77 California opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2026 27 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Poggigreen2 sentences2026However, on appeal Padilla argues only that the statements in the footage are not excited utterances and therefore should have been excluded on that ground and does not raise Evidence Code section 352. 4 evidence and review for abuse of discretion its decision to admit evidence under the spontaneous statement exception.” (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 65 .) “ ‘To render [statements] admissible [under the excited utterance exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unrefl 2022It doesn’t qualify.” Evidence Code section 1240 provides: “Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.” For an out-of- court statement to fall within the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule, “ ‘(1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous a | 12 | 26 |
People v. Merrimangreen2 sentences2026Applicable Legal Standards Evidence Code section 1240 provides, “Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.” “For an out-of-court statement to fall within the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule, ‘ “(1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontan 2026However, on appeal Padilla argues only that the statements in the footage are not excited utterances and therefore should have been excluded on that ground and does not raise Evidence Code section 352. 4 evidence and review for abuse of discretion its decision to admit evidence under the spontaneous statement exception.” (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 65 .) “ ‘To render [statements] admissible [under the excited utterance exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unrefl | 6 | 15 |
People v. Farmergreen2 sentences2022It doesn’t qualify.” Evidence Code section 1240 provides: “Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.” For an out-of- court statement to fall within the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule, “ ‘(1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous a 2007The fact that a statement is made in response to questioning is one factor suggesting the answer may be the product of deliberation, but it does not ipso facto deprive the statement of spontaneity.” {People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 903-904 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 508 , 765 P.2d 940 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724, fn. 6 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396 , 996 P.2d 46 ].) The decision to admit evidence under Evidence Code section 1240 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. {People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 236 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 , 991 P.2d 145 ].) “Wheth | 5 | 8 |
People v. Browngreen2 sentences2026Applicable Legal Standards Evidence Code section 1240 provides, “Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.” “For an out-of-court statement to fall within the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule, ‘ “(1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontan 2020People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 541 [the trial court properly considered the declarant “was crying, shaking and visibly upset” when making the statement].) “[N]o one factor or combination of factors is dispositive. [Citations.]” (People v. Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th 1, 64-65 .) “Because the . . . requirement. . . that the statement was made before there was ‘“time to contrive and misrepresent,”’ ‘relates to the peculiar facts of the individual case more than the [other requirements] [citations], the discretion of the trial court is at its broadest when it determines whether this requir | 5 | 6 |
People v. Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2025Code, § 1240.) 10 For hearsay to be admissible under the spontaneous statement exception, “ ‘ “(1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Spontaneous statements are deemed sufficien 2025Code, § 1240.) For hearsay to be admissible under the spontaneous statement exception, “ ‘ “(1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous 10 excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Spontaneous statements are deemed sufficien | 4 | 9 |
People v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences2021Otherwise, the statement would be hearsay on hearsay and admissible only if each layer of hearsay separately met the requirements of an exception to the hearsay rule. [Citation.]” (People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 235 .) In a multiple, “nested” hearsay situation, the multiple hearsay is admissible only “if each hearsay layer separately meets the requirements of a hearsay exception. [Citation.]” (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 149 ; People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 714 , disapproved on other grounds by People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390 .) “ ‘Whether the requirements 2020(People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 65 ; People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 236 .) Any preliminary factfinding undertaken to determine whether the requisite elements of the spontaneous statement exception have been met will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. | 4 | 8 |
People v. Saracoglugreen2 sentences2025(People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 185-186 ; People v. Saracoglu (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1584, 1588-1590 (Saracoglu).) “‘The crucial element in determining whether a declaration is sufficiently reliable to be admissible under this exception to the hearsay rule is . . . the mental state of the speaker.’” (Mataele, at p. 411.) 11 When Kent was shot, Kevin was standing near him, just on the other side of the car. 2013(People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 236 [ 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58 , 991 P.2d 145 ].) „Whether the requirements of the spontaneous statement exception are satisfied in any given case is, in general, largely a question of fact. [Citation.] The 11 determination of the question is vested in the court, not the jury. [Citation.] In performing this task, the court “necessarily [exercises] some element of discretion . . . .” [Citation.]‟” (People v. Saracoglu (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1584, 1588-1589 .) As our Supreme Court explained in People v. Gutierrez, supra, 45 Cal.4th 789 , “The word „spontaneo | 3 | 5 |
