clra claim in California

2019Importantly, the Broughton - Cruz rule distinguishes between public injunctive relief and private injunctive relief, and it only bars arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief. ( McGill, supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 955 , 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 627 , 393 P.3d 85 ; see Cruz , supra , 30 Cal.4th at p. 315 , 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 , 66 P.3d 1157 [declining to decide whether a UCL claim for injunctive relief designed primarily to rectify individual wrongs is arbitrable]; Broughton , supra , 21 Cal.4th at p. 1081, fn. 5 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 , 988 P.2d 67 [declining to decide whether a CLRA claim for priva

2019Importantly, the Broughton - Cruz rule distinguishes between public injunctive relief and private injunctive relief, and it only bars arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief. ( McGill, supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 955 , 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 627 , 393 P.3d 85 ; see Cruz , supra , 30 Cal.4th at p. 315 , 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 , 66 P.3d 1157 [declining to decide whether a UCL claim for injunctive relief designed primarily to rectify individual wrongs is arbitrable]; Broughton , supra , 21 Cal.4th at p. 1081, fn. 5 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 , 988 P.2d 67 [declining to decide whether a CLRA claim for priva

2025CLRA We next consider whether the trial court erred in granting defendant judgment on plaintiffs’ CLRA claim. “‘The CLRA makes unlawful, in . . . section 1770, subdivision (a) . . . , various “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer.”’ (Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 634, 639 .) . . . [¶] The CLRA sets forth 27 proscribed acts or practices. (. . . § 1770, subd. (a)(1)–(27).)” (Veera v. Banana Republic, LLC (2016

2021Before the hearing on the demurrer, Mikki filed an amended complaint, dropping 2 At our request, the parties provided supplemental briefing on the effect, if any, of Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., supra, 45 Cal.4th 634 on the availability of attorney fees in this case. 3 In addition to the CLRA claim, plaintiffs’ complaint set out causes of action for breach of contract, violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (§ 51), negligence and violation of the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof.

2026(See Collins, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 255 [conduct proscribed by CLRA includes concealment of material fact “because fraud or deceit encompasses the suppression of a fact by one who is bound to disclose it, or the suppression of a fact that is contrary to a representation that was made,” italics added]; Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1258 [“an omission is actionable under the CLRA if the omitted fact is (1) ‘contrary to a [material] representation actually made by the defendant ’ or (2) is ‘a fact the defendant was obliged to disclose,’ ” itali

2026(See Collins, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 255 [conduct proscribed by CLRA includes concealment of material fact “because fraud or deceit encompasses the suppression of a fact by one who is bound to disclose it, or the suppression of a fact that is contrary to a representation that was made,” italics added]; Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1258 [“an omission is actionable under the CLRA if the omitted fact is (1) ‘contrary to a [material] representation actually made by the defendant ’ or (2) is ‘a fact the defendant was obliged to disclose,’ ” itali

2020Standing A person has standing to bring a claim under the Unfair Competition Law, the false advertising law, or the CLRA only if she establishes that (1) she “has suffered” “economic injury” or “damage,” and (2) this injury or damage “was the result of, i.e., caused by,” the unfair business practice, false advertising or the 9 CLRA violation “that is the gravamen of [her] claim.” (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 322, 326 (Kwikset); Veera v. Banana Republic, LLC (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 907, 916 [“the standing requirements of the CLRA are essentially identical to those of the

2018To the contrary, Kwikset held that a consumer’s 4 The Ninth Circuit also held that plaintiff had standing to assert his CLRA claim, concluding that “any plaintiff who has standing under the UCL’s and FAL’s ‘lost money or property’ requirement will, a fortiori, have suffered ‘any damage’ for purposes of establishing CLRA standing.” (Hinojos, supra, 718 F.3d at p. 1108 .) 17 subjective willingness to pay more for the product than he or she would have been willing to pay in the absence of the misrepresentation is itself a form of economic injury “whether or not a court might objectively view the

