UCL claim in California

2025(Cf. Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 179 ; Madrid v. Perot Systems Corp. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 440, 453 [“in the context of the UCL, ‘restitution’ is limited to the return of property or funds in which the plaintiff has an ownership interest”]; Korea Supply, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 1144–1145 [“We defined an order for ‘restitution’ as one ‘compelling a UCL defendant to return money obtained through an unfair business practice to those persons in interest from whom the property was taken’ ”].)9 Consequently, the trial court did 9 Relying on Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813 , Cou

2025Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 263, 287 .) Thus, “[b]y proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, ‘section 17200 “borrows” violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices’ that the [UCL] makes independently actionable.” (Cel–Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 ; Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370 .) When a UCL claim is derivative of the other alleged causes of action, the “UCL claims rise or fall” with the other claims.

2024(See Nationwide Biweekly, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 326 [describing the UCL’s “primary objective” as “preventive, authorizing the exercise of broad equitable authority to protect consumers”]; Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 382 (Zhang) [“[a] UCL claim does not duplicate the contract and tort causes of action involved in bad faith litigation”]; Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 337 [explaining that injunctive relief “ ‘under the UCL . . . protect[s] consumers from unfair business practices’ ”]; In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 320 [“The purpose of [injunctive] relief, in

2024(See Nationwide Biweekly, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 326 [describing the UCL’s “primary objective” as “preventive, authorizing the exercise of broad equitable authority to protect consumers”]; Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 382 (Zhang) [“[a] UCL claim does not duplicate the contract and tort causes of action involved in bad faith litigation”]; Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 337 [explaining that injunctive relief “ ‘under the UCL . . . protect[s] consumers from unfair business practices’ ”]; In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 320 [“The purpose of [injunctive] relief, in

2026And while EFD claims injunctive relief is required for any UCL violation, in truth the UCL “does not mandate . . . injunctive relief when an unfair business practice has been shown.” (Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 180 .)11 V.

2025(Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 173 .) 16 not err in granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the UCL claim. 2.

2025(Cf. Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 179 ; Madrid v. Perot Systems Corp. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 440, 453 [“in the context of the UCL, ‘restitution’ is limited to the return of property or funds in which the plaintiff has an ownership interest”]; Korea Supply, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 1144–1145 [“We defined an order for ‘restitution’ as one ‘compelling a UCL defendant to return money obtained through an unfair business practice to those persons in interest from whom the property was taken’ ”].)9 Consequently, the trial court did 9 Relying on Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813 , Cou

2025Nguyen conceded in her opposition to the motion for summary judgment that a UCL claim is “not an all-purpose substitute for a tort or contract action” (Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 173 ), but is “equitable in nature,” provides for limited remedies, and does not allow for recovery of damages (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1144 ).

2025Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 263, 287 .) Thus, “[b]y proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, ‘section 17200 “borrows” violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices’ that the [UCL] makes independently actionable.” (Cel–Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 ; Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370 .) When a UCL claim is derivative of the other alleged causes of action, the “UCL claims rise or fall” with the other claims.

2025Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 263, 287 .) Thus, “[b]y proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, ‘section 17200 “borrows” violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices’ that the [UCL] makes independently actionable.” (Cel–Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 ; Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370 .) When a UCL claim is derivative of the other alleged causes of action, the “UCL claims rise or fall” with the other claims.

2025(See Aleksick v. 7-Eleven, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1185 .) Thus, the UCL claim also depends on Rogers’s entitlement to overtime.

2025(See Aleksick v. 7-Eleven, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1185 .) Thus, the UCL claim also depends on Rogers’s entitlement to overtime.

2010Thus a year before Proposition 64 was adopted, the Supreme Court wrote, “A UCL action is equitable in nature; damages cannot be recovered. [Citation.] . . . [Citation.] We have stated that under the UCL, ‘[prevailing plaintiffs are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution.’ ” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1144 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 29 , 63 P.3d 937 ], quoting Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 179 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548 , 973 P.2d 527 ].) A few years earlier, the court had pointedly limited its

2010Thus a year before Proposition 64 was adopted, the Supreme Court wrote, “A UCL action is equitable in nature; damages cannot be recovered. [Citation.] . . . [Citation.] We have stated that under the UCL, ‘[prevailing plaintiffs are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution.’ ” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1144 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 29 , 63 P.3d 937 ], quoting Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 179 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548 , 973 P.2d 527 ].) A few years earlier, the court had pointedly limited its

2021(See In re Turner (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3d 1145, 1151 [plaintiff who defaulted on mortgage loans lacked standing under UCL because plaintiff’s default caused economic injury]; Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 497, 522-523 [same], overruled on other grounds in Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 939 .) The trial court therefore properly sustained Respondents’ demurrer to the SAC’s UCL claim.

