11 Missouri opinions name it 1 courts 2011–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mansil v. Midwest Emergency Med. Servs., P.C.green2 sentences2024Servs., P.C., 554 S.W.3d 471, 475 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018). 8 We find DOC’s third Point Relied On marginally sufficient under Rule 72.01, although it does not specify the actual error (in overruling DOC’s objection to Mother’s testimony) and it fails to mention in its preservation statement that it objected to Mother’s testimony during trial, which is required to preserve the issue in addition to raising it in a post-trial motion. 11 We do not decide “whether the evidence was admissible or should have been excluded, [but] whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting or excluding the 2019Servs., P.C., 554 S.W.3d 471, 475 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). 8 DOC’s claim of error as to the exclusion of Dr. Elizabeth Arnold’s testimony is not preserved for appellate review, as DOC made no offer of proof as to what her testimony would have been at the damages trial. | 2 | 2 |
Glasgow School District v. Howard County Coronergreen2 sentences2024Coroner, 572 S.W.3d 543, 548 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (judgment finding the Coroner violated the Sunshine Law was not a final and appealable judgment because it left unadjudicated whether the violation was knowing or purposeful)).5 After we dismissed the appeal, the trial court conducted a bench trial on the issues of whether the DOC’s violation was knowing or purposeful. 2023In her petition, Hynes asked the trial court for relief through civil penalties and to “award [her] costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in prosecuting this claim pursuant to RSMo [section] 610.027.3 due to [the DOC’s] willful violation of the Sunshine Law . . . .” These damages depended on both the DOC’s violation of the Sunshine Law, and that the violation was done “purposely” and “knowingly.” See Glasgow, 572 S.W.3d at 548 (holding that the imposition of civil penalties and attorney fees due to a “violation that was done ‘knowingly’ or ‘purposely’” are not separate, independent cla | 2 | 2 |
Farish v. Missouri Department of Correctionsgreen1 sentence2025In making this argument, Vickers ignores the fact that the current version of § 558.031 expressly provides that the language he relies on is limited “to offenses for which the offender was sentenced on or 9 This determination is consistent with this court’s prior determination that “much of Vickers’s time in custody was due to either a parole violation on an unrelated case or his federal charge and conviction.” State v. Vickers, 560 S.W.3d 3, 18 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018). 10 For two reasons, it is irrelevant that the sentencing court found Vickers would have been in the custody of either the Jackso | 1 | 1 |
State v. Walkergreen1 sentence2025In making this argument, Vickers ignores the fact that the current version of § 558.031 expressly provides that the language he relies on is limited “to offenses for which the offender was sentenced on or 9 This determination is consistent with this court’s prior determination that “much of Vickers’s time in custody was due to either a parole violation on an unrelated case or his federal charge and conviction.” State v. Vickers, 560 S.W.3d 3, 18 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018). 10 For two reasons, it is irrelevant that the sentencing court found Vickers would have been in the custody of either the Jackso | 1 | 1 |
Delacroix v. Doncasters, Inc.green1 sentence2024All Rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2023). 2 In an appeal from the denial of a directed verdict or JNOV, “this Court considers the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and disregards all contrary evidence and inferences.” Delacroix v. Doncasters, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 13, 26 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013). | 1 | 1 |
Nelson v. Waxmangreen1 sentence2024The decision to admit or exclude evidence at trial “lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Mitchell v. Kardesch, 313 S.W.3d 667, 674-75 (Mo. banc 2010) (quoting Nelson v. Waxman, 9 S.W.3d 601, 603 (Mo. banc 2000)). | 1 | 1 |
