80 California opinions name it 3 courts 1981–2026 24 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Murphygreen2 sentences2026(People v. Cockburn (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1157 .) But under “the Williamson rule, if a general statute includes the same conduct as a special statute, the court infers that the Legislature intended that conduct to be prosecuted exclusively under the special statute.” (People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86 (Murphy).) It applies when “each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute” or when “it appears from the statutory context that a violation of the special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general sta 2026(People v. Cockburn (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1157 .) But under “the Williamson rule, if a general statute includes the same conduct as a special statute, the court infers that the Legislature intended that conduct to be prosecuted exclusively under the special statute.” (People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86 (Murphy).) It applies when “each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute” or when “it appears from the statutory context that a violation of the special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general sta | 33 | 57 |
People v. Jenkinsgreen2 sentences2026If it appears from the entire context that a violation of the ‘special’ statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the ‘general’ statute, the Williamson rule may apply even though the elements of the general statute are not mirrored on the face of the special statute.” (People v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal.3d 494, 502 ; see People v. Mayers, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d 809 [§ 332, the specific misdemeanor statute prohibiting three-card monte, prevailed over § 182, subd. (a)(4), the general felony conspiracy to defraud statute, because § 332 would otherwise be voided]; People v. Ruster 2026If it appears from the entire context that a violation of the ‘special’ statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the ‘general’ statute, the Williamson rule may apply even though the elements of the general statute are not mirrored on the face of the special statute.” (People v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal.3d 494, 502 ; see People v. Mayers, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d 809 [§ 332, the specific misdemeanor statute prohibiting three-card monte, prevailed over § 182, subd. (a)(4), the general felony conspiracy to defraud statute, because § 332 would otherwise be voided]; People v. Ruster | 20 | 35 |
In Re Williamsongreen2 sentences2026“The Williamson rule refers to the California Supreme Court’s decision in Williamson, supra, 43 Cal.2d 651 . ‘Under the Williamson rule, if a general statute includes the same conduct as a special statute, the court infers that the Legislature intended that conduct to be prosecuted exclusively under the special statute. 2026“The Williamson rule refers to the California Supreme Court’s decision in Williamson, supra, 43 Cal.2d 651 . ‘Under the Williamson rule, if a general statute includes the same conduct as a special statute, the court infers that the Legislature intended that conduct to be prosecuted exclusively under the special statute. | 12 | 46 |
People v. Watsongreen2 sentences2026(People v. Cockburn (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1157 .) But under “the Williamson rule, if a general statute includes the same conduct as a special statute, the court infers that the Legislature intended that conduct to be prosecuted exclusively under the special statute.” (People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86 (Murphy).) It applies when “each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute” or when “it appears from the statutory context that a violation of the special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general sta 2026(People v. Cockburn (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1157 .) But under “the Williamson rule, if a general statute includes the same conduct as a special statute, the court infers that the Legislature intended that conduct to be prosecuted exclusively under the special statute.” (People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86 (Murphy).) It applies when “each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute” or when “it appears from the statutory context that a violation of the special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general sta | 9 | 24 |
Mitchell v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2026Indeed, in most instances, an overlap of provisions is determinative of the issue of legislative intent and “requires us to give effect to the special provision alone in the face of the dual applicability of the general provision . . . and the special provision . . . .” [Citation.]’ “Absent some indication of legislative intent to the contrary, the Williamson rule applies when (1) ‘each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute’ or (2) when ‘it appears from the statutory context that a violation of the special statute will necessarily or common 2026Indeed, in most instances, an overlap of provisions is determinative of the issue of legislative intent and “requires us to give effect to the special provision alone in the face of the dual applicability of the general provision . . . and the special provision . . . .” [Citation.]’ “Absent some indication of legislative intent to the contrary, the Williamson rule applies when (1) ‘each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute’ or (2) when ‘it appears from the statutory context that a violation of the special statute will necessarily or common | 5 | 8 |
