nied claim in Alaska

2008But see Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson Coll., 743 P.2d 356, 365-66 (Alaska 1987) (affirming the rejection of an NIED claim where plaintiff was 150 miles away when he learned of the accident injuring his son and had no "sudden sensory observation" of his injured son). .

2008But see Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson Coll., 743 P.2d 356, 365-66 (Alaska 1987) (affirming the rejection of an NIED claim where plaintiff was 150 miles away when he learned of the accident injuring his son and had no "sudden sensory observation" of his injured son). [145] See Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, Relationship Between Victim and Plaintiff-Witness as Affecting Right to Recover Under State Law for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Due to Witnessing Injury to Another Where Bystander Plaintiff Is Not Member of Victim's Immediate Family, 98 A.L.R.5TH 609, 621-22 (2002) ("The re

2025In Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc., we affirmed dismissal of an IIED claim by corporate shareholders against a corporation, reasoning “to the extent that the IIED claim is based on [the corporation’s] lawsuit against the [shareholders], filing that lawsuit is privileged and cannot be the basis of IIED liability.” 31 We cited with approval a Texas decision holding that “the institution and prosecution of a civil suit afford no cause of action for damages against the party suing except in cases of malicious prosecution or abuse of process.”32 If filing a lawsuit cannot be the basis for intentional inf

2025In Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc., we affirmed dismissal of an IIED claim by corporate shareholders against a corporation, reasoning “to the extent that the IIED claim is based on [the corporation’s] lawsuit against the [shareholders], filing that lawsuit is privileged and cannot be the basis of IIED liability.” 31 We cited with approval a Texas decision holding that “the institution and prosecution of a civil suit afford no cause of action for damages against the party suing except in cases of malicious prosecution or abuse of process.”32 If filing a lawsuit cannot be the basis for intentional inf

2008Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 201-04 (Alaska 1995). [144] See Beck, 837 P.2d at 109-10 (holding that a plaintiff who saw her injured daughter "for the first time" in the hospital could assert an NIED claim); Tommy's Elbow Room, 727 P.2d at 1040, 1043 (holding that a plaintiff who arrived at the scene of a car accident in time to find his daughter injured and being removed from the car could assert an NIED claim).

2008Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 201-04 (Alaska 1995). [144] See Beck, 837 P.2d at 109-10 (holding that a plaintiff who saw her injured daughter "for the first time" in the hospital could assert an NIED claim); Tommy's Elbow Room, 727 P.2d at 1040, 1043 (holding that a plaintiff who arrived at the scene of a car accident in time to find his daughter injured and being removed from the car could assert an NIED claim).

2011Co. v. Teel, 100 P.3d 2, 4 (Alaska 2004) ("We construe grants of coverage broadly and interpret exclusions narrowly."); Spenard Action Comm. v. Lot 3, Block 1, Evergreen Subdivision, 902 P.2d 766, 773 (Alaska 1995) ("[W]e construe these statutes in a manner to avoid frustrating their remedial purpose."). [40] Dowdy II, 192 P.3d at 998 ("Ambiguities in. . . insurance policies are to be construed most favorably to an insured, but ambiguities only exist when there are two or more reasonable interpretations of particular policy language."). [41] Id. at 1002 ("[I]t seems plain that the `in the same

2011Co. v. Teel, 100 P.3d 2, 4 (Alaska 2004) ("We construe grants of coverage broadly and interpret exclusions narrowly."); Spenard Action Comm. v. Lot 3, Block 1, Evergreen Subdivision, 902 P.2d 766, 773 (Alaska 1995) ("[W]e construe these statutes in a manner to avoid frustrating their remedial purpose."). [40] Dowdy II, 192 P.3d at 998 ("Ambiguities in. . . insurance policies are to be construed most favorably to an insured, but ambiguities only exist when there are two or more reasonable interpretations of particular policy language."). [41] Id. at 1002 ("[I]t seems plain that the `in the same

2008Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 201-04 (Alaska 1995). [144] See Beck, 837 P.2d at 109-10 (holding that a plaintiff who saw her injured daughter "for the first time" in the hospital could assert an NIED claim); Tommy's Elbow Room, 727 P.2d at 1040, 1043 (holding that a plaintiff who arrived at the scene of a car accident in time to find his daughter injured and being removed from the car could assert an NIED claim).

2008Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 201-04 (Alaska 1995). [144] See Beck, 837 P.2d at 109-10 (holding that a plaintiff who saw her injured daughter "for the first time" in the hospital could assert an NIED claim); Tommy's Elbow Room, 727 P.2d at 1040, 1043 (holding that a plaintiff who arrived at the scene of a car accident in time to find his daughter injured and being removed from the car could assert an NIED claim).

1992In Kavorkian and subsequent cases we rejected the “rigid requirement of sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident” and instead focused on “the reasonable foreseeability that the plaintiff-witness would suffer emotional harm.” Id. at 1043 ; Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson College, 743 P.2d 356, 365 (Alaska 1987); Croft v. Wicker, 737 P.2d 789, 791-92 (Alaska 1987).

