time of the suppression hearing in New York

2025As this issue was testified to and otherwise brought to light at the suppression hearing, we do not find that Supreme Court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to reopen the suppression hearing ( see People v Castro , 206 AD3d 1444 , 1448 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 1132 [2022]; People v Newell , 148 AD3d at 1220 ; People v Rivera , 124 AD3d 1070, 1071 [3d Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 971 [2015]). [FN2] Defendant's argument that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel is equally unpersuasive.

2008After sufficient inquiry (see People v Frederick, 45 NY2d 520 [1978]), the court properly denied defendant’s meritless motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

1995The pendency of the investigation may raise confidentiality concerns at the time of the application that are not present at the time of a suppression hearing (see, Matter of Fingerprinting of M.B., 125 NJ Super 115, 309 A2d 3, 6 ).

1992Defendant furnished no new evidence on his motion inasmuch as both documents were available at the time of the suppression hearing (see, People v Vitanza, 167 AD2d 763, 764-765 , lv denied 77 NY2d 845 ; see also, CPL 440.10 [1] [g]).

1991Defendant’s testimony at her husband’s suppression hearing was both material to the underlying charges (see, People v Stanard, 42 NY2d 74, 80 , cert denied 434 US 986 ) and relevant to defendant’s own credibility (see, People v Davis, 53 NY2d 164).

1991Defendant’s testimony at her husband’s suppression hearing was both material to the underlying charges (see, People v Stanard, 42 NY2d 74, 80 , cert denied 434 US 986 ) and relevant to defendant’s own credibility (see, People v Davis, 53 NY2d 164).

1991Defendant’s testimony at her husband’s suppression hearing was both material to the underlying charges (see, People v Stanard, 42 NY2d 74, 80 , cert denied 434 US 986 ) and relevant to defendant’s own credibility (see, People v Davis, 53 NY2d 164).

1989However, at the time of the suppression hearing, held almost six months after the warrant had been executed, the Justice’s notes could not be found (People v Taylor, supra, at 687 ) .

1989People v Rodriguez ( 69 NY2d 159 ) exemplifies the problems posed by such hindsight analysis: there, the defendant pleaded guilty — as is often the case — under one count of a three-count indictment, and a potential witness who had previously spoken to the police was missing at the time of the suppression hearing.

1986At the time of the suppression hearing, there was no requirement that the police obtain a waiver of the right to counsel in order to question a suspect in a noncustodial situation (People v McKie, 25 NY2d 19 ).

1983At the time of the suppression hearing People v Payton ( 45 NY2d 300 , supra) represented the law in New York.

1982I note, in addition, that this is not a case in which the People have demonstrated that the informant would have been unavailable to testify at the time of the suppression hearing, and I am therefore assuming that but for the erroneous ruling of the motion court the testimony of the said informant could have been taken in camera at that time in accordance with the dictates of People v Darden (supra).