2019Importantly, the Broughton - Cruz rule distinguishes between public injunctive relief and private injunctive relief, and it only bars arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief. ( McGill, supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 955 , 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 627 , 393 P.3d 85 ; see Cruz , supra , 30 Cal.4th at p. 315 , 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 , 66 P.3d 1157 [declining to decide whether a UCL claim for injunctive relief designed primarily to rectify individual wrongs is arbitrable]; Broughton , supra , 21 Cal.4th at p. 1081, fn. 5 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 , 988 P.2d 67 [declining to decide whether a CLRA claim for priva

2019Importantly, the Broughton - Cruz rule distinguishes between public injunctive relief and private injunctive relief, and it only bars arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief. ( McGill, supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 955 , 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 627 , 393 P.3d 85 ; see Cruz , supra , 30 Cal.4th at p. 315 , 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 , 66 P.3d 1157 [declining to decide whether a UCL claim for injunctive relief designed primarily to rectify individual wrongs is arbitrable]; Broughton , supra , 21 Cal.4th at p. 1081, fn. 5 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 , 988 P.2d 67 [declining to decide whether a CLRA claim for priva

2024THE CLRA’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS “The Legislature enacted the CLRA ‘to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection.’” (McGill v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 945, 954 .) “[T]he CLRA authorizes any consumer who has been damaged by an unlawful method, act, or practice to bring an action for various forms of relief . . . .” (Ibid.) The statute of limitations for a CLRA claim is three years. (§ 1783.) “Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at ‘the time when the cause of action is complete

2024THE CLRA’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS “The Legislature enacted the CLRA ‘to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection.’” (McGill v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 945, 954 .) “[T]he CLRA authorizes any consumer who has been damaged by an unlawful method, act, or practice to bring an action for various forms of relief . . . .” (Ibid.) The statute of limitations for a CLRA claim is three years. (§ 1783.) “Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at ‘the time when the cause of action is complete

2026(See Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 ; see ibid. [“[b]y proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, ‘section 17200 6 Because we conclude substantial evidence does not support the judgment as to the CLRA claim on this basis, we need not address the parties’ arguments about whether the CLRA contains a scienter requirement necessitating proof the defendant knew a statement was false in order to establish a deceptive business practice based on a misrepresentation. 11 [the UCL] “borrows” violations of other laws and treats them as unl

2026(See Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 ; see ibid. [“[b]y proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, ‘section 17200 6 Because we conclude substantial evidence does not support the judgment as to the CLRA claim on this basis, we need not address the parties’ arguments about whether the CLRA contains a scienter requirement necessitating proof the defendant knew a statement was false in order to establish a deceptive business practice based on a misrepresentation. 11 [the UCL] “borrows” violations of other laws and treats them as unl

2024(See Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1258 , citing Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 835 ; Rubenstein v. The Gap, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 870, 881 ; Collins v. eMachines, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 249, 255 .) Moreover, the plaintiff asserting a CLRA claim must show the omission was likely to deceive a reasonable consumer.

2018The Second District stated: "Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to state a CLRA claim predicated on a material omission, which ' "consist[s] of the suppression of a fact by one who ... gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of that fact." ' ( McAdams , supra , 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 185 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 704 ], italics omitted.)" ( Klein , supra , at p. 1383, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 293 .) We interpret Klein 's statements about omissions of material fact to be necessary to the outcome of reversing the judgment on the pleadings. 19 (Cf. *719 Rubenstein

2018The Second District stated: "Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to state a CLRA claim predicated on a material omission, which ' "consist[s] of the suppression of a fact by one who ... gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of that fact." ' ( McAdams , supra , 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 185 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 704 ], italics omitted.)" ( Klein , supra , at p. 1383, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 293 .) We interpret Klein 's statements about omissions of material fact to be necessary to the outcome of reversing the judgment on the pleadings. 19 (Cf. *719 Rubenstein

2018The Second District stated: "Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to state a CLRA claim predicated on a material omission, which ' "consist[s] of the suppression of a fact by one who ... gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of that fact." ' ( McAdams , supra , 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 185 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 704 ], italics omitted.)" ( Klein , supra , at p. 1383, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 293 .) We interpret Klein 's statements about omissions of material fact to be necessary to the outcome of reversing the judgment on the pleadings. 19 (Cf. *719 Rubenstein

