Estrada rule in California

2026An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered.”’” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139 , 154-155 (Knoller); accord, Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 110 .) Thus, a “‘decision is … authority … only “for the points actually involved and actually decided”’” ( Knoller, supra, at p. 155 ), and Lara is necessarily limited to the determination that Proposition 57 applies retroactively under Estrada and to the approval of a remedy in that situation (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 309-310 & 313).14 Notably, Lara could not have spoken to the issues in 14 “The Estrada rule only answers the

2026An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered.”’” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139 , 154-155 (Knoller); accord, Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 110 .) Thus, a “‘decision is … authority … only “for the points actually involved and actually decided”’” ( Knoller, supra, at p. 155 ), and Lara is necessarily limited to the determination that Proposition 57 applies retroactively under Estrada and to the approval of a remedy in that situation (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 309-310 & 313).14 Notably, Lara could not have spoken to the issues in 14 “The Estrada rule only answers the

2026No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime.” (Id. at p. 511.) An ameliorative statute is understood to “apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745 .) But an inflexible application of the Estrada presumption under the circumstances here comes at the price of violating overriding principles of justice.

2026No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime.” (Id. at p. 511.) An ameliorative statute is understood to “apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745 .) But an inflexible application of the Estrada presumption under the circumstances here comes at the price of violating overriding principles of justice.

2025(Faial, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 214.) But the court hastened to emphasize “the breadth of the ‘inference’ on which ‘[t]he Estrada rule rests’: ‘in the absence of contrary indications, a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and sentences that are not,’ ” and it explained that, “[a]bsent any savings clause, ‘the statute must demonstrate contrary indications of legislative intent “ ‘with sufficient clarity’ ” in order to rebut the Estrada rule.’ ” (Ibid.,

2025(Faial, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 214.) But the court hastened to emphasize “the breadth of the ‘inference’ on which ‘[t]he Estrada rule rests’: ‘in the absence of contrary indications, a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and sentences that are not,’ ” and it explained that, “[a]bsent any savings clause, ‘the statute must demonstrate contrary indications of legislative intent “ ‘with sufficient clarity’ ” in order to rebut the Estrada rule.’ ” (Ibid.,

2026(Mitchell, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 735.) 4 “Because the Estrada rule reflects a presumption about legislative intent, rather than a constitutional command, the Legislature . . . may choose to modify, limit, or entirely forbid the retroactive application of ameliorative criminal-law amendments if it so chooses.” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 656 .) The question in this appeal is whether the Legislature chose to do so in the context of a resentencing under section 1172.75.

2026(Mitchell, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 735.) 4 “Because the Estrada rule reflects a presumption about legislative intent, rather than a constitutional command, the Legislature . . . may choose to modify, limit, or entirely forbid the retroactive application of ameliorative criminal-law amendments if it so chooses.” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 656 .) The question in this appeal is whether the Legislature chose to do so in the context of a resentencing under section 1172.75.

2022(Id. at pp. 744-746; People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 796 .) The Estrada rule applies to ameliorative statutes “governing penalty enhancements.” ( Nasalga, supra, at p. 792 .) In Estrada, the Supreme Court explained that for purposes of retroactivity “[t]he key date is the date of final judgment.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744 ; People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 676 .) An ameliorative statute applies retroactively to a case if it “becomes effective prior to the date the judgment of conviction becomes final.” (Estrada, at p. 744.) For purposes of determining retroactivity

2022(Id. at pp. 744-746; People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 796 .) The Estrada rule applies to ameliorative statutes “governing penalty enhancements.” ( Nasalga, supra, at p. 792 .) In Estrada, the Supreme Court explained that for purposes of retroactivity “[t]he key date is the date of final judgment.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744 ; People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 676 .) An ameliorative statute applies retroactively to a case if it “becomes effective prior to the date the judgment of conviction becomes final.” (Estrada, at p. 744.) For purposes of determining retroactivity

2026The Estrada presumption of retroactivity “stand[s] for the proposition that (i) in the absence of a contrary indication of legislative intent, (ii) legislation that ameliorates punishment (iii) applies to all cases that are not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 675 .) Because Senate Bill 567 is ameliorative and took effect when Bustillos’s case was not final, the Estrada presumption applies.