2015The trial court sustained SFR's demurrer to the fourth cause of action on the ground 9 "Sections 17200 through 17210 . . . do not have a specific statutory title; however, California courts have referred to these statutes as the unfair competition law (UCL)." (Jenkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 497, 520 (Jenkins).) 19 that plaintiffs failed to allege facts establishing that they have standing to bring their UCL claim.

2025(Cf. Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 179 ; Madrid v. Perot Systems Corp. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 440, 453 [“in the context of the UCL, ‘restitution’ is limited to the return of property or funds in which the plaintiff has an ownership interest”]; Korea Supply, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 1144–1145 [“We defined an order for ‘restitution’ as one ‘compelling a UCL defendant to return money obtained through an unfair business practice to those persons in interest from whom the property was taken’ ”].)9 Consequently, the trial court did 9 Relying on Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813 , Cou

2021Restitution “‘Restitution under . . . section 17203 is confined to restoration of any interest in “money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition.” (Italics added.) A restitution order against a defendant thus requires both that money or property have been 7 lost by a plaintiff, on the one hand, and that it have been acquired by a defendant, on the other.’” (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 371 (Zhang).) “[T]he California Supreme Court has defined a UCL order for restitution as one ‘“compelling a UCL defendant to return money

2021(Former § 17204; see also Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 227 (Mervyn’s).) Proposition 64, approved by the voters in 2004, amended section 17204 and “changed the standing requirements for a UCL claim to create a two-pronged test: A private person now has standing to assert a UCL claim only if he or she (1) ‘has suffered injury in fact,’ and (2) ‘has lost money or property as a result of such unfair competition.’” (Hall v. Time Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 847, 852 , citing § 17204; see also Mervyn’s, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 227-228 .) Thus, “[t]o satis

2021(Former § 17204; see also Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 227 (Mervyn’s).) Proposition 64, approved by the voters in 2004, amended section 17204 and “changed the standing requirements for a UCL claim to create a two-pronged test: A private person now has standing to assert a UCL claim only if he or she (1) ‘has suffered injury in fact,’ and (2) ‘has lost money or property as a result of such unfair competition.’” (Hall v. Time Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 847, 852 , citing § 17204; see also Mervyn’s, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 227-228 .) Thus, “[t]o satis

2018(Korea Supply, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1143 [referring to section 17204 as conferring standing]; Cruz v. PacificCare Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 303 , 315; Feitelberg v. Credit Suisse First Boston, LLC (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 997, 1011 ["Standing is addressed in section 17204"].) It authorizes actions for relief to be initiated by a public prosecutor, including the Attorney General or, as here, a district attorney. (§ 17204.8) A UCL violation may be redressed by the remedies of restitution and injunctive relief, which can be pursued by either a public prosecutor or a private party wh

2018(Korea Supply, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1143 [referring to section 17204 as conferring standing]; Cruz v. PacificCare Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 303 , 315; Feitelberg v. Credit Suisse First Boston, LLC (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 997, 1011 ["Standing is addressed in section 17204"].) It authorizes actions for relief to be initiated by a public prosecutor, including the Attorney General or, as here, a district attorney. (§ 17204.8) A UCL violation may be redressed by the remedies of restitution and injunctive relief, which can be pursued by either a public prosecutor or a private party wh

2024(See Nationwide Biweekly, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 326 [describing the UCL’s “primary objective” as “preventive, authorizing the exercise of broad equitable authority to protect consumers”]; Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 382 (Zhang) [“[a] UCL claim does not duplicate the contract and tort causes of action involved in bad faith litigation”]; Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 337 [explaining that injunctive relief “ ‘under the UCL . . . protect[s] consumers from unfair business practices’ ”]; In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 320 [“The purpose of [injunctive] relief, in

