11 New York opinions name it 1 courts 1980–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Leavitt Enter., Inc. v. Two Fulton Sq., LLCgreen1 sentence2025"The essential elements of a cause of action sounding in trespass are the intentional [*3]entry onto the land of another without justification or permission" ( Leavitt Enter., Inc. v Two Fulton Sq., LLC , 181 AD3d 662, 663-664 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Chaikin v Karipas , 162 AD3d 842 , 843). | 1 | 1 |
Wo Yee Hing Realty Corp. v. Sterngreen1 sentence2016Unlike issues implicating “the byzantine world of immigration law” (see Suppiah v Kalish, 76 AD3d 829 , 833 [1st Dept 2010], appeal withdrawn 16 NY3d 796 [2011]), the issue of causation in this case rests on the “discrete factual question” of how Gourary, a lay person, would have reacted to certain information (see Wo Yee Hing Realty Corp. v Stern, 99 AD3d 58, 63 [1st Dept 2012]). | 1 | 1 |
Fielding v. Kupfermangreen1 sentence2016Moreover, defendants established the absence of proximately caused damages; since “there is no way to know whether the advice not given . . . ‘would have altered the [outcome],’ ” the claim of damages is speculative (id. at 436; see also Fielding v Kupferman, 104 AD3d 580 [1st Dept 2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 859 [2013]; Global Bus. | 1 | 1 |
AmBase Corp. v. Davis Polk & Wardwellgreen1 sentence2016The Green defendants established prima facie, through deposition testimony and two experts’ affidavits, that the sale was consistent with Gourary’s objectives, that Green did not represent Macomber before the deal was struck, and that the evidence did not support an inference that Green’s representation violated the ethics rules or was inconsistent with the standard of professional conduct (see AmBase Corp. v Davis Polk & Wardwell, 8 NY3d 428, 434 [2007]). | 1 | 1 |
Hopper v. McCollumgreen1 sentence2015Initially, since Green’s motion, which recited CPLR 3211 (a) (3) as its basis, was made after issue was joined, and since the parties deliberately charted a summary judgment course, the Supreme Court properly treated Green’s motion as one for summary judgment dismissing the complaint for lack of standing (see Meredith v Siben & Siben, LLP, 130 AD3d 791 [2015]; *707 Hopper v McCollum, 65 AD3d 669, 670 [2009]; Tendler v Bais Knesses of New Hempstead, Inc., 52 AD3d 500, 502 [2008]). | 1 | 1 |
Tendler v. Bais Knesses of New Hempstead, Inc.green1 sentence2015Initially, since Green’s motion, which recited CPLR 3211 (a) (3) as its basis, was made after issue was joined, and since the parties deliberately charted a summary judgment course, the Supreme Court properly treated Green’s motion as one for summary judgment dismissing the complaint for lack of standing (see Meredith v Siben & Siben, LLP, 130 AD3d 791 [2015]; *707 Hopper v McCollum, 65 AD3d 669, 670 [2009]; Tendler v Bais Knesses of New Hempstead, Inc., 52 AD3d 500, 502 [2008]). | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of Katie Kickertz v. New York Universitygreen1 sentence2015A court need not permit a respondent to file an answer “if the Tacts are so fully presented in the papers of the respective parties that it is clear that no dispute as to the facts exists and no prejudice will result from the failure to require an answer’ ” (Matter of Kickertz v New York Univ., 25 NY3d 942, 944 [2015] [emphasis omitted], quoting Matter of Nassau BOCES Cent. | 1 | 1 |
Pessin v. Persaudgreen2 sentences2008We find the Green analysis of this issue (which followed the analysis of the partially dissenting Justice at this Court in Hampton [92 AD2d at 492-494]) persuasive (see also People v Harrison, 141 AD2d 842, 842-843 [1988], lv denied 72 NY2d 1046 [1988] [following Green in holding that “one may aid in the commission of a crime without having the mental culpability necessary to be guilty of that crime as an accomplice”]; People v Ward, 107 AD2d 892, 894 [1985] [because the second-degree robbery statute “does not require that the person assisting share the perpetrator’s intent,” the Court conclud 2008We find the Green analysis of this issue (which followed the