Estrada rule in California

2026An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered.”’” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139 , 154–155 (Knoller); accord, Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 110 .) Thus, a “‘decision is … authority … only “for the points actually involved and actually decided”’” ( Knoller, supra, at p. 155 ), and Lara is necessarily limited to the determination that Proposition 57 applies retroactively under Estrada and to the approval of a remedy in that situation (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 309–310 & 313).14 Notably, Lara could not have spoken to the issues in 14 “The Estrada rule only answers the

2026An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered.”’” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139 , 154–155 (Knoller); accord, Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 110 .) Thus, a “‘decision is … authority … only “for the points actually involved and actually decided”’” ( Knoller, supra, at p. 155 ), and Lara is necessarily limited to the determination that Proposition 57 applies retroactively under Estrada and to the approval of a remedy in that situation (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 309–310 & 313).14 Notably, Lara could not have spoken to the issues in 14 “The Estrada rule only answers the

2025(People v. Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 700.) However, his arguments critically overlook the breadth of the “inference” on which “[t]he Estrada rule rests”: “in the absence of contrary indications, a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and sentences that are not.” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 657 ; see, e.g., People v. Braden 17 PEOPLE v. FAIAL Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791 , 801–802; People v. Frahs (2020) 9

2025(See In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744–748 (Estrada).) When a new or amendatory statute “mitigates punishment and there is no saving clause, the rule is that the [statute] will operate retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed.” (Id. at p. 748.) More specifically, “[w]hen new legislation reduces the punishment for an offense, we presume that the legislation applies to all cases not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 673 .) “The Estrada rule rests on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providi

2026No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime.” (Id. at p. 511.) An ameliorative statute is understood to “apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745 .) But an inflexible application of the Estrada presumption under the circumstances here comes at the price of violating overriding principles of justice.

2026No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime.” (Id. at p. 511.) An ameliorative statute is understood to “apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745 .) But an inflexible application of the Estrada presumption under the circumstances here comes at the price of violating overriding principles of justice.

2025(See Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 656 [“the Legislature (or here, the electorate) may choose to modify, limit, or entirely forbid the retroactive application of ameliorative criminal law amendments if it so chooses”]; Kimble, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 757 [“Courts may not indiscriminately apply every ameliorative change in the law at resentencing without analyzing the scope of its intended application under Estrada”].) The Estrada rule contemplates the possibility that some defendants with nonfinal judgments will be resentenced but not receive the benefit of ameliorative changes where the

2025(People v. Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 700.) However, his arguments critically overlook the breadth of the “inference” on which “[t]he Estrada rule rests”: “in the absence of contrary indications, a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and sentences that are not.” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 657 ; see, e.g., People v. Braden 17 PEOPLE v. FAIAL Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791 , 801–802; People v. Frahs (2020) 9

2022(People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 789, fn. 5 .) The Supreme Court has since “applied the Estrada rule to statutes that merely made a reduced punishment possible.” (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 629 (Frahs).) In Frahs, the court applied Estrada to Penal Code section 1001.36, which established a pretrial diversion program for certain defendants with mental health disorders.

2022(People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 789, fn. 5 .) The Supreme Court has since “applied the Estrada rule to statutes that merely made a reduced punishment possible.” (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 629 (Frahs).) In Frahs, the court applied Estrada to Penal Code section 1001.36, which established a pretrial diversion program for certain defendants with mental health disorders.

2026The Estrada presumption of retroactivity “stand[s] for the proposition that (i) in the absence of a contrary indication of legislative intent, (ii) legislation that ameliorates punishment (iii) applies to all cases that are not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 675 .) Because Senate Bill 567 is ameliorative and took effect when Bustillos’s case was not final, the Estrada presumption applies.

2026The Estrada presumption of retroactivity “stand[s] for the proposition that (i) in the absence of a contrary indication of legislative intent, (ii) legislation that ameliorates punishment (iii) applies to all cases that are not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 675 .) Because Senate Bill 567 is ameliorative and took effect when Bustillos’s case was not final, the Estrada presumption applies.