2026The Estrada presumption of retroactivity “stand[s] for the proposition that (i) in the absence of a contrary indication of legislative intent, (ii) legislation that ameliorates punishment (iii) applies to all cases that are not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 675 .) Because Senate Bill 567 is ameliorative and took effect when Bustillos’s case was not final, the Estrada presumption applies.

2026We need not assess whether different factual scenarios not presented here might call for different results. 28 PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 185 Cal.App.3d 831 , 834; accord, Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 893 .) Our opinion in this matter simply permits some relief where there might otherwise be no relief and puts petitioner in the position closest to that which he would have been in had he timely pursued his Estrada claim on direct appeal (see ante, at pp. 23-24).

2026We need not assess whether different factual scenarios not presented here might call for different results. 28 PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 185 Cal.App.3d 831 , 834; accord, Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 893 .) Our opinion in this matter simply permits some relief where there might otherwise be no relief and puts petitioner in the position closest to that which he would have been in had he timely pursued his Estrada claim on direct appeal (see ante, at pp. 23-24).

2024The same logic does not inform our understanding of a law that rewards good behavior in prison.” (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 325 .) We rejected the argument that Estrada should be understood to apply more broadly to any statute that reduces punishment in any manner, explaining that this contention “would expand the Estrada rule’s scope of operation in precisely the manner we forbade” in our prior decisions, and “does not in any event represent a logical extension of Estrada’s reasoning.” (Brown, at p. 325.) Consistent with our reasoning in Brown, both our case law and decisions by the Cour

2024The same logic does not inform our understanding of a law that rewards good behavior in prison.” (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 325 .) We rejected the argument that Estrada should be understood to apply more broadly to any statute that reduces punishment in any manner, explaining that this contention “would expand the Estrada rule’s scope of operation in precisely the manner we forbade” in our prior decisions, and “does not in any event represent a logical extension of Estrada’s reasoning.” (Brown, at p. 325.) Consistent with our reasoning in Brown, both our case law and decisions by the Cour

2025Rossi’s holding, we explained, was based on the presumption, derived from common law, that “the Legislature, by removing the proscription from specified conduct, intended to condone past acts.” (Collins, at p. 212, italics added.) Thus, “an amendment eliminating criminal sanctions is a sufficient declaration of the Legislature’s intent to bar all punishment for the conduct so decriminalized.” (Id. at p. 213.) We concluded that because the defendant’s conviction was not final and “the act that he admitted, and upon which his guilty plea and conviction were based, was no longer punishable” under

2025Rossi’s holding, we explained, was based on the presumption, derived from common law, that “the Legislature, by removing the proscription from specified conduct, intended to condone past acts.” (Collins, at p. 212, italics added.) Thus, “an amendment eliminating criminal sanctions is a sufficient declaration of the Legislature’s intent to bar all punishment for the conduct so decriminalized.” (Id. at p. 213.) We concluded that because the defendant’s conviction was not final and “the act that he admitted, and upon which his guilty plea and conviction were based, was no longer punishable” under

2023In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 , 744–745 [absent evidence of contrary legislative intent, ameliorative criminal statutes apply to all cases not final when the statute takes effect]; see also People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 664 , 682 [“For purposes of the Estrada rule, a judgment is not final so long as courts may provide a remedy on direct review.”].) Count 1 (premeditated attempted murder), count 2 (shooting at an occupied vehicle), and count 3 (assault with a firearm) arose from the same act of shooting at Thomas in his car.

