time of the suppression hearing in California

2017As the proper inquiry focuses on a reasonable person's understanding at the time of the search, not at the time of the suppression hearing, it is not relevant that the ECPA was in effect at the time of the suppression hearing.7 Although it may be reasonable, after the ECPA became effective, for a law enforcement officer conducting a search to interpret a general probation search condition authorizing a warrantless search of the probationer's property as excluding searches of the probationer's electronic device information, such as cell phone data, we see no basis for a reasonable person to hav

2017We disagree. 13 As we have explained, the proper inquiry under Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d 600 , is whether at the time of the search a reasonable, objective person would have understood the search of Sandee's cell phone to fall within the scope of the warrantless search conditions in Sandee's probation orders.

2017We disagree. 13 As we have explained, the proper inquiry under Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d 600 , is whether at the time of the search a reasonable, objective person would have understood the search of Sandee's cell phone to fall within the scope of the warrantless search conditions in Sandee's probation orders.

2015This testimony was not before the trial court at the time of the suppression hearing, and it is irrelevant to our inquiry now; in reviewing the trial court’s suppression ruling, we consider only the evidence that was presented to the trial court at the time it ruled.”]; People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900 , 1007-1008 and fn. 23 [rejecting defendant’s reliance on trial evidence to overturn 10 viewing him.

2013A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” (Id. at pp. 217-218; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 215 .) Based on Villany’s testimony at trial and defense counsel’s questioning of Deputy Clark at the suppression hearing, defendant claims and the People agree that it can be reasonably inferred that counsel was aware, at the time of the suppression hearing, that Villany did not voluntarily consent to the deputies’ entry into his home.

2008By the time of the suppression hearing, it had been determined that defendant was not a suspect in those murders. 12 The Court of Appeal did not specifically use the term “rebuttable presumption”; the word “presumption” comes from our decision in People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 614 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 580 P.2d 672 ], overruled on another ground in People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 509-510 , footnote 17 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582 , 853 P.2d 1037 ], which the Court of Appeal cited.

2008By the time of the suppression hearing, it had been determined that defendant was not a suspect in those murders. 12 The Court of Appeal did not specifically use the term “rebuttable presumption”; the word “presumption” comes from our decision in People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 614 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 580 P.2d 672 ], overruled on another ground in People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 509-510 , footnote 17 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582 , 853 P.2d 1037 ], which the Court of Appeal cited.

2002(See, e.g., People v. Drews (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1324-1328 , 256 Cal.Rptr. 846 .) In any event, as the Attorney General observes, the trial court did not find Arturo's testimony at the jurisdictional hearing to be wholly truthful or accurate concerning other aspects of the case. [19] Indeed, cases from other jurisdictions essentially have followed the standard suggested by the Attorney General, allowing limited searches for required documentation in locations where such documents "may reasonably be found." (See State v. Taras, supra, 19 Ariz.App. 7 , 504 P.2d 548, 552 , described ante,

2002(See, e.g., People v. Drews (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1324-1328 , 256 Cal.Rptr. 846 .) In any event, as the Attorney General observes, the trial court did not find Arturo's testimony at the jurisdictional hearing to be wholly truthful or accurate concerning other aspects of the case. [19] Indeed, cases from other jurisdictions essentially have followed the standard suggested by the Attorney General, allowing limited searches for required documentation in locations where such documents "may reasonably be found." (See State v. Taras, supra, 19 Ariz.App. 7 , 504 P.2d 548, 552 , described ante,

2002(See, e.g., People v. Drews (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1324-1328 , 256 Cal.Rptr. 846 .) In any event, as the Attorney General observes, the trial court did not find Arturo's testimony at the jurisdictional hearing to be wholly truthful or accurate concerning other aspects of the case. [19] Indeed, cases from other jurisdictions essentially have followed the standard suggested by the Attorney General, allowing limited searches for required documentation in locations where such documents "may reasonably be found." (See State v. Taras, supra, 19 Ariz.App. 7 , 504 P.2d 548, 552 , described ante,

