late notice claim in New York

2023Ctr. , 6 NY3d 531, 539 [2006]). " 'It is well settled that key factors for the court to consider in determining an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim are whether the claimant has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the delay, whether the [public corporation] acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of its accrual or within a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the [public corporation] in maintaining a defense on the merits' " [*2]( Matter of Turlington v Brockport Cent.

2023Ctr. , 6 NY3d 531, 539 [2006]). " 'It is well settled that key factors for the court to consider in determining an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim are whether the claimant has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the delay, whether the [public corporation] acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of its accrual or within a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the [public corporation] in maintaining a defense on the merits' " ( Matter of Turlington v Brockport Cent.

2026As to plaintiff's motion to renew, the court lacked discretion to grant the renewed application for leave to file a late notice of claim because that application was made after the one-year-and-90-day limitations period for bringing suit against H+H had elapsed (General Municipal Law § 50-i[1][c]; see Young , 147 AD3d at 509 , citing Pierson v City of New York , 56 NY2d 950, 955-956 [1982]; Fornabaio v City of New York , 41 AD3d 125, 125 [2007]) Plaintiff also failed to provide a reasonable justification for not presenting the facts regarding her alleged constructive discharge in May 2022 in h

2026A motion seeking leave to serve a late notice of claim "may be made before or after the commencement of the action but not more than one year and 90 days after the cause of action accrued, unless the statute has been tolled" ( Pierson v City of New York , 56 NY2d 950, 954 [1982]). "[W[here the time for commencing an action on the claim is tolled under CPLR 208, there will be a concomitant tolling of the time during which late notice of claim may be served" ( Cohen v Pearl Riv.

2013School Dist., 50 AD3d at 147 ), the plaintiffs motion to deem the late notice of claim served upon the HHC timely served nunc pro tunc should have been denied.

2013School Dist., 50 AD3d at 147 ), the plaintiffs motion to deem the late notice of claim served upon the HHC timely served nunc pro tunc should have been denied.

2004While GML § 50-e(5) prohibits the court from considering a motion to file a late notice of claim if its is made after the statute of limitations has expired, in [*2]Cohen v Pearl River Union Free School Dist. ( 51 NY2d 256 ), the Court of Appeals held that "the period specified in [General Municipal Law § 50-e(5)] during which a court may authorize service of a late notice of claim is completely coextensive with the time limited for commencing an action against a public corporation and is therefore similarly subject to the tolling provisions [for infancy] of CPLR 208." Therefore, Ben Birnbaum,

2003Although infancy automatically tolls the statutory period for commencing an action against a municipality (see General Municipal Law § 50-i; CPLR 208; Henry v City of New York, 94 NY2d 275 [1999]), the infancy of an injured claimant, standing alone, does not compel the granting of an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim (see Cohen v Pearl River Union Free School Dist., 51 NY2d 256, 266 [1980]; Matter of Brown v County of Westchester, supra; Matter of Knightner v City of New York, 269 AD2d 397 [2000]).

2025However, where a claim is “patently meritless,” leave is properly denied (Catherine G. v Cnty. of Essex, 3 NY3d 175, 179 [2004] [leave to file a late notice of claim “is not appropriate for a patently meritless claim”]; Singh v City of New York, 165 AD3d 593 , 594 [1st Dept 2018]).

2021Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiff's petition to serve a late notice of claim ( see Matter of Catherine G. v County of Essex , 3 NY3d at 179 ).

2020We agree with the Supreme Court's determination, in effect, upon reargument, to adhere to its original determination in the order dated April 20, 2018, denying that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for leave to serve a late notice of claim upon the City on behalf of the mother in her individual capacity, as the statute of limitations for her derivative cause of action had expired at the time the motion was made ( see General Municipal Law § 50-i[1][c]; Bazile v City of [*2] New York , 94 AD3d at 930 ; Kim L. v Port Jervis City School Dist. , 77 AD3d 627 ).

2018In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, a court must consider whether (1) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) the claimant was an infant at the time the claim arose and, if so, whether there was a nexus between the claimant's infancy and the delay in service of a notice of claim, (3) the claimant had a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, and (4) the public corporation was prejudiced by the delay in i

2014Ctr., 6 NY3d 531, 535 [2006]; Matter of Destine v City of New York, 111 AD3d 629 [2013]; Bazile v City of New York, 94 AD3d 929, 929-930 [2012]; Matter of Diggs v Board of Educ. of City of Yonkers, 79 AD3d 869, 869-870 [2010]).

2014Ctr., 6 NY3d 531, 535 [2006]; Matter of Destine v City of New York, 111 AD3d 629 [2013]; Bazile v City of New York, 94 AD3d 929, 929-930 [2012]; Matter of Diggs v Board of Educ. of City of Yonkers, 79 AD3d 869, 869-870 [2010]).

