charges and materials upon which the action is based, and the right to respond, either orally or in writing, to the authority initially imposing discipline.’ [Citation.] The Supreme Court’s directive gave rise to an administrative procedure known as a Skelly hearing, in which an employee has the opportunity to respond to the charges upon which the | 2 | 6 |
Williams v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2015Remington’s understanding is consistent with case law holding that implied in the Skelly “right to respond” is a right to respond “before a reasonably impartial, noninvolved reviewer.” (Williams v. County of Los Angeles (1978) 22 Cal.3d 731, 736-737 .) In this case, McCoy-Miller, a manager from the County Department of Children and Family Services, served as the Skelly hearing officer and decided to recommend demotion. 2015Remington’s understanding is consistent with case law holding that implied in the Skelly “right to respond” is a right to respond “before a reasonably impartial, noninvolved reviewer.” (Williams v. County of Los Angeles (1978) 22 Cal.3d 731, 736-737 .) In this case, McCoy-Miller, a manager from the County Department of Children and Family Services, served as the Skelly hearing officer and decided to recommend demotion. | 2 | 4 |
Gilbert v. City of Sunnyvalegreen2 sentences2023Loudermill (1985) 470 U.S. 532, 546 .) An employer complies with Skelly when it provides the employee with statements of witnesses, documents, and investigative reports or extracts therefrom. ( Gilbert, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1275–1276, 1280.) The employee has “ ‘ the right to be informed not only of the nature of the charges but also of the substance of the relevant supporting evidence.’ ” (Id. at p. 1278; see also Ferguson v. City of Cathedral City (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1170 [holding no Skelly violation where employee received “notice of the proposed discharge, the reasons, a c 2023It cites Gilbert, supra, for the proposition that Sahakyan bore the burden in this writ proceeding of showing that the materials received prior to his Skelly hearing were insufficient to provide him an “opportunity to meaningfully respond at the pretermination stage.” (Gilbert, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1281 .) The City also points to Sahakyan’s Shelly response, and the fact that he had “access to the arrest report” and was present at the criminal court proceedings, to argue that Sahakyan understood the conduct upon which the off-duty misconduct charge was based. | 2 | 3 |
Barber v. Cal. State Pers. Bd.green2 sentences2026Personnel Com., supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1133 ; see Barber v. State Personnel Bd. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 500, 513 [“‘“‘The appropriate standard for the measurement of a back pay award is to take the difference between the actual wages earned and the wages the individual would have earned in the position that, but for the [employer’s wrongful conduct], the individual would have [held].’”’”].) The Department’s decision to discharge Jackson caused him loss of earnings from the effective date of the discharge; the Skelly violation in connection with Jackson’s suspension did not cause that loss. 2026Personnel Com., supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1133 ; see Barber v. State Personnel Bd. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 500, 513 [“‘“‘The appropriate standard for the measurement of a back pay award is to take the difference between the actual wages earned and the wages the individual would have earned in the position that, but for the [employer’s wrongful conduct], the individual would have [held].’”’”].) The Department’s decision to discharge Jackson caused him loss of earnings from the effective date of the discharge; the Skelly violation in connection with Jackson’s suspension did not cause that loss. | 2 | 2 |
Roe v. State Personnel Boardgreen2 sentences2026Analogizing his case to Roe, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th 1029 , Jackson argues remedies for a Skelly violation “are not extinguished by employee actions taken while the violation remains uncured.” Roe, however, is distinguishable. 2026Analogizing his case to Roe, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th 1029 , Jackson argues remedies for a Skelly violation “are not extinguished by employee actions taken while the violation remains uncured.” Roe, however, is distinguishable. | 1 | 2 |
Kempland v. Regents of University of Californiagreen2 sentences2026(See Kempland v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 644, 651 [employee discharged without due process was entitled to back pay “less interim wages earned”].) Of course, if there were a Skelly violation in connection with the discharge (and we express no opinion on that possibility), Jackson might be entitled to additional days of back pay until that violation was cured. 2026(See Kempland v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 644, 651 [employee discharged without due process was entitled to back pay “less interim wages earned”].) Of course, if there were a Skelly violation in connection with the discharge (and we express no opinion on that possibility), Jackson might be entitled to additional days of back pay until that violation was cured. | 1 | 2 |
Arthur Andersen LLP v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2018"It was established long ago that ignorance of the law does not excuse one from the consequences of the law." ( Arthur Andersen v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1506, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 879 [collecting authority].) III Predismissal Procedure Fisher tenders an argument under the heading, "The SPB Decision failed to address the Skelly violation." The gravamen of Fisher's argument is unclear. 2018"It was established long ago that ignorance of the law does not excuse one from the consequences of the law." ( Arthur Andersen v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1506, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 879 [collecting authority].) III Predismissal Procedure Fisher tenders an argument under the heading, "The SPB Decision failed to address the Skelly violation." The gravamen of Fisher's argument is unclear. | 1 | 2 |
