11 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1956–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hamilton v. Dallas Countygreen2 sentences2024See City of Pasadena v. Poulos, No. 01-22-00676-CV, 2023 WL 7134974 , at *10 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 31, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Hamilton v. Dallas Cnty., 79 F.4th 494 , 499–502 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc)). 2023See Hamilton v. Dallas Cnty., 79 F.4th 494 , 499–502 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc). | 2 | 2 |
Elgaghil v. Tarrant County Junior Collegegreen1 sentence2024Junior Coll., 45 S.W.3d 133, 142 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied) (stating that TCHRA was “designed to address ultimate employment decisions, not every action that occurs in the workplace that makes an employee unhappy”). 7 As this Court recently noted, the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc has recently concluded that limiting Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision only to “ultimate employment decisions” was inconsistent with the language of Title VII itself, and the court abandoned this requirement for demonstrating an adverse employment action. | 1 | 1 |
State of Texas v. Duarte, Gilbertgreen1 sentence2024Whereas Aguilar created a two-prong test for affidavit sufficiency, the Court later abandoned that test in Gates to return to the “totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally informed probable-cause determinations.” See Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 355 (analyzing Aguilar and Gates). | 1 | 1 |
Standard Fruit & Vegetable Co. v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2015Cf. Standard Fruit and Vegetable Co., Inc. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Tex. 1998) (finding that a litigant “cannot wait more than six months and then argue that ‘justice’ requires that he be permitted post- argument to resurrect an abandoned claim” via a supplemental brief). | 1 | 1 |
In the Interest of S.D.green2 sentences2014During Father’s homelessness, he refused to stay in shelters for any length of time and constantly moved the children from place to place, did not keep in contact with the Department to obtain services, exposed his children to environments where known drug users were present, and subjected his children to sleeping on pallets behind an abandoned bar and to panhandling on the highway in the heat of summer.30 See S.D., 980 S.W.2d at 763 (stating that conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the child’s physical and emotional well-being). 2014See S.D., 980 S.W.2d at 763 (stating that conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the child’s physical and emotional well-being). | 1 | 1 |
Woods v. Stategreen2 sentences2007See Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 34 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). 2007See Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 34 (Tex. Crim.App.1997). | 1 | 1 |
Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Reesegreen2 sentences1984See Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835 , 839 n. 2 (Tex.1979). 1984See Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835 , 839 n. 2 (Tex.1979). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schering Corp. v. Giesecke
green
2 sentences1992Relying on Schering Corp. v. Giesecke, 589 S.W.2d 516 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.), a pre-Dun-can case, the court adopts a dollar-for-dollar credit for a previous pretrial settlement. 1992Relying on Schering Corp. v. Giesecke, 589 S.W.2d 516 (Tex.Civ.App. Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.), a re-Duncan case, the court adopts a dollar-fordollar credit for a previous pretrial settlement. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Ex Parte McWilliams
green
1 sentence1983In Ex parte McWilliams, 634 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), the Court abandoned the doctrine, pointing out substantial reasons for doing so. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Aultman v. Dallas Railway & Terminal Co.
green
2 sentences1964Rule 434 and Rule 503, T.R.C.P.; Aultman v. Dallas Railway & Terminal Co., 152 Tex. 509 , 260 S.W.2d 596, 600 . 1964Rule 434 and Rule 503, T.R.C.P.; Aultman v. Dallas Railway & Terminal Co., 152 Tex. 509 , 260 S.W.2d 596, 600 . | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Bell v. Blackwell
green
2 sentences1956It probably would under the abandoned rule of Bell v. Blackwell, Tex.Com.App., 283 S.W. 765 , but under the present harmless error rule before we can reverse we must be able to say, not only that error was committed, but that the error was one which was calculated to prejudice and probably did prejudice appellant in the end result. 1956It probably would under the abandoned rule of Bell v. Blackwell, Tex.Com.App., 283 S.W. 765 , but under the present harmless error rule before we can reverse we must be able to say, not only that error was committed, but that the error was one which was calculated to prejudice and probably did prejudice appellant in the end result. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.