2025(See In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744–748 (Estrada).) When a new or amendatory statute “mitigates punishment and there is no saving clause, the rule is that the [statute] will operate retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed.” (Id. at p. 748.) More specifically, “[w]hen new legislation reduces the punishment for an offense, we presume that the legislation applies to all cases not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 673 .) “The Estrada rule rests on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providi

2025(See In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744–748 (Estrada).) When a new or amendatory statute “mitigates punishment and there is no saving clause, the rule is that the [statute] will operate retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed.” (Id. at p. 748.) More specifically, “[w]hen new legislation reduces the punishment for an offense, we presume that the legislation applies to all cases not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 673 .) “The Estrada rule rests on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providi

2024The same logic does not inform our understanding of a law that rewards good behavior in prison.” (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 325 .) We rejected the argument that Estrada should be understood to apply more broadly to any statute that reduces punishment in any manner, explaining that this contention “would expand the Estrada rule’s scope of operation in precisely the manner we forbade” in our prior decisions, and “does not in any event represent a logical extension of Estrada’s reasoning.” (Brown, at p. 325.) Consistent with our reasoning in Brown, both our case law and decisions by the Cour

2024The same logic does not inform our understanding of a law that rewards good behavior in prison.” (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 325 .) We rejected the argument that Estrada should be understood to apply more broadly to any statute that reduces punishment in any manner, explaining that this contention “would expand the Estrada rule’s scope of operation in precisely the manner we forbade” in our prior decisions, and “does not in any event represent a logical extension of Estrada’s reasoning.” (Brown, at p. 325.) Consistent with our reasoning in Brown, both our case law and decisions by the Cour

2025Rossi’s holding, we explained, was based on the presumption, derived from common law, that “the Legislature, by removing the proscription from specified conduct, intended to condone past acts.” (Collins, at p. 212, italics added.) Thus, “an amendment eliminating criminal sanctions is a sufficient declaration of the Legislature’s intent to bar all punishment for the conduct so decriminalized.” (Id. at p. 213.) We concluded that because the defendant’s conviction was not final and “the act that he admitted, and upon which his guilty plea and conviction were based, was no longer punishable” under

2025Rossi’s holding, we explained, was based on the presumption, derived from common law, that “the Legislature, by removing the proscription from specified conduct, intended to condone past acts.” (Collins, at p. 212, italics added.) Thus, “an amendment eliminating criminal sanctions is a sufficient declaration of the Legislature’s intent to bar all punishment for the conduct so decriminalized.” (Id. at p. 213.) We concluded that because the defendant’s conviction was not final and “the act that he admitted, and upon which his guilty plea and conviction were based, was no longer punishable” under

2025(People v. Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 700.) However, his arguments critically overlook the breadth of the “inference” on which “[t]he Estrada rule rests”: “in the absence of contrary indications, a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and sentences that are not.” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 657 ; see, e.g., People v. Braden 17 PEOPLE v. FAIAL Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791 , 801–802; People v. Frahs (2020) 9

2023(See People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 700 (Stamps) [“The Estrada rule only answers the question of whether an amended statute should be applied retroactively.

2025(Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1207.) The Court reasoned that the changes to section 186.22 “have the effect of ‘increas[ing] the threshold for conviction of the section 186.22 offense and the imposition of the enhancement,’ with obvious benefit to defendants like Tran.” (Tran, at p. 1207.) In Padilla, the Supreme Court further held that the Estrada rule applies when a defendant’s judgment is vacated during habeas corpus proceedings. ( Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th. at pp. 158–159.) “A case is final when ‘the criminal proceeding as a whole’ has ended [citation] and ‘the courts can no longer provi

2025(Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1207.) The Court reasoned that the changes to section 186.22 “have the effect of ‘increas[ing] the threshold for conviction of the section 186.22 offense and the imposition of the enhancement,’ with obvious benefit to defendants like Tran.” (Tran, at p. 1207.) In Padilla, the Supreme Court further held that the Estrada rule applies when a defendant’s judgment is vacated during habeas corpus proceedings. ( Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th. at pp. 158–159.) “A case is final when ‘the criminal proceeding as a whole’ has ended [citation] and ‘the courts can no longer provi