People v. Henrygreen2 sentences2026In effect, the special statute is interpreted as creating an exception to the general statute for conduct that otherwise could be prosecuted under either statute.’ (People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86 (Murphy).) [¶] ‘Absent some indication of legislative intent to the contrary, the Williamson rule applies when (1) “each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute” or (2) when “it appears from the statutory context that a violation of the special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general statute.” ’ ” (People 2026In effect, the special statute is interpreted as creating an exception to the general statute for conduct that otherwise could be prosecuted under either statute.’ (People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86 (Murphy).) [¶] ‘Absent some indication of legislative intent to the contrary, the Williamson rule applies when (1) “each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute” or (2) when “it appears from the statutory context that a violation of the special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general statute.” ’ ” (People | 5 | 8 |
People v. Gilbertgreen2 sentences2026Indeed, in most instances, an overlap of provisions is determinative of the issue of legislative intent and “requires us to give effect to the special provision alone in the face of the dual applicability of the general provision . . . and the special provision . . . .” ’ ” (People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86 (Murphy).) “Absent some indication of legislative intent to the contrary, the Williamson rule applies when (1) ‘each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute’ or (2) when ‘it appears from the statutory context that a violation of t 2026Indeed, in most instances, an overlap of provisions is determinative of the issue of legislative intent and “requires us to give effect to the special provision alone in the face of the dual applicability of the general provision . . . and the special provision . . . .” ’ ” (People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86 (Murphy).) “Absent some indication of legislative intent to the contrary, the Williamson rule applies when (1) ‘each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute’ or (2) when ‘it appears from the statutory context that a violation of t | 4 | 11 |
People v. Cockburngreen2 sentences2026(People v. Cockburn (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1157 .) But under “the Williamson rule, if a general statute includes the same conduct as a special statute, the court infers that the Legislature intended that conduct to be prosecuted exclusively under the special statute.” (People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86 (Murphy).) It applies when “each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute” or when “it appears from the statutory context that a violation of the special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general sta 2026(People v. Cockburn (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1157 .) But under “the Williamson rule, if a general statute includes the same conduct as a special statute, the court infers that the Legislature intended that conduct to be prosecuted exclusively under the special statute.” (People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86 (Murphy).) It applies when “each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute” or when “it appears from the statutory context that a violation of the special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general sta | 4 | 5 |
People v. Walkergreen2 sentences2024In effect, the special statute is interpreted as creating an exception to the general statute for conduct that otherwise could be prosecuted under either statute.” (People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86 .) Accordingly, “[a]bsent some indication of legislative intent to the contrary, the Williamson rule applies when (1) ‘each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute’ or (2) when ‘it appears from the statutory context that a violation of the special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general statute.’ ” (Ibid.) 2024In effect, the special statute is interpreted as creating an exception to the general statute for conduct that otherwise could be prosecuted under either statute.” (People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86 .) Accordingly, “[a]bsent some indication of legislative intent to the contrary, the Williamson rule applies when (1) ‘each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute’ or (2) when ‘it appears from the statutory context that a violation of the special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general statute.’ ” (Ibid.) | 3 | 7 |
People v. Medelezgreen2 sentences2021Indeed, applying for aid under a false identity, which entails signing eligibility questionnaires and pay certification cards with a false name, is apparently one of the most common forms of unemployment insurance fraud.’ ( Ruster, supra, at p. 699 .)” (People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81 , 86–88.) In short, the Williamson rule does not apply when “a felony statute requires a more culpable mental state than a misdemeanor statute proscribing the same behavior.” (Hudson v. Superior Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 999, 1007 .) “On the other hand, we do not assume the Legislature intended to preclude 2021Indeed, applying for aid under a false identity, which entails signing eligibility questionnaires and pay certification cards with a false name, is apparently one of the most common forms of unemployment insurance fraud.’ ( Ruster, supra, at p. 699 .)” (People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81 , 86–88.) In short, the Williamson rule does not apply when “a felony statute requires a more culpable mental state than a misdemeanor statute proscribing the same behavior.” (Hudson v. Superior Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 999, 1007 .) “On the other hand, we do not assume the Legislature intended to preclude | 3 | 3 |