1992In Kavorkian and subsequent cases we rejected the "rigid requirement of sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident" and instead focused on "the reasonable foreseeability that the plaintiff-witness would suffer emotional harm." Id. at 1043 ; Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson College, 743 P.2d 356, 365 (Alaska 1987); Croft v. Wicker, 737 P.2d 789, 791-92 (Alaska 1987).

2008Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 201-04 (Alaska 1995). [144] See Beck, 837 P.2d at 109-10 (holding that a plaintiff who saw her injured daughter "for the first time" in the hospital could assert an NIED claim); Tommy's Elbow Room, 727 P.2d at 1040, 1043 (holding that a plaintiff who arrived at the scene of a car accident in time to find his daughter injured and being removed from the car could assert an NIED claim).

2008Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 201-04 (Alaska 1995). [144] See Beck, 837 P.2d at 109-10 (holding that a plaintiff who saw her injured daughter "for the first time" in the hospital could assert an NIED claim); Tommy's Elbow Room, 727 P.2d at 1040, 1043 (holding that a plaintiff who arrived at the scene of a car accident in time to find his daughter injured and being removed from the car could assert an NIED claim).

2025In Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc., we affirmed dismissal of an IIED claim by corporate shareholders against a corporation, reasoning “to the extent that the IIED claim is based on [the corporation’s] lawsuit against the [shareholders], filing that lawsuit is privileged and cannot be the basis of IIED liability.” 31 We cited with approval a Texas decision holding that “the institution and prosecution of a civil suit afford no cause of action for damages against the party suing except in cases of malicious prosecution or abuse of process.”32 If filing a lawsuit cannot be the basis for intentional inf

2025In Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc., we affirmed dismissal of an IIED claim by corporate shareholders against a corporation, reasoning “to the extent that the IIED claim is based on [the corporation’s] lawsuit against the [shareholders], filing that lawsuit is privileged and cannot be the basis of IIED liability.” 31 We cited with approval a Texas decision holding that “the institution and prosecution of a civil suit afford no cause of action for damages against the party suing except in cases of malicious prosecution or abuse of process.”32 If filing a lawsuit cannot be the basis for intentional inf

2025In Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc., we affirmed dismissal of an IIED claim by corporate shareholders against a corporation, reasoning “to the extent that the IIED claim is based on [the corporation’s] lawsuit against the [shareholders], filing that lawsuit is privileged and cannot be the basis of IIED liability.” 31 We cited with approval a Texas decision holding that “the institution and prosecution of a civil suit afford no cause of action for damages against the party suing except in cases of malicious prosecution or abuse of process.”32 If filing a lawsuit cannot be the basis for intentional inf

2025In Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc., we affirmed dismissal of an IIED claim by corporate shareholders against a corporation, reasoning “to the extent that the IIED claim is based on [the corporation’s] lawsuit against the [shareholders], filing that lawsuit is privileged and cannot be the basis of IIED liability.” 31 We cited with approval a Texas decision holding that “the institution and prosecution of a civil suit afford no cause of action for damages against the party suing except in cases of malicious prosecution or abuse of process.”32 If filing a lawsuit cannot be the basis for intentional inf

2023Id. 47 Concerned Citizens of S. Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447, 452 (Alaska 1974). 48 This conclusion was the basis on which the court denied Doan’s motion to amend her complaint for the third time; the court found that she was attempting to raise new claims, particularly the NIED claim against the doctors. 49 Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 181 (Alaska 2009). -23- 7663 (2) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks”; however, “[n]o technical forms of pleading or motions are required.” 50 “[T]he rule is satisfied by a brief statement that

2023Id. 47 Concerned Citizens of S. Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447, 452 (Alaska 1974). 48 This conclusion was the basis on which the court denied Doan’s motion to amend her complaint for the third time; the court found that she was attempting to raise new claims, particularly the NIED claim against the doctors. 49 Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 181 (Alaska 2009). -23- 7663 (2) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks”; however, “[n]o technical forms of pleading or motions are required.” 50 “[T]he rule is satisfied by a brief statement that

2023Id. 47 Concerned Citizens of S. Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447, 452 (Alaska 1974). 48 This conclusion was the basis on which the court denied Doan’s motion to amend her complaint for the third time; the court found that she was attempting to raise new claims, particularly the NIED claim against the doctors. 49 Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 181 (Alaska 2009). -23- 7663 (2) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks”; however, “[n]o technical forms of pleading or motions are required.” 50 “[T]he rule is satisfied by a brief statement that

2023Id. 47 Concerned Citizens of S. Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447, 452 (Alaska 1974). 48 This conclusion was the basis on which the court denied Doan’s motion to amend her complaint for the third time; the court found that she was attempting to raise new claims, particularly the NIED claim against the doctors. 49 Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 181 (Alaska 2009). -23- 7663 (2) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks”; however, “[n]o technical forms of pleading or motions are required.” 50 “[T]he rule is satisfied by a brief statement that