2024(E.g., Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 286, 289, 301; Francis, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 78 [rejecting argument that legislative intent applicable to chaptered laws “is ‘presumptively the same’ ”; to the contrary, “the Legislature manifestly could have different intents with respect to different sections contained in one chapter”]; Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 573 (dis. opn. of Elia, J.) [“Many legislative bills amend numerous (sometimes hundreds of) statutes, and whether a specific amendatory statute is subject to the Estrada rule depends on the nature of the amendment, not the mere fact t

2024(E.g., Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 286, 289, 301; Francis, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 78 [rejecting argument that legislative intent applicable to chaptered laws “is ‘presumptively the same’ ”; to the contrary, “the Legislature manifestly could have different intents with respect to different sections contained in one chapter”]; Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 573 (dis. opn. of Elia, J.) [“Many legislative bills amend numerous (sometimes hundreds of) statutes, and whether a specific amendatory statute is subject to the Estrada rule depends on the nature of the amendment, not the mere fact t

2023(E.g., People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 94-95 [newly enacted affirmative defense to transporting marijuana applies retroactively]; Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 301 [statute specifying that certain death-penalty qualifying special circumstances must be intentional applies retroactively]; In re Kirk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 761, 762-763 [amendment increasing dollar amount concerning insufficient funds checks applies retroactively].) “Significantly, we have also applied the Estrada rule to statutes that merely made a reduced punishment possible. . . .

2023(E.g., People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 94-95 [newly enacted affirmative defense to transporting marijuana applies retroactively]; Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 301 [statute specifying that certain death-penalty qualifying special circumstances must be intentional applies retroactively]; In re Kirk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 761, 762-763 [amendment increasing dollar amount concerning insufficient funds checks applies retroactively].) “Significantly, we have also applied the Estrada rule to statutes that merely made a reduced punishment possible. . . .

2014(Nasalga, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 794 .) 18 In enacting new laws, both the Legislature and the electorate are “presumed to be aware of existing laws and judicial construction thereof.” (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 890, fn. 11 .) Accordingly, we presume that in enacting the Reform Act, the electorate was aware of the Estrada presumption that a law ameliorating punishment applies to all judgments not yet final on appeal on the effective date of the new statute.

2014(Nasalga, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 794 .) 18 In enacting new laws, both the Legislature and the electorate are “presumed to be aware of existing laws and judicial construction thereof.” (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 890, fn. 11 .) Accordingly, we presume that in enacting the Reform Act, the electorate was aware of the Estrada presumption that a law ameliorating punishment applies to all judgments not yet final on appeal on the effective date of the new statute.

2024(E.g., Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 286, 289, 301; Francis, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 78 [rejecting argument that legislative intent applicable to chaptered laws “is ‘presumptively the same’ ”; to the contrary, “the Legislature manifestly could have different intents with respect to different sections contained in one chapter”]; Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 573 (dis. opn. of Elia, J.) [“Many legislative bills amend numerous (sometimes hundreds of) statutes, and whether a specific amendatory statute is subject to the Estrada rule depends on the nature of the amendment, not the mere fact t

2024(E.g., Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 286, 289, 301; Francis, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 78 [rejecting argument that legislative intent applicable to chaptered laws “is ‘presumptively the same’ ”; to the contrary, “the Legislature manifestly could have different intents with respect to different sections contained in one chapter”]; Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 573 (dis. opn. of Elia, J.) [“Many legislative bills amend numerous (sometimes hundreds of) statutes, and whether a specific amendatory statute is subject to the Estrada rule depends on the nature of the amendment, not the mere fact t