People v. Mataelegreen2 sentences2026Applicable Legal Standards Evidence Code section 1240 provides, “Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.” “For an out-of-court statement to fall within the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule, ‘ “(1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontan 2026Applicable Legal Standards Evidence Code section 1240 provides, “Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.” “For an out-of-court statement to fall within the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule, ‘ “(1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontan | 3 | 4 |
People v. Waidlagreen2 sentences2022It doesn’t qualify.” Evidence Code section 1240 provides: “Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.” For an out-of- court statement to fall within the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule, “ ‘(1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous a 2007The fact that a statement is made in response to questioning is one factor suggesting the answer may be the product of deliberation, but it does not ipso facto deprive the statement of spontaneity.” {People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 903-904 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 508 , 765 P.2d 940 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724, fn. 6 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396 , 996 P.2d 46 ].) The decision to admit evidence under Evidence Code section 1240 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. {People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 236 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 , 991 P.2d 145 ].) “Wheth | 3 | 4 |
People v. Blackshergreen2 sentences2014Thus, the touchstone questions are whether a statement is hearsay offered against a criminal defendant, whether the statement is otherwise admissible under a hearsay exception, and, if so, whether the statement is testimonial.” (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 813 [(Blacksher)].) The juvenile court found M.E.’s statement admissible against appellant under the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule. 2014Thus, the touchstone questions are whether a statement is hearsay offered against a criminal defendant, whether the statement is otherwise admissible under a hearsay exception, and, if so, whether the statement is testimonial.” (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 813 [(Blacksher)].) The juvenile court found M.E.’s statement admissible against appellant under the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule. | 3 | 4 |
People v. Raleyred2 sentences2015(Poggi, at pp. 318-320; see People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870 , 893–894 [statement made 18 hours after event held spontaneous under Evid. 2009For example, in People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 893-894 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678 , 830 P.2d 712 ], the victim of a sexual attack suffered a traumatic head injury, was near death and had been lying in a ravine bleeding for 18 hours when she made the relevant statements. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Lynchgreen2 sentences2026(Mataele, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 410 .) The dispute is over the second requirement, namely, whether the statement was made “before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance.” (Ibid.) “[T]he discretion of the trial court is at its broadest when it determines whether this requirement is met.’ ” (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693 , 752.) 3. 2020People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 541 [the trial court properly considered the declarant “was crying, shaking and visibly upset” when making the statement].) “[N]o one factor or combination of factors is dispositive. [Citations.]” (People v. Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th 1, 64-65 .) “Because the . . . requirement. . . that the statement was made before there was ‘“time to contrive and misrepresent,”’ ‘relates to the peculiar facts of the individual case more than the [other requirements] [citations], the discretion of the trial court is at its broadest when it determines whether this requir | 2 | 5 |
People v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2014Code, § 1240.) “‘“To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘Whether the require 2012When hearsay is admitted from other sources, expert witnesses are “not precluded from reiterating the same facts during their direct examination.” (People v. Dean (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 186, 193 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 478 ] (Dean).) The court admitted the Interdisciplinary Notes under section 1280, the public records exception to the hearsay rule. 2 “ ‘The object of this hearsay exception “is to eliminate the calling of each witness involved in preparation of the record and substitute the record of the transaction instead.” ’ ” (Bhatt v. State Dept, of Health Services (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 923, 929 | 2 | 5 |
People v. Penunurigreen2 sentences2022(Cf. Penunuri, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 152–153 [spontaneous statement exception satisfied where at the time of the statement the declarant “was out of breath” and his “ ‘eyes were big’ ”].) The admission of this testimony as a spontaneous statement was in error. 2020People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 541 [the trial court properly considered the declarant “was crying, shaking and visibly upset” when making the statement].) “[N]o one factor or combination of factors is dispositive. [Citations.]” (People v. Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th 1, 64-65 .) “Because the . . . requirement. . . that the statement was made before there was ‘“time to contrive and misrepresent,”’ ‘relates to the peculiar facts of the individual case more than the [other requirements] [citations], the discretion of the trial court is at its broadest when it determines whether this requir | 2 | 3 |
People v. Trimblegreen2 sentences2026Here, because Jane Doe did not compose Exhibit 2 until “a couple of weeks” after Renfroe sexually assaulted her, a significant amount of time had passed, making it very unlikely that Jane Doe’s “reflective powers” were still “in abeyance.” (Id. at p. 410.) “[O]ur high court has explained that ‘allowing admission of a statement that was made approximately eight hours after the startling event may be the exception rather than the rule’ [Citation.] And in each of the cases upholding application of the spontaneous statement exception after a delay, the declarant was still laboring under the immedi 2026Here, because Jane Doe did not compose Exhibit 2 until “a couple of weeks” after Renfroe sexually assaulted her, a significant amount of time had passed, making it very unlikely that Jane Doe’s “reflective powers” were still “in abeyance.” (Id. at p. 410.) “[O]ur high court has explained that ‘allowing admission of a statement that was made approximately eight hours after the startling event may be the exception rather than the rule’ [Citation.] And in each of the cases upholding application of the spontaneous statement exception after a delay, the declarant was still laboring under the immedi | 2 | 2 |