People v. Rustergreen2 sentences2026If it appears from the entire context that a violation of the ‘special’ statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the ‘general’ statute, the Williamson rule may apply even though the elements of the general statute are not mirrored on the face of the special statute.” (People v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal.3d 494, 502 ; see People v. Mayers, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d 809 [§ 332, the specific misdemeanor statute prohibiting three-card monte, prevailed over § 182, subd. (a)(4), the general felony conspiracy to defraud statute, because § 332 would otherwise be voided]; People v. Ruster 2026If it appears from the entire context that a violation of the ‘special’ statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the ‘general’ statute, the Williamson rule may apply even though the elements of the general statute are not mirrored on the face of the special statute.” (People v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal.3d 494, 502 ; see People v. Mayers, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d 809 [§ 332, the specific misdemeanor statute prohibiting three-card monte, prevailed over § 182, subd. (a)(4), the general felony conspiracy to defraud statute, because § 332 would otherwise be voided]; People v. Ruster | 2 | 8 |
Hudson v. Superior Court of Riverside Countygreen2 sentences2026If it appears from the entire context that a violation of the ‘special’ statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the ‘general’ statute, the Williamson rule may apply even though the elements of the general statute are not mirrored on the face of the special statute.” (People v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal.3d 494, 502 ; see People v. Mayers, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d 809 [§ 332, the specific misdemeanor statute prohibiting three-card monte, prevailed over § 182, subd. (a)(4), the general felony conspiracy to defraud statute, because § 332 would otherwise be voided]; People v. Ruster 2026If it appears from the entire context that a violation of the ‘special’ statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the ‘general’ statute, the Williamson rule may apply even though the elements of the general statute are not mirrored on the face of the special statute.” (People v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal.3d 494, 502 ; see People v. Mayers, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d 809 [§ 332, the specific misdemeanor statute prohibiting three-card monte, prevailed over § 182, subd. (a)(4), the general felony conspiracy to defraud statute, because § 332 would otherwise be voided]; People v. Ruster | 2 | 5 |
People v. Powersgreen2 sentences2026A defendant who acts in concert with others to ‘. . . steal merchandise from one or more 10 merchant’s premises or online marketplace with the intent to sell, exchange, or return the merchandise for value’ cannot help but risk prosecution for conspiracy to commit petty theft. ([§] 490.4[, subd. ](a)(1).) It is no coincidence that in the present case, the People first charged Alberry with organized retail theft.” The People disagree, arguing that the Williamson rule does not apply to Alberry’s case “because the conspiracy and organized retail theft statutes target different criminal acts and le 2026A defendant who acts in concert with others to ‘. . . steal merchandise from one or more 10 merchant’s premises or online marketplace with the intent to sell, exchange, or return the merchandise for value’ cannot help but risk prosecution for conspiracy to commit petty theft. ([§] 490.4[, subd. ](a)(1).) It is no coincidence that in the present case, the People first charged Alberry with organized retail theft.” The People disagree, arguing that the Williamson rule does not apply to Alberry’s case “because the conspiracy and organized retail theft statutes target different criminal acts and le | 2 | 3 |
People v. Mullinsgreen2 sentences2026(Ibid.; see People v. Mullins (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 594, 608 [finding robbery convictions not precluded by more specific identity theft statute because each element of robbery statute did not correspond to an element of the identity theft statute, and because violations of the identity theft statute would not commonly result in violation of the robbery statute due to the robbery statute’s force or fear requirement].) Here, application of the Williamson test, as described in Murphy, supports defendant’s argument that he could not be prosecuted under section 594 for damaging the Tuolumne County 2026(Ibid.; see People v. Mullins (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 594, 608 [finding robbery convictions not precluded by more specific identity theft statute because each element of robbery statute did not correspond to an element of the identity theft statute, and because violations of the identity theft statute would not commonly result in violation of the robbery statute due to the robbery statute’s force or fear requirement].) Here, application of the Williamson test, as described in Murphy, supports defendant’s argument that he could not be prosecuted under section 594 for damaging the Tuolumne County | 2 | 2 |