2022Cal.App.5th at p. 1019 (dis. opn. of Raye, P.J.); Stewart, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1078–1079, review granted.) As the California Supreme Court has explained, “[b]ecause the Estrada rule reflects a presumption about legislative intent, rather than a constitutional command, the Legislature (or … the electorate) may choose to modify, limit, or entirely forbid the retroactive application of ameliorative criminal law amendments if it so chooses.” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 656 .) “Our cases do not ‘dictate to legislative drafters the forms in which laws must be written’ to expres

2022Cal.App.5th at p. 1019 (dis. opn. of Raye, P.J.); Stewart, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1078–1079, review granted.) As the California Supreme Court has explained, “[b]ecause the Estrada rule reflects a presumption about legislative intent, rather than a constitutional command, the Legislature (or … the electorate) may choose to modify, limit, or entirely forbid the retroactive application of ameliorative criminal law amendments if it so chooses.” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 656 .) “Our cases do not ‘dictate to legislative drafters the forms in which laws must be written’ to expres

2025(People v. Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 700.) However, his arguments critically overlook the breadth of the “inference” on which “[t]he Estrada rule rests”: “in the absence of contrary indications, a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and sentences that are not.” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 657 ; see, e.g., People v. Braden 17 PEOPLE v. FAIAL Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791 , 801–802; People v. Frahs (2020) 9

2025Rossi’s holding, we explained, was based on the presumption, derived from common law, that “the Legislature, by removing the proscription from specified conduct, intended to condone past acts.” (Collins, at p. 212, italics added.) Thus, “an amendment eliminating criminal sanctions is a sufficient declaration of the Legislature’s intent to bar all punishment for the conduct so decriminalized.” (Id. at p. 213.) We concluded that because the defendant’s conviction was not final and “the act that he admitted, and upon which his guilty plea and conviction were based, was no longer punishable” under

2021In accordance with the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744 (Estrada), “‘“[a]n amendatory statute lessening punishment is presumed to apply in all cases not yet reduced to final judgment as of the amendatory statute’s effective date” [citation], unless the enacting body “clearly signals its intent to make the amendment prospective, by the inclusion of either an express saving clause or its equivalent” [citations].’” (People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1134 , quoting People v. DeHoyos (2018) 4 Cal.5th 594, 600 ; accord, People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5

2021In accordance with the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744 (Estrada), “‘“[a]n amendatory statute lessening punishment is presumed to apply in all cases not yet reduced to final judgment as of the amendatory statute’s effective date” [citation], unless the enacting body “clearly signals its intent to make the amendment prospective, by the inclusion of either an express saving clause or its equivalent” [citations].’” (People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1134 , quoting People v. DeHoyos (2018) 4 Cal.5th 594, 600 ; accord, People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5

2025(Esquivel, at p. 680; see People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264 , 305–306.) “Through all these steps, a suspended execution sentence is not final, and the Estrada presumption remains available.” (Esquivel, at p. 680.) As pertinent here, we stated in Esquivel that “[a] case in which a defendant is convicted and placed on probation with execution of sentence suspended is not final while direct review of the order imposing sentence remains ongoing.” (Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 680.) As in Esquivel, the relevant ameliorative legislation in this case, Assembly Bill 1950, became operative af

2025(Esquivel, at p. 680; see People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264 , 305–306.) “Through all these steps, a suspended execution sentence is not final, and the Estrada presumption remains available.” (Esquivel, at p. 680.) As pertinent here, we stated in Esquivel that “[a] case in which a defendant is convicted and placed on probation with execution of sentence suspended is not final while direct review of the order imposing sentence remains ongoing.” (Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 680.) As in Esquivel, the relevant ameliorative legislation in this case, Assembly Bill 1950, became operative af

2022Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c) applied retroactively]; People v. Figueroa, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at pp. 69-71 [amendment adding requirements for imposition of drug trafficking enhancement applied retroactively].) To rebut Estrada’s inference of retroactivity, the Legislature must clearly signal “its intent to make the amendment prospective, by the inclusion of either an express saving[s] clause or its equivalent.” ( Nasalga, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. at p. 793.) Neither the text nor the legislative history of amended section 186.22 clearly indicate that the Legislature intended that the Estrada rule