analysis of the partially dissenting Justice at this Court in Hampton [92 AD2d at 492-494]) persuasive (see also People v Harrison, 141 AD2d 842, 842-843 [1988], lv denied 72 NY2d 1046 [1988] [following Green in holding that “one may aid in the commission of a crime without having the mental culpability necessary to be guilty of that crime as an accomplice”]; People v Ward, 107 AD2d 892, 894 [1985] [because the second-degree robbery statute “does not require that the person assisting share the perpetrator’s intent,” the Court conclud | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wardgreen2 sentences2008We find the Green analysis of this issue (which followed the analysis of the partially dissenting Justice at this Court in Hampton [92 AD2d at 492-494]) persuasive (see also People v Harrison, 141 AD2d 842, 842-843 [1988], lv denied 72 NY2d 1046 [1988] [following Green in holding that “one may aid in the commission of a crime without having the mental culpability necessary to be guilty of that crime as an accomplice”]; People v Ward, 107 AD2d 892, 894 [1985] [because the second-degree robbery statute “does not require that the person assisting share the perpetrator’s intent,” the Court conclud 2008We find the Green analysis of this issue (which followed the analysis of the partially dissenting Justice at this Court in Hampton [92 AD2d at 492-494]) persuasive (see also People v Harrison, 141 AD2d 842, 842-843 [1988], lv denied 72 NY2d 1046 [1988] [following Green in holding that “one may aid in the commission of a crime without having the mental culpability necessary to be guilty of that crime as an accomplice”]; People v Ward, 107 AD2d 892, 894 [1985] [because the second-degree robbery statute “does not require that the person assisting share the perpetrator’s intent,” the Court conclud | 1 | 1 |
People v. Harrisongreen2 sentences2008We find the Green analysis of this issue (which followed the analysis of the partially dissenting Justice at this Court in Hampton [92 AD2d at 492-494]) persuasive (see also People v Harrison, 141 AD2d 842, 842-843 [1988], lv denied 72 NY2d 1046 [1988] [following Green in holding that “one may aid in the commission of a crime without having the mental culpability necessary to be guilty of that crime as an accomplice”]; People v Ward, 107 AD2d 892, 894 [1985] [because the second-degree robbery statute “does not require that the person assisting share the perpetrator’s intent,” the Court conclud 2008We find the Green analysis of this issue (which followed the analysis of the partially dissenting Justice at this Court in Hampton [92 AD2d at 492-494]) persuasive (see also People v Harrison, 141 AD2d 842, 842-843 [1988], lv denied 72 NY2d 1046 [1988] [following Green in holding that “one may aid in the commission of a crime without having the mental culpability necessary to be guilty of that crime as an accomplice”]; People v Ward, 107 AD2d 892, 894 [1985] [because the second-degree robbery statute “does not require that the person assisting share the perpetrator’s intent,” the Court conclud | 1 | 1 |
James v. Jamie Towers Housing Co.green1 sentence2008Co., 294 AD2d 268, 272 [2002], affd on other grounds 99 NY2d 639 [2003]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blech v. West Park Presbyterian Church
green
2 sentences2013Church, 97 AD3d 443 [1st Dept 2012]). 2013Church, 97 AD3d 443 [1st Dept 2012]). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Stewart v. Maitland
green
2 sentences2013In light of the differing versions as to how the accident occurred and the possible contributions by the various defendants, summary disposition was not warranted {see Lewis v Konan, 39 AD3d 319 [1st Dept 2007]). 2013In light of the differing versions as to how the accident occurred and the possible contributions by the various defendants, summary disposition was not warranted {see Lewis v Konan, 39 AD3d 319 [1st Dept 2007]). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Global Bussiness Institute v. Rivkin Radler LLP
green
1 sentence2016Inst. v Rivkin Radler LLP, 101 AD3d 651 , 652 [1st Dept 2012]). *581 Contrary to plaintiffs contention, the Green defendants were not required to submit an expert opinion on the issue of causation. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