People v. Mooregreen2 sentences2026(See, e.g., People v. Woods, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 999 [finding the Williamson rule applicable despite the fact the general and specific statutes used different wording because, functionally, the requisite mental states were the same].) The Penal Code defines “ ‘[m]alice’ ” and “ ‘maliciously’ ” in part on mere “intent” grounds, calling for proof of “an intent to do a wrongful act.” (§ 7, subd. (b)(4); see People v. Moore (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 889, 895 [finding the term “ ‘maliciously’ ” to only require a general intent to do the proscribed act because “the term ‘maliciously’ does not i 2026(See, e.g., People v. Woods, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 999 [finding the Williamson rule applicable despite the fact the general and specific statutes used different wording because, functionally, the requisite mental states were the same].) The Penal Code defines “ ‘[m]alice’ ” and “ ‘maliciously’ ” in part on mere “intent” grounds, calling for proof of “an intent to do a wrongful act.” (§ 7, subd. (b)(4); see People v. Moore (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 889, 895 [finding the term “ ‘maliciously’ ” to only require a general intent to do the proscribed act because “the term ‘maliciously’ does not i | 2 | 2 |
People v. Vegagreen2 sentences2022(People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, 119 ; People v. Vega (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 706, 710 [“Section 273.5 was enacted to expand its predecessor section, a ‘wife beating’ statute (former § 273d)”].) Former section 273d prohibited corporal injury to a wife. 2022(People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, 119 ; People v. Vega (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 706, 710 [“Section 273.5 was enacted to expand its predecessor section, a ‘wife beating’ statute (former § 273d)”].) Former section 273d prohibited corporal injury to a wife. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Cruz Villagrangreen2 sentences2022(People v. Villagran (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 880, 896 [“This distinction makes it apparent that ‘the statues cover different conduct,’ and so the Williamson rule does not apply”].) The Legislature added more protection for victims without changing criminal liability for other more serious crimes. 2022(People v. Villagran (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 880, 896 [“This distinction makes it apparent that ‘the statues cover different conduct,’ and so the Williamson rule does not apply”].) The Legislature added more protection for victims without changing criminal liability for other more serious crimes. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Sungreen2 sentences2019(Ibid.) On appeal, the defendant argued that prosecution for the general offense of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245) was precluded by the specific statutes addressing unlawful use of a laser (§ 247.5).6 The Court of Appeal agreed. ( Sun, supra, at p. 950 .) The court determined that the statutes at issue in Sun contained disparate elements. 2019(Ibid.) On appeal, the defendant argued that prosecution for the general offense of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245) was precluded by the specific statutes addressing unlawful use of a laser (§ 247.5).6 The Court of Appeal agreed. ( Sun, supra, at p. 950 .) The court determined that the statutes at issue in Sun contained disparate elements. | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Artisgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Breyergreen | 2 | 2 |
People v. Pruntygreen2 sentences2024(See People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71 (Prunty).) In interpreting a statute, our primary goal “ ‘is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose.’ ” (People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100, 1105 .) 2. 2024(See People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71 (Prunty).) In interpreting a statute, our primary goal “ ‘is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose.’ ” (People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100, 1105 .) 2. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Radergreen2 sentences2024In People v. Rader (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 184 (Rader), the Second District Court of Appeal identified three potential conflicts between the provisions in a general versus a specific statute that could trigger the Williamson rule as follows: (1) a conflict in potential sentences; (2) a conflict in the applicable statutes of limitations; and (3) a conflict in the 16 required elements of each offense. 2024In People v. Rader (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 184 (Rader), the Second District Court of Appeal identified three potential conflicts between the provisions in a general versus a specific statute that could trigger the Williamson rule as follows: (1) a conflict in potential sentences; (2) a conflict in the applicable statutes of limitations; and (3) a conflict in the 16 required elements of each offense. | 1 | 2 |
| In Re Shullgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Bradwell v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Robertsongreen | 1 | 2 |
| Abatti v. Eldridgegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mayersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Irwingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wilkersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Haydongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. DeLaCruzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Josephgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Escarcegagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Torresgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Griffinigreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Butlergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Yeatsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Charles G. (In re Charles G.)