Davis v. LAUSD PERSONNEL COM'Ngreen2 sentences2026Personnel Com. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1133 [employee’s “unavailability for work due to his nonindustrial illness justified the . . . denial of full back pay” because, “[e]ven if [his employer] had not wrongfully demoted him, [he] would not have appeared for work because of his illness,” which was “unrelated to his demotion and employment”].) Jackson lost 10 days of wages as a result of the Skelly violation, but no more. 2026Personnel Com. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1133 [employee’s “unavailability for work due to his nonindustrial illness justified the . . . denial of full back pay” because, “[e]ven if [his employer] had not wrongfully demoted him, [he] would not have appeared for work because of his illness,” which was “unrelated to his demotion and employment”].) Jackson lost 10 days of wages as a result of the Skelly violation, but no more. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2026(See Bedard v. City of Los Angeles (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 442 , 460 [“Barber established that the only remedy for the violation of an employee’s due process is back pay when her discharge is justified.”]; Williams v. City of Los Angeles 19 (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1217 [“the proper remedy for a Skelly violation is an award of back pay for the period described in Barber, rather than reinstatement”].) Regarding Jackson’s second argument, the proper back pay award, as discussed, was 10 days, not more. 2026(See Bedard v. City of Los Angeles (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 442 , 460 [“Barber established that the only remedy for the violation of an employee’s due process is back pay when her discharge is justified.”]; Williams v. City of Los Angeles 19 (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1217 [“the proper remedy for a Skelly violation is an award of back pay for the period described in Barber, rather than reinstatement”].) Regarding Jackson’s second argument, the proper back pay award, as discussed, was 10 days, not more. | 1 | 1 |
Delaney v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2025(See Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 800-801, fn. 11 .) Thus, if there is a conflict between the IPA and the due process clause, the due process clause prevails. 25 That leaves just one potential issue. 2025(See Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 800-801, fn. 11 .) Thus, if there is a conflict between the IPA and the due process clause, the due process clause prevails. 25 That leaves just one potential issue. | 1 | 1 |
Kenneth Econ. v. Sutter E. Bay Hosps.green2 sentences2025Rejecting Riggs’s contention that reinstatement was the proper remedy for the Skelly violation, the court awarded her back pay and benefits from January 21, 2022 to May 18, 2022—when the Chief of Police signed the final order executing the Board’s recommendation that Riggs “be removed from her position as sergeant, with total loss of pay, effective 01/21/2022.” In Barber v. State Personnel Board (1976) 18 Cal.3d 395, 402 (Barber), our high court held the remedy for a Skelly violation “is to award back pay for the period of wrongful discipline.” (See also Economy v. Sutter East Bay Hospitals (2 2025Rejecting Riggs’s contention that reinstatement was the proper remedy for the Skelly violation, the court awarded her back pay and benefits from January 21, 2022 to May 18, 2022—when the Chief of Police signed the final order executing the Board’s recommendation that Riggs “be removed from her position as sergeant, with total loss of pay, effective 01/21/2022.” In Barber v. State Personnel Board (1976) 18 Cal.3d 395, 402 (Barber), our high court held the remedy for a Skelly violation “is to award back pay for the period of wrongful discipline.” (See also Economy v. Sutter East Bay Hospitals (2 | 1 | 1 |
Mendoza v. Regents of the University of Californiagreen2 sentences2024(Mendoza v. Regents of University of California (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 168, 172 [a civil employee may be deprived of his or her property interest in employment “only if, prior to his [or her] dismissal, certain procedural safeguards are observed”].) But a Skelly hearing is not required if there has not been a deprivation or an issued intent to take an adverse action. 2024(Mendoza v. Regents of University of California (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 168, 172 [a civil employee may be deprived of his or her property interest in employment “only if, prior to his [or her] dismissal, certain procedural safeguards are observed”].) But a Skelly hearing is not required if there has not been a deprivation or an issued intent to take an adverse action. | 1 | 1 |
Coleman v. Regents of University of Californiagreen2 sentences2024(Coleman v. Regents of University of California, supra, 93 Cal.App.3d at p. 526 [“the opportunity to respond must come after the notice of intention to dismiss”].) LaMarr provides no legal support for the proposition underlying her argument that employees are afforded due process as soon as an employer considers an adverse action; this would dramatically expand Skelly. 2024(Coleman v. Regents of University of California, supra, 93 Cal.App.3d at p. 526 [“the opportunity to respond must come after the notice of intention to dismiss”].) LaMarr provides no legal support for the proposition underlying her argument that employees are afforded due process as soon as an employer considers an adverse action; this would dramatically expand Skelly. | 1 | 1 |
Ferguson v. City of Cathedral Citygreen1 sentence2023Loudermill (1985) 470 U.S. 532, 546 .) An employer complies with Skelly when it provides the employee with statements of witnesses, documents, and investigative reports or extracts therefrom. ( Gilbert, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1275–1276, 1280.) The employee has “ ‘ the right to be informed not only of the nature of the charges but also of the substance of the relevant supporting evidence.’ ” (Id. at p. 1278; see also Ferguson v. City of Cathedral City (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1170 [holding no Skelly violation where employee received “notice of the proposed discharge, the reasons, a c | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. State Personnel Boardgreen2 sentences2022(See Brown, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1164, fn. 4 [noting that section 19575.5 authorizes “amendment of the charging document only prior to the submission of the appeal for decision by the board”].) In other words, if an employee did not receive notice that the proposed penalty could be imposed based on the facts that were found true after the evidentiary hearing, then the Skelly factors do not even come into play. 2022(See Brown, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1164, fn. 4 [noting that section 19575.5 authorizes “amendment of the charging document only prior to the submission of the appeal for decision by the board”].) In other words, if an employee did not receive notice that the proposed penalty could be imposed based on the facts that were found true after the evidentiary hearing, then the Skelly factors do not even come into play. | 1 | 1 |
Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc.green2 sentences2022(See Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 709 [Labor Code “Section 1102.5 provides whistleblower protections to employees who disclose wrongdoing to authorities”].) the proposed action, the reasons therefor, a copy of the charges and materials upon which the action is based, and the right to respond, either orally or in writing, to the authority initially imposing discipline.’ [Citation.] The Supreme Court’s directive gave rise to an administrative procedure known as a Skelly hearing, in which an employee has the opportunity to respond to the charges upon which the 2022(See Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 709 [Labor Code “Section 1102.5 provides whistleblower protections to employees who disclose wrongdoing to authorities”].) the proposed action, the reasons therefor, a copy of the charges and materials upon which the action is based, and the right to respond, either orally or in writing, to the authority initially imposing discipline.’ [Citation.] The Supreme Court’s directive gave rise to an administrative procedure known as a Skelly hearing, in which an employee has the opportunity to respond to the charges upon which the | 1 | 1 |
| Burrell v. City of Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Birdsall v. Carrillogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pitman v. City of Oaklandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cranston v. City of Richmondgreen | 1 | 1 |
| International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 1245 v. City of Gridleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Neves v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lam v. Bureau of Security & Investigative Servicesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Duncan v. Department of Personnel Administrationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Alameda County Management Employees Ass'n v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United Pub. Emps., Local 790 v. City & County of San Franciscogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Civil Service Assn. v. Redevelopment Agencygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nicolini v. County of Tuolumnegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mitchell v. State Personnel Board
green
2 sentences2026(Ibid.) On appeal, the SPB argued “ ‘extraordinary circumstances’ ” required it to promptly dismiss the technician “to avert harm to the public.” (Mitchell, supra, 39. 90 Cal.App.3d at p. 812 .) The Mitchell court concluded there was a valid basis upon which to place the technician on administrative leave but “[t]he forced leave removed any emergency which might have been presented by [the technician’s] continued presence at the hospital.” (Id. at p. 813.) The court found no justification for “utilization of an emergency exception to the procedural requirements announced in Skelly.” (Ibid.) Th 2026(Ibid.) On appeal, the SPB argued “ ‘extraordinary circumstances’ ” required it to promptly dismiss the technician “to avert harm to the public.” (Mitchell, supra, 39. 90 Cal.App.3d at p. 812 .) The Mitchell court concluded there was a valid basis upon which to place the technician on administrative leave but “[t]he forced leave removed any emergency which might have been presented by [the technician’s] continued presence at the hospital.” (Id. at p. 813.) The court found no justification for “utilization of an emergency exception to the procedural requirements announced in Skelly.” (Ibid.) Th | 2 | 2004–2026 |
Townsel v. San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Board
green
2 sentences2016Bd. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 940, 949 .) The “right to respond” includes the 2 Although Merenda cites the 2006 edition we have only been able to obtain and review the 1985 edition cited by the California Supreme Court in Cranston. 10 administrative procedure known as a “Skelly hearing,” in which the employee receives an opportunity to respond “either orally or in writing” to “the authority initially imposing discipline.” In addition, the employer must provide an opportunity for a postdiscipline evidentiary hearing. 2014Code, § 3301), which included “notice that the public agency, having completed its investigation into the alleged misconduct within the statutory period, has decided that it may take disciplinary action against the officer for specified misconduct.” (Mays v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 325 ; Townsel v. San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Bd. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 940, 949 .) The County’s reasons for its decision to terminate Hager based upon specific misconduct had been presented to Hager in accordance with these rights before his Skelly hearing, which gave him the “rig | 2 | 2014–2016 |
Mays v. City of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2015(Benefield v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 477, fn. 12 , citing Mays v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 320-324.)5 Sviridov also suggests that Department was required to send a "notice of adverse action" containing information about "what he has been accused of having done, the results of the investigation, the proposed discipline, and the time and place for a pre-termination Skelly hearing." (Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194 (Skelly).) The assertion is meritless, as " 'section 3304[, subdivision ](d) does not suggest 2014Code, § 3301), which included “notice that the public agency, having completed its investigation into the alleged misconduct within the statutory period, has decided that it may take disciplinary action against the officer for specified misconduct.” (Mays v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 325 ; Townsel v. San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Bd. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 940, 949 .) The County’s reasons for its decision to terminate Hager based upon specific misconduct had been presented to Hager in accordance with these rights before his Skelly hearing, which gave him the “rig | 2 | 2014–2015 |
Ng v. State Personnel Board
green