2021(Id. at p. 327, fn. 9.) When a UCL claim is based on a fraud theory, the type of causation required to demonstrate standing is “‘actual reliance on the allegedly deceptive or misleading statements, in accordance with well- settled principles regarding the element of reliance in ordinary fraud actions’ ([In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298 ,] 306).” ( Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 326– 327.) The plaintiffs did not allege the locksets that they received were overpriced or defective, but alleged that they relied on the false representation that the locksets were made in the United St

2024Jan. 25, 2023, S277693); see Gutierrez, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1261 [adopting an intermediate requirement of “reasonable particularity”].) “A UCL claim based on the fraudulent prong can be based on representations that deceive because they are untrue, but ‘ “ ‘ “also those which may be accurate on some level, but will nonetheless tend to mislead or deceive....’ ” ’ ” (Morgan v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1255 .) “ ‘[U]nless we can say as a matter of law that … members of the public were not likely to be deceived or misled by [the defendant’s alleged conduct]

2024Jan. 25, 2023, S277693); see Gutierrez, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1261 [adopting an intermediate requirement of “reasonable particularity”].) “A UCL claim based on the fraudulent prong can be based on representations that deceive because they are untrue, but ‘ “ ‘ “also those which may be accurate on some level, but will nonetheless tend to mislead or deceive....’ ” ’ ” (Morgan v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1255 .) “ ‘[U]nless we can say as a matter of law that … members of the public were not likely to be deceived or misled by [the defendant’s alleged conduct]

2023And if plaintiff does not win, no UCL claim could succeed. 21 Business and Professions Code section 17204 provides that for an individual to pursue a UCL claim, he or she must prove they “suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” The standing requirement is intended to preserve standing for those who had had “business dealings with a defendant and had lost money or property as a result of the defendant’s unfair business practices.” (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 321 (Kwikset).) Thus, to have standing, plaintiff must

2023And if plaintiff does not win, no UCL claim could succeed. 21 Business and Professions Code section 17204 provides that for an individual to pursue a UCL claim, he or she must prove they “suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” The standing requirement is intended to preserve standing for those who had had “business dealings with a defendant and had lost money or property as a result of the defendant’s unfair business practices.” (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 321 (Kwikset).) Thus, to have standing, plaintiff must

2013Co. v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 257, 283-284 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 220 , 895 P.2d 56 ] (Manufacturers Life); see Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 182-183 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548 , 973 P.2d 527 ] (Cel-Tech); Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 , 960 P.2d 513 ] (Quelimane); Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 565 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 , 950 P.2d 1086 ] (Stop Youth Addiction).) Here, plaintiff alleges causes of action for false advertising and insuranc

2013Co. v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 257, 283-284 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 220 , 895 P.2d 56 ] (Manufacturers Life); see Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 182-183 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548 , 973 P.2d 527 ] (Cel-Tech); Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 , 960 P.2d 513 ] (Quelimane); Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 565 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 , 950 P.2d 1086 ] (Stop Youth Addiction).) Here, plaintiff alleges causes of action for false advertising and insuranc

2022For example, in Rose v. Bank of America, N.A. (2013) 57 Cal.4th 390 , the court held that a UCL claim premised on the bank defendant’s violation of the federal Truth in Saving Act (TISA, 12 U.S.C. § 4301 , et seq.) was permissible.

2022For example, in Rose v. Bank of America, N.A. (2013) 57 Cal.4th 390 , the court held that a UCL claim premised on the bank defendant’s violation of the federal Truth in Saving Act (TISA, 12 U.S.C. § 4301 , et seq.) was permissible.

2015(Daro v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1097-1098 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 ] (Daro).) As reflected above, judgment was entered against Aladdin on its UCL claim because evidence produced in the summary judgment proceeding established that (1) Aladdin lacks standing, and (2) GPS’s business activities are not unlawful or unfair under the theory alleged in the SAC.

2015(Daro v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1097-1098 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 ] (Daro).) As reflected above, judgment was entered against Aladdin on its UCL claim because evidence produced in the summary judgment proceeding established that (1) Aladdin lacks standing, and (2) GPS’s business activities are not unlawful or unfair under the theory alleged in the SAC.