2026(See Collins, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 255 [conduct proscribed by CLRA includes concealment of material fact “because fraud or deceit encompasses the suppression of a fact by one who is bound to disclose it, or the suppression of a fact that is contrary to a representation that was made,” italics added]; Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1258 [“an omission is actionable under the CLRA if the omitted fact is (1) ‘contrary to a [material] representation actually made by the defendant ’ or (2) is ‘a fact the defendant was obliged to disclose,’ ” itali

2026(See Collins, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 255 [conduct proscribed by CLRA includes concealment of material fact “because fraud or deceit encompasses the suppression of a fact by one who is bound to disclose it, or the suppression of a fact that is contrary to a representation that was made,” italics added]; Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1258 [“an omission is actionable under the CLRA if the omitted fact is (1) ‘contrary to a [material] representation actually made by the defendant ’ or (2) is ‘a fact the defendant was obliged to disclose,’ ” itali

2020Standing A person has standing to bring a claim under the Unfair Competition Law, the false advertising law, or the CLRA only if she establishes that (1) she “has suffered” “economic injury” or “damage,” and (2) this injury or damage “was the result of, i.e., caused by,” the unfair business practice, false advertising or the 9 CLRA violation “that is the gravamen of [her] claim.” (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 322, 326 (Kwikset); Veera v. Banana Republic, LLC (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 907, 916 [“the standing requirements of the CLRA are essentially identical to those of the

2018Code, § 1770, subd. (a).) The Ninth Circuit also held that plaintiff had standing to assert his CLRA claim, concluding that "any plaintiff who has standing under the UCL's and FAL's 'lost money or property' requirement will, a fortiori, have suffered 'any damage' for purposes of establishing CLRA standing." ( Hinojos , supra , 718 F.3d at p. 1108 .) Newegg contends that limiting Kwikset in the manner it has proposed would not preclude all forms of consumer suits challenging the use of false or misleading former price information.

2026(See Collins, supra, at p. 255 .) It follows that, under the CLRA, even if a representation is true, it may still be deceptive because “ ‘[a] perfectly true statement couched in such a manner that it is likely to mislead or deceive the consumer, such as by failure to disclose other relevant information, is actionable.’ [Citation.]” (Consumer Advocates v. 9 Echostar Satellite Corp. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1362 ; see also Jones v. Credit Auto Center, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 11 .) The deceptive practice on which Quillen based his CLRA claim were Oganesyan’s statements that the v

2023(See Collins, supra, at p. 255 .) It follows that, under the CLRA, even if a representation is true, it may still be deceptive because “ ‘[a] perfectly true statement couched in such a manner that it is likely to mislead or deceive the consumer, such as by failure to disclose other relevant information, is actionable.’ [Citation.]” (Consumer Advocates v. 9 Echostar Satellite Corp. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1362 ; see also Jones v. Credit Auto Center, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 11 .) The deceptive practice on which Quillen based his CLRA claim were Oganesyan’s statements that the v

2019As to a CLRA claim, a timely and appropriate correction under section 1782, subdivision (b), only bars a claim for damages, not injunctive relief. (§ 1782, subd. (b) ["no action for damages may be maintained under Section 1780" if an appropriate correction offer is made (italics added) ] & subd. (d) ["An action for injunctive relief brought under the specific provisions of Section 1770 may be commenced without compliance with subdivision (a)."]; 15 Meyer, supra , 45 Cal.4th at p. 645 , 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 859 , 200 P.3d 295 ["[S]ection 1782, subdivision (d) contemplates the filing of a CLRA action

2019As to a CLRA claim, a timely and appropriate correction under section 1782, subdivision (b), only bars a claim for damages, not injunctive relief. (§ 1782, subd. (b) ["no action for damages may be maintained under Section 1780" if an appropriate correction offer is made (italics added) ] & subd. (d) ["An action for injunctive relief brought under the specific provisions of Section 1770 may be commenced without compliance with subdivision (a)."]; 15 Meyer, supra , 45 Cal.4th at p. 645 , 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 859 , 200 P.3d 295 ["[S]ection 1782, subdivision (d) contemplates the filing of a CLRA action

