annual review requirement in California

2013(See, e.g., County of Fresno v. Shelton (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 996, 1006 ; In re Jody R. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1615, 1622 .) In People v. Cheek (2001) 25 Cal.4th 894 (Cheek), the defendant challenged an order following the annual review hearing afforded defendants committed under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst.

2013(See People v. Cobb (2010) 48 Cal.4th 243, 252 ; People v. Bell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1705, 1710 [MDO criteria must be shown to exist as of the date of the recommitment hearing].) For purposes of MDO status, a severe mental disorder does not include a personality disorder, mental retardation or other developmental disabilities, or substance addiction or abuse. (§ 2962, subd. (a)(2).) The disorder is in remission when its overt signs and symptoms are controlled either by psychotropic medication or psychosocial support. (§ 2962, subd. (a)(3).) When the disorder is in remission, it is deemed to b

2013The deputy district attorney interjected that the question was whether the court finds "there is reasonable cause to 9 If the court grants the MDO outpatient status, it must thereafter conduct an annual review hearing, at which time the court will receive a report and recommendation from the MDO's community program director and will decide whether to renew the outpatient approval, place the MDO back in a treatment facility, or discharge the person from the MDO commitment. (§ 2972.1; May, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 362 .) 19 believe that the person can safely and effectively be treated on an

2013The deputy district attorney interjected that the question was whether the court finds "there is reasonable cause to 9 If the court grants the MDO outpatient status, it must thereafter conduct an annual review hearing, at which time the court will receive a report and recommendation from the MDO's community program director and will decide whether to renew the outpatient approval, place the MDO back in a treatment facility, or discharge the person from the MDO commitment. (§ 2972.1; May, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 362 .) 19 believe that the person can safely and effectively be treated on an

2013(See, e.g., County of Fresno v. Shelton (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 996, 1006 ; In re Jody R. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1615, 1622 .) In People v. Cheek (2001) 25 Cal.4th 894 (Cheek), the defendant challenged an order following the annual review hearing afforded defendants committed under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst.

2013(See, e.g., County of Fresno v. Shelton (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 996, 1006 ; In re Jody R. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1615, 1622 .) In People v. Cheek (2001) 25 Cal.4th 894 (Cheek), the defendant challenged an order following the annual review hearing afforded defendants committed under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst.

2007Three of the original criteria “concern past events that once established, are incapable of change.” (People v. Francis, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 879 .) By contrast, the other three criteria are based on evidence as it existed at the time of the BPT’s initial commitment hearing or the annual review hearing continuing that commitment—namely, whether the prisoner is currently suffering from a severe mental disorder, whether that disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment, and whether he presently represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others by

2001The Legislature may have believed that if the defendant conceded his or her condition had not changed sufficiently to warrant conditional release, then almost certainly it had not changed enough to warrant unconditional release. 4 The Washington statute was amended after Petersen to provide that the hearing “may be conducted solely on the basis of affidavits and declarations.” (2001 Wash. Laws, ch. 286, §9.) 5 Section 6608 permits a judge to dismiss a petition for conditional release as frivolous “either upon review of the petition or following a hearing.” In the Court of Appeal, the Attorney

1989A holding by this court that the statute violated is a `mandatory' one, thereby voiding the subsequent recommitment order and releasing appellant into the community, not only exposes the public to a dangerous person but prevents appellant from receiving treatment for his illness." ( Ibid. ) [11] We similarly conclude here that to hold the annual review requirement of section 1606 directory will best promote the statutory purpose of public protection [12] and will allow appellant to be provided with any continuing *1410 treatment needed. [13] We do not share the dissent's cynical view that our

1989“A statute granting a new right is mandatory; and a right which exists only by virtue of statutory grant comes into being only after strict compliance with the statute and all of its conditions.” (2A Sutherland, supra, § 57.18, p. 681., fn. omitted.) My colleagues’ different view of section 1606 results in large part from their unjustified reliance on the opinion in People v. Mord (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1090 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 403 ], which is not only badly reasoned but involved a different statute.

1989People v. Hernandez (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 560 [ 196 Cal. Rptr. 31 ], the sole authority the majority relies upon in this regard, is a due process case that is in this connection wholly inapposite.

1989People v. Hernandez (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 560 [ 196 Cal. Rptr. 31 ], the sole authority the majority relies upon in this regard, is a due process case that is in this connection wholly inapposite.

1989(See Cake v. Los Angeles 1913] 164 Cal. 705 , 709-710 ...; City of Oakland v. Burns [1956] 46 Cal.2d 401 , 406 ...; Steele v. Bartlett [1941] 18 Cal.2d 573, 574 ....) [¶] Accordingly, where a statute absolutely fixes the time within which an act is to be done it is peremptory and the act cannot be done at any other time unless during the existence of the prescribed time the time has been extended by an order made for that purpose under authority of law. [Citations.]" ( Ursino v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal. App.3d 611, 619 [114 *1419 Cal. Rptr. 404].) The language of section 1606 thus clearly

1989(See Cake v. Los Angeles 1913] 164 Cal. 705 , 709-710 . . .; City of Oakland v. Burns [1956] 46 Cal.2d 401 , 406 . . . ; Steele v. Bartlett [1941] 18 Cal.2d 573 , 574 . . . .) [1J] Accordingly, where a statute absolutely fixes the time within which an act is to be done it is peremptory and the act cannot be done at any other time unless during the existence of the prescribed time the time has been extended by an order made for that purpose under authority of law. [Citations.]” (Ursino v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 611, 619 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 404 ].) The language of section 1606 thus clea

