departure from the general rule in Pennsylvania

11 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1922–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

Case	Followed	Cited
Sellers v. Owens-Illinois Glass Companygreen wva · 1972 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1975–1975 1 sentence 1975While other courts have frequently employed such phrases as ‘clear and unequivocal’ or ‘clear and explicit,’ we do not believe that the Bowlby-Harmon case is a departure from the general rule.” 191 S.E. 2d at 170 (Emphasis added).	1	1
Escobedo v. Illinoisgreen scotus · 1964 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1965–1965 1 sentence 1965Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. at 492, 84 S. Ct. at 1766 . [3] Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 126 , 213 A. 2d 670, 674 (1965). [4] As the Supreme Court itself noted, the decision to refuse retrospective application to the search and seizure exclusionary rule was a departure from the general rule of retrospective application of constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights.	1	1
Linkletter v. Walkerred scotus · 1965 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1965–1965 2 sentences 1965Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628, 643 , 85 S. Ct. 1731, 1737, 1745 (1965). 1965Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628, 643 , 85 S. Ct. 1731, 1737, 1745 (1965).	1	1
Commonwealth v. Negrigreen pa · 1965 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1965–1965 2 sentences 1965Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. at 492, 84 S. Ct. at 1766 . [3] Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 126 , 213 A. 2d 670, 674 (1965). [4] As the Supreme Court itself noted, the decision to refuse retrospective application to the search and seizure exclusionary rule was a departure from the general rule of retrospective application of constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights. 1965Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. at 492, 84 S. Ct. at 1766 . [3] Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 126 , 213 A. 2d 670, 674 (1965). [4] As the Supreme Court itself noted, the decision to refuse retrospective application to the search and seizure exclusionary rule was a departure from the general rule of retrospective application of constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights.	1	1
Sprigg v. Commonwealth Title Insurance & Trust Co.green pa · 1903 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1940–1940 1 sentence 1940See Sprigg v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 206 Pa. 548, 555 .	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (16)