2019As the Flores court stated, a correction offer made under the CLRA does not bar a consumer from seeking *281 remedies for violations of other statutes or under the common law based on conduct that violates those laws. ( Flores, supra , 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 850 , 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 12 ; see Loeffler, supra , 58 Cal.4th at p. 1125 , 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 189 , 324 P.3d 50 ["Like the UCL, CLRA remedies are not *615 exclusive, but are 'in addition to any other procedures or remedies for any violation or conduct provided for in any other law.' "].) Although Flores was decided in the context of an appeal of

2019As the Flores court stated, a correction offer made under the CLRA does not bar a consumer from seeking *281 remedies for violations of other statutes or under the common law based on conduct that violates those laws. ( Flores, supra , 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 850 , 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 12 ; see Loeffler, supra , 58 Cal.4th at p. 1125 , 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 189 , 324 P.3d 50 ["Like the UCL, CLRA remedies are not *615 exclusive, but are 'in addition to any other procedures or remedies for any violation or conduct provided for in any other law.' "].) Although Flores was decided in the context of an appeal of

2026(See Collins, supra, at p. 255 .) It follows that, under the CLRA, even if a representation is true, it may still be deceptive because “ ‘[a] perfectly true statement couched in such a manner that it is likely to mislead or deceive the consumer, such as by failure to disclose other relevant information, is actionable.’ [Citation.]” (Consumer Advocates v. 9 Echostar Satellite Corp. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1362 ; see also Jones v. Credit Auto Center, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 11 .) The deceptive practice on which Quillen based his CLRA claim were Oganesyan’s statements that the v

2023(See Collins, supra, at p. 255 .) It follows that, under the CLRA, even if a representation is true, it may still be deceptive because “ ‘[a] perfectly true statement couched in such a manner that it is likely to mislead or deceive the consumer, such as by failure to disclose other relevant information, is actionable.’ [Citation.]” (Consumer Advocates v. 9 Echostar Satellite Corp. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1362 ; see also Jones v. Credit Auto Center, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 11 .) The deceptive practice on which Quillen based his CLRA claim were Oganesyan’s statements that the v

2025Nonetheless, we will assume, as the parties do, that plaintiffs allege a CLRA claim based on the Service Contract. 19 Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 835 .) Plaintiffs have failed to raise a triable issue of material fact that defendant fraudulently omitted the scope of the Service Contract’s coverage.

2025Nonetheless, we will assume, as the parties do, that plaintiffs allege a CLRA claim based on the Service Contract. 19 Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 835 .) Plaintiffs have failed to raise a triable issue of material fact that defendant fraudulently omitted the scope of the Service Contract’s coverage.

2018He does not seek actual damages, but instead seeks restitution." ( Steroid Hormone Product Cases , supra , 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 156 , 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 329 .) The court concluded (1) the plaintiff had stated a claim under the CLRA, (2) he could represent the class, and (3) the trial court erred in denying class certification of the CLRA claim. ( Id . at p. 157, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 329 .) 2.

2018He does not seek actual damages, but instead seeks restitution." ( Steroid Hormone Product Cases , supra , 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 156 , 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 329 .) The court concluded (1) the plaintiff had stated a claim under the CLRA, (2) he could represent the class, and (3) the trial court erred in denying class certification of the CLRA claim. ( Id . at p. 157, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 329 .) 2.

2025(See Rheinhart, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1034- 1035 [burden reversed when the plaintiff asserts Song-Beverly Act claim]; America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1, 10-11 [burden reversed when the plaintiff asserts CLRA claim].) In order to meet its burden, the party seeking to enforce the clause must show either (1) that “the foreign forum provides the same or greater rights than California,” or (2) that “the foreign forum will apply California law.”6 (Verdugo, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 157 .) We review an order enforcing a forum selection clause for abuse of discre

