arbitration provision requirement in California

2026(Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 695, 704 [“It is well settled that adhesion contracts in the employment context, that is, those contracts offered to employees on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, typically contain some aspects of procedural unconscionability”]; Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 825 [notwithstanding plaintiff’s stature in the music industry, arbitration agreement was adhesive and unenforceable “on grounds of unconscionability”]; see also Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1109 [employee c

2026(See, e.g., Farrar v. Direct Commerce, Inc. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1267 [arbitration agreement was adhesive, even as to vice president of business development, because although plaintiff had opportunity to negotiate some of the terms of her employment, “she apparently had no opportunity to negotiate over the arbitration provision or the requirement that she sign a confidentiality agreement”]; Dotson v. Amgen, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 975, 981 [adhesive arbitration agreement was unconscionable (albeit only to a “low degree”) with regard to employee who was a licensed attorney and highly

2026(See, e.g., Farrar v. Direct Commerce, Inc. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1267 [arbitration agreement was adhesive, even as to vice president of business development, because although plaintiff had opportunity to negotiate some of the terms of her employment, “she apparently had no opportunity to negotiate over the arbitration provision or the requirement that she sign a confidentiality agreement”]; Dotson v. Amgen, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 975, 981 [adhesive arbitration agreement was unconscionable (albeit only to a “low degree”) with regard to employee who was a licensed attorney and highly

2026(Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 695, 704 [“It is well settled that adhesion contracts in the employment context, that is, those contracts offered to employees on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, typically contain some aspects of procedural unconscionability”]; Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 825 [notwithstanding plaintiff’s stature in the music industry, arbitration agreement was adhesive and unenforceable “on grounds of unconscionability”]; see also Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1109 [employee c

2026(Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 695, 704 [“It is well settled that adhesion contracts in the employment context, that is, those contracts offered to employees on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, typically contain some aspects of procedural unconscionability”]; Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 825 [notwithstanding plaintiff’s stature in the music industry, arbitration agreement was adhesive and unenforceable “on grounds of unconscionability”]; see also Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1109 [employee c

2026(See, e.g., Farrar v. Direct Commerce, Inc. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1267 [arbitration agreement was adhesive, even as to vice president of business development, because although plaintiff had opportunity to negotiate some of the terms of her employment, “she apparently had no opportunity to negotiate over the arbitration provision or the requirement that she sign a confidentiality agreement”]; Dotson v. Amgen, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 975, 981 [adhesive arbitration agreement was unconscionable (albeit only to a “low degree”) with regard to employee who was a licensed attorney and highly

2025Finally, Appellants cite several cases that purportedly “shed[] light on instances where courts have correctly held that an agreement to arbitrate does not apply.” (See Gravillis v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 761, 780, 782 [addressing whether claims for emotional distress and distress-induced diabetes constitute “bodily injury” for 13 purposes of an exclusion from an arbitration provision in a standard form real estate purchase agreement]; Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062 , 1063 [addressing the authenticity of an electronic signa

2024(See Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534, 541 [“‘Ordinarily, we review a denial of a petition to compel arbitration for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] However, where the trial court’s denial of a petition to arbitrate presents a pure question of law, we review the order de novo.’”].) We conclude FMC and Ford are neither intended third party beneficiaries of the sale contract, nor entitled to enforce the arbitration provision under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

2017(Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1244 , quoting Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 469 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 , 165 P.3d 556 ] (Gentry), abrogated in part by statute as stated in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 366 [ 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 327 P.3d 129 ].) *1267 Farrar has averred, however, and Direct Commerce has not disputed, that while she was able to negotiate the economic terms of her employment, she believed she could not negotiate other terms, including the arbitration provision and the requirement that she sign a separate confidentiali

2017(Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1244 , quoting Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 469 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 , 165 P.3d 556 ] (Gentry), abrogated in part by statute as stated in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 366 [ 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 327 P.3d 129 ].) *1267 Farrar has averred, however, and Direct Commerce has not disputed, that while she was able to negotiate the economic terms of her employment, she believed she could not negotiate other terms, including the arbitration provision and the requirement that she sign a separate confidentiali

2017In Annendariz, the Supreme Court explained “ ‘[t]he term [contract of adhesion] signifies a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.’ ” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 113 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 , 6 P.3d 669 ] (Armendariz), abrogated in part on another ground in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333 , 339-340 [ 179 L.Ed.2d 742 , 131 S.Ct. 1740 ], quoting Neal v. State Farm Ins.

2017In Annendariz, the Supreme Court explained “ ‘[t]he term [contract of adhesion] signifies a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.’ ” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 113 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 , 6 P.3d 669 ] (Armendariz), abrogated in part on another ground in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333 , 339-340 [ 179 L.Ed.2d 742 , 131 S.Ct. 1740 ], quoting Neal v. State Farm Ins.