2024Thus, “[w]e will independently review the granting of defendant’s motion in limine, viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff[ ] and determining whether the evidence and inferences were sufficient to support a judgment in defendant’s favor.” (Id., at p. 1282) Moreover, the ruling concerns “[t]he application of the statute of limitations on undisputed facts[, which] is a purely legal question.” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191 (Aryeh).) Accordingly, we review de novo whether the discovery rule applies to delay accrual of the UCL claim.

2024Thus, “[w]e will independently review the granting of defendant’s motion in limine, viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff[ ] and determining whether the evidence and inferences were sufficient to support a judgment in defendant’s favor.” (Id., at p. 1282) Moreover, the ruling concerns “[t]he application of the statute of limitations on undisputed facts[, which] is a purely legal question.” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191 (Aryeh).) Accordingly, we review de novo whether the discovery rule applies to delay accrual of the UCL claim.

2025Code, § 17200.) 26 “[T]o state a claim under the [UCL] one need not plead and prove the elements of a tort.” (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1267 (Bank of the West).) A UCL claim based on fraudulent business practices “‘is ‘distinct from common law fraud. ‘A [common law] fraudulent deception must be actually false, known to be false by the perpetrator and reasonably relied upon by a victim who incurs damages.

2025Code, § 17200.) 26 “[T]o state a claim under the [UCL] one need not plead and prove the elements of a tort.” (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1267 (Bank of the West).) A UCL claim based on fraudulent business practices “‘is ‘distinct from common law fraud. ‘A [common law] fraudulent deception must be actually false, known to be false by the perpetrator and reasonably relied upon by a victim who incurs damages.

2018(In re Steroid Hormone Product Cases, supra, at p. 157 .) Kwikset considered a demurrer challenging a plaintiff’s standing to bring a UCL claim where the plaintiff alleged reliance on a label that stated the product he purchased was “made in the USA,” and our Supreme Court concluded the allegation was sufficient to demonstrate an injury at the pleading stage because the plaintiffs alleged they had purchased the product in reliance on a misrepresentation and had not received the benefit of the bargain.

2018Instead, the UCL cause of action was expressly premised only on the allegation that “Defendants violated the FTSL . . . and therefore engaged in unfair competition.” Because the BBB representation is not an actionable violation of the FTSL, Demeter cannot now rely on that allegation to argue a jury must decide whether he was injured for purposes of the UCL.4 (See Hutton v. Fidelity 4 Even if we were to consider Demeter’s BBB allegation as a separate ground for his UCL claim, we would conclude he has not provided sufficient evidence of injury to survive summary 16 National Title Co. (2013) 213

2021(See Troyk, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1354-1355.) And because Severin’s UCL claim is derivative of its conversion claim, and because summary judgment was erroneously granted as to the conversion claim, the UCL claim will be reinstated.

2021(See Troyk, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1354-1355.) And because Severin’s UCL claim is derivative of its conversion claim, and because summary judgment was erroneously granted as to the conversion claim, the UCL claim will be reinstated.

2020Analysis The elements of plaintiffs’ Cartwright Act claims are “ ‘ “(1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) the wrongful act or acts done pursuant thereto, and (3) the damage resulting from such act or acts. [Citations.]” ’ ” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 47 (Quelimane); Marsh v. Anesthesia Services Medical Group, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 480, 493 .) The remaining two claims (intentional interference and the UCL violation) are based on proof of the Cartwright Act claims.

2020Analysis The elements of plaintiffs’ Cartwright Act claims are “ ‘ “(1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) the wrongful act or acts done pursuant thereto, and (3) the damage resulting from such act or acts. [Citations.]” ’ ” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 47 (Quelimane); Marsh v. Anesthesia Services Medical Group, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 480, 493 .) The remaining two claims (intentional interference and the UCL violation) are based on proof of the Cartwright Act claims.