People v. Stanphillgreen2 sentences2020People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 541 [the trial court properly considered the declarant “was crying, shaking and visibly upset” when making the statement].) “[N]o one factor or combination of factors is dispositive. [Citations.]” (People v. Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th 1, 64-65 .) “Because the . . . requirement. . . that the statement was made before there was ‘“time to contrive and misrepresent,”’ ‘relates to the peculiar facts of the individual case more than the [other requirements] [citations], the discretion of the trial court is at its broadest when it determines whether this requir 2020(Stanphill, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 81 .) According to the Stanphill court, “ ‘[t]he theory of the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule is that since the statement is made spontaneously, while under the stress of excitement and with no opportunity to contrive or reflect, it is particularly likely to be truthful. . . . | 1 | 4 |
People v. ANTHONY O.green2 sentences2025(People v. Anthony O. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 428, 436 .) However, as we discuss below, unavailability is a requirement under Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 53–54. 2013“Whether the requirements of the spontaneous statement exception are satisfied in any given case is, in general, largely a question of fact. [Citation.] The determination of the question is vested in the court, not the jury. [Citation.] In performing this task, the court ‘necessarily [exercises] some element of discretion .…’ [Citation.]” (People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 318 .) The preliminary facts that bring statements within the exception require only proof by a preponderance of the evidence (People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 966 ; People v. Anthony O. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 4 | 1 | 3 |
People v. Corellagreen2 sentences2022In People v. Corella (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 461, 469 , the court observed: “it is difficult to identify any circumstances under which a section 1240 spontaneous statement would be ‘testimonial.’ The rationale of the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule is that the utterance must be made without reflection or deliberation due to 13 the stress of excitement. [Citation.] . . . [S]tatements made without reflection or deliberation are not made in contemplation of their ‘testimonial’ use in a future trial.” (Fn. omitted.) We concur with this rationale, and it applies here. 2015If the information the parties knew at the time of the encounter would lead a reasonable person to believe that there was an emergency, even if that belief was later proved incorrect, that is sufficient for purposes of the Confrontation Clause….” (Id. at p. 361, fn. 8.) 23. “[I]t is difficult to identify any circumstances under which [an Evidence Code] section 1240 spontaneous statement would be ‘testimonial.’ The rationale of the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule is that the utterance must be made without reflection or deliberation due to the stress of excitement. [Citation. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Ramirezgreen2 sentences2021Otherwise, the statement would be hearsay on hearsay and admissible only if each layer of hearsay separately met the requirements of an exception to the hearsay rule. [Citation.]” (People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 235 .) In a multiple, “nested” hearsay situation, the multiple hearsay is admissible only “if each hearsay layer separately meets the requirements of a hearsay exception. [Citation.]” (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 149 ; People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 714 , disapproved on other grounds by People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390 .) “ ‘Whether the requirements 2016(Ibid.) “‘Whether the requirements of the spontaneous statement exception are satisfied in any given case is, in general, largely a question of fact. [Citation.] The determination of the question is vested in the court, not the jury.’” (People v. Ramirez, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1523 .) “On appeal, determination of preliminary facts by the trial court made in the course of deciding the admissibility of hearsay evidence will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 831 .) The statement Soderbergh heard satisfies the first requirement: th | 1 | 3 |
Showalter v. Western Pacific Railroadgreen2 sentences2016Co. (1940) 16 Cal.2d 460, 468 [ 106 P.2d 895 ].) “Whether an out-of-court statement meets the statutory requirements for admission as a spontaneous statement is generally a question of fact for the trial court, the determination of which involves an exercise of the court’s discretion. [Citation.] We will uphold the trial court’s determination of facts when they are supported by substantial evidence and review for abuse of discretion its decision to admit evidence under the spontaneous statement exception. [Citations.]” (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 65 [ 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 332 P.3d 2016Co. (1940) 16 Cal.2d 460, 468 [ 106 P.2d 895 ].) “Whether an out-of-court statement meets the statutory requirements for admission as a spontaneous statement is generally a question of fact for the trial court, the determination of which involves an exercise of the court’s discretion. [Citation.] We will uphold the trial court’s determination of facts when they are supported by substantial evidence and review for abuse of discretion its decision to admit evidence under the spontaneous statement exception. [Citations.]” (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 65 [ 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 332 P.3d | 1 | 3 |
