acceptance of benefits doctrine in Texas

2025Under the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine, “a ‘litigant cannot treat a judgment as both right and wrong, and if he has voluntarily accepted the benefits of a judgment, he cannot afterward prosecute an appeal therefrom.’” Texas State Bank v. Amaro, 87 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. 2002) (quoting Carle v. Carle, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1004 (Tex. 1950)).

2015Evelyn’s motion to dismiss implicates the acceptance of benefits doctrine, under which “[a] litigant cannot treat a judgment as both right and wrong, and if he has voluntarily accepted the benefits of a judgment, he cannot afterward prosecute an appeal therefrom.” Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469 , 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1004 (1950).

2026See Waite v. Waite, 150 S.W.3d 797, 803 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (“There are . . . exceptions to the acceptance of benefits doctrine.

2021Cf. Waite, 150 S.W.3d at 803 (noting that an exception to the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine is when the acceptance is involuntary because of financial duress or other economic circumstances).

2025See F.M.G.W. v. D.S.W., 402 S.W.3d 329, 332 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (citing Texas State Bank v. Amaro, 87 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. 2002)). 7 counsel stated any participation in fulfilling the final judgment would be “predicated on the fact and knowledge that we’d be continuing with our appeal.” We agree with Blackburn that the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine does not apply in this case to bar his cross-appeal.

2025Under the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine, “a ‘litigant cannot treat a judgment as both right and wrong, and if he has voluntarily accepted the benefits of a judgment, he cannot afterward prosecute an appeal therefrom.’” Texas State Bank v. Amaro, 87 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. 2002) (quoting Carle v. Carle, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1004 (Tex. 1950)).

2025ANALYSIS Wavier Due to Acceptance of Benefits As an initial matter, we address Husband’s argument that Wife has waived error on appeal under the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine. “[T]he acceptance-of-benefits doctrine is a fact-dependent, estoppel-based doctrine focused on preventing unfair prejudice to the opposing party.” Kramer v. Kastleman, 508 S.W.3d 211 , 213–14 (Tex. 2017).

2025“The acceptance-of-benefits doctrine is a fact-dependent, estoppel-based doctrine that focuses on unfair prejudice to the opposing party.” Kramer v. Kastleman, 508 S.W.3d 211, 232 (Tex. 2017).

2010See Carle, 149 Tex. at 472 , 234 S.W.2d at 1004 ; Bloom, 935 S.W.2d at 945 ; Couch, 688 S.W.2d at 155 ; Rawlins, 399 S.W.2d at 164 ; Bowling, 353 S.W.2d at 893 ; Latimer, 328 S.W.2d at 242-43 .

2009See Bloom , 935 S.W.2d at 945 ; see also City of Mesquite , 399 S.W.2d at 164 .

2025See F.M.G.W. v. D.S.W., 402 S.W.3d 329, 332 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (citing Texas State Bank v. Amaro, 87 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. 2002)). 7 counsel stated any participation in fulfilling the final judgment would be “predicated on the fact and knowledge that we’d be continuing with our appeal.” We agree with Blackburn that the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine does not apply in this case to bar his cross-appeal.

2021See F.M.G.W. v. D.S.W., 402 S.W.3d 329, 334 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (explaining that the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine is a jurisdictional rule, the application of which renders an appeal moot and deprives the appellant of standing); see also Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 22 S.W.3d 857, 864 (Tex. 2000) (“The doctrine applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one to which he acquiesced, or from which he accepted a benefit.”).

2017Id. at 217 ; Richards v. Richards, 371 S.W.3d 412, 414 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (op. on reh’g).

2012See Richards, 371 S.W.3d at 417 (dismissing appeal challenging a divorce decree for being moot due to the application of the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine).

2015Leedy v. Leedy, 399 S.W.3d 335, 339 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.).