2023In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 , 744–745 [absent evidence of contrary legislative intent, ameliorative criminal statutes apply to all cases not final when the statute takes effect]; see also People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 664 , 682 [“For purposes of the Estrada rule, a judgment is not final so long as courts may provide a remedy on direct review.”].) Count 1 (premeditated attempted murder), count 2 (shooting at an occupied vehicle), and count 3 (assault with a firearm) arose from the same act of shooting at Thomas in his car.

2025(People v. Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 700.) However, his arguments critically overlook the breadth of the “inference” on which “[t]he Estrada rule rests”: “in the absence of contrary indications, a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and sentences that are not.” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 657 ; see, e.g., People v. Braden 17 PEOPLE v. FAIAL Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791 , 801-802; People v. Frahs (2020) 9

2023(See, e.g., People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 323 [discussing rule of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 ]; see also Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 699 [under Estrada rule, Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) applies retroactively to nonfinal appeal of a defendant who entered plea agreement for a specified term].) The question remains whether defendant is entitled to a remand to ask the court to reduce his plea bargain.

2023(Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 160 .) “We have not had occasion to delineate the parameters of ‘the Legislature’s power to intervene in judicial decisionmaking.’ [Citation.] But we have indicated that any restrictions on that power would attach at ‘the conclusion of a criminal proceeding as a whole’ — i.e., when ‘“the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy”’ has issued. [Citation.]” ( Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 160-161.) Thus, “[a] case is final when ‘the criminal proceeding as a whole’ has ended [citation] and ‘the courts can no longer p

2023(Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 160 .) “We have not had occasion to delineate the parameters of ‘the Legislature’s power to intervene in judicial decisionmaking.’ [Citation.] But we have indicated that any restrictions on that power would attach at ‘the conclusion of a criminal proceeding as a whole’ — i.e., when ‘“the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy”’ has issued. [Citation.]” ( Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 160-161.) Thus, “[a] case is final when ‘the criminal proceeding as a whole’ has ended [citation] and ‘the courts can no longer p

2024(E.g., Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 286, 289, 301; Francis, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 78 [rejecting argument that legislative intent applicable to chaptered laws “is ‘presumptively the same’ ”; to the contrary, “the Legislature manifestly could have different intents with respect to different sections contained in one chapter”]; Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 573 (dis. opn. of Elia, J.) [“Many legislative bills amend numerous (sometimes hundreds of) statutes, and whether a specific amendatory statute is subject to the Estrada rule depends on the nature of the amendment, not the mere fact t

2024(E.g., Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 286, 289, 301; Francis, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 78 [rejecting argument that legislative intent applicable to chaptered laws “is ‘presumptively the same’ ”; to the contrary, “the Legislature manifestly could have different intents with respect to different sections contained in one chapter”]; Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 573 (dis. opn. of Elia, J.) [“Many legislative bills amend numerous (sometimes hundreds of) statutes, and whether a specific amendatory statute is subject to the Estrada rule depends on the nature of the amendment, not the mere fact t

2022(People v. Ramirez (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48 , 65; People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192 , 207; People v. Burgos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 550 , 569– 575 (Burgos) (dis. opn. of Elia, J.); accord, People v. Cervantes (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 927 , 940; People v. Hayes (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1260, 1274 ; but see Burgos, supra, at pp. 568-569 (maj. opn. of Greenwood, P. J.).) Beyond Estrada, we discern nothing in A.B. 333’s legislative history representing an express declaration of retroactivity, or “‘a clear and compelling implication’” that section 1109 should apply retroactively to cases that are not fi

2022(People v. Ramirez (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48 , 65; People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192 , 207; People v. Burgos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 550 , 569– 575 (Burgos) (dis. opn. of Elia, J.); accord, People v. Cervantes (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 927 , 940; People v. Hayes (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1260, 1274 ; but see Burgos, supra, at pp. 568-569 (maj. opn. of Greenwood, P. J.).) Beyond Estrada, we discern nothing in A.B. 333’s legislative history representing an express declaration of retroactivity, or “‘a clear and compelling implication’” that section 1109 should apply retroactively to cases that are not fi

2023(E.g., People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 94-95 [newly enacted affirmative defense to transporting marijuana applies retroactively]; Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 301 [statute specifying that certain death-penalty qualifying special circumstances must be intentional applies retroactively]; In re Kirk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 761, 762-763 [amendment increasing dollar amount concerning insufficient funds checks applies retroactively].) “Significantly, we have also applied the Estrada rule to statutes that merely made a reduced punishment possible. . . .