2021(Clifford v. Quest Software, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 745, 750 [(Clifford), italics added.])” In Clifford, the trial court denied in its entirety a motion to compel arbitration of a UCL claim, “citing without discussion our Supreme Court’s decision in Cruz [v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 303 ].” ( Clifford, supra, at p. 749 .) The Clifford court reversed, explaining that in Cruz, the Supreme Court held that “UCL claims for restitution ‘are fully arbitrable’ [citation], but UCL claims for public injunctive relief cannot be arbitrated.” (Id. at p. 750.) The Clifford court

2021(Clifford v. Quest Software, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 745, 750 [(Clifford), italics added.])” In Clifford, the trial court denied in its entirety a motion to compel arbitration of a UCL claim, “citing without discussion our Supreme Court’s decision in Cruz [v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 303 ].” ( Clifford, supra, at p. 749 .) The Clifford court reversed, explaining that in Cruz, the Supreme Court held that “UCL claims for restitution ‘are fully arbitrable’ [citation], but UCL claims for public injunctive relief cannot be arbitrated.” (Id. at p. 750.) The Clifford court

2021Code, § 17200; see id., §§ 17203, 17204, 17206), broadly interpreted to mean “ ‘ “anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626, 632 .) Where, as here, a claim depends on the allegation that a practice is “ ‘ “unlawful” ’ ” under some other law, defeating the underlying claim extinguishes the UCL claim as well.

2021Code, § 17200; see id., §§ 17203, 17204, 17206), broadly interpreted to mean “ ‘ “anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626, 632 .) Where, as here, a claim depends on the allegation that a practice is “ ‘ “unlawful” ’ ” under some other law, defeating the underlying claim extinguishes the UCL claim as well.

2024(Klein, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1376 .) Accordingly, we reject plaintiff’s challenge to the dismissal of his UCL claim.

2022(Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 182 .) Outside the commercial context of a plaintiff who claims to have suffered injury from a direct competitor, “a business practice is ‘unfair’ if (1) the consumer injury is substantial; (2) the injury is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition; and (3) the injury could not reasonably have been avoided by consumers themselves.” (Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1376 .) As Affiliated contends, unlicensed insurance sales can serve as the basis for a UCL claim.

2018(See Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939 , 949-950, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 .) Indeed, a district attorney can prosecute a UCL claim based even on alleged violations of a statute that provides a different government agency with the sole authority to bring enforcement actions. ( People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626 , 632-633, 159 Cal.Rptr. 811 , 602 P.2d 731 .) And as the majority recognize, "the civil remedies of the [UCL] were enacted because criminal *755 remedies were too often inadequate to protect the public, especially where corporate defendants were concerned." ( People

2018(See Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939 , 949-950, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 .) Indeed, a district attorney can prosecute a UCL claim based even on alleged violations of a statute that provides a different government agency with the sole authority to bring enforcement actions. ( People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626 , 632-633, 159 Cal.Rptr. 811 , 602 P.2d 731 .) And as the majority recognize, "the civil remedies of the [UCL] were enacted because criminal *755 remedies were too often inadequate to protect the public, especially where corporate defendants were concerned." ( People

2021(See, e.g., Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1266-1267 ; State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1105 .) In her reply, she concedes that under the amended statute, a plaintiff alleging a UCL claim “must satisfy its burden of demonstrating standing by alleging facts showing that she suffered an economic injury in fact as a result of the alleged violation,” citing Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 322, 326.

2017(Tobacco II, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 306 ; Steroid Cases, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 154-155; see Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1267 ; Prata v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1144 ; State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1105 , disapproved on other grounds in Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 184-185 .) Neither these cases nor Proposition 64, however, changed what a class proponent must show to certify a class on a UCL claim.

2005“Both consumer class actions and representative UCL actions serve important roles in the enforcement of consumers’ rights.” (Kraus, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 126, fn. omitted.) As stated in an appellate decision published prior to Proposition 64, “a trial court may certify a UCL claim as a class action when the statutory requirements of section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure are met.” (Corbett v. Superior Court, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 663 .) That authority is now explicit in the amended statute, which authorizes the pursuit of “representative claims or relief on behalf of others” provi

2005“Both consumer class actions and representative UCL actions serve important roles in the enforcement of consumers’ rights.” (Kraus, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 126, fn. omitted.) As stated in an appellate decision published prior to Proposition 64, “a trial court may certify a UCL claim as a class action when the statutory requirements of section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure are met.” (Corbett v. Superior Court, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 663 .) That authority is now explicit in the amended statute, which authorizes the pursuit of “representative claims or relief on behalf of others” provi