2015“The doctrine arises most often in divorce cases in which one spouse accepts certain assets awarded by the judgment and then seeks to appeal the remainder of the judgment.” Williams v. LifeCare Hosps. of N. Tex., L.P., 207 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.); Waite v Waite, 150 S.W.3d 797, 803 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). “[A] party who has accepted the benefits of a judgment is estopped from challenging the judgment by appeal.” Waite, 150 S.W.3d at 803 ; see also Leedy, 399 S.W.3d at 339 ; Dorai v. Dorai, No. 01-12-00308-CV, 2013 WL 1694866 , at *1-2 (T

2026We also recognize that the Texas Supreme Court has stated that case law suggests a contestant “may overcome an acceptance-of-benefits defense by returning the benefit.” Johnson, 631 S.W.3d at 61 n.17 (emphasis added); see Trevino v. Turcotte, 564 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. 1978) (considering whether a beneficiary “returned or tendered a return” of accepted benefits as part of determining whether beneficiary’s acceptance was voluntary).

2024Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 262 S.W.3d 773, 778 (Tex. 2008) (“Estoppel . . . generally prevents one party from misleading another to the other’s detriment or to the misleading party’s own benefit.”); see generally Estate of Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 56 , 61 (Tex. 2021) (stating doctrine of acceptance of benefits “arises out of equity’s aversion to a claimant who seeks to exploit irreconcilable positions”).

2026We also recognize that the Texas Supreme Court has stated that case law suggests a contestant “may overcome an acceptance-of-benefits defense by returning the benefit.” Johnson, 631 S.W.3d at 61 n.17 (emphasis added); see Trevino v. Turcotte, 564 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. 1978) (considering whether a beneficiary “returned or tendered a return” of accepted benefits as part of determining whether beneficiary’s acceptance was voluntary).

2021See Trevino, 564 S.W.2d at 686 (considering whether a beneficiary “returned or tendered a return” of accepted benefits as part of determining whether beneficiary’s acceptance was voluntary).

2009See Smith v. Smith , 143 S.W.3d 206, 212 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.) (holding that, because of the economic circumstances created by the court’s property division, wife’s acceptance of the benefit was not voluntary and therefore husband’s argument as to the acceptance of benefits doctrine did not apply).

2009See Smith v. Smith, 143 S.W.3d 206, 212 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.) (holding that, because of the economic circumstances created by the court’s property division, wife’s acceptance of the benefit was not voluntary and therefore husband’s argument as to the acceptance of benefits doctrine did not apply).

2007As claimant of such defense, appellee had the burden to prove appellant was “estopped by the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine.” Cooper v. Bushong, 10 S.W.3d 20, 23 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied) (accepting child support was not voluntary because support was essential to provide necessities for family). *866 Did appellant meet the financial duress exception and thereby defeat appellee’s affirmative defense of estoppel?

2004See Smith v. Smith, 143 S.W.3d 206, 212 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004, no pet. h.); McAlister v. McAlister, 75 S.W.3d 481, 484 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied); Cooper v. Bushong, 10 S.W.3d 20, 23-24 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied); Haggard v. Haggard, 550 S.W.2d 374, 376-77 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).

2009See Gonzalez v. Gonzalez , 614 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Tex. App. C Eastland 1981, writ dism = d).

2004See Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 614 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1981, writ dism’d).

2010See Lara, 52 S.W.3d at 178 ; Rawlins, 399 S.W.2d at 169 .

2010See Carle, 149 Tex. at 472 , 234 S.W.2d at 1004 ; Bloom, 935 S.W.2d at 945 ; Couch, 688 S.W.2d at 155 ; Rawlins, 399 S.W.2d at 164 ; Bowling, 353 S.W.2d at 893 ; Latimer, 328 S.W.2d at 242-43 .

2008Aycock v. Pannill , 853 S.W.2d 161, 163 (Tex. App.–Eastland 1993, writ denied).

1996Bashara, 685 S.W.2d at 352; see also, e.g., Aycock, 853 S.W.2d at 163 (criticizing De Lange and holding that Rule 71 does not apply in this situation because estoppel by acceptance of benefits is not an “informalit[y] in the record” encompassed by Rule 71 and “[i]f Rule 71 were applicable to the acceptance of benefits doctrine, then it could always be defeated by an appellant who waited the appropriate time before accepting any benefits”).