green
2 sentences2021Indeed, applying for aid under a false identity, which entails signing eligibility questionnaires and pay certification cards with a false name, is apparently one of the most common forms of unemployment insurance fraud.’ ( Ruster, supra, at p. 699 .)” (People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81 , 86–88.) In short, the Williamson rule does not apply when “a felony statute requires a more culpable mental state than a misdemeanor statute proscribing the same behavior.” (Hudson v. Superior Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 999, 1007 .) “On the other hand, we do not assume the Legislature intended to preclude 2021Indeed, applying for aid under a false identity, which entails signing eligibility questionnaires and pay certification cards with a false name, is apparently one of the most common forms of unemployment insurance fraud.’ ( Ruster, supra, at p. 699 .)” (People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81 , 86–88.) In short, the Williamson rule does not apply when “a felony statute requires a more culpable mental state than a misdemeanor statute proscribing the same behavior.” (Hudson v. Superior Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 999, 1007 .) “On the other hand, we do not assume the Legislature intended to preclude | 4 | 2021–2026 |
Finn v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2018The Williamson rule gets its name from In re Williamson, supra, 43 Cal.2d 651 , 276 P.2d 593 , which held that when a general statute includes the same matter as a more specific statute, the latter will be considered an exception to the former. ( Id . at p. 654, 276 P.2d 593 .) The rule "precludes prosecution under a general *699 statute when a more specific one describes the conduct involved. [Citations.]" ( Finn v. Superior Court (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 268 , 271, 202 Cal.Rptr. 732 .) It is a bedrock rule of statutory construction; every jurisdiction has its own analog to the Williamson rule. 2018The Williamson rule gets its name from In re Williamson, supra, 43 Cal.2d 651 , 276 P.2d 593 , which held that when a general statute includes the same matter as a more specific statute, the latter will be considered an exception to the former. ( Id . at p. 654, 276 P.2d 593 .) The rule "precludes prosecution under a general *699 statute when a more specific one describes the conduct involved. [Citations.]" ( Finn v. Superior Court (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 268 , 271, 202 Cal.Rptr. 732 .) It is a bedrock rule of statutory construction; every jurisdiction has its own analog to the Williamson rule. | 3 | 2018–2020 |
In Re Tobacco II Cases
green
2 sentences2017A. General Legal Standards " 'Questions of statutory interpretation are, of course, pure matters of law upon which we may exercise our independent judgment.' " ( In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298 , 311, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 , 207 P.3d 20 .) "[I]f a general statute includes the same conduct as a special statute, the court infers that the Legislature intended that conduct to be prosecuted exclusively under the special statute." ( People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81 , 86, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 78 , 253 P.3d 1216 ( Murphy ).) This " Williamson rule," first formulated in In re Williamson (1954 2017A. General Legal Standards " 'Questions of statutory interpretation are, of course, pure matters of law upon which we may exercise our independent judgment.' " ( In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298 , 311, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 , 207 P.3d 20 .) "[I]f a general statute includes the same conduct as a special statute, the court infers that the Legislature intended that conduct to be prosecuted exclusively under the special statute." ( People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81 , 86, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 78 , 253 P.3d 1216 ( Murphy ).) This " Williamson rule," first formulated in In re Williamson (1954 | 3 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Montalvo
green
2 sentences2026(Montalvo, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 622 .) The court continued, “Because the Williamson rule ‘prohibits prosecution under a general statute when the conduct at issue is covered under a more specific statute’ [citation], a necessary predicate to the application of the rule is that the defendant’s conduct fits the elements of the assertedly more specific statute.” (Ibid., original italics.) It rejected Montalvo’s argument because his “conduct [wa]s not covered by the statutes defendant relies upon and thus, defendant could not be convicted under either statute.” (Ibid.) Section 530 required h 2026(Montalvo, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 622 .) The court continued, “Because the Williamson rule ‘prohibits prosecution under a general statute when the conduct at issue is covered under a more specific statute’ [citation], a necessary predicate to the application of the rule is that the defendant’s conduct fits the elements of the assertedly more specific statute.” (Ibid., original italics.) It rejected Montalvo’s argument because his “conduct [wa]s not covered by the statutes defendant relies upon and thus, defendant could not be convicted under either statute.” (Ibid.) Section 530 required h | 2 | 2019–2026 |
People v. Alvarez
green