2022(People v. Figueroa (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 65 , 69–70 [Estrada presumption applies to legislative amendments that add new element to enhancements]; see also People v. Lee (June 24, 2022—published July 15, 2022) 2022 Cal. App. LEXIS 624 , *4 [AB 333 amendments to § 186.22 apply retroactively to nonfinal judgments]; People v. Ramos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1116 , 1126– 1127; People v. Rodriguez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 816 , 822 [same]; People v. Vasquez (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1021 , 1032 [same]; People v. Lopez, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 344 [same].)15 Respondent further concedes that “at least one o

2023Estrada represents ‘an important, contextually specific qualification to the ordinary presumption that statutes operate prospectively: When the Legislature has amended a statute to reduce the punishment for a particular criminal offense, we will assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that the Legislature intended the amended statute to apply to all defendants whose judgments are not yet final on the statute’s operative date.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hajek and Vo 34 (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1195-1196 (Hajek), overruled on another ground in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192 .) The Estrada

2023Estrada represents ‘an important, contextually specific qualification to the ordinary presumption that statutes operate prospectively: When the Legislature has amended a statute to reduce the punishment for a particular criminal offense, we will assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that the Legislature intended the amended statute to apply to all defendants whose judgments are not yet final on the statute’s operative date.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hajek and Vo 34 (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1195-1196 (Hajek), overruled on another ground in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192 .) The Estrada

2023(People v. Floyd (2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 189 [“Defendant’s 18. equal protection argument presumes that the Estrada rule is constitutionally compelled.

2023(People v. Floyd (2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 189 [“Defendant’s 18. equal protection argument presumes that the Estrada rule is constitutionally compelled.

2023(Lopez, at p. 414 [“[g]iven the court’s complete authority to ‘revoke, modify, or change’ its previous sentence (§ 1203.3, subd. (a)), the sentencing process cannot fairly be described as finished when execution of a sentence is suspended to place a defendant on mandatory supervision”].) A criminal proceeding itself is not considered final for purposes of Estrada retroactivity “so long as the courts may provide a remedy on direct review” including “the time within which to petition to the United States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari.” (In re Pine (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 593, 594 ; accord Es

2023(Lopez, at p. 414 [“[g]iven the court’s complete authority to ‘revoke, modify, or change’ its previous sentence (§ 1203.3, subd. (a)), the sentencing process cannot fairly be described as finished when execution of a sentence is suspended to place a defendant on mandatory supervision”].) A criminal proceeding itself is not considered final for purposes of Estrada retroactivity “so long as the courts may provide a remedy on direct review” including “the time within which to petition to the United States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari.” (In re Pine (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 593, 594 ; accord Es

2023Assembly Bill 518 thereafter amended section 654 to provide “the trial court with discretion to impose and execute the sentence of either term, which could result in the trial court imposing and executing the shorter sentence rather than the longer sentence.” (People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343 , 379.) In re Estrada’s presumption of retroactivity does not apply to section 1465.9, subdivision (a), based on language in that subdivision that is also found in subdivision (b) of that section].) 13 “Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the ‘informed discretio

2022This is so because “ ‘[d]efendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the 32 “informed discretion” of the sentencing court’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 (Gutierrez)), and “ ‘a court that is unaware of its discretionary authority cannot exercise its informed discretion.’ ” (People v. McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 425 .) An exception to this requirement exists, however, in the circumstance where “ the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it had such discreti

2022(In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744-745 [absent evidence of a contrary legislative intent, “[i]t is an inevitable inference” that the Legislature intends ameliorative criminal statutes to apply to all cases not final when the statutes become effective]; People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 306 [For purposes of determining the retroactive application of ameliorative amendments to a criminal statute, an appeal is not final until the time has passed for petitioning the United Stated Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.]; People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 973 [same]; People v.