2024Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 262 S.W.3d 773, 778 (Tex. 2008) (“Estoppel . . . generally prevents one party from misleading another to the other’s detriment or to the misleading party’s own benefit.”); see generally Estate of Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 56 , 61 (Tex. 2021) (stating doctrine of acceptance of benefits “arises out of equity’s aversion to a claimant who seeks to exploit irreconcilable positions”).

2024Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 262 S.W.3d 773, 778 (Tex. 2008) (“Estoppel . . . generally prevents one party from misleading another to the other’s detriment or to the misleading party’s own benefit.”); see generally Estate of Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 56 , 61 (Tex. 2021) (stating doctrine of acceptance of benefits “arises out of equity’s aversion to a claimant who seeks to exploit irreconcilable positions”).

2021Sprague v. Sprague, 363 S.W.3d 788, 794 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (citing McAlister v. McAlister, 75 S.W.3d 481 , 483-84 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied), and Waite, 150 S.W.3d at 807 n.13); see Tex. Fam.

2012Co. v. Liedeker, 958 S.W.2d 382, 386 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (“Acceptance of cash benefits has been held as an exception to the general rule announced in Carle.”); see also Sprague v. Sprague, 363 S.W.3d 788, 793 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. filed) (explaining that ■ the acceptance of benefits doctrine does not apply if the benefit accepted was cash, the use of which would not prejudice the appellee).

2012See Richards v. Richards, 371 S.W.3d 412, 414-115 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Smith v. Tex. Commerce Bank-Corpus Christi, N.A., 822 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied) (concluding that appellant’s failure to establish exception to acceptance-of-benefits doctrine prevented challenge to the judgment on appeal).

2010However, narrow exceptions to the acceptance of benefits doctrine exist; the doctrine does not apply if: (1) reversal of the judgment could not possibly affect Juan’s right to the benefits already secured under it, see Waite v. Waite , 150 S.W.3d 797, 804 (Tex. App.– Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (citing Tex. State Bank v. Amaro , 87 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. 2002); Carle , 234 S.W.2d at 1004 ; Blaylock v. Blaylock , 603 S.W.2d 254, 255 (Tex. Civ. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ)); (2) economic circumstances compelled Juan to accept benefits, see Smith v. Tex. Commerce Bank Corpu

2011See Nguyen v. Woodley, 273 S.W.3d 891 , 899 & n.6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (holding that a trial court correctly granted summary judgment on a ground contained in a supplement that was filed with leave of court); Mowbray v. Avery, 76 S.W.3d 663 , 687–88 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied) (overruling an appellant‘s issue concerning the trial court‘s consideration of a supplemental motion for summary judgment).

2011See Nguyen v. Woodley, 273 S.W.3d 891 , 899 & n. 6 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (holding that a trial court correctly granted summary judgment on a ground contained in a supplement that was filed with leave of court); Mowbray v. Avery, 76 S.W.3d 663, 687-88 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied) (overruling an appellant’s issue concerning the trial court’s consideration of a supplemental motion for summary judgment).

2021Sprague v. Sprague, 363 S.W.3d 788, 794 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (citing McAlister v. McAlister, 75 S.W.3d 481 , 483-84 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied), and Waite, 150 S.W.3d at 807 n.13); see Tex. Fam.

2012McAlister v. McAlister, 75 S.W.3d 481, 483-84 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied); Waite, 150 S.W.3d at 807, n. 13 .

2015“The doctrine arises most often in divorce cases in which one spouse accepts certain assets awarded by the judgment and then seeks to appeal the remainder of the judgment.” Williams v. LifeCare Hosps. of N. Tex., L.P., 207 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.); Waite v Waite, 150 S.W.3d 797, 803 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). “[A] party who has accepted the benefits of a judgment is estopped from challenging the judgment by appeal.” Waite, 150 S.W.3d at 803 ; see also Leedy, 399 S.W.3d at 339 ; Dorai v. Dorai, No. 01-12-00308-CV, 2013 WL 1694866 , at *1-2 (T