2019Henry Brown failed to proffer any excuse for his failure to serve a timely notice of claim ( see Matter of Wilson v City of New York , 160 AD3d 970 , 971; Matter of D'Agostino v City of New York , 146 AD3d 880, 882 ; Troy v Town of Hyde Park , 63 AD3d 913, 914 ).

2018Here, the plaintiffs failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for the delay in serving a notice of claim that described the infant plaintiff's injuries as arising from any negligence on the part of the Town other than that related to the nonfunctioning street lights, as described in the original notice of claim ( see Hudson v Patel , 146 AD3d at 759 ; Ramirez v City of New York , 139 AD3d at 695 ; Troy v Town of Hyde Park , 63 AD3d 913, 914 ).

2026Again, it is well settled that actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim is the factor that is accorded "great weight" in determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim ( Santana v Western Regional Off-Track Betting Corp. , 2 AD3d 1304, 1304 [4th Dept 2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 704 [2004]; see Williams v Nassau County Med.

2026Again, it is well settled that actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim is the factor that is accorded "great weight" in determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim ( Santana v Western Regional Off-Track Betting Corp. , 2 AD3d 1304, 1304 [4th Dept 2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 704 [2004]; see Williams v Nassau County Med.

2019In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, a court must consider, in particular, whether the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the accrual of the claim or within a reasonable time thereafter ( see Matter of Naar v City of New York , 161 AD3d 1081 , 1082; Matter of Maldonado v City of New York , 152 AD3d 522 ; Matter of Whittaker v New York City Bd. of Educ. , 71 AD3d 776 ).

2019In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, a court must consider, in particular, whether the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the accrual of the claim or within a reasonable time thereafter ( see Matter of Naar v City of New York , 161 AD3d 1081 , 1082; Matter of Maldonado v City of New York , 152 AD3d 522 ; Matter of Whittaker v New York City Bd. of Educ. , 71 AD3d 776 ).

2021The statute providing for a late notice of claim is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed ( see Matter of Porcaro v City of New York, 20 AD3d 357, 357 [1st Dept 2005]).

2021The statute providing for a late notice of claim is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed ( see Matter of Porcaro v City of New York, 20 AD3d 357, 357 [1st Dept 2005]).

2026Schools , 107 AD3d 1517, 1518 [4th Dept 2013], affd 22 NY3d 1000 [2013]). " 'It is well settled that key factors for the court to consider in determining an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim are [1] whether the claimant has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the delay, [2] whether the [school district] acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of its accrual or within a reasonable time thereafter, and [3] whether the delay would substantially prejudice the [school district] in maintaining a defense on the merits' " ( Matter of

2023Although the presence or absence of any given factor is not determinative, it is well settled that "[a] factor to be accorded great weight in determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim is whether the [public corporation] had actual knowledge of the facts underlying the claim, including knowledge of the injuries or damages" ( Dalton , 107 AD3d at 1518-1519 ).

2018"The determination of an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim is left to the sound discretion of the court" ( Matter of Vasquez v City of Newburgh , 35 AD3d 621, 623 ; see Matter of Newcomb v Middle Country Cent.

2018"The determination of an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim is left to the sound discretion of the court" ( Matter of Vasquez v City of Newburgh , 35 AD3d 621, 623 ; see Matter of Newcomb v Middle Country Cent.

2025"CPLR 204(a) tolls the statute of limitations while a motion [or petition] to serve a late notice of claim is pending" ( Young Soo Chi v Castelli , 112 AD3d 816, 817 ; see Giblin v Nassau County Med Ctr. , 61 NY2d 67, 72-76 ).

2016Ctr., 61 NY2d 67, 72-74 [1984]; CPLR 204 [a]), it began running anew on September 13, 2013, when Supreme Court granted plaintiff leave to serve a late notice of claim (Doddy v City of New York, 45 AD3d 431, 432 [1st Dept 2007]).

2019The decision to grant petitioners leave to file a late notice of claim was a provident exercise of discretion ( see generally Matter of Dubowy v City of New York , 305 AD2d 320, 321 [1st Dept 2003]).

2014Upon consideration of the factors relevant to deciding a motion for leave to file a late notice of claim, we find that the court properly granted plaintiffs motion (see Matter of Dubowy v City of New York, 305 AD2d 320 [1st Dept 2003]; General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]).

2025"In determining whether to grant a petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim or to deem a late notice of claim timely served nunc pro tunc, the court must consider all relevant circumstances, including whether (1) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in its defense on the merits" ( Matter o

2025"In determining whether to grant a petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim or to deem a late notice of claim timely served nunc pro tunc, the court must consider all relevant circumstances, including whether (1) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in its defense on the merits" ( Lobos v

2026Dist. , 28 NY3d 455, 467 ), the balancing of the actual knowledge and reasonable excuse factors weighed against permitting service of a late notice of claim ( see Matter of Ippolito v City of New York , 230 AD3d at 686; Matter of Nunez v Village of Rockville Ctr. , 176 AD3d 1211 , 1215-1216).