1989The last of the three factors that must be considered in determining whether the annual review requirement is mandatory or directory is "the consequences which would follow the doing or failure to do the particular act at the required time." ( Pulcifer v. County of Alameda, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 262 .) The consequence that would result from holding the one-year termination and annual review requirements of section 1606 merely directory is precisely the one the courts most assiduously avoid: the rendering of the statute unenforceable. "`Whether a statutory requirement is mandatory or directory

1989The last of the three factors that must be considered in determining whether the annual review requirement is mandatory or directory is “the consequences which would follow the doing or failure to do the particular act at the required time.” (Pulcifer v. County of Alameda, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 262 .) The consequence that would result from holding the one-year termination and annual review requirements of section 1606 merely directory is precisely the one the courts most assiduously avoid: the rendering of the statute unenforceable. “ ‘Whether a statutory requirement is mandatory or directory

1989If no substantial rights depend on it and no injury can result from ignoring it, and the purpose of the legislature can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed and substantially the same results obtained, then the statute will generally be regarded as directory; but, if not, it will be mandatory.’ ” (2A Sutherland, supra, § 57.07, p. 656, quoting Miller v. Lakewood Housing Co. (1932) 125 Ohio St. 152 [ 180 N.E. 700 , 81 A.L.R. 1239 ].) The consequence of characterizing the annual review requirement directory is to deprive persons who have been adjudicated “not [to] be a danger t

1989If no substantial rights depend on it and no injury can result from ignoring it, and the purpose of the legislature can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed and substantially the same results obtained, then the statute will generally be regarded as directory; but, if not, it will be mandatory.’ ” (2A Sutherland, supra, § 57.07, p. 656, quoting Miller v. Lakewood Housing Co. (1932) 125 Ohio St. 152 [ 180 N.E. 700 , 81 A.L.R. 1239 ].) The consequence of characterizing the annual review requirement directory is to deprive persons who have been adjudicated “not [to] be a danger t

1989(See Cake v. Los Angeles 1913] 164 Cal. 705 , 709-710 ...; City of Oakland v. Burns [1956] 46 Cal.2d 401 , 406 ...; Steele v. Bartlett [1941] 18 Cal.2d 573, 574 ....) [¶] Accordingly, where a statute absolutely fixes the time within which an act is to be done it is peremptory and the act cannot be done at any other time unless during the existence of the prescribed time the time has been extended by an order made for that purpose under authority of law. [Citations.]" ( Ursino v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal. App.3d 611, 619 [114 *1419 Cal. Rptr. 404].) The language of section 1606 thus clearly

1989(See Cake v. Los Angeles 1913] 164 Cal. 705 , 709-710 . . .; City of Oakland v. Burns [1956] 46 Cal.2d 401 , 406 . . . ; Steele v. Bartlett [1941] 18 Cal.2d 573 , 574 . . . .) [1J] Accordingly, where a statute absolutely fixes the time within which an act is to be done it is peremptory and the act cannot be done at any other time unless during the existence of the prescribed time the time has been extended by an order made for that purpose under authority of law. [Citations.]” (Ursino v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 611, 619 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 404 ].) The language of section 1606 thus clea

1989(See Cake v. Los Angeles 1913] 164 Cal. 705 , 709-710 ...; City of Oakland v. Burns [1956] 46 Cal.2d 401 , 406 ...; Steele v. Bartlett [1941] 18 Cal.2d 573, 574 ....) [¶] Accordingly, where a statute absolutely fixes the time within which an act is to be done it is peremptory and the act cannot be done at any other time unless during the existence of the prescribed time the time has been extended by an order made for that purpose under authority of law. [Citations.]" ( Ursino v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal. App.3d 611, 619 [114 *1419 Cal. Rptr. 404].) The language of section 1606 thus clearly

1989(See Cake v. Los Angeles 1913] 164 Cal. 705 , 709-710 . . .; City of Oakland v. Burns [1956] 46 Cal.2d 401 , 406 . . . ; Steele v. Bartlett [1941] 18 Cal.2d 573 , 574 . . . .) [1J] Accordingly, where a statute absolutely fixes the time within which an act is to be done it is peremptory and the act cannot be done at any other time unless during the existence of the prescribed time the time has been extended by an order made for that purpose under authority of law. [Citations.]” (Ursino v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 611, 619 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 404 ].) The language of section 1606 thus clea

1981The notice requirement under section 386 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is to be read in connection with section 387 which applies to removing a dependent child from the parent’s custody. *361 Section 387 of the Welfare and Institutions Code reads as follows: “An order changing or modifying a previous order by removing a minor from the physical custody of a parent, guardian, relative or friend and directing placement in a foster home, or commitment to a private institution or commitment to a county institution, shall be made only after noticed hearing upon a supplemental petition.” In th

1981The notice requirement under section 386 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is to be read in connection with section 387 which applies to removing a dependent child from the parent’s custody. *361 Section 387 of the Welfare and Institutions Code reads as follows: “An order changing or modifying a previous order by removing a minor from the physical custody of a parent, guardian, relative or friend and directing placement in a foster home, or commitment to a private institution or commitment to a county institution, shall be made only after noticed hearing upon a supplemental petition.” In th

1979The parent at an annual review hearing has the burden of proof to show cause why the jurisdiction of the juvenile court should be terminated. ( In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679 , 691 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 , 523 P.2d 244 ]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1378(d).) Appellant does not contend that a requisite showing was made that the child's interest justified the termination of jurisdiction.

1979The parent at an annual review hearing has the burden of proof to show cause why the jurisdiction of the juvenile court should be terminated. ( In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679 , 691 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 , 523 P.2d 244 ]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1378(d).) Appellant does not contend that a requisite showing was made that the child's interest justified the termination of jurisdiction.