People v. Morrisongreen2 sentences2014(Ibid.) “Whether the requirements of the spontaneous statement exception are satisfied in any given case is, in general, largely a question of fact. [Citation.] The determination of the question is vested in the court, not the jury.” (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318 .) “The trial court must consider each fact pattern on its own merits and is vested with reasonable discretion in the matter.” (People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 719 .) “The crucial element in determining whether an out-of-court statement is admissible as a spontaneous declaration is the mental state of the speake 2014(Ibid.) “Whether the requirements of the spontaneous statement exception are satisfied in any given case is, in general, largely a question of fact. [Citation.] The determination of the question is vested in the court, not the jury.” (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318 .) “The trial court must consider each fact pattern on its own merits and is vested with reasonable discretion in the matter.” (People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 719 .) “The crucial element in determining whether an out-of-court statement is admissible as a spontaneous declaration is the mental state of the speake | 1 | 3 |
People v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2025Evidence Code section 1200, subdivisions (a) and (b) provide: “(a) ‘Hearsay evidence’ is evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated. “(b) Except as provided by law, hearsay evidence is inadmissible.” Evidence Code section 1240, subdivisions (a) and (b) state the “spontaneous statement” exception to the hearsay rule as follows: “(a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and “(b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was u 2020People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 541 [the trial court properly considered the declarant “was crying, shaking and visibly upset” when making the statement].) “[N]o one factor or combination of factors is dispositive. [Citations.]” (People v. Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th 1, 64-65 .) “Because the . . . requirement. . . that the statement was made before there was ‘“time to contrive and misrepresent,”’ ‘relates to the peculiar facts of the individual case more than the [other requirements] [citations], the discretion of the trial court is at its broadest when it determines whether this requir | 1 | 2 |
People v. Pirwanigreen2 sentences2024The “ ‘ “crucial element” ’ ” in the spontaneous statement exception is “ ‘ “the mental state of the speaker.” ’ ” (People v. Pirwani (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 770 , 6 789.) The missing foundation pieces described ante are meant to aid in establishing Garcia’s mental state. 2007The fact that a statement is made in response to questioning is one factor suggesting the answer may be the product of deliberation, but it does not ipso facto deprive the statement of spontaneity.” {People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 903-904 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 508 , 765 P.2d 940 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724, fn. 6 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396 , 996 P.2d 46 ].) The decision to admit evidence under Evidence Code section 1240 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. {People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 236 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 , 991 P.2d 145 ].) “Wheth | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Hovartergreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Karisgreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Francisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cagegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lazanisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Sanchezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cagegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Fuiavagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Gutierrezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Provenciogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Loygreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Tanya P.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Deangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bhatt v. State Department of Health Servicesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Loper v. Morrisongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bernsteingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2022Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion admitting the call under the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule.5 b) T.H.’s Statements Are Not Testimonial and Do Not Implicate the Sixth Amendment In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause bars testimonial hearsay unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant and he or she is unavailable to testify. ( Crawford, supra, 5 We need not address the People’s argument that T.H.’s statements were separately admissible under Evidence Co 2022Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion admitting the call under the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule.5 b) T.H.’s Statements Are Not Testimonial and Do Not Implicate the Sixth Amendment In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause bars testimonial hearsay unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant and he or she is unavailable to testify. ( Crawford, supra, 5 We need not address the People’s argument that T.H.’s statements were separately admissible under Evidence Co | 9 | 2004–2025 |
People v. Washington
green
2 sentences2025The context of statements is critical when considering that exception because its application is limited to statements “made under the stress of excitement and while the reflective powers were still in abeyance.” (People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1170, 1176 ; see also Evid. 2024Code, § 1240.) The proponent of the statement must also show that the declarant had “no time to contrive.” (People v. Hughey (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1383, 1388 .) But “[n]either lapse of time between the event and the declarations nor the fact that the declarations were elicited by questioning deprives the statements of spontaneity if it nevertheless appears that they were made under the stress of excitement and while the reflective powers were still in abeyance.” (People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1170, 1176 .) A trial court’s “preliminary factfinding undertaken to determine whether the req | 3 | 1988–2025 |
People v. Turner
green
2 sentences2024Code, § 1200, subd. (b).)” (People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 821 .) “To qualify for admission under the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule, ‘an utterance must first purport to describe or explain an act or condition perceived by the declarant. 2023Code, § 1200, subd. (b).)” (People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 821 .) One such statutory exception is the spontaneous statement exception. | 3 | 2023–2024 |
People v. Riccardi
green