2022(In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744-745 [absent evidence of a contrary legislative intent, “[i]t is an inevitable inference” that the Legislature intends ameliorative criminal statutes to apply to all cases not final when the statutes become effective]; People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 306 [For purposes of determining the retroactive application of ameliorative amendments to a criminal statute, an appeal is not final until the time has passed for petitioning the United Stated Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.]; People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 973 [same]; People v.

2025Rossi’s holding, we explained, was based on the presumption, derived from common law, that “the Legislature, by removing the proscription from specified conduct, intended to condone past acts.” (Collins, at p. 212, italics added.) Thus, “an amendment eliminating criminal sanctions is a sufficient declaration of the Legislature’s intent to bar all punishment for the conduct so decriminalized.” (Id. at p. 213.) We concluded that because the defendant’s conviction was not final and “the act that he admitted, and upon which his guilty plea and conviction were based, was no longer punishable” under

2025Rossi’s holding, we explained, was based on the presumption, derived from common law, that “the Legislature, by removing the proscription from specified conduct, intended to condone past acts.” (Collins, at p. 212, italics added.) Thus, “an amendment eliminating criminal sanctions is a sufficient declaration of the Legislature’s intent to bar all punishment for the conduct so decriminalized.” (Id. at p. 213.) We concluded that because the defendant’s conviction was not final and “the act that he admitted, and upon which his guilty plea and conviction were based, was no longer punishable” under

2017Where, as under Proposition 57, the potential benefit inures to a class of offenders based on their age rather than on the offenses they commit, the inference that voters deemed the entire Penal Code unduly severe when applied to minors is too attenuated to support application of the Estrada rule.” ( Mendoza, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 348-349.) Contrary to Cervantes and Mendoza, People v. Vela (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 68 [ 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ] (Vela) held that Proposition 57 has retroactive application because the intent of the voters was to broaden the number of minors who could potentially st

2017Where, as under Proposition 57, the potential benefit inures to a class of offenders based on their age rather than on the offenses they commit, the inference that voters deemed the entire Penal Code unduly severe when applied to minors is too attenuated to support application of the Estrada rule.” ( Mendoza, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 348-349.) Contrary to Cervantes and Mendoza, People v. Vela (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 68 [ 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ] (Vela) held that Proposition 57 has retroactive application because the intent of the voters was to broaden the number of minors who could potentially st

2021They took the extraordinary step of extending the retroactive benefits of the Act beyond the bounds contemplated by Estrada—including even prisoners serving final sentences within the Act’s ameliorative reach.” ( Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 657-658.) In People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161 , the Court of Appeal noted, “[t]he Estrada rule does not apply to [Proposition 36’s recall provisions] because section 1170.126 operates as the functional equivalent of a savings clause.” (Id. at p. 172.).

2016The Yearwood court disagreed, finding that “[t]he Estrada rule does not apply to the [Reform] Act because section 1170.126 operates as the functional equivalent of a saving clause.” (Yearwood, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 172 .) The court examined the language of section 1170.126, subdivision (b), which provides, “Any person serving an indeterminate term of life imprisonment” imposed for a third strike conviction “may file a petition for a recall of sentence.” The court found this phrase was “not ambiguous” and that section 1170.126 “is correctly interpreted to apply to all prisoners serving a

2023The exception provides that “[n]ewly enacted legislation lessening criminal punishment or reducing criminal liability presumptively applies to all cases not yet final on appeal at the time of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 852 , italics added.) The Estrada exception has been applied to statutes that govern penalty enhancements as well as substantive offenses, statutes that only make reduced punishment possible, and a statute that “ ‘ameliorated the possible punishment for a class of persons.’ ” (People v. Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 628-629, ita

2023The exception provides that “[n]ewly enacted legislation lessening criminal punishment or reducing criminal liability presumptively applies to all cases not yet final on appeal at the time of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 852 , italics added.) The Estrada exception has been applied to statutes that govern penalty enhancements as well as substantive offenses, statutes that only make reduced punishment possible, and a statute that “ ‘ameliorated the possible punishment for a class of persons.’ ” (People v. Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 628-629, ita