Case	Cited	Years
Demitz Estate green pa · 1965 1 sentence 2020Demitz’ Estate, 208 A.2d at 282 ; Estate of Tashjian, 544 A.2d at 70 .	1	2020–2020
In Re the Estate of Tashjian green pasuperct · 1988 1 sentence 2020Demitz’ Estate, 208 A.2d at 282 ; Estate of Tashjian, 544 A.2d at 70 .	1	2020–2020
Zane v. Friends Hospital green pa · 2003 1 sentence 2003Starr, supra at 575-76 , 664 A.2d at 1332 . ¶ 20 Our Supreme "Court recently revisited the coordinate jurisdiction rule in Zane v. Friends Hospital, — Pa. -, 836 A.2d 25 (Pa.2003), and employed the clearly erroneous exception as a departure from the general rule.	1	2003–2003
Commonwealth v. Starr green pa · 1995 1 sentence 2003Starr, supra at 575-76 , 664 A.2d at 1332 . ¶ 20 Our Supreme "Court recently revisited the coordinate jurisdiction rule in Zane v. Friends Hospital, — Pa. -, 836 A.2d 25 (Pa.2003), and employed the clearly erroneous exception as a departure from the general rule.	1	2003–2003
Geary v. United States Steel Corp. green pa · 1974 2 sentences 1986Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171 , 319 A.2d 174 (1974), examined a departure from the general rule that no recourse is available for an at-will employee who has been terminated. 1986Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171 , 319 A.2d 174 (1974), examined a departure from the general rule that no recourse is available for an at-will employee who has been terminated.	1	1986–1986
Fink v. Farmers' Bank green pa · 1896 1 sentence 1938Fink v. Farmers’ Bank, 178 Pa. 154 .” Referring again to Norris v. Crowe, supra, Mr. Justice Dean reached the conclusion there was no element of such extreme hardship in that case as to call for a departure from the general rule.	1	1938–1938
Norris v. Crowe neutral pa · 1903 1 sentence 1938Fink v. Farmers’ Bank, 178 Pa. 154 .” Referring again to Norris v. Crowe, supra, Mr. Justice Dean reached the conclusion there was no element of such extreme hardship in that case as to call for a departure from the general rule.	1	1938–1938
Easby's Estate green pa · 1925 1 sentence 1934It was for this reason that the decree was affirmed.” The above language is quoted and approved in Easby’s Estate, 285 Pa. 60 , at page 65, cited and relied upon by the attorneys for the executrix in the instant case.	1	1934–1934
Cundey v. Hall green pa · 1904 1 sentence 1931The court below rested its decision largely on the cases of Riter’s Est., 260 Pa. 168 and Penn-Gaskell’s Est., No. 1, 208 Pa. 342 , which stated the rule in substantially the above form.	1	1931–1931
Riter's Estate green pa · 1918 1 sentence 1931The court below rested its decision largely on the cases of Riter’s Est., 260 Pa. 168 and Penn-Gaskell’s Est., No. 1, 208 Pa. 342 , which stated the rule in substantially the above form.	1	1931–1931
Lapcevic v. Concordia Insurance neutral pasuperct · 1909 1 sentence 1926As to the alleged set-off, it has been held by our appellate courts that in a scire facias to revive a judgment, an offer to prove as a set-off an item of indebtedness of the plaintiff to the defendant is inadmissible, unless followed by evidence that the plaintiff accepted and acknowledged the item as a credit upon the judgment in suit: Bishop v. Goodhart, 135 Pa. 374 ; Curry v. Morrison, 40 Pa. Superior Ct. 301 .	1	1926–1926
Bishop v. Goodhart neutral pa · 1890 1 sentence 1926As to the alleged set-off, it has been held by our appellate courts that in a scire facias to revive a judgment, an offer to prove as a set-off an item of indebtedness of the plaintiff to the defendant is inadmissible, unless followed by evidence that the plaintiff accepted and acknowledged the item as a credit upon the judgment in suit: Bishop v. Goodhart, 135 Pa. 374 ; Curry v. Morrison, 40 Pa. Superior Ct. 301 .	1	1926–1926
Smith v. Coray neutral pa · 1900 1 sentence 1926The case of Smith v. Coray, 196 Pa. 602 , cited by the defendant, was decided upon its peculiar circumstances, which impugned the integrity of the original judgment and involved the question of fraud and a resulting trust, and is not authority for a departure from the general rule laid down by our appellate courts relative to defences to a scire facias to revive a judgment.	1	1926–1926
Consaul v. Cummings green scotus · 1911 1 sentence 1922There are no such special circumstances here as to justify a departure from the general rule that a partner is not entitled to extra compensation merely because of the arduous character of his services (Zell’s App., 126 Pa. 329 ; Consaul v. Cummings, 222 U. S. 262 ; Ruggles v. Buckley, 175 Fed. 57 ), especially not from the estate of a deceased partner (Appeal of Miller & Spang, 18 W.	1	1922–1922
Ruggles v. Buckley neutral ca6 · 1910 1 sentence 1922There are no such special circumstances here as to justify a departure from the general rule that a partner is not entitled to extra compensation merely because of the arduous character of his services (Zell’s App., 126 Pa. 329 ; Consaul v. Cummings, 222 U. S. 262 ; Ruggles v. Buckley, 175 Fed. 57 ), especially not from the estate of a deceased partner (Appeal of Miller & Spang, 18 W.	1	1922–1922
Clark's Admrs. v. Zell's Admrs. neutral pa · 1889 1 sentence 1922There are no such special circumstances here as to justify a departure from the general rule that a partner is not entitled to extra compensation merely because of the arduous character of his services (Zell’s App., 126 Pa. 329 ; Consaul v. Cummings, 222 U. S. 262 ; Ruggles v. Buckley, 175 Fed. 57 ), especially not from the estate of a deceased partner (Appeal of Miller & Spang, 18 W.	1	1922–1922

Where else courts name it

NY 61 (1880–2022) CA 36 (1914–2026) MD 30 (1961–2018) PA 11 (1922–2020) FL 10 (1925–2010) MA 10 (1949–2018) TX 10 (1856–2007) GA 8 (1918–2022) MI 8 (1973–2023) CT 8 (1885–2014) IL 7 (1883–1990) TN 7 (1921–2013) MN 6 (1907–2003) OH 6 (1999–2021) NM 6 (1946–2022) RI 6 (1924–2024) UT 6 (1999–2025) NE 5 (1893–1965) AL 5 (1908–1998) WA 5 (1941–2010) WV 4 (1949–2024) ID 4 (1980–2022) NH 4 (1998–2010) SC 3 (1904–2003) OK 3 (1988–2010) AZ 3 (1997–2019) NJ 3 (2001–2017) VA 3 (1906–1949) IA 3 (1960–2014) HI 3 (1966–1987) KY 3 (1817–1996) AR 2 (1978–1978) WY 2 (1956–1992) VI 2 (2008–2008) OR 2 (1977–1989) MO 2 (1857–1901) IN 2 (1918–1983) DC 2 (1957–1990) ME 2 (1966–2008)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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