2026Dist. , 143 AD3d 1247, 1248 [4th Dept 2016]). "[A] court's decision to grant or deny a motion to serve a late notice of claim is purely a discretionary one" ( Newcomb , 28 NY3d at 465 [internal quotation marks omitted]) and, "[w]hile the discretion of Supreme Court [in considering the application] will generally be upheld absent demonstrated abuse[,] . . . such discretion is ultimately reposed in [the Appellate Division]" ( Matter of Dusch v Erie County Med.

2017Pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5), a court considering a petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim upon a municipal corporation must consider whether the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after it arose or within a reasonable time thereafter (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter of Whittaker v New York City Bd. of Educ., 71 AD3d 776 [2010]; Matter of Leeds v Port Washington Union Free School Dist., 55 AD3d 734 [2008]; Matter of Felice v Eastport/South Manor Cent.

2015Ordered that the orders are affirmed, with one bill of costs payable to the respondents. *998 In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, the court must consider all relevant circumstances, including whether (1) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in its defense (see Gene

2011The statute of limitations in this case is one year and 90 days after the accrual of the cause of action (Public Housing Law § 157 [2]), after which time the court has no power to grant an application to file a late notice of claim because “[t]o permit a court to grant an extension after the Statute of Limitations has run would, in practical effect, allow the court to grant an extension which exceeds the Statute of Limitations, thus rendering meaningless that portion of section 50-e which expressly prohibits the court from doing so.” (Pierson v City of New York, 56 NY2d 950, 955 [1982]; see Si

2011(See Singleton, 55 AD3d at 447 ; Maxwell, 29 AD3d at 541 .) Plaintiff s/debtor’s argument that she was not required to request leave of court to file a late notice of claim, and the late notice she did serve should be deemed nunc pro tunc as of the commencement date because the purpose of the notice requirement was satisfied by way of actual notice to Housing Authority and the investigation Housing Authority undertook within 90 days of the fire, is misguided.

2025Auth. , 226 AD3d at 898). "[W]here there is actual notice and absence of prejudice, the lack of a reasonable excuse will not bar the granting of leave to serve a late notice of claim" ( Matter of Joy v County of Suffolk , 89 AD3d 1025, 1027 ; see Matter of Guerre v New York City Tr.

2024A petitioner's lack of a reasonable excuse for the delay in serving a timely notice of claim is "not necessarily fatal" to an application for leave to serve late notice ( Matter of Johnson v County of Suffolk , 167 AD3d 742 , 745 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "[W]here there is actual notice and absence of prejudice, the lack of a reasonable excuse will not bar the granting of leave to serve a late notice of claim" ( Matter of Joy v County of Suffolk , 89 AD3d 1025, 1027 ).

2010A petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim is addressed to the sound discretion of the court (see Matter of Alexander v Board of Educ. for Vil. of Mamaroneck, 18 AD3d 654 [2005]; Matter of Flores v County of Nassau, 8 AD3d 377 [2004]; Moise v County of Nassau, 234 AD2d 275 [1996]), and requires that the court consider, inter alia, whether the petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the delay, whether the municipal entity acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the accident or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay wo

2009Moreover, the petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing that the hospital has not been prejudiced in maintaining its defenses on the merits (see Casias v City of New York, 39 AD3d 681 [2007]; Matter of Flores v County of Nassau, 8 AD3d 377, 378 [2004]) given the lengthy and unexcused delay in seeking to serve the late notice of claim (see Beretey v New York City Health & Hosps.

2025"Timely service of a notice of claim is a condition precedent to the commencement of an action sounding in tort against the New York City Transit Authority and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority" ( Durand v MV Transp., Inc. , 186 AD3d 564, 564-565 ; see Public Authorities Law §§ 1212[2]; 1276[2]; General Municipal Law § 50-e[1][a]). "'In determining whether to grant a petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim or to deem a late notice of claim timely served nunc pro tunc, the court must consider all relevant circumstances, including whether (1) the public corporation acquired ac

2025Dist. , 28 NY3d 455, 460 ). "'In determining whether to grant a petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim or to deem a late notice of claim timely served nunc pro tunc, the court must consider all relevant circumstances, including whether (1) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in its defe

2019Auth. , 150 AD3d 849, 850 ; see also Matter of Lawhorne v City of New York , 133 AD3d 856, 857 ; Matter of Sanchez v City of New York , 116 AD3d 703, 704 ), Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim.

2019Pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e(5), in determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, the court must consider all relevant circumstances, including whether (1) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim and for the subsequent delay in seeking leave to serve a late notice of claim, (2) the municipal corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) the delay in seeking leave would substantially prejudic