2023Id. 47 Concerned Citizens of S. Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447, 452 (Alaska 1974). 48 This conclusion was the basis on which the court denied Doan’s motion to amend her complaint for the third time; the court found that she was attempting to raise new claims, particularly the NIED claim against the doctors. 49 Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 181 (Alaska 2009). -23- 7663 (2) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks”; however, “[n]o technical forms of pleading or motions are required.” 50 “[T]he rule is satisfied by a brief statement that

2023Id. 47 Concerned Citizens of S. Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447, 452 (Alaska 1974). 48 This conclusion was the basis on which the court denied Doan’s motion to amend her complaint for the third time; the court found that she was attempting to raise new claims, particularly the NIED claim against the doctors. 49 Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 181 (Alaska 2009). -23- 7663 (2) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks”; however, “[n]o technical forms of pleading or motions are required.” 50 “[T]he rule is satisfied by a brief statement that

2018See Severson v. Estate of Severson , 627 P.2d 649 , 651 (Alaska 1981) (noting that Alaska law does not permit direct actions against an alleged tortfeasor's liability insurer). 3 Under AS 13.16.475(a), a personal representative of an estate can respond to a notice of a claim against the estate by disallowing it. 4 Donahue v. Ledgends, Inc. , 331 P.3d 342 , 346 (Alaska 2014). 5 Id. 6 Beck v. State, Dep't of Transp. & Pub.

2018See Severson v. Estate of Severson , 627 P.2d 649 , 651 (Alaska 1981) (noting that Alaska law does not permit direct actions against an alleged tortfeasor's liability insurer). 3 Under AS 13.16.475(a), a personal representative of an estate can respond to a notice of a claim against the estate by disallowing it. 4 Donahue v. Ledgends, Inc. , 331 P.3d 342 , 346 (Alaska 2014). 5 Id. 6 Beck v. State, Dep't of Transp. & Pub.

2018See Severson v. Estate of Severson , 627 P.2d 649 , 651 (Alaska 1981) (noting that Alaska law does not permit direct actions against an alleged tortfeasor's liability insurer). 3 Under AS 13.16.475(a), a personal representative of an estate can respond to a notice of a claim against the estate by disallowing it. 4 Donahue v. Ledgends, Inc. , 331 P.3d 342 , 346 (Alaska 2014). 5 Id. 6 Beck v. State, Dep't of Transp. & Pub.

2018See Severson v. Estate of Severson , 627 P.2d 649 , 651 (Alaska 1981) (noting that Alaska law does not permit direct actions against an alleged tortfeasor's liability insurer). 3 Under AS 13.16.475(a), a personal representative of an estate can respond to a notice of a claim against the estate by disallowing it. 4 Donahue v. Ledgends, Inc. , 331 P.3d 342 , 346 (Alaska 2014). 5 Id. 6 Beck v. State, Dep't of Transp. & Pub.

2016KEETON, supra note 50, § 54, quoted in Hancock, 808 P.2d at 257 . 52 RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, at § 436A cmt. c. -26- 7119 contain no allegations that would permit recovery if proven.”53 The Cornelisons’ allegations that they suffered great physical harm and physical distress are adequate at the pleading stage to set out the physical injury element of an NIED claim.54 Griffin & Smith denied in its answer the Cornelisons’ allegations that they suffered great physical harm and physical distress.

2016KEETON, supra note 50, § 54, quoted in Hancock, 808 P.2d at 257 . 52 RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, at § 436A cmt. c. -26- 7119 contain no allegations that would permit recovery if proven.”53 The Cornelisons’ allegations that they suffered great physical harm and physical distress are adequate at the pleading stage to set out the physical injury element of an NIED claim.54 Griffin & Smith denied in its answer the Cornelisons’ allegations that they suffered great physical harm and physical distress.

2011Co. v. Teel, 100 P.3d 2, 4 (Alaska 2004) ("We construe grants of coverage broadly and interpret exclusions narrowly."); Spenard Action Comm. v. Lot 3, Block 1, Evergreen Subdivision, 902 P.2d 766, 773 (Alaska 1995) ("[W]e construe these statutes in a manner to avoid frustrating their remedial purpose."). [40] Dowdy II, 192 P.3d at 998 ("Ambiguities in. . . insurance policies are to be construed most favorably to an insured, but ambiguities only exist when there are two or more reasonable interpretations of particular policy language."). [41] Id. at 1002 ("[I]t seems plain that the `in the same

2011Co. v. Teel, 100 P.3d 2, 4 (Alaska 2004) ("We construe grants of coverage broadly and interpret exclusions narrowly."); Spenard Action Comm. v. Lot 3, Block 1, Evergreen Subdivision, 902 P.2d 766, 773 (Alaska 1995) ("[W]e construe these statutes in a manner to avoid frustrating their remedial purpose."). [40] Dowdy II, 192 P.3d at 998 ("Ambiguities in. . . insurance policies are to be construed most favorably to an insured, but ambiguities only exist when there are two or more reasonable interpretations of particular policy language."). [41] Id. at 1002 ("[I]t seems plain that the `in the same