2023(E.g., People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 94-95 [newly enacted affirmative defense to transporting marijuana applies retroactively]; Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 301 [statute specifying that certain death-penalty qualifying special circumstances must be intentional applies retroactively]; In re Kirk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 761, 762-763 [amendment increasing dollar amount concerning insufficient funds checks applies retroactively].) “Significantly, we have also applied the Estrada rule to statutes that merely made a reduced punishment possible. . . .

2024(E.g., Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 286, 289, 301; Francis, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 78 [rejecting argument that legislative intent applicable to chaptered laws “is ‘presumptively the same’ ”; to the contrary, “the Legislature manifestly could have different intents with respect to different sections contained in one chapter”]; Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 573 (dis. opn. of Elia, J.) [“Many legislative bills amend numerous (sometimes hundreds of) statutes, and whether a specific amendatory statute is subject to the Estrada rule depends on the nature of the amendment, not the mere fact t

2024(E.g., Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 286, 289, 301; Francis, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 78 [rejecting argument that legislative intent applicable to chaptered laws “is ‘presumptively the same’ ”; to the contrary, “the Legislature manifestly could have different intents with respect to different sections contained in one chapter”]; Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 573 (dis. opn. of Elia, J.) [“Many legislative bills amend numerous (sometimes hundreds of) statutes, and whether a specific amendatory statute is subject to the Estrada rule depends on the nature of the amendment, not the mere fact t

2025Rossi’s holding, we explained, was based on the presumption, derived from common law, that “the Legislature, by removing the proscription from specified conduct, intended to condone past acts.” (Collins, at p. 212, italics added.) Thus, “an amendment eliminating criminal sanctions is a sufficient declaration of the Legislature’s intent to bar all punishment for the conduct so decriminalized.” (Id. at p. 213.) We concluded that because the defendant’s conviction was not final and “the act that he admitted, and upon which his guilty plea and conviction were based, was no longer punishable” under

2025(People v. Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 700.) However, his arguments critically overlook the breadth of the “inference” on which “[t]he Estrada rule rests”: “in the absence of contrary indications, a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and sentences that are not.” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 657 ; see, e.g., People v. Braden 17 PEOPLE v. FAIAL Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791 , 801-802; People v. Frahs (2020) 9

2021(Stewart, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1072–1073, review granted; Sims, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 959–961; Quinn, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 883; accord, Lord, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 245.) Sims explained, “[W]e do not believe the label affixed to probation—i.e., whether it is labeled punishment, rehabilitation, or some combination—is necessarily determinative of whether the Estrada presumption of retroactivity applies.” (Sims, supra, at p. 959.) “[P]robation—though often deemed preferable to imprisonment from the perspective of a defendant—can be invasive, time- consuming, and restric

2021(Stewart, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1072–1073, review granted; Sims, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 959–961; Quinn, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 883; accord, Lord, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 245.) Sims explained, “[W]e do not believe the label affixed to probation—i.e., whether it is labeled punishment, rehabilitation, or some combination—is necessarily determinative of whether the Estrada presumption of retroactivity applies.” (Sims, supra, at p. 959.) “[P]robation—though often deemed preferable to imprisonment from the perspective of a defendant—can be invasive, time- consuming, and restric

2022Cal.App.5th at p. 1019 (dis. opn. of Raye, P.J.); Stewart, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1078-1079, review granted.) As the California Supreme Court has explained, “[b]ecause the Estrada rule reflects a presumption about legislative intent, rather than a constitutional command, the Legislature (or … the electorate) may choose to modify, limit, or entirely forbid the retroactive application of ameliorative criminal law amendments if it so chooses.” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 656 .) “Our cases do not ‘dictate to legislative drafters the forms in which laws must be written’ to expres