2 sentences2024(See People v. Torres (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1053 , 1056–1061 (Torres); People v. Alvarez (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1170 , 1177–1178 (Alvarez); People v. Johnson (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 24, 26 (Johnson); People v. Hord (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 711 , 716–721 (Hord); People v. Wilkerson (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1581 (Wilkerson).) Commonly referred to as the Williamson rule, prosecution under a general criminal statute may be precluded when a more specific prohibition applies. 2024(See People v. Torres (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1053 , 1056–1061 (Torres); People v. Alvarez (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1170 , 1177–1178 (Alvarez); People v. Johnson (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 24, 26 (Johnson); People v. Hord (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 711 , 716–721 (Hord); People v. Wilkerson (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1581 (Wilkerson).) Commonly referred to as the Williamson rule, prosecution under a general criminal statute may be precluded when a more specific prohibition applies. | 2 | 2022–2024 |
People v. Hord
green
2 sentences2024(See People v. Torres (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1053 , 1056–1061 (Torres); People v. Alvarez (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1170 , 1177–1178 (Alvarez); People v. Johnson (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 24, 26 (Johnson); People v. Hord (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 711 , 716–721 (Hord); People v. Wilkerson (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1581 (Wilkerson).) Commonly referred to as the Williamson rule, prosecution under a general criminal statute may be precluded when a more specific prohibition applies. 2024(See People v. Torres (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1053 , 1056–1061 (Torres); People v. Alvarez (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1170 , 1177–1178 (Alvarez); People v. Johnson (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 24, 26 (Johnson); People v. Hord (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 711 , 716–721 (Hord); People v. Wilkerson (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1581 (Wilkerson).) Commonly referred to as the Williamson rule, prosecution under a general criminal statute may be precluded when a more specific prohibition applies. | 2 | 2022–2024 |
People v. Korwin
green
2 sentences2023In enacting section 288.3, the electorate expressed its intent to protect children from Internet predators. 2 (People v. Korwin (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 682, 689-690 .) As a general rule, the Williamson rule is simply a means of 2 The Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica’s Law (Prop. 83, as approved by voters, Gen. 2023In enacting section 288.3, the electorate expressed its intent to protect children from Internet predators. 2 (People v. Korwin (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 682, 689-690 .) As a general rule, the Williamson rule is simply a means of 2 The Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica’s Law (Prop. 83, as approved by voters, Gen. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Sloan
green
2 sentences2022(People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, 119 ; People v. Vega (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 706, 710 [“Section 273.5 was enacted to expand its predecessor section, a ‘wife beating’ statute (former § 273d)”].) Former section 273d prohibited corporal injury to a wife. 2022(People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, 119 ; People v. Vega (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 706, 710 [“Section 273.5 was enacted to expand its predecessor section, a ‘wife beating’ statute (former § 273d)”].) Former section 273d prohibited corporal injury to a wife. | 2 | 2021–2022 |
People v. Whitmer
green
2 sentences2021(See People v. Cockburn (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1159-1160 [Williamson rule does not apply when “competing provisions are a wash” in severity of penalty imposed]; People v. Lucero (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 370 , 408-410 [same]; see Mitchell v. Superior Court, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1250 .) 17 II Defendant contends, quoting the caption of his brief: “Because all of appellant’s grand theft convictions were committed pursuant to a single continuing scheme, those based upon acts committed prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Whitmer (2014) 59 Cal.4th 733 [(Whitmer)] must be combined 2021(See People v. Cockburn (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1159-1160 [Williamson rule does not apply when “competing provisions are a wash” in severity of penalty imposed]; People v. Lucero (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 370 , 408-410 [same]; see Mitchell v. Superior Court, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1250 .) 17 II Defendant contends, quoting the caption of his brief: “Because all of appellant’s grand theft convictions were committed pursuant to a single continuing scheme, those based upon acts committed prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Whitmer (2014) 59 Cal.4th 733 [(Whitmer)] must be combined | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Mandell
green
2 sentences2020Section 266a Section 266a provides in full, “Each person who, within this state, takes any person against his or her will and without his or her consent, or with his or her consent procured by fraudulent inducement or misrepresentation, for the purpose of prostitution, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 647, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, and a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000).”13 A violation of section 266a is punishable by 16 months, two years, or three years in prison. (§ 18, subd. (a).) People v. Mandell (1939) 35 Cal.App.2d 368 (Mandell) is the o 2020(Id. at p. 791, fn. 3.) We agree with Henry and consider the merits of Harper’s Williamson argument. 13 Section 647, subdivision (b)(4), provides that “ ‘prostitution’ includes any lewd act between persons for money or other consideration.” 14 When Mandell was decided, section 266a provided that it was a crime to take “ ‘any female person.’ ” (Mandell, supra, 35 Cal.App.2d at p. 372 .) The statute now applies to the taking of “any person.” (§ 266a.) 14 b. | 2 | 2016–2020 |
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