Francis v. Stategreen2 sentences2024No specifics were given about which element(s) of the three claims failed or why. 7 Objections at trial must be specific enough to allow “the opponent an opportunity to correct the error and the court to correctly rule on it.” Morphis v. Tracker Marine, LLC, 640 S.W.3d 481 , 483 (Mo. App. S.D. 2022) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Goins, 306 S.W.3d 639, 646 (Mo. 7 At least ten potential elements (not counting damages) might have supported DOC’s motion. 2024No specifics were given about which element(s) of the three claims failed or why. 7 Objections at trial must be specific enough to allow “the opponent an opportunity to correct the error and the court to correctly rule on it.” Morphis v. Tracker Marine, LLC, 640 S.W.3d 481 , 483 (Mo. App. S.D. 2022) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Goins, 306 S.W.3d 639, 646 (Mo. 7 At least ten potential elements (not counting damages) might have supported DOC’s motion. | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Kardeschgreen1 sentence2024The decision to admit or exclude evidence at trial “lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Mitchell v. Kardesch, 313 S.W.3d 667, 674-75 (Mo. banc 2010) (quoting Nelson v. Waxman, 9 S.W.3d 601, 603 (Mo. banc 2000)). | 1 | 1 |
Kieffer v. Icazagreen2 sentences2024The Missouri Supreme Court has stated the “law of the case doctrine generally applies to issues that could have been raised . . . during the first appeal,” but [w]hen a judgment is reversed completely, “the case is put in the same posture in which it was before the judgment was entered . . . [and] the parties’ rights are left wholly unaffected by any previous determination that was reversed, so that a judgment that is reversed and remanded stands as if no trial has yet been held.” 4 We note that none of the admitted facts at issue in Eivins I were deemed admitted under Rule 59.01 or Rule 61.01 2024Kieffer, 376 S.W.3d at 655 ; Century II, 87 S.W.3d at 423 . | 1 | 1 |
Spradlin v. City of Fultongreen1 sentence2024“The standard required to prove a ‘purposeful’ violation under section 610.027 is greater—the party must show that the defendant . . . act[ed] with ‘a conscious design, intent, 12 Because we find substantial evidence supported the determination that the DOC’s violation was “purposeful,” we need not analyze whether the DOC’s violation was “knowing.” See Laut, 491 S.W.3d at 199 (it is a “far greater burden” to prove a purposeful violation than it is a knowing violation). 18 or plan to violate the law and did so with awareness of the probable consequences.’” Id. (internal marks omitted) (quoting | 1 | 1 |
Rachal Laut, f/k/a Rachal Govro, and John M. Soellner v. City of Arnoldgreen2 sentences2024“The standard required to prove a ‘purposeful’ violation under section 610.027 is greater—the party must show that the defendant . . . act[ed] with ‘a conscious design, intent, 12 Because we find substantial evidence supported the determination that the DOC’s violation was “purposeful,” we need not analyze whether the DOC’s violation was “knowing.” See Laut, 491 S.W.3d at 199 (it is a “far greater burden” to prove a purposeful violation than it is a knowing violation). 18 or plan to violate the law and did so with awareness of the probable consequences.’” Id. (internal marks omitted) (quoting 2024“The standard required to prove a ‘purposeful’ violation under section 610.027 is greater—the party must show that the defendant . . . act[ed] with ‘a conscious design, intent, 12 Because we find substantial evidence supported the determination that the DOC’s violation was “purposeful,” we need not analyze whether the DOC’s violation was “knowing.” See Laut, 491 S.W.3d at 199 (it is a “far greater burden” to prove a purposeful violation than it is a knowing violation). 18 or plan to violate the law and did so with awareness of the probable consequences.’” Id. (internal marks omitted) (quoting | 1 | 1 |
Ellen L. Nicol v. David L. Nicolgreen1 sentence2020Thus, the dismissal of the unserved defendants without prejudice effectively terminated the litigation and, therefore, the dismissal is appealable, and we have jurisdiction to review Rauch’s point appealed. 3 All Rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2018) unless otherwise noted. 4 “Although [Rauch] appears pro se, he ‘is subject to the same procedural rules as parties represented by counsel, including the rules specifying the required contents of appellate briefs.’” Hiner v. Hiner, 573 S.W.3d 732 , 734 n.2 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (quoting Kim v. Won Il Kim, 443 S.W.3d 29, 30 ( | 1 | 1 |
Kwang H. Kim v. Won Il Kimgreen2 sentences2020Thus, the dismissal of the unserved defendants without prejudice effectively terminated the litigation and, therefore, the dismissal is appealable, and we have jurisdiction to review Rauch’s point appealed. 3 All Rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2018) unless otherwise noted. 4 “Although [Rauch] appears pro se, he ‘is subject to the same procedural rules as parties represented by counsel, including the rules specifying the required contents of appellate briefs.’” Hiner v. Hiner, 573 S.W.3d 732 , 734 n.2 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (quoting Kim v. Won Il Kim, 443 S.W.3d 29, 30 ( 2020Thus, the dismissal of the unserved defendants without prejudice effectively terminated the litigation and, therefore, the dismissal is appealable, and we have jurisdiction to review Rauch’s point appealed. 3 All Rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2018) unless otherwise noted. 4 “Although [Rauch] appears pro se, he ‘is subject to the same procedural rules as parties represented by counsel, including the rules specifying the required contents of appellate briefs.’” Hiner v. Hiner, 573 S.W.3d 732 , 734 n.2 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (quoting Kim v. Won Il Kim, 443 S.W.3d 29, 30 ( | 1 | 1 |