2017(Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1244 , quoting Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 469 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 , 165 P.3d 556 ] (Gentry), abrogated in part by statute as stated in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 366 [ 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 327 P.3d 129 ].) *1267 Farrar has averred, however, and Direct Commerce has not disputed, that while she was able to negotiate the economic terms of her employment, she believed she could not negotiate other terms, including the arbitration provision and the requirement that she sign a separate confidentiali

2017(Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1244 , quoting Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 469 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 , 165 P.3d 556 ] (Gentry), abrogated in part by statute as stated in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 366 [ 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 327 P.3d 129 ].) *1267 Farrar has averred, however, and Direct Commerce has not disputed, that while she was able to negotiate the economic terms of her employment, she believed she could not negotiate other terms, including the arbitration provision and the requirement that she sign a separate confidentiali

1983(Local 659, I.A.T.S.E. v. Color Corp. Amer. (1956) 47 Cal.2d 189, 194-195 [ 302 P.2d 294 ].) Thus, “a failure by a party to proceed to arbitrate in the manner and at the time provided in the arbitration provision is a waiver of the right to insist on arbitration as a defense to an action on the contract. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 195.) Whether there has been a waiver of the right to arbitrate is a question of fact, and a finding of waiver must be upheld on appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence.

1983(Local 659, I.A.T.S.E. v. Color Corp. Amer. (1956) 47 Cal.2d 189, 194-195 [ 302 P.2d 294 ].) Thus, “a failure by a party to proceed to arbitrate in the manner and at the time provided in the arbitration provision is a waiver of the right to insist on arbitration as a defense to an action on the contract. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 195.) Whether there has been a waiver of the right to arbitrate is a question of fact, and a finding of waiver must be upheld on appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence.

1983(Sawday v. Vista Irrigation Dist. (1966) 64 Cal.2d 833, 836 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 415 P.2d 816 ]; Weisman v. Johnson (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 289, 293 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 792 ].) Although there is no single test as to what conduct will constitute a waiver, the courts “have found a waiver of the right to demand arbitration in a variety of contexts ranging from situations in which the party seeking to compel arbitration has previously taken steps inconsistent with an intent to invoke arbitration to instances in which the petitioning party has unreasonably delayed an undertaking of the procedure.” (Weisman

1983(Sawday v. Vista Irrigation Dist. (1966) 64 Cal.2d 833, 836 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 415 P.2d 816 ]; Weisman v. Johnson (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 289, 293 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 792 ].) Although there is no single test as to what conduct will constitute a waiver, the courts “have found a waiver of the right to demand arbitration in a variety of contexts ranging from situations in which the party seeking to compel arbitration has previously taken steps inconsistent with an intent to invoke arbitration to instances in which the petitioning party has unreasonably delayed an undertaking of the procedure.” (Weisman

1983(Sawday v. Vista Irrigation Dist. (1966) 64 Cal.2d 833, 836 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 415 P.2d 816 ]; Weisman v. Johnson (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 289, 293 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 792 ].) Although there is no single test as to what conduct will constitute a waiver, the courts “have found a waiver of the right to demand arbitration in a variety of contexts ranging from situations in which the party seeking to compel arbitration has previously taken steps inconsistent with an intent to invoke arbitration to instances in which the petitioning party has unreasonably delayed an undertaking of the procedure.” (Weisman

1983(Sawday v. Vista Irrigation Dist. (1966) 64 Cal.2d 833, 836 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 415 P.2d 816 ]; Weisman v. Johnson (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 289, 293 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 792 ].) Although there is no single test as to what conduct will constitute a waiver, the courts “have found a waiver of the right to demand arbitration in a variety of contexts ranging from situations in which the party seeking to compel arbitration has previously taken steps inconsistent with an intent to invoke arbitration to instances in which the petitioning party has unreasonably delayed an undertaking of the procedure.” (Weisman

1967In Local 659, supra, page 195, the court stated: “that a failure by a party to proceed to arbitrate in the manner and at the time provided in the arbitration provision is a waiver of the right to insist on arbitration as a defense to an action on the contract. [Citations.] ” This statement is quoted with approval in Grunwald-Marx, Inc. v. Los Angeles Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 192 Cal.App.2d 268, 278 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 446 ].

1967In Local 659, supra, page 195, the court stated: “that a failure by a party to proceed to arbitrate in the manner and at the time provided in the arbitration provision is a waiver of the right to insist on arbitration as a defense to an action on the contract. [Citations.] ” This statement is quoted with approval in Grunwald-Marx, Inc. v. Los Angeles Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 192 Cal.App.2d 268, 278 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 446 ].