2015(America Online, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 4-7.) The Court of Appeal affirmed because “the CLRA claim pleaded by [the plaintiffs], like the [Franchise Investment Law] claims asserted in Wimsatt, mandate[d] departure from the general rule which normally places the burden of proving unfairness or unreasonableness of the forum selection clause on the party opposed to its enforcement.” (America Online, at p. 11.) The America Online court explained both the Franchise Investment Law and the CLRA share the common purpose of protecting California residents from unfair or deceptive business practice

2022“The conduct that violates [Vehicle Code] section 11711, i.e., fraud or fraudulent representation, falls within the CLRA.” (Pierce v. Western Surety Co. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 83, 91-92 .) Thus, “plaintiffs routinely plead fraud, [unfair competition law], and CLRA claims based on similar allegations.” (Flores v. Southcoast Automotive Liquidators, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 841, 850 ; see Outboard Marine Corp. v. Superior Court (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 30, 35-38 [plaintiff may allege both a common law fraud claim and CLRA claim based upon same facts].) However, simply because an act of actual fraud

2019As to a CLRA claim, a timely and appropriate correction under section 1782, subdivision (b), only bars a claim for damages, not injunctive relief. (§ 1782, subd. (b) ["no action for damages may be maintained under Section 1780" if an appropriate correction offer is made (italics added) ] & subd. (d) ["An action for injunctive relief brought under the specific provisions of Section 1770 may be commenced without compliance with subdivision (a)."]; 15 Meyer, supra , 45 Cal.4th at p. 645 , 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 859 , 200 P.3d 295 ["[S]ection 1782, subdivision (d) contemplates the filing of a CLRA action

2011(LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 539 ]; see also Falk v. General Motors Corp. (N.D.Cal. 2007) 496 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1094-1095 (Falk).) Here, the complaint alleges a CLRA violation under the failure to disclose factors Nos. (2) and (3) of LiMandri .

2011(LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 539 ]; see also Falk v. General Motors Corp. (N.D.Cal. 2007) 496 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1094-1095 (Falk).) Here, the complaint alleges a CLRA violation under the failure to disclose factors Nos. (2) and (3) of LiMandri .

2025CLRA We next consider whether the trial court erred in granting defendant judgment on plaintiffs’ CLRA claim. “‘The CLRA makes unlawful, in . . . section 1770, subdivision (a) . . . , various “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer.”’ (Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 634, 639 .) . . . [¶] The CLRA sets forth 27 proscribed acts or practices. (. . . § 1770, subd. (a)(1)–(27).)” (Veera v. Banana Republic, LLC (2016

2020Standing A person has standing to bring a claim under the Unfair Competition Law, the false advertising law, or the CLRA only if she establishes that (1) she “has suffered” “economic injury” or “damage,” and (2) this injury or damage “was the result of, i.e., caused by,” the unfair business practice, false advertising or the 9 CLRA violation “that is the gravamen of [her] claim.” (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 322, 326 (Kwikset); Veera v. Banana Republic, LLC (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 907, 916 [“the standing requirements of the CLRA are essentially identical to those of the

2019Ass'n (9th Cir. 2013) 718 F.3d 1052 , 1061 ( Kilgore ).) In Kilgore , for example, students of a defunct flight school who had obtained student loans from KeyBank brought a putative class action under the UCL to enjoin KeyBank from reporting loan defaults to credit agencies and from enforcing notes against them. ( Id. at p. 1056.) The Ninth Circuit found their claims were arbitrable because their claims did "not fall within [the] purview" of the Broughton - Cruz rule. ( Id. at p. 1060.) The *276 court explained Broughton - Cruz only bars arbitration when the benefits of the requested injunctiv

2019Ass'n (9th Cir. 2013) 718 F.3d 1052 , 1061 ( Kilgore ).) In Kilgore , for example, students of a defunct flight school who had obtained student loans from KeyBank brought a putative class action under the UCL to enjoin KeyBank from reporting loan defaults to credit agencies and from enforcing notes against them. ( Id. at p. 1056.) The Ninth Circuit found their claims were arbitrable because their claims did "not fall within [the] purview" of the Broughton - Cruz rule. ( Id. at p. 1060.) The *276 court explained Broughton - Cruz only bars arbitration when the benefits of the requested injunctiv