2 sentences1977The Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, holds in Ng v. State Personnel Bd. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 600 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 387 ], that the Skelly rule is applicable to demotions. 1977The Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, holds in Ng v. State Personnel Bd. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 600 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 387 ], that the Skelly rule is applicable to demotions. | 2 | 1977–2004 |
Coleman v. DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL ADMININISTRATION
green
2 sentences2026Because Jackson did not lose any earnings beyond 10 days of pay “as a result of” (Coleman, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1124 ) his wrongful suspension, the trial court correctly ruled he was entitled to only 10 days of back pay. 2026Because Jackson did not lose any earnings beyond 10 days of pay “as a result of” (Coleman, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1124 ) his wrongful suspension, the trial court correctly ruled he was entitled to only 10 days of back pay. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Thaxton v. State Personnel Board
neutral
2 sentences2026(See Thaxton, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 692 .) Mooradian bore the burden of demonstrating a Skelly violation. 2026(See Thaxton, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 692 .) Mooradian bore the burden of demonstrating a Skelly violation. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Bostean v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.
green
2 sentences2024(Gilbert, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 930 ; Bostean, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at pp. 112–113.) As the City points out, legislators are “presumed to be aware of ‘ “judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 659 .) The current City Charter was affirmed effective July 2000. 2024(Gilbert, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 930 ; Bostean, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at pp. 112–113.) As the City points out, legislators are “presumed to be aware of ‘ “judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 659 .) The current City Charter was affirmed effective July 2000. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Gilbert v. Homar
green
2 sentences2024(Gilbert, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 930 ; Bostean, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at pp. 112–113.) As the City points out, legislators are “presumed to be aware of ‘ “judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 659 .) The current City Charter was affirmed effective July 2000. 2024(Gilbert, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 930 ; Bostean, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at pp. 112–113.) As the City points out, legislators are “presumed to be aware of ‘ “judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 659 .) The current City Charter was affirmed effective July 2000. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Giordano
green
2 sentences2024(Gilbert, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 930 ; Bostean, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at pp. 112–113.) As the City points out, legislators are “presumed to be aware of ‘ “judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 659 .) The current City Charter was affirmed effective July 2000. 2024(Gilbert, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 930 ; Bostean, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at pp. 112–113.) As the City points out, legislators are “presumed to be aware of ‘ “judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 659 .) The current City Charter was affirmed effective July 2000. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Moyer v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board
green
2 sentences2024Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 .) This decision alone also did not trigger her right to a Skelly hearing. 2024Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 .) This decision alone also did not trigger her right to a Skelly hearing. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill
green
1 sentence2023Loudermill (1985) 470 U.S. 532, 546 .) An employer complies with Skelly when it provides the employee with statements of witnesses, documents, and investigative reports or extracts therefrom. ( Gilbert, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1275–1276, 1280.) The employee has “ ‘ the right to be informed not only of the nature of the charges but also of the substance of the relevant supporting evidence.’ ” (Id. at p. 1278; see also Ferguson v. City of Cathedral City (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1170 [holding no Skelly violation where employee received “notice of the proposed discharge, the reasons, a c | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Gray v. City of Gustine green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| San Diego Unified School District v. Commission on Professional Competence green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Fisher v. State Pers. Bd. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Shenouda v. Veterinary Med. Bd. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Lubey v. City and County of San Francisco green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Gonzales v. State Personnel Board green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Denham v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Bell v. City of Torrance green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Miller v. State of California green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Sulier v. State Personnel Board green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Jackson v. City of Los Angeles green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Kern v. City of Long Beach green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Kirkpatrick v. Civil Service Commission green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Earl v. State Personnel Board green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Binkley v. City of Long Beach green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Gates v. Department of Motor Vehicles green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Martinez v. County of Tulare green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Mennig v. City Council of Culver City green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| White v. County of Sacramento green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.