2022Cal.App.5th at p. 1019 (dis. opn. of Raye, P.J.); Stewart, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1078-1079, review granted.) As the California Supreme Court has explained, “[b]ecause the Estrada rule reflects a presumption about legislative intent, rather than a constitutional command, the Legislature (or … the electorate) may choose to modify, limit, or entirely forbid the retroactive application of ameliorative criminal law amendments if it so chooses.” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 656 .) “Our cases do not ‘dictate to legislative drafters the forms in which laws must be written’ to expres

2025(Id. at p. 745.) While Assembly Bill 333 does not directly reduce punishment for a gang enhancement, the Estrada rule also applies where “an enhancement has been amended to redefine to an appellant’s benefit the conduct subject to the enhancement” (People v. Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327 , 344, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743 , 764, fn. 8) or modifies the elements of a penalty enhancement (People v. Roberts (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1466 ).

2025(Id. at p. 745.) While Assembly Bill 333 does not directly reduce punishment for a gang enhancement, the Estrada rule also applies where “an enhancement has been amended to redefine to an appellant’s benefit the conduct subject to the enhancement” (People v. Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327 , 344, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743 , 764, fn. 8) or modifies the elements of a penalty enhancement (People v. Roberts (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1466 ).

2021In accordance with the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744 , “‘“[a]n amendatory statute lessening punishment is presumed to apply in all cases not yet reduced to final judgment as of the amendatory statute’s effective date” [citation], unless the enacting body “clearly signals its intent to make the amendment prospective, by the inclusion of either an express saving clause or its equivalent” [citations].’” (People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1134 , quoting People v. DeHoyos (2018) 4 Cal.5th 594, 600 ; accord, People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 6

2021In accordance with the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744 , “‘“[a]n amendatory statute lessening punishment is presumed to apply in all cases not yet reduced to final judgment as of the amendatory statute’s effective date” [citation], unless the enacting body “clearly signals its intent to make the amendment prospective, by the inclusion of either an express saving clause or its equivalent” [citations].’” (People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1134 , quoting People v. DeHoyos (2018) 4 Cal.5th 594, 600 ; accord, People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 6

2025(See In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 748 [“where the amendatory statute mitigates punishment and there is no saving clause, the rule is that the amendment will operate 2 retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed”]; see also People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 305 [defendant was entitled to the benefits of amendments to a statute governing a restitution fine that became effective while the defendant’s case was on appeal]; In re Hunter W. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 358 , 367 [ameliorative statutory amendments apply to non-final juvenile cases]; In re N.D. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th

2025(Esquivel, at p. 680; see People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264 , 305-306.) “Through all these steps, a suspended execution sentence is not final, and the Estrada presumption remains available.” (Esquivel, at p. 680.) As pertinent here, we stated in Esquivel that “[a] case in which a defendant is convicted and placed on probation with execution of sentence suspended is not final while direct review of the order imposing sentence remains ongoing.” (Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 680.) As in Esquivel, the relevant ameliorative legislation in this case, Assembly Bill 1950, became operative af

2022Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c) applied retroactively]; People v. Figueroa, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at pp. 69-71 [amendment adding requirements for imposition of drug trafficking enhancement applied retroactively].) To rebut Estrada’s inference of retroactivity, the Legislature must clearly signal “its intent to make the amendment prospective, by the inclusion of either an express saving[s] clause or its equivalent.” ( Nasalga, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. at p. 793.) Neither the text nor the legislative history of amended section 186.22 clearly indicate that the Legislature intended that the Estrada rule

2022Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c) applied retroactively]; People v. Figueroa, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at pp. 69-71 [amendment adding requirements for imposition of drug trafficking enhancement applied retroactively].) To rebut Estrada’s inference of retroactivity, the Legislature must clearly signal “its intent to make the amendment prospective, by the inclusion of either an express saving[s] clause or its equivalent.” ( Nasalga, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. at p. 793.) Neither the text nor the legislative history of amended section 186.22 clearly indicate that the Legislature intended that the Estrada rule