Terry v. Mossiegreen1 sentence2019Terry v. Mossie, 59 S.W.3d 611, 612 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001) (“’Normally, an appellate court will not review evidence excluded by the [circuit] court unless a specific and definite offer of proof was made at trial . . . show[ing] . . . : (1) what the evidence will be; (2) the purpose and object of the evidence; and (3) each fact essential to establishing the admissibility of the evidence.’”). 10 Alberswerth v. Alberswerth, 184 S.W.3d 81, 101 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. McCulloughgreen1 sentence2019See Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 555 (Mo. banc 2010). 16 employment actions at issue.” The DOC also sought to exclude “testimony regarding other litigation, claims, or allegations or unrelated discrimination or bad acts against MDOC or its employees.” During a hearing on the DOC’s motion in limine, the DOC argued that it was specifically seeking to exclude evidence of the Malloy report because it contained evidence of other claims of discrimination by parties not involved in the case. | 1 | 1 |
State of Missouri v. Scott William Eckertgreen1 sentence2019Jones appeals. 4 Standard of Review “Statutory interpretation raises a question of law that we review de novo.” State v. Eckert, 491 S.W.3d 228, 231 (Mo. App. 2016). | 1 | 1 |
Alberswerth v. Alberswerthgreen1 sentence2019Terry v. Mossie, 59 S.W.3d 611, 612 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001) (“’Normally, an appellate court will not review evidence excluded by the [circuit] court unless a specific and definite offer of proof was made at trial . . . show[ing] . . . : (1) what the evidence will be; (2) the purpose and object of the evidence; and (3) each fact essential to establishing the admissibility of the evidence.’”). 10 Alberswerth v. Alberswerth, 184 S.W.3d 81, 101 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
James C. Rhea, Individually and as Ad Litem for Margaret Rhea v. Norman Sappgreen1 sentence2019Rhea v. Sapp, 463 S.W.3d 370, 375 (Mo. App. 2015). 1 Because the jury found in favor of the DOC on Dixson’s race discrimination and hostile work environment claims, we have not included the facts supporting those claims in this opinion. 2 While this case was pending, Dixson filed a motion to strike portions of the DOC’s appendix and Points I, III, and IV of the DOC’s brief. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. Cravens v. Nixon
green
2 sentences2012Cravens v. Nixon, 234 S.W.3d 442 (Mo.App.2007), an inmate of the Department of Corrections had obtained a federal judgment against an employee of the DOC for violation of his civil rights as a prisoner to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. 2011Cravens v. Nixon, 234 S.W.3d 442 (Mo.App.2007), an inmate of the Department of Corrections had obtained a federal judgment against an employee of the DOC for violation of his civil rights as a prisoner to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. | 2 | 2011–2012 |
Pope v. Pope
green
1 sentence2024“Where an insufficient motion for directed verdict has been made, a subsequent post-verdict motion is without basis and preserves nothing for review.” Pope, 179 S.W.3d at 451 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Century Fire Sprinklers, Inc. v. CNA/Transportation Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2024Kieffer, 376 S.W.3d at 655 ; Century II, 87 S.W.3d at 423 . 2024As discussed above, as a result of our reversal, the summary judgment was null and void, meaning “the parties’ rights [were] left wholly unaffected by [the] previous determination that was reversed, so that [the summary] judgment that is reversed and remanded stands as if no trial has yet been held.” Century II, 87 S.W.3d at 423 (quoting 5 AM.JUR.2D Appellate Review § 861 (1995)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Carla K. Hiner v. John W. Hiner
green
1 sentence2020Thus, the dismissal of the unserved defendants without prejudice effectively terminated the litigation and, therefore, the dismissal is appealable, and we have jurisdiction to review Rauch’s point appealed. 3 All Rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2018) unless otherwise noted. 4 “Although [Rauch] appears pro se, he ‘is subject to the same procedural rules as parties represented by counsel, including the rules specifying the required contents of appellate briefs.’” Hiner v. Hiner, 573 S.W.3d 732 , 734 n.2 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (quoting Kim v. Won Il Kim, 443 S.W.3d 29, 30 ( | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.