2002(See, e.g., People v. Drews (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1324-1328 , 256 Cal.Rptr. 846 .) In any event, as the Attorney General observes, the trial court did not find Arturo's testimony at the jurisdictional hearing to be wholly truthful or accurate concerning other aspects of the case. [19] Indeed, cases from other jurisdictions essentially have followed the standard suggested by the Attorney General, allowing limited searches for required documentation in locations where such documents "may reasonably be found." (See State v. Taras, supra, 19 Ariz.App. 7 , 504 P.2d 548, 552 , described ante,

2002(See, e.g., People v. Drews (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1324-1328 , 256 Cal.Rptr. 846 .) In any event, as the Attorney General observes, the trial court did not find Arturo's testimony at the jurisdictional hearing to be wholly truthful or accurate concerning other aspects of the case. [19] Indeed, cases from other jurisdictions essentially have followed the standard suggested by the Attorney General, allowing limited searches for required documentation in locations where such documents "may reasonably be found." (See State v. Taras, supra, 19 Ariz.App. 7 , 504 P.2d 548, 552 , described ante,

2002(See, e.g., People v. Drews (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1324-1328 , 256 Cal.Rptr. 846 .) In any event, as the Attorney General observes, the trial court did not find Arturo's testimony at the jurisdictional hearing to be wholly truthful or accurate concerning other aspects of the case. [19] Indeed, cases from other jurisdictions essentially have followed the standard suggested by the Attorney General, allowing limited searches for required documentation in locations where such documents "may reasonably be found." (See State v. Taras, supra, 19 Ariz.App. 7 , 504 P.2d 548, 552 , described ante,

2002(See, e.g., People v. Drews (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1324-1328 , 256 Cal.Rptr. 846 .) In any event, as the Attorney General observes, the trial court did not find Arturo's testimony at the jurisdictional hearing to be wholly truthful or accurate concerning other aspects of the case. [19] Indeed, cases from other jurisdictions essentially have followed the standard suggested by the Attorney General, allowing limited searches for required documentation in locations where such documents "may reasonably be found." (See State v. Taras, supra, 19 Ariz.App. 7 , 504 P.2d 548, 552 , described ante,

2002(See, e.g., People v. Drews (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1324-1328 , 256 Cal.Rptr. 846 .) In any event, as the Attorney General observes, the trial court did not find Arturo's testimony at the jurisdictional hearing to be wholly truthful or accurate concerning other aspects of the case. [19] Indeed, cases from other jurisdictions essentially have followed the standard suggested by the Attorney General, allowing limited searches for required documentation in locations where such documents "may reasonably be found." (See State v. Taras, supra, 19 Ariz.App. 7 , 504 P.2d 548, 552 , described ante,

1990And, in a recent argument before the United States Supreme Court, the People conceded, “The curtilage doctrine protects against warrantless physical intrusions into the home. . . .A person may reasonably expect that an officer will not jump a fence . . . .” (Citing California v. Ciraolo (1986) 476 U.S. 207 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 210 , 106 S.Ct. 1809 ] (italics added).) Yet, this is exactly what the officers did in the case before us.

1990And, in a recent argument before the United States Supreme Court, the People conceded, “The curtilage doctrine protects against warrantless physical intrusions into the home. . . .A person may reasonably expect that an officer will not jump a fence . . . .” (Citing California v. Ciraolo (1986) 476 U.S. 207 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 210 , 106 S.Ct. 1809 ] (italics added).) Yet, this is exactly what the officers did in the case before us.

1980I do not know, and am unable to determine from the record, whether the reason trial counsel gave for stipulating that all contraband in the trunk was seized properly (namely, that the police officer “made a plain view observation once the trunk was opened”) reflected (a) a mistake of fact (since the marijuana was in closed bags); or (b) what turned out to be a mistake of law in lieu of People v. Dalton (1979) 24 Cal.3d 850 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 598 P.2d 467 ], which was pending before the Supreme Court at the time of the suppression hearing; or (c) a cover for some other motivation, such as (f

1980I do not know, and am unable to determine from the record, whether the reason trial counsel gave for stipulating that all contraband in the trunk was seized properly (namely, that the police officer “made a plain view observation once the trunk was opened”) reflected (a) a mistake of fact (since the marijuana was in closed bags); or (b) what turned out to be a mistake of law in lieu of People v. Dalton (1979) 24 Cal.3d 850 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 598 P.2d 467 ], which was pending before the Supreme Court at the time of the suppression hearing; or (c) a cover for some other motivation, such as (f