2 sentences2020(People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 831 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216 .) 4 In attacking each piece of challenged hearsay here—the body camera footage capturing Roy’s statements to Officer Smith, as well as Officer Kryvoruka’s testimony describing Roy’s identification at the cold show— Liggins makes the same argument: According to him, Roy was sufficiently calm when she spoke to Officers Smith and Kryvoruka that her statements cannot be considered excited utterances, and thus do not qualify for admission under the spontaneous statement exce 2016(Ibid.) “‘Whether the requirements of the spontaneous statement exception are satisfied in any given case is, in general, largely a question of fact. [Citation.] The determination of the question is vested in the court, not the jury.’” (People v. Ramirez, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1523 .) “On appeal, determination of preliminary facts by the trial court made in the course of deciding the admissibility of hearsay evidence will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 831 .) The statement Soderbergh heard satisfies the first requirement: th | 3 | 2013–2020 |
People v. Sanchez
green
2 sentences2026(People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 319 [“the fact that the declarant has become calm enough to speak coherently also is not inconsistent with spontaneity”]; People v. Jones (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 653, 662 [“[c]almness . . . does not necessarily defeat admissibility of a spontaneous statement”]; People v. Francis (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 241, 254 [“[t]hough the declarations were made in a calm manner, this does not necessarily indicate a lack of spontaneity” because calmness was a “ ‘manifestation of shock’ ”].) Our Supreme Court’s holding in People v. Sanchez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 14 (Sanchez) is i 2020Code, § 353, subd. (a); Cage, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 282 [“Defendant forfeited his claims by failing to object to any of the testimony on the grounds he now raises.”]; People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 721 [“‘“In accordance with [section 353 of the Evidence Code], we have consistently held that the ‘defendant’s failure to make a timely and specific objection’ on the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not cognizable.”’”].) Even if Daniels had not forfeited his evidentiary challenge, the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting Cindy’s statements to Officer Luna under | 2 | 2020–2026 |
People v. Hughey
green
2 sentences2024Code, § 1240.) The proponent of the statement must also show that the declarant had “no time to contrive.” (People v. Hughey (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1383, 1388 .) But “[n]either lapse of time between the event and the declarations nor the fact that the declarations were elicited by questioning deprives the statements of spontaneity if it nevertheless appears that they were made under the stress of excitement and while the reflective powers were still in abeyance.” (People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1170, 1176 .) A trial court’s “preliminary factfinding undertaken to determine whether the req 2001(People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 319-320; People v. Hughey, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d 1383, 1388 ; People v. Forgason (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 356, 365 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 263 ].) State of Mind Evidence Hearsay is a statement made other than while testifying as a witness, which statement is offered in the trial to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. | 2 | 2001–2024 |
People v. McKinnon
green
2 sentences2022(People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 752 (Lynch), abrogated on other grounds by People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610 .) “ ‘[T]he discretion of the trial court is at its broadest’ when it determines whether an utterance was made while the declarant was still in a state of nervous excitement.” (Thomas, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 496 .) We have “rarely held” that answers to extensive questioning by police officers constitute spontaneous statements. 2021Code, § 1240.) “[T]he basis for the circumstantial trustworthiness of spontaneous utterances is that in the stress of nervous excitement, the reflective faculties may be stilled and the utterance may become the instinctive and uninhibited expression of the speaker’s actual impressions and belief.” (People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 903 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724, fn. 6 .) 48. “ ‘To be admissible, “(1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce … nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) t | 2 | 2021–2022 |
| People v. Smith green | 2 | 2014–2021 |
| San Bernardino County Department of Public Social Services v. Ebrahim A. green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. Rincon green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Alvarez green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Goldsmith green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Kopatz green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Clay green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Haskell neutral | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Oiye v. Fox green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Arreola green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Lane v. Pacific Greyhound Lines green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Cruz green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Gagnon v. Scarpelli red | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Morrissey v. Brewer green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Gurule green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Davis v. Washington green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Roldan green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Arias green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Arauz green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Doolin green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Rangel green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Maury green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Urke green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Gonzales green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Michigan v. Bryant green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Tewksbury green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Franklin green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Hill green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Homick green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Wilcox v. Berry green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.