constitutional harmless error in New Mexico

2024“Where a defendant has made a proper 8 objection at trial, the appellate court determines whether the prosecution commented 9 on the defendant’s protected silence, and if so, reverses the conviction unless the 10 State can demonstrate that ‘the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” 11 State v. DeGraff, 2006-NMSC-011, ¶ 22 , 139 N.M. 211 , 131 P.3d 61 (citation 12 omitted). 13 {13} Under this constitutional harmless error standard, we will deem the error 14 “harmless only if we conclude that there is no reasonable possibility the error 15 contributed to the jury’s decision to convict.

2024“Where a defendant has made a proper 8 objection at trial, the appellate court determines whether the prosecution commented 9 on the defendant’s protected silence, and if so, reverses the conviction unless the 10 State can demonstrate that ‘the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” 11 State v. DeGraff, 2006-NMSC-011, ¶ 22 , 139 N.M. 211 , 131 P.3d 61 (citation 12 omitted). 13 {13} Under this constitutional harmless error standard, we will deem the error 14 “harmless only if we conclude that there is no reasonable possibility the error 15 contributed to the jury’s decision to convict.

2020Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404, 408-09 (1968) (recognizing that the admission of unreliable identification evidence obtained from an unduly suggestive lineup violates a defendant’s due process rights and thus is subject to review under the constitutional harmless error standard); see also Manson, 432 U.S. at 118 n.* (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that facts that “tend[] to confirm [the defendant’s] guilt” but do not support reliability under Manson should be considered only to determine “whether error, if any, in admitting identification testimony was harmless”); United States v. Concep

2020Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404, 408-09 (1968) (recognizing that the admission of unreliable identification evidence obtained from an unduly suggestive lineup violates a defendant’s due process rights and thus is subject to review under the constitutional harmless error standard); see also Manson, 432 U.S. at 118 n.* (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that facts that “tend[] to confirm [the defendant’s] guilt” but do not support reliability under Manson should be considered only to determine “whether error, if any, in admitting identification testimony was harmless”); United States v. Concep

2020Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404, 408-09 (1968) (recognizing that the admission of unreliable identification evidence obtained from an unduly suggestive lineup violates a defendant’s due process rights and thus is subject to review under the constitutional harmless error standard); see also Manson, 432 U.S. at 118 n.* (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that facts that “tend[] to confirm [the defendant’s] guilt” but do not support reliability under Manson should be considered only to determine “whether error, if any, in admitting identification testimony was harmless”); United States v. Concep

2019However, given the constitutional rights that an erroneous admission of Defendant’s attempt to plead guilty could touch upon, we consider the error to be of the constitutional variety, which is harmless “only if we conclude that there is no reasonable possibility the error contributed to the jury’s decision to convict Defendant.” State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 45 , 275 P.3d 110 (emphasis added); see Smile, 2009-NMCA-064, ¶ 46 (applying a constitutional harmless error test because the improper admission of plea negotiation evidence “could touch upon various constitutional rights”). “[T]her

2009Thus, the harmlessness of a constitutional error is properly analyzed asking whether “there [was] a reasonable possibility that the [error] complained of might have contributed to the conviction,” Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 , 84 S.Ct. 229 , 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963), or whether the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ; see also State v. Walters, 2007-NMSC-050 ¶¶ 25, 27 , 142 N.M. 644 , 168 P.3d 1068 (referring to both standards in discussing harmless error analysis); State v. Johnson, 2004-NMSC-029, ¶ 9 , 136 N.M. 348 , 98 P.3d 998 (n

2009Thus, the harmlessness of a constitutional error is properly analyzed asking whether “there [was] a reasonable possibility that the [error] complained of might have contributed to the conviction,” Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 , 84 S.Ct. 229 , 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963), or whether the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ; see also State v. Walters, 2007-NMSC-050 ¶¶ 25, 27 , 142 N.M. 644 , 168 P.3d 1068 (referring to both standards in discussing harmless error analysis); State v. Johnson, 2004-NMSC-029, ¶ 9 , 136 N.M. 348 , 98 P.3d 998 (n

2004Stated differently, in the context of an essential element that was not presented to the jury, the reviewing court must be able to "conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error[.]" Neder, 527 U.S. at 19 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 ; see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) ("The inquiry ... is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.").

2004Stated differently, in the context of an essential element that was not presented to the jury, the reviewing court must be able to "conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error[.]" Neder, 527 U.S. at 19 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 ; see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) ("The inquiry ... is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.").

2004At any rate, even if one or more of those opinions are in conflict with the constitutional harmless error analysis we describe today, see, e.g., State v. Roybal, 107 N.M. 309, 312 , 756 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Ct.App.1988) (stating in dicta that "[w]here the record contains other properly admitted and overwhelming evidence that independently establishes defendant's guilt, admission of the challenged evidence is harmless error"), those opinions would be inconsistent with the federal law we are bound to apply in this case. {34} We now consider whether the State has met its burden of establishing that t

2004At any rate, even if one or more of those opinions are in conflict with the constitutional harmless error analysis we describe today, see, e.g., State v. Roybal, 107 N.M. 309, 312 , 756 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Ct.App.1988) (stating in dicta that "[w]here the record contains other properly admitted and overwhelming evidence that independently establishes defendant's guilt, admission of the challenged evidence is harmless error"), those opinions would be inconsistent with the federal law we are bound to apply in this case. {34} We now consider whether the State has met its burden of establishing that t