San Marco v. Village/Town of Mount Kisco
green
1 sentence2016Unlike issues implicating “the byzantine world of immigration law” (see Suppiah v Kalish, 76 AD3d 829 , 833 [1st Dept 2010], appeal withdrawn 16 NY3d 796 [2011]), the issue of causation in this case rests on the “discrete factual question” of how Gourary, a lay person, would have reacted to certain information (see Wo Yee Hing Realty Corp. v Stern, 99 AD3d 58, 63 [1st Dept 2012]). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Meredith v. Siben & Siben, LLP
green
1 sentence2015Initially, since Green’s motion, which recited CPLR 3211 (a) (3) as its basis, was made after issue was joined, and since the parties deliberately charted a summary judgment course, the Supreme Court properly treated Green’s motion as one for summary judgment dismissing the complaint for lack of standing (see Meredith v Siben & Siben, LLP, 130 AD3d 791 [2015]; *707 Hopper v McCollum, 65 AD3d 669, 670 [2009]; Tendler v Bais Knesses of New Hempstead, Inc., 52 AD3d 500, 502 [2008]). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
James v. Jamie Towers Housing Co.
green
1 sentence2008Co., 294 AD2d 268, 272 [2002], affd on other grounds 99 NY2d 639 [2003]). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Galarza v. Pacific Steel Boiler Corp.
neutral
1 sentence1996In repairing the car puller, Green owed a duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence (see, Wagner v Kenific, 161 AD2d 1092, 1093 ; Galarza v Pacific Steel Boiler Corp., 147 AD2d 527, 529 ; PJI 2:127 [1996 Supp]). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Wagner v. Kenific
green
1 sentence1996In repairing the car puller, Green owed a duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence (see, Wagner v Kenific, 161 AD2d 1092, 1093 ; Galarza v Pacific Steel Boiler Corp., 147 AD2d 527, 529 ; PJI 2:127 [1996 Supp]). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Barber
neutral
2 sentences1983Although this practice of taking judicial notice of the conviction is suspect (see CPL 60.40), we conclude that reversal is required because the jury was never instructed that Green’s plea did not constitute and could not be considered as proof of defendant’s guilt, and defendant could have been prejudiced by this omission (see People v Colascione, 22 NY2d 65, 73 ; People v Barber, 81 AD2d 943, 943-944 ). 1983Although this practice of taking judicial notice of the conviction is suspect (see CPL 60.40), we conclude that reversal is required because the jury was never instructed that Green’s plea did not constitute and could not be considered as proof of defendant’s guilt, and defendant could have been prejudiced by this omission (see People v Colascione, 22 NY2d 65, 73 ; People v Barber, 81 AD2d 943, 943-944 ). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Colascione
green
2 sentences1983Although this practice of taking judicial notice of the conviction is suspect (see CPL 60.40), we conclude that reversal is required because the jury was never instructed that Green’s plea did not constitute and could not be considered as proof of defendant’s guilt, and defendant could have been prejudiced by this omission (see People v Colascione, 22 NY2d 65, 73 ; People v Barber, 81 AD2d 943, 943-944 ). 1983Although this practice of taking judicial notice of the conviction is suspect (see CPL 60.40), we conclude that reversal is required because the jury was never instructed that Green’s plea did not constitute and could not be considered as proof of defendant’s guilt, and defendant could have been prejudiced by this omission (see People v Colascione, 22 NY2d 65, 73 ; People v Barber, 81 AD2d 943, 943-944 ). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
McCracken v. . Flanagan
green
1 sentence1980Special Term granted Green’s motion, relying on the long-established principle of McCracken v Flanagan ( 141 NY 174 ), that a Sheriffs deed is a nullity where the underlying judgment is voided. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.