2014“The doctrine arises most often in divorce cases in which one spouse accepts certain assets awarded by the judgment and then seeks to appeal the remainder of the judgment.” Williams v. LifeCare Hosps. of N. Tex., L.P., 207 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.); Waite v Waite, 150 S.W.3d 797, 803 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet.denied). “[A] party who has accepted the benefits of a judgment is estopped from challenging the judgment by appeal.” Waite, 150 S.W.3d at 803 ; see also Leedy, 399 S.W.3d at 339 ; Dorai v. Dorai, No. 01-12-00308-CV, 2013 WL 1694866 , at *1-2 (Te

2025Thus, given this record and Nutt’s arguments on appeal, Nutt has failed to meet the burden to establish that the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine applies, and we deny Nutt’s motion to 8 dismiss Blackburn’s cross-appeal. 5 This conclusion is consistent with “the policy that ‘an adjudication on the merits is preferred in Texas.’” Id. at 227 (quoting Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752, 756 (Tex. 2012)).

2022Id. at 227 (quoting Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752, 756 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 86 (Tex. 1992))); see Matter of Marriage of A.W.E. & D.M.F.N., No. 05-19-01303-CV, 2021 WL 822492 , at *3, *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 4, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). 11 of which title is finally vested.” Id. (quoting Zagorski v. Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)).

2017See id.

2017The acceptance-of-benefits doctrine “often arises in divorce cases when one spouse accepts some of the benefits of the judgment and then tries to appeal the judgment.” In re M.A.H., 365 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Tex. App—Dallas 2012).

2016See Estate of McDaniel, 935 S.W.2d at 829 . 8 Because Holcomb is, in my view, contrary to Trevino and is an aberration in the case law, it does not apply.

2016See Trevino, 564 S.W.2d at 685-86 ; see also Estate of McDaniel, 935 S.W.2d at 829 ; Estate of Davis, 870 S.W.2d at 322 ; Sheffield, 620 S.W.2d at 693-94 ; see also, e.g., Carle, 234 S.W.2d at 1004 (“[a] litigant cannot treat a judgment as both right and wrong”); Graham v. Caballero, 243 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (“One may not accept and received the benefits of a judgment and deny its validity.”).

2016See Trevino, 564 S.W.2d at 685–86; see also Estate of McDaniel, 935 S.W.2d at 829 ; Estate of Davis, 870 S.W.2d at 322 ; Sheffield, 620 S.W.2d at 693–94; see also, e.g., Carle, 234 S.W.2d at 1004 (“[a] litigant cannot treat a judgment as both right and wrong”); Graham v. Caballero, 243 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex. Civ.

2016See Trevino, 564 S.W.2d at 685-86 ; see also Estate of McDaniel, 935 S.W.2d at 829 ; Estate of Davis, 870 S.W.2d at 322 ; Sheffield, 620 S.W.2d at 693-94 ; see also, e.g., Carle, 234 S.W.2d at 1004 (“[a] litigant cannot treat a judgment as both right and wrong”); Graham v. Caballero, 243 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (“One may not accept and received the benefits of a judgment and deny its validity.”).

2011See Nguyen v. Woodley, 273 S.W.3d 891 , 899 & n.6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (holding that a trial court correctly granted summary judgment on a ground contained in a supplement that was filed with leave of court); Mowbray v. Avery, 76 S.W.3d 663 , 687–88 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied) (overruling an appellant‘s issue concerning the trial court‘s consideration of a supplemental motion for summary judgment).

2011See Nguyen v. Woodley, 273 S.W.3d 891 , 899 & n. 6 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (holding that a trial court correctly granted summary judgment on a ground contained in a supplement that was filed with leave of court); Mowbray v. Avery, 76 S.W.3d 663, 687-88 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied) (overruling an appellant’s issue concerning the trial court’s consideration of a supplemental motion for summary judgment).

2013Cash Benefits Exception Lastly, Kedren contends that the Cash Benefits Exception applies because the only benefit she accepted from Brad was cash, which the trial court could simply have taken into account when making any new division of property in the event of a remand, citing Demler v. Demler, 836 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, no writ), disapproved on other grounds, Dallas Mkt.

2012Sprague, 363 S.W.3d at 793 ; Demler, 836 S.W.2d at 698 . *317 In summary, we conclude that Sharyon could not have accepted benefits from a non-existent March 27, 2009 decree.