2023(See People v. Ramos, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 595, review granted [finding § 352.2 different in kind from previous statutes found retroactive under the Estrada rule]; People v. Cervantes (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 927 , 937, 940-941 [rule requiring the recording of custodial interrogations of those suspected of committing murder—which would at times benefit defendants and at other times benefit prosecutors—did not apply retroactively].) Our Supreme Court’s precedents demonstrate as much.

2023(See People v. Ramos, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 595, review granted [finding § 352.2 different in kind from previous statutes found retroactive under the Estrada rule]; People v. Cervantes (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 927 , 937, 940-941 [rule requiring the recording of custodial interrogations of those suspected of committing murder—which would at times benefit defendants and at other times benefit prosecutors—did not apply retroactively].) Our Supreme Court’s precedents demonstrate as much.

2023Estrada represents ‘an important, contextually specific qualification to the ordinary presumption that statutes operate prospectively: When the Legislature has amended a statute to reduce the punishment for a particular criminal offense, we will assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that the Legislature intended the amended statute to apply to all defendants whose judgments are not yet final on the statute’s operative date.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hajek and Vo 34 (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1195-1196 (Hajek), overruled on another ground in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192 .) The Estrada

2023Estrada represents ‘an important, contextually specific qualification to the ordinary presumption that statutes operate prospectively: When the Legislature has amended a statute to reduce the punishment for a particular criminal offense, we will assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that the Legislature intended the amended statute to apply to all defendants whose judgments are not yet final on the statute’s operative date.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hajek and Vo 34 (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1195-1196 (Hajek), overruled on another ground in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192 .) The Estrada

2023(People v. Floyd (2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 189 [“Defendant’s 18. equal protection argument presumes that the Estrada rule is constitutionally compelled.

2023(People v. Floyd (2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 189 [“Defendant’s 18. equal protection argument presumes that the Estrada rule is constitutionally compelled.

2025(Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1207.) The Court reasoned that the changes to section 186.22 “have the effect of ‘increas[ing] the threshold for conviction of the section 186.22 offense and the imposition of the enhancement,’ with obvious benefit to defendants like Tran.” (Tran, at p. 1207.) In Padilla, the Supreme Court further held that the Estrada rule applies when a defendant’s judgment is vacated during habeas corpus proceedings. ( Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th. at pp. 158-159.) “A case is final when ‘the criminal proceeding as a whole’ has ended [citation] and ‘the courts can no longer provi

2025(Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1207.) The Court reasoned that the changes to section 186.22 “have the effect of ‘increas[ing] the threshold for conviction of the section 186.22 offense and the imposition of the enhancement,’ with obvious benefit to defendants like Tran.” (Tran, at p. 1207.) In Padilla, the Supreme Court further held that the Estrada rule applies when a defendant’s judgment is vacated during habeas corpus proceedings. ( Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th. at pp. 158-159.) “A case is final when ‘the criminal proceeding as a whole’ has ended [citation] and ‘the courts can no longer provi

2022(In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744-745 [absent evidence of a contrary legislative intent, “[i]t is an inevitable inference” that the Legislature intends ameliorative criminal statutes to apply to all cases not final when the statutes become effective]; People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 306 [For purposes of determining the retroactive application of ameliorative amendments to a criminal statute, an appeal is not final until the time has passed for petitioning the United Stated Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.]; People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 973 [same]; People v.

2022(In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744-745 [absent evidence of a contrary legislative intent, “[i]t is an inevitable inference” that the Legislature intends ameliorative criminal statutes to apply to all cases not final when the statutes become effective]; People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 306 [For purposes of determining the retroactive application of ameliorative amendments to a criminal statute, an appeal is not final until the time has passed for petitioning the United Stated Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.]; People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 973 [same]; People v.